A. S. SRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) BY this petition under Article 216 of the Constitution of India, Raksha Pal Singh petitioner questions the validity of his continued detention by the order dated 19/2/1984 of the District Magistrate, Rampur, passed under Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act of 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). ( 2 ) THE petitioner is a resident of village Arsal Parsal, PS Swar, district Rampur. In a report lodged at PS Swar on 4/2/19184 (registered as Crime case No. 8 of 1984), the petitioner and others are accused of baying committed murders of two brothers Suba Singh and Balvinder Singh with firearms. On 14/2/1984, the petitioner surrendered in the court in that case. On 19. 2. 1984 the District Magistrate passed the impugned order which was served on the petitioner in jail and a copy of which was also forwarded by the District Magistrate to the State Government. On 28. 2 1984, the State Govt. accorded its approval to the same. On the same day i. e. on 28. 2. 1984, the State Government, submitted its report also to the Central Government. On 1. 3. 19m however, the petitioner demanded the material from the District Magistrate on the basis of which the impugned order was passed. On 1. 3. 1984 the petitioner was informed that no further materials other than those already furnished to him were to be furnished by the District Magistrate. ( 3 ) ON 4. 3. 1984 the petitioner made a representation against his detention which was forwarded to the State Government by the District Magistrate on 5. 3. 1984 along with his comments. On 7. 3. 1984 this representation of the Petitioner and the comments of the District Magistrate were placed before the advisory Board. The Advisory Board considered the representation of the petitioner after giving a hearing to him on 3. 4. 1984. In the meantime i. e. , On 20. 3. 1984 the Chief Minister had rejected the representation of the petitioner. The State Government again examined the matter in the light of the opinion of the Advisory board and confirmed the order of the detention of the petitioner by an order dated. 12. 4. 1984. ( 4 ) ON 14. 6. 1984 the petitioners counsel had sent another representation to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, which was received there on 29. 12. 4. 1984. ( 4 ) ON 14. 6. 1984 the petitioners counsel had sent another representation to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, which was received there on 29. 6. 1984. On this representation the Central Government called for the opinion from the State Government which was received on 9. 8. 1984. On 13. 8. 1984 the Central Government also rejected the representation of the petitioner and communicated its result to the petitioner through wireless message dated 16. 8. 1984. ( 5 ) THE grounds on which the impugned order was passed by the District Magistrate, as specified in the order are as under ( 6 ) THE petitioner has attacked his detention alleging that the grounds on which the impugned order is passed are not germane to the maintenance of public order and based on irrelevent considerations. The grounds are state, incorrect and incomplete and on their basis the district Magistrate could not form an opinion as to whether the detention of the petitioner was necessary to maintain public order. In other words the order has been passed by her arbitrarily, without any justification and in colourable exercise of per powers under the Act. The order, also, contravenes. Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. ( 7 ) AFTER considering the arguments of both the sides and after examining the various affidavit filed in this case, we find that the basis of the impugned order is merely ground No. 7 which ground was considered by the District Magistrate not in isolation but in the background of the other grounds. It is clear from the following averments contained in para 6 of the affidavit of the District Magistrate which reads as under :- That the averments made in paragraph 7 of the petition are not admitted and it is stated that the real ground to detain the petitioner is ground No. 7 which discloses the activities of the petitioner on 4. 2. 1984. Ground No. 1 to 6 and 8 to 18 clearly show the background anti the tendency of the petitioner in the past and it was in this background that the petitioners activity dated 4. 2. 1984 was found to be of a nature which was clearly calculated to effect the maintenance of public order. All the averments to contrary are incorrect and as such denied. 2. 1984 was found to be of a nature which was clearly calculated to effect the maintenance of public order. All the averments to contrary are incorrect and as such denied. Evidently, the District Magistrate bas admitted that the main ground for the detention of the petitioner is ground No. 7 and the other grounds were considered for forming an opinion about the background and the tendency of the petitioner in the past. That is, the other grounds furnished the past antecedents of the petitioner which was taken into account for considering the adequacy of ground No. 7 for passing the impugned order and for deciding whether the petitioners reported activity dated 4. 