JUDGMENT H.N. Seth, A.C.J. 1. Petitioners, Committee of Management of Santosh Kumar Memorial Inter College, Gangola Dataganj, Budaun and Sri Onkar Singh, Manager of the College, are aggrieved by the order of the District Inspector of Schools, Budaun dated 27.9.1984 disapproving their action in suspending Sri Ram pal Singh, Principal of the College (Respondent No. 2). They have, therefore, approached this Court for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The Committee of Management of the Institution passed a resolution on 27.8.1984 placing Sri Rampal Singh (Respondent No. 2) under suspension, and served a charge sheet, leveling as many as 27 charges, upon him on 28.8.1984. As required by Section 16G(6) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, it also sent a report in that regard to the District Inspector of Schools Budaun (Respondent No. 1). The District Inspector of Schools vide his order dated 27.9.1984 disapproved the action of the Managing Committee on the ground that it did not, while forwarding its resolution dated 27.8.1984, send along with it the entire evidence in support of the charges leveled against the Principal. 3. The Petitioners filed the present petition on 10.10.1984 and prayed that the order dated 27.9.1984 be quashed. The Principal (Respondent No. 2) appeared before the Court, and prayed that he should be heard before any orders regarding admission of the writ petition were made. The court permitted the parties to exchange their affidavits and directed that the petition be listed for admission thereafter. It also passed an interim order to the following effect: Meanwhile until further orders of this Court the operation of the impugned order dated 27.9.1984 is stayed. If, however, Respondent No. 2 has already joined, he is restrained from interfering with the office of the Principal of the Petitioners' Institution. 4. While filing the counter affidavit, Sri Ram pal Singh (Respondent No. 2) also moved an application on 15.11.1984 contending that by lapse of time, relief claimed in the petition had become in fructuous, and prayed that the interim order dated 10.10.1984 should be ' vacated. The petition was listed for admission on 1.4.1985 when the court made an order admitting the petition and granting time to the other Respondent, namely, the District Inspector of Schools, to file a counter affidavit. It did not, at that time, pass any specific orders on the application dated 15.11.1984, filed by Respondent No. 2. The petition was listed for admission on 1.4.1985 when the court made an order admitting the petition and granting time to the other Respondent, namely, the District Inspector of Schools, to file a counter affidavit. It did not, at that time, pass any specific orders on the application dated 15.11.1984, filed by Respondent No. 2. Instead, it made a fresh interim order which ran thus: In the meantime the Petitioner Committee of Management is directed to pay the subsistence allowance of the Respondent No. 2 as Principal as permissible under the Act within 30 days from today for the period during which he has been under suspension and shall also keep on paying every month. In case of default, the interim order shall stand automatically vacated. The application dated 15.11.1984 filed by Respondent No. 2 was eventually put up for orders before the Court on 12.8.1985. The Respondent again pressed the plea that as the impugned order had, by lapse of time, come to an end, the petition had become in fructuous and that it should be dismissed accordingly. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners objected to consideration of the prayer made in tae application' on the ground that the question whether or not the relief claimed in the petition had become in fructuous by lapse of time, was considered by the Court while passing orders for admission of the writ petition on 1.4.1985. In the circumstances, the application for the purpose moved by the Respondent prior to the date of admission cannot now be countenanced. The Court accepted the plea raised by the Petitioners and held that, in the circumstances, it was not necessary for it to pass any further order on the application dated 15.11.1984, but it made it clear that if any fresh application for the purpose is moved, the same would be dealt with by the appropriate bench. 5. Respondent No. 2 then moved yet another application on 28.8.1985 praying for the dismissal of the writ petition on the ground that the relief claimed therein had been, by efflux of time rendered in fructuous. The Petitioners strongly objected to the consideration of the said application at this stage on the ground that the similar request made by the Respondent had already been rejected. 6. The Petitioners strongly objected to the consideration of the said application at this stage on the ground that the similar request made by the Respondent had already been rejected. 