JUDGMENT I.B. Singh, Member. - This is a defendant's revision against the order dated July 27, 1981 passed by learned Additional Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra, dismissing Revision No. 35 of 1980-81/Etah against order dated December 23, 1980 passed by Additional S.D.O. in a suit under Section 229-B of Act I of 1951. 2. The following facts are not disputed that the trial court had held on February 22, 1973 that the suit was barred by Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act. The suit was dismissed for default of parties on March 23, 1973. The restoration application was moved on April 2, 1973. 3. The defendant had gone in revision against order dated February 22, 1973 which was recommended to the Board for being dismissed as the suit was dismissed for default and the Board dismissed the revision accordingly on March 6, 1976. 4. Brijendra Singh sole defendant had died on July 10, 1975 and application was moved on March 5, 1980 for substituting his heir in the restoration application. Objection was filed on July 19, 1980. The trial court by order dated December 22, 1980 restored the suit and allowed substitution. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 6. It has been argued that no steps for substitution were taken within time and there was no application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay and that restoration application was liable to be abated under Order 22 of the C.P.C. which was filed even beyond 3 years time even if residuary Article 137 of the Limitation Act was applied and the courts below acted illegally in holding that order 22 of the C.P.C. was not applicable to restoration application and that even after the decision of the revision application, no application was moved within a reasonable time in the suit. Reliance has been placed on 1973 R.D. 453, A.I.R. 1960 Cal. 201, 1956 R.D. 434, 1983 A.L.J. 1305, A.I.R. 1983 (S.C.) 1203 and A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 261. 7. Reliance has been placed on 1973 R.D. 453, A.I.R. 1960 Cal. 201, 1956 R.D. 434, 1983 A.L.J. 1305, A.I.R. 1983 (S.C.) 1203 and A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 261. 7. It has been argued in reply that no steps were taken to substitute the heirs of the deceased in his revision; further that application was given on January 14, 1983 for summoning the file from Board; that both the courts had allowed the substitution application condoning the delay, therefore, discretion applied by them was not liable to be interfered with in revision. Reliance has been placed on 1977 R.D. 256, 1971 R.D. 76 and 1973 R.D. 453 and it has been argued that application for substitution can be treated for setting aside abatement and for condoning delay. Reliance has been further placed on 1965 R.D. 356 and it has been argued that matter of stay was sufficient ground for condoning delay. Reliance has been placed on 1963 R.D. 249, A.I.R. 1983 (S.C.) 355 and it has been further argued that in view of Order 22 rule 11 of the C.P.C. restoration application was not liable to be abated if the suit has been dismissed for default and that there is no limitation for application under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. Reliance has been placed on 1983 A.W.C. 99 (Revenue) 17. 8. Limitation for substitution in revision applications is 3 years as this is the limitation for revision applications as no limitation for revision applications has been provided, therefore, residuary Article 137 of Limitation Act has been applied as has been held by the Full Bench of the Board of Revenu in Dulha Miyan v. Gaon Sabha 1982 A.W.C. (R.) 99. In Chandra Dev Pandey v. Skuhdeo Rai, AIR 1972 Alld. 504, it was not held that no limitation is applicable for substitution of heirs in revision application under Section 151 of the C.P.C. rather it was held that the limitation was 3 years. The matter involved in this case is not regarding substitution in the revision application, hence these arguments are beyond the point. No advantage can be taken by the opposite party if no substitution application was moved in the revision application which was recommended to be dismissed as the suit itself was dismissed for default. 9. The matter involved in this case is not regarding substitution in the revision application, hence these arguments are beyond the point. No advantage can be taken by the opposite party if no substitution application was moved in the revision application which was recommended to be dismissed as the suit itself was dismissed for default. 9. There is no dispute that if there was a stay it is a sufficient ground of condoning delay in moving the substitution application. See 1965 R.D. 356. 10. The ruling of 1963 R.D. 249 is not applicable to the facts of the case as in it there was irregularity in not taking thumb impression on the Vakalatnama although the appellant was present and had filed affidavit with his thumb impression and it was held to be an irregularity following A.I.R. 1949 Alld. 367 (F.B.). 11. In A.I.R. 1977 Alld. 551 it was held that when application for substitution of deceased-respondent was moved and it was later found that respondent had died earlier and the appeal had abated the application for substitution can be treated as application for setting aside the abatement and bringing on record legal representatives of deceased-respondent. The present case is not covered by this ruling because it was known from before that the opposite party had died earlier and it was no found out later that the suit or the proceeding had abated due to earlier death of defendant or opposite party. Therefore, 1965 R.D. 356 is also not applicable to the present case. 12. It has been held in Toori v. Shiv Baran, 1973 R.D. 453 that if in restoration application defendant died during its pendency, heirs not substituted within period of limitation application held to be abated meaning thereby that even restoration applications are liable to be abated for non-substitution. 