2. 1984 was of such a nature that it posed a problem of law and order or it Was calculated to affect the maintenance of public order. It would, therefore be necessary first to refer to the incident dated 4. 2. 1984 of the Ground No. 7. ( 8 ) IT appears that two brothers viz. Suba Singh and Balvinder Singh died on 4. 2. 1984 on receipt of gunshot injuries and a report of this incident was lodged at P. S. Swar on that date which was registered as Crime Case No. 8 of 1984. In this report the petitioner was named as one of the assailants of the deceased. The motive for this incident was alleged to be the Pairvi which the two deceased were doing in another case No. 3 of 1981 initiated on the report of Mehendra Singh and in which. also the petitioner is an accused. Obviously this incident, if considered in isolation, indicated that the petitioner had indulged in. activities which were not prejudicial to maintenance of public order but which raised problems of law and order. [t only indicates that the petitioner, an accused in a pending murder case (which is the subject matter of Ground N 5) is alleged to have committed another murder on 4. 2. 1984 of two brothers who have been doing pairvi in the aforesaid murder case pending against him. These two inter, related cases of murder, at the best, can be said to be pending against the petitioner on the date of detention. The detention on the basis of these two incident cannot be said to be directed to prevent subversion of public order. The District Magistrate has also not said so. These two inter, related cases of murder, at the best, can be said to be pending against the petitioner on the date of detention. The detention on the basis of these two incident cannot be said to be directed to prevent subversion of public order. The District Magistrate has also not said so. The District Magistrate was satisfied that the petitioner was likely to indulge in activities prejudicial to maintenance of public order only when these incidents were considered with the other grounds in the background i. e. when these grounds were considered along with the past antecedents and the tendency of the petitioner as disclosed by the other grounds. Therefore, detention of the petitioner cannot be justified on ground No. 7 alone or even when it is considered with ground No. 5. It is, therefore, necessary to advert to the other grounds, even though they, as conceded by the District Magistrate, were not by themselves the basis of the petitioners detention but furnished instances indicating the past antecedents of the petitioner. ( 9 ) OUT of the remaining Ground Nos. 1 to 6 and 8 to 18, Ground No. 5 has already been discussed with Ground No. 7. The instances mentioned in Ground Nos. 5 and 7 cannot be held to be prejudicial to maintenance of public order because they have no impact upon the local tranquility, as they do not disturb tempo of the life of the entire community living in that locality. They only affect specific individuals and, therefore, raise problem of law and order only. Ground Nos. 1 to 4 and 6 to 18 can be divided into two categories; (i) those already decided on the date of detention, and (ii) those pending on that date. Ground nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 fall in the first category. The remaining Ground Nos. 6 to 18 fall in the second category. Ground Nos. 1 and 2 relate to two incidents which had allegedly taken place on two dates in the year 1973 i. e, on 11. 5,1973 and 16 12. 1973. In respect of these incidents, the petitioner was tried under Sections 147, 148, 452, 342,323 IPC and under sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 201 and 364 IPC respectively. He was acquitted in both the cases. ( 10 ) GROUNDS Nos. 5,1973 and 16 12. 1973. In respect of these incidents, the petitioner was tried under Sections 147, 148, 452, 342,323 IPC and under sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 201 and 364 IPC respectively. He was acquitted in both the cases. ( 10 ) GROUNDS Nos. 3 and 4 also refer to two incidents which had taken place in the year i. e. 24. 1. 1980 and 21. 11. 1980. The petitioner was named as and of the accused in the report lodged with respect to the incident dated 24. 1. 1980. In this case the police submitted a final report (according to the petitioner, he has been acquitted after trial ). The petitioner was, however, convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment in the case relating to the other incident dated 21. 11. 1980. It is now pending for consideration in appeal and in which the petitioner has been released on bail. ( 11 ) THUS ground nos. 1. 