ORDER N.N. Sharma, J. - This defendant's revision is directed against judgment and decree dated 24-9-1983 recorded by Sri Naseemuddin, learned III Additional District Judge (J. S. C. C.), Aligarh in S. C. C. Suit No. 20 of 1982 by which the suit of plaintiffs for recovery of Rs. 3,750/- as arrears of rent at the rate of 125/- per month was decreed with costs. Future and pendente lite mesne profits were also awarded at the rate of Rs. 125/- per month up to the date of delivery of possession. Defendant was also evicted from the house in suit detailed in the plaint. 2. Plaintiffs were own brothers residents of Mahabirganj, district Aligarh. Both of them were landlords of the disputed premises let out to defendant-revisionist at a monthly rent of Rs. 125/- on 13-9-1966 for business purposes. In contravention of the said purpose, the tenant began to reside with his family in said accommodation. He also started the business of manufacturing locks and installed machinery which caused substantial damage to the building and was inconsistent with the purpose of tenancy. The rent from 1-1-1980 fell due and was demanded through a notice dated 24-5-1982 served on defendant on 25-5-1982 demanding the rent up to 30-4-1982 demanding in the sum of Rs. 3,500/-, defendant did not pay the arrears of rent nor vacated the premises although his tenancy had been terminated by the aforesaid notice. 3. The defence was that on receipt of notice, the entire amount of Rs. 3500/- was remitted to plaintiffs but they refused to accept the same. The building was used for the purpose of manufacturing locks and the tenant was also residing in a portion of the building with the consent and permission of plaintiffs and their father since 1966. It was wrong to say that the tenant prohibited the user of staircase by plaintiffs. In proceedings under S. 21 U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (Act No. XIII of 1972) (hereinafter referred to as the Act), a portion of the tenant shown by letters A B C D E F G H in the judgment of this Court dated 23-5-1982, had been handed over on 22-6-1983 to the plaintiffs. Notice was defective. 4. Learned trial Judge recorded the finding after scrutinising the oral and documentary evidence on record on six points. 5. Notice was defective. 4. Learned trial Judge recorded the finding after scrutinising the oral and documentary evidence on record on six points. 5. Under point 1, he found that the defendant committed default in payment of rent and was liable to ejectment on that ground. It was held under point 5 that the notice served on defendant was valid. Points 2 and 3 were disposed of by a composite finding. It was held under point 2 that the building in question has been used by the tenant for inconsistent purpose and defendant has also caused substantial damage to the building so as to attract the operation of S. 20 (2) (b) and (d) of the Act. It was found under point 4 that the suit was maintainable. Under point 6, it was held that plaintiffs were entitled to the relief sought. 6. Aggrieved by this decision, the tenant has preferred this revision. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. No argument was addressed before me to assail the validity of notice to quit and so I need not address on point 5, found in favour of landlords by learned trial judge. 9. The findings of learned trial judge that the defendant committed default in payment of rent and that the building in question was being used inconsistent to the purpose for which it was let out and that the defendant has caused substantial damage to the buildings were attacked. 10. I take up the point of default first. Ext. 6 is the notice of demand and terminating the tenancy admittedly received by the revisionist. Rent for the period 1-1-1980 up to the date of notice was claimed. This notice also put forward the grievance about the use of premises for inconsistent purpose and causing substantial damage to the building by installing heavy machinery and work-shop therein. 11. In his statement, defendant Ramesh Chandra testified that the entire arrears of rent claimed in the said notice were remitted to the landlords through money orders coupons 47C, 48C, 49C and 50C. The money orders were refused and these coupons were received back by the tenant with the endorsement of refusal. In his cross-examination, the tenant admitted that he remitted rent from 1-2-1980 to 31-5-1982. 12. Plaintiff Gyan Chandra (P. W. 1) testified that from January, 1980, rent at the rate of Rs. The money orders were refused and these coupons were received back by the tenant with the endorsement of refusal. In his cross-examination, the tenant admitted that he remitted rent from 1-2-1980 to 31-5-1982. 