Judgment :- 1. The respondent filed a petition, under S.371 and 372 of the Indian Succession Act, praying for the issue of a succession certificate in respect of the assets of his deceased brother Parameswaran Pillai on the ground that he was the only legal representative of the deceased. The revision petitioner, who is the son of a sister of the deceased, filed a caveat and also filed I.A. No. 735 of 1984 in which he contended that the respondent is not the sole legal representative and also praying that major portion of the amount for which the succession certificate is sought for belongs to the tarwad. Consequently, he claimed that the proceedings have become contentious in nature and therefore the proceedings are to be converted into a suit. The respondent opposed that application. The lower court dismissed LA. No. 735 of 1984. This CRP. is directed against the said order. 2. R.4 of the Rules under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 made by the High Court of Kerala provides that non-contentious proceedings shall include proceedings for obtaining probate and letters of administration where there is no contest as to the right there to. R.22 provides for filing a caveat and as per R.23, where a caveat is entered after an application has been made for grant of probate or letters of administration, the affidavit in support there of shall state the right and interest of the caveator, and the ground of objections to the application. Under R.26, when the caveat is thus filed the proceedings shall be ordered to be numbered as a suit in which the petitioner for probate or letters of administration shall be the plaintiff and the caveator shall be the defendant. The procedure in such suit shall be according to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, these rules are not applicable to proceedings for succession certificate, and as such there is no provision to convert such proceedings as suits. Ss 370 to 373 of the Indian Succession Act do not provide for converting an application for succession certificate into a suit. Under S.373, the provision is to decide the application in a summary manner and the question to be decided is the right to the succession certificate. Ss 370 to 373 of the Indian Succession Act do not provide for converting an application for succession certificate into a suit. Under S.373, the provision is to decide the application in a summary manner and the question to be decided is the right to the succession certificate. Sub-sections (3) and (4) of S.373 reads: "(3) If the judge cannot decide the right to the certificate without determining questions of law or fact which seem to be too intricate and difficult for determination in a summary proceeding, he may nevertheless grant a certificate to the applicant if he appears to be the person having prima facie the best title thereto. (4) When there are more applicants than one for a certificate, and it appears to the judge that more than one of such applicants are interested in the estate of the deceased, the judge may, in deciding to whom the certificate is to be granted, have regard to the extent, of interest and the fitness in other respects of the applicants." 3. Under these circumstances, there is no provision for Converting the proceedings into a suit and as such the dismissal of the petition is proper and correct. 4. However, the revision petitioner is more aggrieved with the following observation of the lower court: "Their contention is that the source for the money which is under deposit comes from a property which was held by the Tharvad of which the petitioner and the respondents were members. This is a matter which requires enquiry and declaration in a properly instituted suit and it is not a matter for enquiry in a summary proceeding like the present case. Therefore, prima facie the respondents have no right to claim anything on the amount under deposit." According to the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, the lower court ought to have conducted some kind of an enquiry before entering a prima facie finding regarding the claim set up by the revision petitioner. In support of this contention, learned counsel placed before me the following authorities: Dharmaya Sangappa v. Sayana Malapa (ILR. 21 Bombay 53). In that case, one Sangappa died leaving a fixed deposit amounting to Rs. 1,768/-leaving a widow, a daughter-in-law, a nephew and a brother. The brother applied to the District Court for a certificate to enable him to recover the fixed deposit amount. 21 Bombay 53). In that case, one Sangappa died leaving a fixed deposit amounting to Rs. 1,768/-leaving a widow, a daughter-in-law, a nephew and a brother. The brother applied to the District Court for a certificate to enable him to recover the fixed deposit amount. The widow, daughter-in-law and nephew opposed the application contending that the applicant and the deceased were not joint but separate and that the applicant had no claim whatsoever to the money in deposit. The District Judge refused the application observing that one party or the other has to prove his title to the amount in the ordinary way by suit in the Civil Court. Allowing the appeal, the Court observed as follows: "Although Clause.3 of that section appears new as enactment and in cases of difficulty and intricacy enables the Court to grant a certificate to the person having prima facie the best title thereto, Clause.1 says "the Court shall proceed to decide in a summary manner the right to the certificate." We think, therefore, that the District Judge erred in refusing the jurisdiction on the reasons he gives." 