2 and 3 relate to instances of three criminal prosecutions against the petitioner in which he was neither acquitted or in which police had submitted a final report. Such instances in which the petitioner was either acquitted by court or final report was submitted by the police cannot legitimately be taken into consideration even for detaining him in the garb of antecedents merely because the petitioner was named as an accused in the reports lodged in the police station. If the District Magistrate wanted to rely upon these incidents, then she could have done so only after scanning the judgments passed by the court and the final report if any submitted by the Police in these cases. The District Magistrate could not form an opinion about these incidents only on a perusal of the police report which contained only the opinion of the police. The District Magistrate has to act upon her own opinion in the matter before passing the order of detention. It is only after scanning the judgments and the final report in the cases referred to above that the District Magistrate could form an opinion whether she agreed with those decisions in the matter or she agreed with the opinion of the police. Since the judgments and the final report were never placed before the District Magistrate her satisfaction about the genuineness of Ground nos. 1, 2 or 3 for detaining the petitioner becomes open to question. Since the judgments and the final report were never placed before the District Magistrate her satisfaction about the genuineness of Ground nos. 1, 2 or 3 for detaining the petitioner becomes open to question. As observed in Nanha Singh v. superintendent District Jail, Kanpur and ors. Since these materials were not placed before the District Magistrate, there is no escape from the conclusion that the District Magistrate had ignored relevant materials before passing the impugned order, for the same reasons the mere reference of the instances mentioned in these grounds could not, in absence of the judgments and the final report furnish a materials from which even an opinion about antecedents of tendencies of the petitioner could legitimately be made by the District Magistrate. ( 12 ) WE will now come to Ground No. 4 which refers to the instance dated 21. 11. 1980 in which one Hardip Singh was murdered and in respect of which the petitioner along with others was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment by an order dated 24. 5. 19 2 by the III Addi. Sessions Judge, Rampur. This conviction no doubt appear to be a relevant factor but the fact does not by itself lead to an inference that the petitioner is likely in future to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of Public order. The District Magistrate has also not considered it so. According to her this ground has been taken in account only as a past antecedent of the petitioner while considering Ground No. 7. So the question for consideration is whether the conviction of the petitioner in this case furnishes an instance which indicates his tendencies towards the public in general or the entire community living in the locality. For judging this question, the judgment of the court against the petitioner was a material which the District Magistrate had no occasion to peruse and scan because it was never placed before her. Without even perusing the judgment the District Magistrate cannot be said to have given any consideration to the incident in question. It is possible that after giving her own consideration to the judgment the District Magistrate could be of the opinion that she should act contrary to the reasons contained in the judgment. It was all the more necessary for the District Magistrate to examine this aspect because the judgment is pending decision in appeal. It is possible that after giving her own consideration to the judgment the District Magistrate could be of the opinion that she should act contrary to the reasons contained in the judgment. It was all the more necessary for the District Magistrate to examine this aspect because the judgment is pending decision in appeal. Further, if this ground is considered along with Ground No. 5 and 7 it Will appear that this ground refer to another incident of murder which is also connected with the incidents of murders of Ground Nos. 5 and 7, that is these three grounds refer to three murders which are corelated and are outcome of enemities with individuals. They do not disclose any prejudice of the petitioner towards the community as a whole. Therefore, the Ground No. 4 could not furnish any antecedent of the petitioner indicating his prejucdice to the maintenance of public order. ( 13 ) GROUND No. 6 refers to a report dated 4. 2. 