12. Plaintiff Gyan Chandra (P. W. 1) testified that from January, 1980, rent at the rate of Rs. 125/- per month remained unpaid despite the service of notice of demand. No rent was remitted to him nor he refused to receive any money order. Learned trial judge found that a written statement was to be filed on 10-8-1982 which was the date specified in the summons served on defendant in the suit. He did not deposit the arrears of rent on 10-8-1982 in Court but the amount was deposited on 6-1-1983 and so it did not satisfy the requirement of sub-S. (4) of S. 20, Act XIII of 1972. So the defendant could not be relieved from liability even for ejectment on that score. 13. Learned trial Court further believed the statement of plaintiff on the point that he had not refused to receive any money order. He further found that it was correct that there was endorsement of refusal on the money orders by postman who had not been examined. The presumption available to the tenant on this endorsement has been amply rebutted when the plaintiff denied it. Further this part of plaintiffs' evidence was rebuttable by defendant producing the postman only which was not done. 14. This finding has been attacked by the learned Advocate for revisionist whose contention was that the examination of postman was not necessary in the case. The presumption under S. 27, General Clauses Act and S. 114 illustration (e) Evidence Act was available to the tenant irrespective of non-production of postman. In this connection reliance was placed upon Shiv Narain Chaudhary v. Naug & Co. reported in 1981 (U.P.) R. C. C. 512: ( AIR 1982 All 44 ) in which it was held that the record of Post Office was public record and admissible in evidence. In that case, the postman. was examined although his statement was not believed. However, the refusal made on the money order coupon by appellant's father was held as sufficient to establish payment to the landlord. 15. In that case, the postman. was examined although his statement was not believed. However, the refusal made on the money order coupon by appellant's father was held as sufficient to establish payment to the landlord. 15. In Ram Nakshatra Misra v. Girdhar Das Kashya reported in 1979,(U. P.) R. C. C. page 5, it was held that such presumption was rebuttable and when tenant rebuts it, the burden shifts on landlord to prove the service. In Bharat Panday v. 2nd Addl. District Judge, Varanasi, reported in (1984) 1 All Rent Cas 279 it was observed that these presumptions were rebuttable and it was a complete question of fact to be determined by the Court having regard to all the surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the parties as to whether the evidence in rebuttal is reliable or not. 16. This question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Pawada Venkateswara Rao v. Chidemana Venketa Ramana, reported in AIR 1976 SC 869 . In that case also, the notice was sent through registered post and was returned with the endorsement of refusal. It was held that it was not necessary to produce the postman who tried to effect service. A denial of service by a party may be found to be correct or incorrect from its own admission or conduct. 17. In the instant case also, there was a denial by respondent Gyan Chandra, the plaintiff, who denied to have refused any money order sent to him by the tenant. His statement on oath was believed by the learned trial Judge. Under such circumstances, the impugned judgment cannot be assailed on the ground that the learned trial Judge erred in not accepting the endorsement of refusal as the sufficient compliance of the notice of demand. 18. Moreover, it is further significant to note that according to the plaintiffs, rent at the rate of Rs. 125/- per month from 1-1-1980 up to 30-4-1982 was due when the notice of demand Ext. 6 was sent through registered post on 24-5-1982. The receipt of this notice is admitted. In the written statement as well as in his own statement, defendant admitted that the rent for the aforesaid period is payable but he filed the money order coupons papers Nos. 67C, 68C, 69C, and 70C numbered as 11 to 14 to show that the arrears of rent amounting to Rs. The receipt of this notice is admitted. In the written statement as well as in his own statement, defendant admitted that the rent for the aforesaid period is payable but he filed the money order coupons papers Nos. 67C, 68C, 69C, and 70C numbered as 11 to 14 to show that the arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 3500/- for the period 1-2-1980 to 31-5-1982 were remitted. This amount did not include the rent for the month of January, 1980. The language on the coupons shows that this amount was being sent in full and final settlement of all three portions. Had plaintiffs accepted these money orders, by knowledge thereof, their claim for rent for the month of January, 1980 could have been barred. When the tenant remits any rent in full satisfaction and the payment is accepted by landlord then such acceptance must be deemed to be in full satisfaction vide S. 63, Contract Act. 1872, as held in Sunder Lal v. Ram Krishan reported in AIR 1960 All 544 . Under such circumstances, even if it were to be assumed for the sake of argument that the refusal on money orders imputed knowledge to plaintiffs irrespective of examination of postman, it could not have been operative to save the default having regard to the conditions laid in the money order coupons. 