JUDGMENT K.N. Misra , J. - Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that one Sri Ram Naresb, the opposite party No. 4, was served with a notice under Section 10(2) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act (for short the Act) by the Prescribed Authority. The Prescribed Authority initially held that the total area of the land comprised in the holding of the opposite party No. 4 was within the ceiling limit applicable to him. The notice was, therefore, discharged. Against that order the State of Uttar Pradesh preferred appeal before the District Judge, Lakhimpur Kheri, which was allowed by the District Judge vide judgment and order dated August 11, 1975 and an area of 7,422 acres of land comprised in plot No. 220-M was declared surplus. The petitioners Daya Ram and others preferred objection before the Prescribed Authority on 20th January, 1976 asserting that the entire plot No. 220 measuring 12.57 acres has been transferred by opposite party No. 4 in their favour through registered by sale-deed dated 23rd August, 1974 far a valuable sale consideration of Rs. 30,000. They also asserted to be in possession over the said land over since them. It was thus, contended by the petitioners in their objection that the said plot is liable to be excluded from being declared surplus. This objection was rejected by the Prescribed Authority vide order dated 26th March, 1976. The Prescribed Authority observed that since surplus land in respect of the holding of opposite party No. 4 has been determined by the appellate authority, aDd, as such, the present application moved by the petitioners is not maintainable. The petitioners, thereupon, approached this court against order dated 26th March, 1976 passed by the Prescribed Authority. In the Writ Petition No. 1430 of 1976 filed by the petitioners a stay order was also passed staying the operation of the order dated 26th March, 1976 and the petitioners' dispossession was stayed. The petitioners, thereupon, approached this court against order dated 26th March, 1976 passed by the Prescribed Authority. In the Writ Petition No. 1430 of 1976 filed by the petitioners a stay order was also passed staying the operation of the order dated 26th March, 1976 and the petitioners' dispossession was stayed. The said writ petition was, however, dismissed by order dated 2nd July, 1980 passed by Hon'ble S.C. Mathur, J. With regard to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Prescribed Authority should have excluded the area covered by the sale-deed and should have declared some other plot of opposite party No. 4 to be surplus land it was observed that it is hardly material to them whether the surplus area is taken out from one parcel of land or from another parcel thereof. It was open to the petitioners to press the plea before the District Judge by filing appeal under Section 13. The learned counsel, however, argued that under Section 13 the appeal could be preferred only within 30 days from the date of the order and so if they were to file the appeal now they would be faced with the question of limitation. It was held that it is true that the period of limitation has been prescribed under Section 13 of the Act, but under Section 42 of the Act the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 have been made applicable to all proceedings, including appeals, under the Act. If the petitioners make out a good case under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, they would be able to obtain relief from the appellate court. The petitioners themselves have to blame for the lapse of limitation. 2. It is averred in the writ petition that the petitioners could not know about the decision in the writ petition, and, as such, they could not prefer appeal under Section 13 against the order dated March 26, 1976 passed by the Prescribed Authority immediately after the decision in the said writ petition. It has also been averred that the petitioners came t& know about the aforesaid judgment passed in the writ petition only on 28th May, 1981 when the petitioners came to Lucknow to enquire about the fate of the writ petition. It has also been averred that the petitioners came t& know about the aforesaid judgment passed in the writ petition only on 28th May, 1981 when the petitioners came to Lucknow to enquire about the fate of the writ petition. They thereupon immediately preferred appeal on 30th May, 1981 along with an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, supported by an affidavit. The learned District Judge, however, refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal being time barred vide order dated September 19, 1981. The petitioners have challenged this order in this writ petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the petitioners have been contesting the case with due diligence and the period during which the writ petition was pending would have been excluded because they bad filed writ petition against the order dated 26th March, 1976 under legal advice given by their counsel, who was of the opinion that against said order writ petition could be filed in this Hon'ble Court. Learned counsel further contended that the District Judge has erred in holding that the petitions have not acted diligently and in good faith all along from March 26, 1976 to May 30, 1981 when they preferred appeal. His contention was that since the petitioners were deprived of their land which they had purchased bona fide and for valuable consideration, the learned District Judge should have condoned the delay and should have considered the question regarding declaring some other land of opposite party No. 4 as surplus land instead of declaring an area of 7.422 acres of plot No. 220-M. 4. In reply learned standing counsel urged that the District Judge hat committed no error in rejecting the appeal as time barred because the petitioners could not explain the delay in filing the appeal between the period from 26th March, 1981 to 30th May, 1981. He, thus, urged that no case is made out for interference with the order passed by the District Judge. 5. I have carefully considered the aforesaid arguments and have perused the order passed by the District Judge and in my opinion there it much substance in what has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 6. He, thus, urged that no case is made out for interference with the order passed by the District Judge. 5. I have carefully considered the aforesaid arguments and have perused the order passed by the District Judge and in my opinion there it much substance in what has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 6. A perusal of order dated September 19, 1991 passed by the District Judge, Kheri rejecting the appeal as time barred would indicate that by non-speaking order the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been rejected. It has been observed by the learned District Judge that it does not appear that the applicants Daya Ram and others had acted diligently and in good faith all along from March 26, 1981 (sic March 26, 1976) to May 30, 1981 in dealing with the order dated March 26, 1976 now challenged in appeal. It is not disputed that against order dated 26th March, 1976 the petitioners had preferred Writ Petition No. 1430 of 1976 in this court. It was admitted and stay order was also passed in favour of the petitioners. The petitioners were, therefore, diligently pursuing their remedy in good faith. This writ petition was disposed of by order dated 2nd July, 1980 with the observation noticed above. According to it the petitioners were required to hie appeal under Section 13 before the District Judge seeking relief on the question regarding declaration of some other plot as surplus land of the holding of opposite party No. 4 instead of plot No. 220-M, which the petitioners arc said to have purchased through registered sale-deed. This question could be considered by the District Judge in the appeal. The petitioners had preferred appeal on 30th May, 1981 and it was indicated in the application for condonation of delay that the petitioners could not know about the decision in the writ petition earlier. In these circumstances, there appears to be no laches on the part of the petitioners, who were, in my opinion, acting diligently and in good faith in pursuing the remedy available to them for getting some other plot of the holding of opposite party No. 4 to be declared surplus instead of the plot which they bad purchased from opposite party No. 4 Ram Naresh through registered sale-deed dated August 23, 1974 for a valuation consideration of Rs. 30,000. 30,000. This question could be gone into on merits by the learned District Judge, Kheri. The learned District Judge, Kheri has, thus, committed an error in not condoning the delay and the impugned order has, thus, resulted in grave miscarriage of justice and deserves to be quashed. The delay in filing the appeal deserved to be condoned and it is accordingly condoned. 7. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated September 19, 1981 passed by the District Judge, Kheri is hereby quashed and he is directed to restore the appeal filed by the petitioners and decide it on merits. 8. No order as to costs.