6. Instead of going into the question whether, in the circumstances of the case, the prayer made by Respondent No. 2 in his application dated 16.9.1985 can be countenanced, we, with the consent of the parties, decided to dispose of the main petition itself. At this stage learned Counsel for Respondent No. 2 again requested the Court to, before considering various grounds raised in the petition, first of all go into the question as to whether or not, in the circumstances of the case, the relief prayed -for by the Petitioners can be granted at this stage. He contended that as the suspension order passed against the Respondent has since lapsed and any interference with the order refusing to approve the action of the Managing Committee in that regard will be of no consequence in so far as legal rights of the Respondent is concerned, the petition deserves to be dismissed as in fructuous. 7. We find that there is force in this submission. Similar question came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Mahila Vidya Prachar Samiti, Bahadurgani, Prayag v. The Regional Inspectors of Girls Schools IV Region, Allahabad, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 61 of' 1977 decided on 11.4.1978. This Court, while dealing with similar submissions observed thus: Section 16G(5) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act empowers the Managing Committee to place the Head of Institution or a teacher under suspension, if it is of opinion that the charges levelled against him are serious enough-to make his dismissal, the removal or reduction in rank or that his continuance in office is likely to hamper or prejudice the conduct of disciplinary proceedings against him, or a criminal case for an offence involving moral turpitude is either under investigation or is pending inquiry or trial. Sub-section thereof lays down that no order of suspension shall, unless approved in writing by the Inspector, remain in force for more than 60 days from the date of commencement of the U.P. Secondary Education Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 or, as the case may be from the date of such order and the order passed by the Respondent in that regard shall be final and shall not be liable to be questioned in any court of law. It, therefore, follows that if an order of suspension has not been approved by the Inspector of Schools for any reason whatsoever it automatically lapses after 60 days. Even if the submission of the Petitioners is accepted and it is held that the impugned order passed by Respondent No. 1 deserved to be quashed, it may not result either in revival of the suspension order or in its continuance on the ground that the action of the Managing Committee in placing Respondent No. 2 under suspension stands approved. In this view of the matter whether the impugned order stands or is set aside it would make no difference with regard to lapsing of the suspension order after 19.11.1976. Quashing of the order will accordingly afford no relief to the Petitioner. Jurisdiction under Article 226 is not to be exercised merely on academic considerations. It is well settled that High Court does not issue a writ which is futile and is of no consequence. In the circumstances, the preliminary objection prevails and the petition deserves to be dismissed without going into the controversy with regard to the order of the Regional Inspectors of Girls Schools disapproving the action of the Managing Committee raised in the petition. 8. In the instant case also Respondent No. 2 was placed under suspension on 28.8.1984. The order placing Respondent No. 2 under suspension was disapproved by the District Inspector of Schools on 27.9.1984. It is thus obvious that suspension of Respondent No. 2 which is dated 28.8.1984 has not been approved within 60 days of the order of suspension. 8. In the instant case also Respondent No. 2 was placed under suspension on 28.8.1984. The order placing Respondent No. 2 under suspension was disapproved by the District Inspector of Schools on 27.9.1984. It is thus obvious that suspension of Respondent No. 2 which is dated 28.8.1984 has not been approved within 60 days of the order of suspension. Viewed in the light of the observations made by a Division Bench of this Court in Manila Vidya Prachar Samiti, Bahadurganj, Prayag's case (supra) quashing of the order, will afford no relief whatsoever to the Petitioners, for the reason that even if the order disapproving the Petitioner's action in placing Respondent No. 2 under suspension is quashed, such quashing would not review the suspension of Respondent No. 2 which has, in the absence of approval given by the District Inspector of Schools, already lapsed on expiry of 00 days of the resolution passed by the Managing Committee on 28.8.1984. 9. In the result, we do not consider it necessary to go into the merits of the controversy raised in the writ petition and to decide whether or not, in the circumstances of the case, the District Inspector of Schools was justified in disapproving the action of the Petitioners on the ground that they had failed to submit to him all relevant records in connection with various charges levelled against Respondent No. 2. The relief claimed in the petition has thus, by lapse of time, become in fructuous. It is made clear that this order does not, in any way stand in the way of the Petitioners in taking appropriate proceedings against Respondent No. 2, and to, if it is permissible to them, again place Respondent No. 2 under suspension in accordance with law. 10. Subject to the observations made above, the petition fails and is dismissed; but without making any orders as to costs.