19. So on the evidence on record, it must be held that the finding of fact recorded by learned trial Judge is unassailable and this ground alone was sufficient for the ejectment of defendant vide S. 20 (2) (e) of Act. XIII of 1972. 20. However, I would like to discuss the next contention also pressed before me on behalf of revisionist. It was argued that the learned trial Judge erred in holding that the user of the building in suit was inconsistent with the purpose for which it had been let out, no substantial damage to the building was occasioned by the installation of machinery and work shop in the said building by the tenant. In this connection, I may refer to the rent note paper 50C dated 16-8-1966 executed by Ramesh Chand for the use .of disputed accommodation for his business purpose. No other purpose was specified therein. In this connection, I may refer to the rent note paper 50C dated 16-8-1966 executed by Ramesh Chand for the use .of disputed accommodation for his business purpose. No other purpose was specified therein. According to Sri Gyan Chand (P. W.1), the defendant began to reside in the accommodation in dispute with his family and has converted it to work shop for manufacturing locks, heavy machinery has been installed in it which has damaged the building and caused cracks and was a nuisance due to rambling of the machinery. According to him, the machinery was installed on 31-8-1977. He never permitted the premises to be converted into a workshop as was being used or as a residential accommodation. 21. In his statement, Ramesh Chandra (D. W. 1) testified that he was residing in the disputed premises from 1974, now a partnership business was running in this accommodation under the style of Orient Metal Manufacturing Company which was registered in 1967. It was wrong that this machinery was installed in 1976. The running of the machine did not cause any damage to the building. 22. Learned Trial Judge on the evidence on record found that the running of the machine during the day and night was a nuisance due to inconsistent user of the building for which the building had been originally let out. The learned trial Court believed the statement of plaintiff on this point that such user caused substantial damage to the building as cracks occurred in the building. Under such circumstances, he held that Cls. (b) and (d) of sub-sec. (2) of S. 20 of the said Act were attracted in favour of landlords. Learned Advocate for revisionist referred to Smt. Ram janki v. 1st Addl. District Judge. Banda reported in (1984) 1 All Rent Cas 494. In that case the tenant had demolished a wall and constructed another wall at a different place in the courtyard. He had raised the level of the Courtyard with the result that the water flowed inside an adjoining room whose level had become lower than the level of the Courtyard after its being raised which was causing damage to the said room. It was further alleged that although the building has been let out for residential purpose but a portion of it was being used by the tenant in connection with a tea stall. It was further alleged that although the building has been let out for residential purpose but a portion of it was being used by the tenant in connection with a tea stall. Learned Judge referred to Ram Prasad v. Rabindra Kumar Tiwari, 1980 All. Rent Cas 161 in support of his assertion that it was for the Court to find the dominant use of the building if such user was inconsistent with the initial purpose for which the building had been let out. In that event alone, sub- cl. (d) of sub-s. (2) of S. 20 of the Act was to operate. So the case was remanded to the trial Judge with the direction to dispose of the case afresh according to the observation made by him. 23. It appears that a similar question was considered by the same Court in Krishna Kumar v. 3rd. Addl. District Judge. Mathura, reported in (1984) 1 All Rent Cas page 308. In that case, the accommodation was let out to respondent 3 for carrying on the profession of a medical practitioner only, the shop was being used by tenant for the business of dairy, such user was held as inconsistent so as to attract S. 20 (2) (d) of the said Act. 24. It appears that the said Act and the Transfer of Property