JUDGMENT : K.C. Agarwal, J. Writ Petition No. 6588 of 1982 has been preferred by Arun Kumar against the judgment of the District Judge, Saharanpur, dated 18-5-1982, dismissing Ceiling Appeal No. 200 of 1981, whereas Writ Petition No. 6590 of 1982 has been filed by Rajiv Kumar against the judgment of the District Judge, Saharanpur, of the same date dismissing Ceiling Appeal No. 223 of 1981. Both the Petitioners In the two writ petitions are real brothers. 2. A statement u/s 6(1) of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was filed by Rajiv Kumar. A similar statement was filed by Arun Kumar with respect to his properties. After survey and verification in each of the two cases, a draft statement was prepared. This draft statement was sent by the Competent Authority by registered post to Rajiv Kumar, and another draft statement was sent to Arun Kumar. No objections were filed either of these two persons. Consequently, 5204.17 square metres of land in the case of Arun Kumar and 5834.74 square metres land in the case of Rajiv Kumar was declared as surplus on 4-6-1981. On 3-9-1981, these two Petitioner) filed two separate applications for setting aside the ex-parte orders dated 4-6 1981. The applications were rejected by the Competent Authority on 17-9-1981 on the ground that since there was no provision for setting aside the ex-parte orders, the applications were not maintainable. The Petitioners of both these petitions filed two separate appeals before the District Judge, which were numbered as Ceiling Appeals 200 and 223 of 1981. Both of these appeals were dismissed by the District Judge. He did not go into the merits of the case. He, however, found that as the draft statement had been sent by registered post which had been returned back with the endorsement "refused" in each one of these two cases, there would be a presumption of due service. He refused to entertain and consider the affidavits which had been filed by the Petitioners of the two cases in their respective appeals alleging that the notice had not been refused by them. Against the dismissal of the appeals, these to writ petitions have been filed. 3. u/s 33 of the Act, appeal is provided against an order passed by the Competent Authority not being an order u/s 11 or an order under Sub-section (1) of Section 30. Against the dismissal of the appeals, these to writ petitions have been filed. 3. u/s 33 of the Act, appeal is provided against an order passed by the Competent Authority not being an order u/s 11 or an order under Sub-section (1) of Section 30. An order passed ex-parte by the Competent Authority would also be an order covered by Section 33 of the Act. For applying this provision, it is not necessary that the parties must have been heard on merits and the (?) decided thereafter. If a case has been decided ex-parte and the person aggrieved by it wants to file an appeal and shows in the same that the order is incorrect either on facts or in lav, he would be entitled to get the relief in such an appeal. 4. In an appeal preferred against an ex-parte order, the appellate court can go into the ground of non-appearance of the defaulting party as well. In the instant case, the District Judge examined the ground of default of the two Petitioners before the Competent Authority and drawing the presumption from the endorsement of refusal held that the notice must be deemed to have been sufficiently served on each of them. There can be no doubt that in law there is a presumption about the correctness of endorsement made on a registered cover, but the party aggrieved by such an endorsement has the right to rebut the same by bringing evidence to that effect. Upon evidence being brought, the court will have to consider the same and after considering the same if it finds the evidence of the defaulting party to be reliable, it can set aside the order of the Competent Authority, and send the case back for a fresh decision. 5. In the present case, the Petitioners of these two petitions bad filed their affidavits asserting that they had not been served, and that the endorsement of refusal was factually incorrect. The learned District Judge refused to consider the affidavit on the ground that and Order XIX of the CPC has not been applied to the proceedings in appeal, the affidavits were inadmissible. Section 31 of the Act provides that the Competent Authority shall have all the powers of a civil court while trying a suit under the CPC in respect of matters enumerated in Clauses (a) to (f). Section 31 of the Act provides that the Competent Authority shall have all the powers of a civil court while trying a suit under the CPC in respect of matters enumerated in Clauses (a) to (f). Clause (c) empowers the Competent Authority to receive evidence on affidavits. An appeal u/s 33 of the Act is filed before the District Judge, which is a court u/s 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That being so, Order XIX will apply ipso facto in respect of the matters before it. The District Judge was wrong in not considering the affidavits of the Petitioners of the two cases filed in their respective appeals. 6. Further-more, the District Judge, as is clear from the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, was addressed on merits. He ought to have decided the appeals on merits. The District Judge erroneously thought that he had no jurisdiction to go into the merits. 7. For what I have said above, the judgments of the District Judge given in the two appeals are liable to be set aside. The appeals will go back to the District Judge, and it would be open to him to decide only the question of the justifiability of passing the ex-parte order by the Competent Authority and to send the case back to him if the service of notices on the two Petitioners was not made. Alternatively, he could go into the merits on the materials already on record. If the District Judge holds that the ex-parte orders are illegal, he will in that event send the cases back to the Competent: Authority for filing of objections to the draft statements by the Petitioners and decide the cases thereafter. 8. For these reasons, both the writ petitions are allowed. The judgments of the District Judge, Saharanpur, dated 18-5-1982 in both the appeals are quashed, and he is directed to decide the appeals of both the Petitioners afresh in the light of the observations made in the judgment. No order as to costs.