JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This is a tenants writ petition preferred against the judgment of the Vth Additional District Judge, Bijnor, dated July 9, 1982, dismissing his appeal filed under section 22 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The Prescribed Authority by the order dated 30th May, 1981 had allowed the application of the respondent no. 3 for release filed under section 21 of the Act. Against this order, the tenant-petitioner had preferred an appeal. The appeal was dismissed as stated above and thus the petitioner has come to this Court by means of the present writ petition. 3. S.K. Gupta, respondent no. 3 moved an application under section 21 of the Act against the petitioner claiming that the premises in question is required by him for his residential purposes. He alleged that he had only one room on the ground floor attached with latrine, bathroom and kitchen, and his family consisted of himself, his wife, his son, aged about 14 years and a daughter aged about 12 years. Both of these children, the respondent no 3 claimed, were getting education at that time in XIth and VIII class respectively. He claimed that the accommodation, in which he was residing was wholly insufficient to meet his requirement. With regard to petitioner-tenant, the landlord respondent no. 3 asserted that he was possessed of a plot at Najibabad, in the name of his wife, in which foundations had been laid. One room had already been constructed. Respondent no. 3 alleged, apart from the aforesaid plot, the petitioner had a big double storied shop in chowk Bagnar, Najibabad and there was one big residential room on the first floor which could be occupied by the petitioner-tenant. 4. Both the parties adduced evidence in the shape of affidavits. The Prescribed Authority held that the need of the landlord was bona fide and allowed the application by further finding that the landlord was likely to suffer greater hardship, if the application was rejected. The appeal preferred by the petitioner-tenant came up for hearing on 5th July, 1982 before the learned Addl. District Judge. On which date, an application for adjournment was made by the petitioner, on the ground that his counsel Narain Krishna Sharma was not available and he had gone out on his personal work, therefore, the hearing be adjourned. The appeal preferred by the petitioner-tenant came up for hearing on 5th July, 1982 before the learned Addl. District Judge. On which date, an application for adjournment was made by the petitioner, on the ground that his counsel Narain Krishna Sharma was not available and he had gone out on his personal work, therefore, the hearing be adjourned. For himself as well the petitioner claimed that he was not in town on that date. The application for adjournment was rejected by the Additional District Judge by the order passed on 5-7-1982. While rejecting the application, the learned Additional District Judge found that since Sri S.K. Jain Advocate was also a counsel for the petitioner, no ground for adjournment had been made out. He proceeded to hear the appeal on merits. As nobody appeared on behalf of the petitioner, the arguments only of respondent no. 3 were heard. 5. After perusing the record and hearing the counsel for respondent no. 3, he found that the judgment of the Prescribed Authority, holding that the need of the respondent no. 3 was bona fide and that greater hardship was likely to happen to respondent no. 3, in case his application for release was rejected, was quite correct. Considering this view, he dismissed the appeal aforesaid. 6. The first contention of learned counsel for the petitioner was that under Order 41 Rule 17 C.P.C. as amended, by C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1976, the appellate authority had no jurisdiction to decide the appeal on merits. What could the appellate authority do at the most, was to dismiss the same in default. 7. For considering the aforesaid argument, reliance has been placed on the following Explanation, which was added by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act 1976 : "Explanation - Nothing in this sub-rule shall be construed as empowering the court to dismiss the appeal on merits." It appears that there was conflict of judicial decisions on the question whether if the appellant does not appear when the appeal is called for hearing, the Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal and decide the same on merits. In Babu Ram v. Bhagwan Din and another, (AIR 1966, Allahabad, page 1 (Full Bench), the view taken was that the appeal can be decided on merits. In Babu Ram v. Bhagwan Din and another, (AIR 1966, Allahabad, page 1 (Full Bench), the view taken was that the appeal can be decided on merits. However, many other Courts including the Patna in D.D. Singh v. Ram Naresh, (AIR 1973 Patna, 166) held in such an event the appeal could not be decided on merits, the normal course open to the court of appeal was to dismiss it in default. To resolve the conflict, the legislature intervened and added the aforesaid Explanation. The Explanation aforesaid makes it clear that in the event of the appellant absenting on the date when the appeal is called for hearing, it has no jurisdiction to dismiss the same. However, to me, it appears that even the decision of the appellate court given on merits, would be liable to be construed as a decision of the appeal in default. In that event, the remedy of the defaulting appellant would be to move an application for its restoration under Order 41 Rule 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This appears to me to be so when an appellant for whose absence the appeal is dismissed, could not be said to be present in the court. Accordingly, the application would be maintainable for restoring the appeal of its original number. This view has been supported by the decision reported in Ghulam Qadir and others v. Sikander, (1981 J&K, Page 30). These observations made by me, may not be construed as meaning that in the event, whenever an appellant absents himself, the court is obliged or bound to restore the appeal. I wish to make it clear that it is not my intention. If the appellants conduct is found to be such, which does not entitle him to the restoration of the appeal, the court will be fully justified in refusing the request, if made for the same. No party has a right to get adjournment of an appeal or any other litigation or any other proceeding as a matter of right. He will not also be permitted to seek for adjournment utilising it one of the strategies in the litigation. Adjournments can be sought for if there are genuine and bona fide grounds. No litigant has a right to get a case adjourned as of right. 8. In the instant case, the appellate court decided the case on merits also. He will not also be permitted to seek for adjournment utilising it one of the strategies in the litigation. Adjournments can be sought for if there are genuine and bona fide grounds. No litigant has a right to get a case adjourned as of right. 8. In the instant case, the appellate court decided the case on merits also. I am satisfied with the judgment of the Prescribed Authority that it suffers from no error, I would have thought to give the direction to the petitioner to move an application for setting aside the judgment of the appellate authority, but to me it appearson its perusal, that there is no merit in this writ petition. The Prescribed Authority rightly held that the need of respondent no. 3 was bona fide and further that he was likely to suffer greater hardship. It may be pointed out only for the purposes of completing the record of this case that the appellate court also had endorsed all the findings. The endorsement of the appellant court of the findings of the Prescribed Authority, are fully justified. 9. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed, but to enable the petitioner to arrange for an alternative accommodation, the learned counsel for the petitioner prays for and is granted six months time. He will vacate the premises upto 31st March, 1986 and handover the possession of the premises to respondent no. 3. In between the two dates, whatever is the rent, would be paid by the petitioner. No order as to costs.