81 made against the petitioner by police under Section 3 of the U. P. Goondas Act. It is mentioned in the ground that this report was registered as crime case No. 9 of 1981. This bold statement of the police in this ground leads to no inference particularly when this ground suppresses the ultimate outcome in the case and consequently this also could not furnish any instance of past antecedents of the petitioner to indicate that he was likely to indulge in future in activities subversive of public order. ( 14 ) THE remaining Ground Nos. 8 to 18 refer to various reports lodged with the police against the petitioner on various dates. All these reports (except the report mentioned in Ground No. 16) were demonstrated by the following table, non-cognizable reports filed by individuals connected with crime case No. 3 of 1981 which is subject matter of Ground No. 5, already discussed above. The ground No 16 also refers to a non cognizable report dated 22. 12. 1983 lodged with the Police to the effect that the petitioner threatened Sarail Singh son of Karnail Singh. i. e. brother of the deceased of crime case No. 170 of 1980 (which is the subject matter of Ground No. 4, already discussed above ). Ground No. Report with date Allegations 8. Report of non- cognizable 352/504/506 IPC. offence u/ss. 12. 1983 lodged with the Police to the effect that the petitioner threatened Sarail Singh son of Karnail Singh. i. e. brother of the deceased of crime case No. 170 of 1980 (which is the subject matter of Ground No. 4, already discussed above ). Ground No. Report with date Allegations 8. Report of non- cognizable 352/504/506 IPC. offence u/ss. The petitioner threatened Harbhajan Singh the case relating to the incident dated 26. 1 9. Report of non- cognizable 352/504/506 IPC. offence u/ss. On 28. 4. 1931 the petitioner threatened Srr (deceased of crime case no. 3/8 1) for not 5 ). 10. Report of non- cognizable 504/506 I PC. offence u/ss. On 12. 5. 1981 the petitioner threatened Ha 3781 (subject matter of Ground no. 5) for 11. Report of non- cognizable 504/506 I PC. offence u/ss. On 10. 7. 1981 the petitioner again threater crime case no. 3/81 (subject matter of gro 12. Report of non- cognizable 504/506 IPC. offence u/ss. On 6. 8. 1981 the petitioner threatened Smt for not doing pairvi in the aforesaid crime c 5 ). 13. Report of non- cognizable 504/506 I PC. offence u/ss. The petitioner threatened Harbhajan Singh case of Dr. Dalbir Singh (subject matter of 14. Report of non- offence u/ss. On 18. 6. 1982 the petitioner again threater cognizable 504/506 aforesaid crime case no. 3/81 (Subject mat I PC. ( 15 ) IT will be noted from column No. 3 of the above table that these grounds relate merely to maintenance of order and not to the maintenance of public order because they do not affect the locality or every body who lives in the locality. The various reports mentioned in these grounds relate to non cognizable offences and no material was placed before the District Magistrate to indicate that the reports contain allegations which are true and not mere intention of interested persons. We are unable to say that the District Magistrate could on the basis of these reports come to the conclusion that they indicate a tendency of the petitioner regarding his future conduct vis-avis. The public living in the locality. In other words they do not indicate that the petitioners tendency is to act in a manner prejudicial to the public order in the future. The public living in the locality. In other words they do not indicate that the petitioners tendency is to act in a manner prejudicial to the public order in the future. ( 16 ) ACCORDING to Ground No. 7 again, we find that it has no relevance to public order even if it is considered along with the other grounds mentioned in the order of his detention. The order of detention, therefore, deserves to be quashed on this ground alone. ( 17 ) IT may further be pointed out that relevant materials concerning Ground No. 7 were suppressed from the District Magistrate when the impugned order was passed. This around relates to an incident of murder that took place at about 11 A. M. on 4. 2. 1984 in village Arsal Parsal in P. S. Swar. According to the petitioner this was the date fixed in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow, in case mentioned in Ground No. 5 and he was in attendance in that Court on that date. The court committed him along with others to the Court of Session. His contention finds support from the order sheet of the case. In the case it is difficult to believe that the petitioner would be present at Arsal Parsel for committing this offence. In other words, if the petitioner was present in the court of the Addi. Chief Judicial Magistrate. Lucknow, on 4. 21984, the Ground no. 7 would be nonexistent. The petitioner surrendered in this case on 14. 2. 1984 and moved an application for release on bail. In that application he had taken the above plea of alibi. A copy of this application must have been furnished to the State by the petitioner before moving, this application. Therefore, the State shall be deemed to be aware of the above plea of the petitioner that he was, on 4. 2. 1984, attending his case before the Addi. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow. The plea taken by the petitioner was, therefore, a relevant fact which ought to have been placed before the detaining authority on 19. 2. 