Act contemplate following purposes which may be broadly specified : (i) manufacture, (ii) business, and (iii) residential, if the accommodation is let out for a specific purpose but used for different purpose, such user would definitely be inconsistent with the purpose for which it had been let out and would attract the operation of S. 20 (2) (d) of the aforesaid Act. In the instant case, the premises were let out for running business and not for residential or manufacturing purposes. Under such circumstances, it must be held that the user was inconsistent with the purpose for which it had been let out. 25. Learned Advocate for revisionist further pointed out that such inconsistent user, if any, had not been proved to be the dominant purpose and since this user is old so the plaintiffs claim for ejectment on this ground should be deemed to have been waived. 26. It is significant to note that no issue was drawn on this point nor this point was specifically pleaded. 26. It is significant to note that no issue was drawn on this point nor this point was specifically pleaded. There is no evidence on record to show that there was any express or implied consent of the landlords to such user. It is on record that since the inception of tenancy, the parties were embroiled in durable litigation in Civil and Criminal Courts and under such circumstances, it is not possible to hold that the landlords waived their right to press their claim on such score. 27. Learned Advocate for revisionist further pointed out that no commissioner or expert was appointed in the case to detect the cracks and substantial damage caused to the building. It is correct that the testimony of an expert could have been better than the testimony of parties, however, it is a finding of fact and is not liable to be disturbed in this revision when trial Court has believed it. 28. There was also a prayer for adduction of additional evidence consisting of post office receipts No. 3239 and 3240 to evidence the remission of two money orders by tenant on 4-3-1980 and copy of judgment of Criminal Case No. 1620 of 1979 which was not procurable earlier despite the exercise of due diligence. Such prayer was opposed on behalf of respondents. On behalf of revisionist, it was pointed out that this Court could admit such evidence under S. 151, Civil P.C. even though O. 41 R. 27 Civil P.C. is not attracted in such a -- case vide Babu Ram v. Addl. District Judge, Dehradun reported 1982 (U. P.) R. C. C. 764: ( AIR 1983 All. 170 ). 29. It appears that the payment sought to' be proved by these receipts which were alleged to be forged by learned Advocate for respondents was not put forward in the written statement or in the reply of notice Ext. A 7 or in his statement by defendant as D. W. 1, no cogent explanation was given for not producing all these documents at the stage of trial. I do not find any good reason to remand the case for adduction of more evidence when there is nothing on record to show that the judgment could not be pronounced by this Court in the absence of such evidence so as to necessitate such adduction of evidence in the interest of justice. I do not find any good reason to remand the case for adduction of more evidence when there is nothing on record to show that the judgment could not be pronounced by this Court in the absence of such evidence so as to necessitate such adduction of evidence in the interest of justice. In Natha Singh v. The Financial Commissioner, Taxation, Punjab reported in AIR 1976 SC 1053 , it was observed at page 1054 "The discretion given to the appellate Court to receive and admit additional evidence under O. 41 R. 27 is not an arbitrary one but is a judicial one circumscribed by the limitations specified in that provision. If the additional evidence is allowed to be adduced contrary to the principles governing the reception of such evidence, it will be a case of improper exercise of discretion and the additional evidence so brought on the record will have to be ignored. The true test to be applied in dealing with applications for additional evidence is whether the appellate Court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it, without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced." 30. I respectfully follow the aforesaid observations. In that case, the Court was considering its powers to allow additional evidence as an appellate Court. Obviously, as a revisional Court, I do not find any justification for adduction of such. evidence specially to prolong the proceeding by remanding the case now. 31. In the result, I find that this revision is devoid of merit. It is dismissed with costs. The ad interim stay order dated 28-9-1983 confirmed on 23-11-1983 is vacated herewith. Let the premises be vacated within two months from today as prayed.