JUDGMENT M. WAHAJUDDIN, J. 1. BESIDES seeking declaration concerning title to compensation and rehabilitation grant, plaintiffs had sought certain more reliefs concerning injunction and declaration about some plot against some other set of defendants. The Munsif dismissed the suit in toto. The first appellate court, however, partly allowed the appeal and so far as the compensation and rehabilitation grant for the estate, as per schedule appended to the plaint, the suit for declaration was decreed in favour of the plaintiffs. The contesting defendants affected by such decree have preferred this appeal. 2. IT is not in dispute that the property for which compensation and rehabilitation grant was determined and is claimed by the plaintiffs belonged to Hazari. IT is also not in dispute that qua Hazari's ancestors there were three branches, one of Manbahal Singh to which Hazari belonged, one of Agam Singh to which the plaintiffs belong and the third of Ganga Singh. IT is also not in dispute that Mahbal Singh was joint qua his descendants and Agam Singh and Ganga Singh had separated. As would appear from the pedigree that was set up, the plaintiffs are the nearest collaterals of Hazari and claimed to be entitled to the compensation and rehabilitation grant as such collaterals. The defendants-appellants' stand in this second appeal is that Lallu Singh alias Gulab, appellant no. 5, is the son of the daughter of Hazari, namely, Dulari. The further stand is that Smt. Duja is the widow of Hazari's pre-deceased's son, Jai Raj, and, consequently, it is they who would succeed to the property left by Hazari and not the plaintiffs, who are collaterals. I may further mention that there is no dispute that the property in respect of which compensation and rehabilitation grant is claimed was the co-parcenary property of Hazari. 3. THE first point that would arise for consideration is whether Lallu Singh alias Gulab is the son of Hazari's daughter as to have any interest in the properties left by Hazari. It is noteworthy that in the written statement that was filed by Lallu alias Gulab he admitted that he is not Hazari's daughter's son and further admitted that he has no interest in the property in suit. Not only that a compromise was also later filed. It is noteworthy that in the written statement that was filed by Lallu alias Gulab he admitted that he is not Hazari's daughter's son and further admitted that he has no interest in the property in suit. Not only that a compromise was also later filed. Appellant Lallu alias Gulab thereafter moved the application 141-C2 before the trial court itself for setting aside his earlier written statement as well as the compromise. As stress was laid upon the averments of application 141-C2, I may refer to the same. In the compromise, 140-A, filed by defendant Lallu alias Gulab and the plaintiffs jointly, it was stated that the suit may be decreed against the defendant concerned and the defendant concerned and the plaintiffs inter-se will bear their own costs and the defendant concerned is not the daughter's son of Hazari, nor his mother was the daughter of Hazari and it was also stated that the plaintiffs are the Zamindars Bhumidbars of the plots in suit and they are entitled to the compensation and rehabilitation grant. This compromise was duly verified before the court. In the application, 141-C, it was simply stated that the applicant's mother, Dulari, was the daughter of Hazari, and the applicant is her son and is entitled to the entire property of Hazari Singh, and before the date of the written statement the plaintiffs started contacting the applicant and got him under their influence and giving temptations obtained the signatures of the applicant on several papers and also secured verification before the court, and under inducement according to the desire of the plaintiffs and pressure from them the applicant-defendant acted on plaintiffs' dictates and a fraud was played upon and the written statement in question was not filed by the defendant and is a result of fraud and collusion, and the compromise is also not on independent advice, hence the compromise be cancelled and the defendant be allowed to withdraw the written statement. It is noteworthy that the application, 141-C2, is silent concerning the particulars of fraud, while the law requires that the particulars of the fraud are to be specifically pleaded. It is also silent as to how undue influence was exercised, what was the inducement given to the defendant Lallu Singh, how the defendant Lallu Singh acted at the behest of the plaintiffs and so forth so on. It is also silent as to how undue influence was exercised, what was the inducement given to the defendant Lallu Singh, how the defendant Lallu Singh acted at the behest of the plaintiffs and so forth so on. That being the position, the finding of fact of the first appellate court, that the compromise is binding upon the parties to the compromise and that the written statement and the admissions made therein cannot be withdrawn, cannot be disturbed in second appeal. I may also observe that from the materials on record also the stand taken by the applicant in application, 141-02, is not borne out. THE compromise was verified in presence of the court and any question of fraud or misrepresentation practised before the court would not arise. In that compromise also the very admission made in the written statement were repeated and affirmed. When that is the position, the first appellate court was justified in its finding. 4. IT was argued that in any case the court should have allowed the filing of a fresh written statement. I am unable to agree with such a stand. Any party cannot file successive written statements. Once a written statement was filed in court, only its amendment can be sought under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, if permissible. Firstly, there was no amendment application as such and the prayer was for withdrawal of the earlier written statement, and, secondly, any amendment taking a contradictory plea by withdrawing the admissions made would also not be permissible in law. The learned counsel for the appellants then urged that other reliefs claimed were disallowed, the compromise would not fall under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC. I have considered such arguments and I do not find any force in it. Order 23 Rule 3 CPC clearly provides adjustment of a suit as a whole or any part and further lays down that the court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded and shall pass a decree accordingly. It is also provided therein, where one party alleges and the other denies that adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the court shall decide the question. It is also provided therein, where one party alleges and the other denies that adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the court shall decide the question. Even if the findings of the first appellate court are not very express, I have alsj dealt with the salient features and I find that the compromise was duly arrived at and also duly verified by the court and the application, 141-C2, did not contain any details of the alleged fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence etc., and the application 141-C2 could not find favour and had to be rejected, and, consequently, the admission in the written statement will be binding upon Lallu Singh alias Gulao and the compromise also will be binding; and Lallu Singh alias Gulab, therefore, not being the grand-son of Hazari Lal would not have any interest in the compensation or rehabilitation grant. 