1984 along with the materials on which the State considered that plea to be of no consequence. We are, there fore, of the opinion that the impugned order was 15. Report of non- cognizable 504/506 I PC. offence u/ss. On 10. 12. 2. 1984 along with the materials on which the State considered that plea to be of no consequence. We are, there fore, of the opinion that the impugned order was 15. Report of non- cognizable 504/506 I PC. offence u/ss. On 10. 12. 1982 the petitioner threatened P not doing work at his house subject mattes 16. Report of non- cognizable 352/504/506 IPC. offence u/ss. On 22. 12. 1983 the petitioner threatened S Singh son of Karnail Singh (brother of Har Subject matter of Ground No. 4 ). 17. Report of non- cognizable 352/504/506 IPC. offence u/ss. On 4. 9. 1983 the petitioner again threatene Singh (subject matter of Ground No. 5 ). 18. Report of non- cognizable 352/504/506 IPC. offence u/ss. On 8. 12. 1983 the petitioner again threaten Singh (subject matter of Ground No. 5 ). passed by the District Magistrate without having all relevant materials before her. It certainly affords au opportunity to the petitioner to agree that his detention is not bonafide but the order of his detention has rather been procured by the police on insufficient grounds. It is accordingly vitiated. ( 18 ) IT has been urged on behalf of the that satisfaction of the District Magistrate Whether Ground No. 7 considered along with the other grounds possess the question of public order or not was the subjective satisfaction and is not open to judicial scrutiny. The Supreme Court has considered this ques. tion in Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar and others and has held that: It cannot be said that those who are responsible for the national security or for the maintenance of public order must be the sole judges of what the national security or public order requires. It is too perilous a proposition. Our constitution does not give a carte blanche to any organ of the State to be the sole arbiter in such matters. Preventive detention is not beyond judicial scrutiny. While adequacy or sufficiency may not be a ground of challenge, relevancy and proximity are certainly grounds of challenge. Nor is it for the court to put itself in the position of the detaining authority and to satisfy itself that the untested facts reveal a path of crime. Preventive detention is not beyond judicial scrutiny. While adequacy or sufficiency may not be a ground of challenge, relevancy and proximity are certainly grounds of challenge. Nor is it for the court to put itself in the position of the detaining authority and to satisfy itself that the untested facts reveal a path of crime. ( 19 ) IN the present case also satisfaction of the District Magistrate, which as already seen above, has no relevance to the public order cannot be said to be beyond the judicial scrutiny. ( 20 ) IT has also been urged by the counsel for the petitioner that the detention of the petitioner is in violation of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India in as much as the presentation of the petitioner dated 14/6/1984 sent by his counsel Sri D. S. Mishra was received by the Central Government on 29/6/1984 but it was disposed of on 13/8/1984 i. e. about 65 days after the receipt of this representation. It may be seen from the facts given below that so far as the Central Govt. is concerned, it was not guilty of laches. On receipt of the representation of the petitioner on 29/6/1984 the Central Govt. called for the report from the State Govt. which it received on 9/8/1984. Thereafter it was decided on 13/8/1984. So the time was taken by the State Govt. in processing the representation and ultimately sending their comments to the Central Govt. Thus the Central Govt. has an explanation for the time taken by them for the disposal of the petitioners representation made to it. The detention is therefore, not vitiated on this ground unless it is further found that the time taken by the State Govt. in sending their comments was inordinate. The State Govt. has not placed facts from which an inference can be from the time taken by them in furnishing comments was justified. The Central Govt. too cannot be absolved from their responsibilities of taking steps to get the comments from the State Govt. within a reasonable time when the same was being delayed. Taking these facts into consideration we find that the impugned order is vitiated on this ground also. ( 21 ) HOWEVER, for reasons already stated above, we hold that the continued detention of the petitioner is void. The petition is accordingly allowed. within a reasonable time when the same was being delayed. Taking these facts into consideration we find that the impugned order is vitiated on this ground also. ( 21 ) HOWEVER, for reasons already stated above, we hold that the continued detention of the petitioner is void. The petition is accordingly allowed. The petitioner shall be set free forthwith if not required to be detained in connection with any other case. Detenu set free