JUDGMENT : Surendra Narain Jha, J.- Both these appeals have been heard together as they arise out of the same JUDGMENT : and they are being disposed of by this common JUDGMENT :. 2. In Criminal Appeals No. 333 of 1977, the sole appellant has been convicted under section 395 of the Indian Penal Code (for short 'the Penal Code') and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years. 3. In Criminal Appeal No 356 of 1977, there are two appellants, who have been convicted under section 395 of the Penal Code and have been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years each. 4. The prosecution case, briefly stated, is that in the night between 5/6th July, 1967, at about 1 A.M., the informant Major Ved Prakash Nijhwan (P.W. 1) with his wife (P.W. 2) and a servant (not examined) were going towards Purnea from Bhagalpur in his car bearing Registration No. B. R. L. 3. When the said car reached in between mile post nos. 50-51 on the National High Way No. 31, the informant found the road blocked with boulder lying on the road as a result of which the informant (P.W, 1) had to stop his car. Within a minute, he saw about twenty persons armed with lethal weapons and country-made pistols coming from the right flank ditch who surrounded his car. The informant tried to runaway with his car in back gear, but he failed in his attempt. The miscreants broke the wind-shield and caught the informant (P.W. 1) and one of them assaulted him with a small hammer on his right shoulder. In the meantime, the miscreants took out the articles from his car including a wrist watch of his wife, (P.W. 2) and money. It is said that shortly thereafter one truck was seen coming from the opposite direction and then the miscreants fled away with the aforesaid wrist watch and money, in a boat. The informant, thereafter, along with the truck driver (not examined) went to Gogri police station and lodge a written report (Ext 1) about the occurrence. It Was stated in the report that the informant (P.W. 1), his wife (P.W 2) and the servant (not examined) could not identify the miscreants. On the basis of the aforesaid written report, the police drew up a formal first information report and instituted a case against unknown persons. It Was stated in the report that the informant (P.W. 1), his wife (P.W 2) and the servant (not examined) could not identify the miscreants. On the basis of the aforesaid written report, the police drew up a formal first information report and instituted a case against unknown persons. During the course of investigation, the house of-accused Kishun Gorhi and Sitaram Nagar (not appellants before me) were searched and some stolen articles were recovered, which were identified by the informant and his wife as belonging to them. In course of investigation, the police arrested one Sitaram Sharma alias Sitaram Nagar (not appellant before me), who confessed his guilt and named some persons, who had participated in the alleged dacoity. The police, after completing the investigation, submitted chargesheet on 3.1.1969 against seven persons including these three appellants of both these appeals. The Sub-divisional Magistrate took cognizance and after enquiry under Chapter XVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 18')8 committed the same case to the court of session directing the appellants and four other accused to stand their trial. The case was tried by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, 3rd Court, Monghyr, who, after considering the evidence on record, convicted all the seven accused persons including these three appellants of both these appeals under section 395 of the Penal Code and sentenced each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years. Two of the accused persons, namely, Sitaram Nagar and Kishun Gorhi, were further convicted under section 412 of the Penal Code and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years each. I am not concerned in these two appeals with the convictions and sentences of accused presons other than these appellants, before me. 5. The prosecution; in ORDER :to prove its case, has examined, in all seven witnesses. Out of them P.W. 1 is the informant himself. P.W. 2 is the informant's wife, who was accompanying him in the car at the time of alleged occurrence. P.W.3 is a witness on the seizure list. P. Ws. 4 and 5 are the two Magistrate who held the test identification parade. P.W. 6 is a Magistrate before whom a confession was made by one of the accused and P.W. 7 is also a formal witness, who had visited the place of occurrence with the police. 6. P.W.3 is a witness on the seizure list. P. Ws. 4 and 5 are the two Magistrate who held the test identification parade. P.W. 6 is a Magistrate before whom a confession was made by one of the accused and P.W. 7 is also a formal witness, who had visited the place of occurrence with the police. 6. The defence of the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.333 of 1977 is that he has been falsely implicated in the case much after the date of occurrence and was held as a suspect in the instant case at the instance of the Mukhiya of the village and Shiva Nandan Mishra (P.W.7). 7. So far as the defence of the other two appellants in Criminal Appeal No.356 of 1977 is concerned, their case is that they are innocent and they have been falsely Implicated in this case at the instance of co-accused Sitaram Sharma with whom they were not on good terms and also at the instance of the Mukhiya with whom they had enmity. 8. Learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellants in both these appeals has confined his argument to the case of only these three appellants. So far as Criminal Appeal No. 333 of 1977 is concerned, his submission is that the conviction and sentence of the sale appellant is bad in law and fit to be set aside, because he has been convicted only on the identification of a sale witness and, that too, after the lapse of a long time. Learned counsel has further submitted that this appellant was put on test identification parade on 28.11.67 and he was identified by only P. W. 1. P.W.2 i.e. the wife of P.W. l and his servant who were also accompanying them in the car could not identify this appellant. According to him, the conviction based on the sole identification after the lapse of a long time cannot be sustained. I have examined the records of the case. I find that this appellant was put on Test Identification Parade on 28.11.67. From the record, it appears that on 23.11.67, this appellant was arrested in a proceeding bearing case no. 449M of 1967 under section 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Learned counsel vehemently argued that when this appellant was arrested in the aforesaid case, he was produced in a test identification parade on 28.11.67 by the police. From the record, it appears that on 23.11.67, this appellant was arrested in a proceeding bearing case no. 449M of 1967 under section 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Learned counsel vehemently argued that when this appellant was arrested in the aforesaid case, he was produced in a test identification parade on 28.11.67 by the police. Prior to that date, he was never suspected by the police just to implicate him. It is pertinent to note here that the Investigating Officer has not been examined in this case by the prosecution, who could have been the best person to throw light on this point. In the test identification parade, which was held on 28.11.67, when this appellant was produced, out of the three witnesses, only P.W. 1 is said to have identified him. The other two persons who were accompanying tile informant (P.W.1) could not be able to identify this appellant. 9. In the instant case, I may mention here that the informant (P. W. 1) in his initial report or in oral evidence did not give any description of the dacoits who he was alleged to have identified in the dacoity nor did any of the other two persons who were accompanying the informant in the car at the time of alleged occurrence, namely, P.W. 2, the wife of the informant and his servant give any indentifying mark. In absence of any such description, it is not safe to convict any person on the basis of a sole identification in which case the reasonable possibility of mistake in identification cannot be excluded. In Wakil Singh & ors v. State of Bihar [1981 B.B.C.J. 138 (S.C.): 1982 PLJR 83 (SC)], the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "The High Court also ignored the fact that the identification was made at the T.I. parade about 3½ months after the dacoity and in view of such a long lapse of time, it is not possible for any human being to remember the features of the accused and he is, therefore, very likely to commit mistake." In the instant case also, the occurrence is said to have taken place on 5/6th July, 1967 and the test identification parade in which this appellant was identified was held on 28.11.67. In that view of the matter, it is not safe to uphold the conviction of this appellant on the identification of only one witness. In that view of the matter, it is not safe to uphold the conviction of this appellant on the identification of only one witness. 10. So far as the case of the other two appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 357 of 1977 is concerned, it was submitted by the learned counsel that these two appellants have been convicted by the learned 3rd Assistant Sessions Judge only on the statement of the co-accused, which is bad in law. 11. I have perused the impugned JUDGMENT : and I find that the learned 3rd Assistant Sessions Judge, while examining the case of these two appellants, has held that appellants Bhola Baitha and Ganesh Sharma were also named in unequivocal words by accused Sitaram Nagar in the course of his statement under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and there is no reason why they should not be convicted. It is relevant to mention here that this is an admitted tact that these two appellants have not been identified by any of the witnesses in several test identification parades held in this case. They have been convicted simple on the statement of one of the co-accused. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants contended that no conviction can be based solely on the confessional statement of a co-accused. It is well settled that no conviction can be based on the confession of a co-accused. In the instant case, there is no other evidence against these two appellants besides this. If the statement of the co-accused is left out of consideration, there remains nothing against these two appellants. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case in respect of these two appellants, minutely, I find some force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants. The trial court has convicted these two appellants solely on the basis of the statements of a co-accused. Therefore, I am unable to uphold the conviction of these two appellants as well. 12. In the result, both these appeals are allowed, conviction and sentence passed by the impugned JUDGMENT : against the appellants of these two appeals are hereby set aside and they are accordingly acquitted. They are, thus, discharged from the liabilities of their bail-bonds. Therefore, I am unable to uphold the conviction of these two appellants as well. 12. In the result, both these appeals are allowed, conviction and sentence passed by the impugned JUDGMENT : against the appellants of these two appeals are hereby set aside and they are accordingly acquitted. They are, thus, discharged from the liabilities of their bail-bonds. Before parting with this JUDGMENT :s, I may state that the factum of dacoity has not been challenged in this case and I was informed at the Bar that the other accused persons have not preferred any appeal against their convictions and sentences.