5. THE next point that would arise for consideration is the interest of the widowed Hazari's daughter-in law, namely, Duja. It is a common ground that Jai Ram pre-deceased Hazari. Of course, after the amendment in 1937 widows have been given certain rights in the estate and even sons widow will have a right if the son pre-deceased the father. But all such interest would be created only after amendment of 1937. In the present case, Hazari died in 1922 as per death certificate (Ext. 1). At that time, the widow of the deceased or the widow of the pre-deceased son had no interest either limited or absolute in co-parcenary property and, consequently, Hazari's widow and Hazari's son's widow could not have any interest in the landed property of Hazari. As there were no other heirs in the direct line, the collaterals, namely, the plaintiffs shall succeed to such interest. 6. IT was next urged that as the name of Duja was recorded when the ZA and LR Act came into force and even earlier, it is she who will be entitled to compensation and rehabilitation grant. As there were no other heirs in the direct line, the collaterals, namely, the plaintiffs shall succeed to such interest. 6. IT was next urged that as the name of Duja was recorded when the ZA and LR Act came into force and even earlier, it is she who will be entitled to compensation and rehabilitation grant. Reliance in this connection was placed upon section 32 of the UP ZA and LR Act, in which it has been laid down that every entry in the record of rights prepared or revised under U. P. Act No. 3 of 1901 for the previous agricultural year shall for purpose of assessment and payment of compensation under the ZA and LR Act be deemed to be described correctly the right, title and interest of an intermediary in the estate subject to exception under section 46. IT would be found that under some subsequent sections procedure for draft compensation and calculation is provided and then section 46 provides for publication of notice of the draft compensation assessment roll and service of copies and there is a provision for objection in certain regards only and section 48 provides for disposal and then section 49 and SO follow later dealing with appeals. Under section 46 the scope of objection is limited. Under section 46 the scope of objection is limited. I may quote section 46 (2) with the proviso:- "Section 46 (2): The notice under sub-section (1) shall call upon all persons interested, including a person who claims that the name of the intermediary is, in respect of any share or interest to which such person is entitled, entered in a representative capacity or in the capacity of the Karta of a Joint Hindu family, to appear and file objection upon such statements or roll within a period of two months ; Provided that no objection on the ground that the intermediary is entitled to a greater or lesser share or part of the estate or is not entitled to any share or part thereof shall be entertained, except when it is on any grounds mentioned in the notice or is in pursuasive of any or under section 32 or 33." Zamindari and proprietory rights touch title and title of such parties happened to be determinable by the civil court and keeping this in view section 34 was enacted laying down that nothing in sections 32 and 33 or Section 49, which rendered an order under section 48 to be a decree of the court, shall affect the right of any person to establish his claim in respect of any share or part thereof by due process of law in the court having jurisdiction. IT would, thus, appear that section 32 concerning presumption, section 33 and also sections 46 to 49 are all overridden by section 34 and in the matters of right to any estate the person concerned has been given full liberty to go to the competent court of jurisdiction and have it determined. Proprietory rights being involved, civil courts will be competent court and would be fully competent to determine the right, title or interest of any party in a estate, and, consequently, the right to compensation and rehabilitation grant also in respect of such estate. That being the position, the civil court could determine the question and come to an independent rinding irrespective of any recorded entries and section 32 of the UP ZA and LR Act will not come into play, at all, in such situation. Arguments to the contrary have no force. As regards rehabilitation grant it is paid to the person who is held to be entitled for compensation. Arguments to the contrary have no force. As regards rehabilitation grant it is paid to the person who is held to be entitled for compensation. The next point urged is that the suit was barred by time. It was argued that the limitation will start running when ZA and LR Act came into force in view of section 32. Section 32, however, would not be attracted at all. In fact, limitation does not start only on grounds of a party being aggrieved about any record entry rather even that entry would have no consequence, where a suit is filed in civil court, as has been expressly provided under section 34 of the ZA and LR Act. At the best the defendants could urge that the limitation may start running when the Compensation Officer has finally determined the matter under section 48 of the UP ZA and LR Act. But there is no material on record to show when that stage has reached and when was the matter finally determined by the Compensation Authority. That being the position, the suit cannot be time barred. Apart from that, the compensation and rehabilitation grant, as is urged by the respondent's counsel, is with the Authorities itself and when that is the position, it will be open to grant a declaration and the claim will not be time barred. 7. I, therefore, after considering various arguments urged, do not find any force in this second appeal and this second appeal is dismissed with costs to the contesting respondents. Appeal dismissed.