JUDGMENT D.N. Jha, J. - This writ petition has been directed against the order dated 19.10.1983 passed by the Vth Additional District Judge, Lucknow allowing the revision preferred by opposite party. 2. The dispute relates to House No. 501/61 situated in Umrao Bahadur Road, Hasanganj, and Lucknow. The opposite party Smt. Sachi Kumari Misra is admittedly the landlady. The tenant was Dr. K.C. Ojha. Dr. Ojha was in occupation of the ground floor on a monthly rent of Rs. 130/- while the first floor was occupied by Dr. A.N. Dwivedi on a monthly rent of Rs. 175/-. The first floor of the house was got vacated by the landlady through an application made u/s 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The landlady being old wanted the ground floor and it is alleged that before the Prescribed Authority the alternative accommodation was offered by the landlady to Dr. K.C. Ojha. Dr. K.C. Ojha in pursuance of the order passed by the Prescribed Authority entered into possession over the first floor from the ground floor and the ground floor was occupied by the landlady on 25th March, 1977. It may be mentioned that quantum of rent was not determined by the Prescribed Authority. However, Dr. Ojha tendered the rent at the rate of Rs. 10/- per month which was obviously a ridiculous amount and was refused by the landlady. After a lapse of few months, the landlady served a notice for arrears of rent and ejectment and thereafter she filed a suit in the court of Judge, Small Causes. The learned Judge Small Causes held that the Defendant was not liable to pay Rs. 175/- per month as rent as the Prescribed Authority by allotment order bad directed the parties to get the standard rent fixed. The parties did not get the standard rent fixed, hence the Plaintiff was not entitled to claim rent @ of Rs. 175/- per month. He further held that the Defendant cannot be held as defaulter of rent. On these findings he dismissed the suit. The Respondent landlady went up in the revision and the said revision has been allowed. This is how this petition is before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. 175/- per month. He further held that the Defendant cannot be held as defaulter of rent. On these findings he dismissed the suit. The Respondent landlady went up in the revision and the said revision has been allowed. This is how this petition is before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the averments and cross averments made by the contesting parties. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner urged that since no standard rent was fixed, therefore, there was no agreed rent and the suit for ejectment could not be decreed on the ground that Petitioner had defaulted in paying the arrears of rent. I am not impressed by this argument. The standard rent has been defined in Section 3(k) of the Act which reads as under: 3(k) "standard rent", subject to the provisions of Sections 6, 8 and 10 means (i) in the case of a building governed by the old Act and let out at the time of the commencement of this Act (a) where there is both an agreed rent payable there for at such commencement as well as annual rent which in this Act has the same meaning as in Section 2(f) of the old Act reproduced in the Schedule the agreed rent or the reasonable annual rent plus 25 per cent thereon, which ever, is greater ; where there is no agreed rent, but there is a reasonable annual rent, the reasonable rent plus 25 per cent thereon ; where there is neither agreed rent nor reasonable annual rent, the rent as determined u/s 9 ; (ii) in any other case, the assessed letting value, for the time being in force, and in the absence of assessment, the rent determined u/s 9". It has been admitted that there was a fixed assessment of the house. It is also admitted that the assessed rent had also not been paid by Dr. Ojha. It may be mentioned that during the trial Dr. Ojha died and his heirs stepped into the shoes. Section 3(f) defines assessment as under: (f) " assessment ", in relation to a building means the assessment or proportionate assessment, as the case may be, of the letting value thereof by the local authority having jurisdiction and " assessed " shall be construed accordingly 4. Ojha died and his heirs stepped into the shoes. Section 3(f) defines assessment as under: (f) " assessment ", in relation to a building means the assessment or proportionate assessment, as the case may be, of the letting value thereof by the local authority having jurisdiction and " assessed " shall be construed accordingly 4. It may be mentioned that a tenant is bound to pay the rent for use and occupation of the premises. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner could not satisfy me as to how the rent of Rs. 10/- was tendered which was previously occupied on a rent of Rs. 175/- per month. The learned revisional court took real pains and adjudicated the dispute. In my opinion there was no error in determining the rent as Rs. 175/- which was to be paid by the Petitioner. 5. Learned Counsel invited my attention to the order passed by the Prescribed Authority and urged that the rent was disputed by Dr. Ojha and the authorities had left the question open. I have perused the order dated 14.10.1976 passed by the Prescribed Authority and I find that there is a clear cut observation by the Prescribed Authority that what should be the rent of the premises is not to be adjudicated at this stage of consideration of release of an accommodation There is nothing in the order from which it can be interred that it was for the landlord to get the rent fixed or determined by some competent authority. The standard rent has already been defined above and liability to pay the same was there. If this building had not been assessed, probably, a case could have been made out by the Petitioner but unfortunately in the instant case assessment of the building had been made and hence the liability was there on the tenant to pay the same to the landlord. This argument also finds support from Section 9 which relates to determination of standard rent. This argument also finds support from Section 9 which relates to determination of standard rent. Sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Act reads as under: In the case of building to which the old Act was applicable and which is let out at the time of the commencement of this Act in respect of which there is neither any reasonable annual rent nor any agreed rent or in any other case where there is neither any agreed rent nor any assessment in force, the District Magistrate shall, on any application being made in that behalf, determine the standard rent. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner could not point out that the case of the Petitioner fell within the ambit of determination of standard rent. In this view of the matter the submission advanced by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is totally devoid of merit. 6. It was also contested that the learned Additional District Judge while hearing the revision could not shift the evidence. This argument also in view of decision of the Supreme Court does not stand to reason. There are cases in which the revisional court can shift the evidence if the Judge Small Causes has failed to look into the evidence on record. It may be mentioned that the Supreme Court in Jag dish Prasad v. Angoori Devi, 1984 AWC 375 has laid down a proposition that in certain circumstances the revisional court is entitled to shift the evidence particularly where the trial court labored under misconception of law. In the instant case the principal question non payment of rent was disposed of by the Judge Small Causes under a total misconception of law. The view, therefore, taken by the revisional court is correct and in accordance with law. 7. Lastly it was urged that there is paucity of accommodation in the city of Lucknow and, therefore, sometime may be allowed to the Petitioner to find out an alternative accommodation. The time has already been granted from time to time but still in view of the acute shortage of accommodation I accept the prayer for sometime to vacate the premises as requested on behalf of the Petitioners. I, therefore, allow time to the Petitioners to vacate the premises on or before 31st December, 1985 on the condition that they will regularly keep on paying damages at the rate of Rs. I, therefore, allow time to the Petitioners to vacate the premises on or before 31st December, 1985 on the condition that they will regularly keep on paying damages at the rate of Rs. 175/- per month for the use and occupation of the premises. Secondly they will not cause any damage to the property. In the event of default of any of these conditions it will be open to the Respondents to execute the decree. If the Petitioners fail to vacate the premises on or before 31st December, 1.985 the Judge Small Causes will evict the Petitioners and put the Respondent into possession by such force as is necessary. 8. In view of aforesaid discussion there is no merit in this petition which is accordingly dismissed but the Petitioners are allowed to continue to stay in the premises till 31st December, 1985 on terms and conditions mentioned above.