5. " By the order under challenge here, the lower court has only dismissed the prayer for converting the proceedings into a suit. The application for succession certificate is yet to be disposed of. There is no doubt that the lower court will have to make a summary enquiry before allowing the application for succession certificate. The observations in this order will not prevent the lower court from making such a summary enquiry. 6. In Gulabchand v. Moti Chatraji (ILR. 25 Bombay 523), Jenkins, C. J. observed as follows: "It is therefore obvious, it was contemplated that questions arising under this Act were to be determined by a summary proceeding. It may not be possible to precisely define a summary proceeding. It is enough for the present purpose to say that when the Legislature requires the Court to decide in a summary manner the right to the certificate, it contemplated a short enquiry, leading upto and resulting in a rapid decision, in contrast with the lengthy investigation which may be required for the more tardy determination of a regular suit." Ranade, J. in the same decision observed as follows: "The District Judge appears in this case to have entirely misconceived the true character of the proceeding under Act VII of 1889. The preamble of the Act shows that it was intended to facilitate the collection of debts due to deceased persons and to afford protection to parties paying such debts to the representatives of such persons. A person who claims the right to be representative of a deceased owner of the debt is empowered by S.6 to make the application and S.7, Clause.3, provides that when the Court cannot decide the right to the certificate without determining questions of law or, fact, which seem to it to be too intricate and difficult for determination in a summary proceeding, it may grant the certificate to the applicant if he appears to be the person having prima facie the best title thereto, and Clause.4 provides that where there are more applicants than one, it is to decide who has the greatest interest and who is most fit. The question of rival claims of the parties who profess to be adopted by Bai Dabi cannot be disposed of in an inquiry under this Act. and must be reserved for future litigation by the persons interested." 7. In Basanta Lal v. Parbati Koer (ILR. 31 Calcutta 133) and in Balmakund v. Kundan Kunwar (ILR. 29 Allahabad 452), the Calcutta and Allahabad High Courts respectively held that the court is bound to decide though in a summary manner the question as to the right to the certificate, especially when there is a conflict between two parties: 8. This Court in Ammini Ammal v. Lekshmi (AIR. 1957 Kerala 90) referred to the observations of Rankin, C. J. in Brojandra Sundar v. Niladrinath (AIR. 1929 Calcutta 661) and observed as follows: "The Act is thus not intended to afford litigant parties an opportunity of litigating contested questions of title to property. The court has no doubt to satisfy itself that the person to whom it grants the certificate has the prima facie right and for this purpose some enquiry may be necessary id many cases. But if on facts admitted by both parties the prima facie title to the certificate is clear, the Court can dispense with any enquiry. And after all no party is prejudiced because S.387 provides that the decision of a Court as to any question of right between the parties is in no way final and does not bar the trial of the same question in any other proceedings between the same parties." 9. And after all no party is prejudiced because S.387 provides that the decision of a Court as to any question of right between the parties is in no way final and does not bar the trial of the same question in any other proceedings between the same parties." 9. The Madras High Court also in In re N. Narasimhan (AIR. 1975 Mad. 330) adopted an earlier ruling in Hanumantha Rao v. Latchamma (AIR. 1926 Mad. 1193) and held that the test for purposes of S.283(1) (c) is that a person disputing the right of a testator to deal with the property as his own, cannot be properly regarded as having an interest in the estate of the deceased. A caveator is neither a plaintiff nor a defendant and cannot by mere citation be allowed to convert a probate proceeding into a suit for resolving disputed title. 10. From this it is clear that the court is only called upon to make a summary enquiry about the right to the succession certificate and not in respect of the title to the assets. Any enquiry relating to the claim of a caveator that the deceased was not the full owner or the real owner of the assets is alien to such proceedings. 11. Learned counsel for both sides attempted to establish that their parties have a strong case on merit. However, I am not examining either of these contentions as such an enquiry is not warranted at this stage. Suffice it to say that the order of the lower court does not require any interference. The lower court will proceed in accordance with law and dispose of the application for succession certificate. C.R.P. dismissed. No costs. Dismissed.