13. It has been held in Shaili Kumar v. Baliendra Ghose and others, A.I.R. 1980 Cal. 203 that proceedings under Order 9 Rule 13 are not continuation of the suit; that application for substitution in the suit is necessary even though if substitution was made for setting aside exparte proceeding limitation expiring when exparte decree was set aside suit held abated. Legal representative must apply for setting aside abatement and then being substituted. 14. Application for setting aside abatement necessary participation in proceeding does not amount to waiving objection regarding abatement. Legal representative must apply for setting aside abatement and then being substituted. 14. Application for setting aside abatement necessary participation in proceeding does not amount to waiving objection regarding abatement. There should be application for setting aside abatement under Order 22 Rule 9 of the C.P.C. 15. The court has got no inherent jurisdiction to all legal representatives. See Union of India v. Ram Charan, A.I.R. 1964 (S.C.) 215. 16. In Bhagwan Swarup and others v. Mool Chandra and others, A.I.R. 1983 (S.C.) 355 it has been laid down that in view of specific provision of order 22 rule 4 general provision of Order I Rule 10 of the C.P.C. is not appropriate to be applied. This ruling has been explained in 1983 Alld. L.J. page 1305 (F.B.). In paras 16 and 17 that in view of specific provisions for substitution and setting aside abatement general provisions of Order I Rule 10(2) of the C.P.C. should be excluded. So A.I.R. 1983 (S.C.) page 355 is not applicable to the present case because there was no application on behalf of the heirs of the deceased for being substituted was the case in the aforesaid case. 17. From the above discussion it is clear that (i) Application of the provisions for abating proceedings for setting aside ex-parte decree or restoring the suits, for substitution of heirs within time is valid. (ii) There must be application for setting aside abatement if the substitution application has not been moved within limitation. (iii) The court has got no inherent jurisdiction to substitute legal representatives without application moved for it. (iv) The proceeding for setting aside exparte decree of proceeding for restoration are not continuation of the suit and even if substitution is made in that application for substitutions to be made in the suit stand abated. 18. Now we have to see whether the aforesaid conditions have been complied with or not in the present case. 19. Brijendra Pratap Singh had admittedly died on July 18, 1975. The restoration application was moved on April 2, 1973 and was pending. The revision was dismissed on March 26, 1976 by the Board. Even if there was any stay order due to pendency of the revision application no stay subsisted after March 26, 1976. The substitution application was moved on March 5, 1980 in the proceeding restoration application. The restoration application was moved on April 2, 1973 and was pending. The revision was dismissed on March 26, 1976 by the Board. Even if there was any stay order due to pendency of the revision application no stay subsisted after March 26, 1976. The substitution application was moved on March 5, 1980 in the proceeding restoration application. There was no application for setting aside abatement of the restoration proceeding which had abated automatically after 90 days of the death of Brijendra Pratap Singh. The application for summoning the file from the Record soon was moved on January 14, 1980 and the file was received and put up on February 19, 1980 and there was no reason given why the application was moved on March 5, 1980. The courts below wrongly held that in the restoration proceeding provisions for abatement for non-substitution within time was not applicable. There was no application on behalf of the heirs for being substituted as was the case in A.I.R. 1983 S.C. page 355. No application was moved in the suit itself for substitution, and for setting aside its abatement which also had abated automatically. There is no inherent power in the court for making substitution without making application for it and for setting aside abatement. The present power of order X Rule (1)(3) of the C.P.C. being excluded. Therefore, none of the aforesaid conditions were complied with, in the present case, therefore, the restoration proceeding was liable to be abated rather it stood abated and there was no application for setting it aside. Therefore, the orders passed by both the courts below are liable to be set aside and as there was no application for substitution within time made in the suit itself it also would have abated but as the restoration proceeding itself is liable to be abated that contingency does not arise. Hence this revision application is liable to be allowed and the orders passed by both the courts below are liable to be set aside. 20. In view of the above, this revision application is allowed with costs. The order passed by both the courts below are set aside and the restoration proceeding had stood abated for not applying for setting aside its abatement with application for condoning the delay non-substitution of Brijendra Singh within time.