JUDGMENT - MASODKAR B.A., J.: - These six petitions can be disposed of by common order, as raising common questions with regard to the orders made by the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu upon request by the Union of India under section 4-A(1) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, terminating the mining leases before the period of each of the mining lease had run out. 2. For the purpose of these petitions, it is not in dispute that the leases are granted concerning the mineral covered by the provisions of section 4-A and further that the leases were for the period which did not expire when the impugned order was made. Each of the petitioners under the lease was entitled to mine silica-sand from the dunes or beaches that lie within the territory of Goa. It is not necessary to set out all the details of these leases. We purport to set out the admitted position with regard to the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 170 of 1983. The petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 therein claim to be carrying on business of mining silica-sand. After due application for extraction of that mineral over an area of 120 hectares, lease was sanctioned to them. The said lease area is situated at villages Cavelossim and Carmona in Salcete Taluka of South Goa. The lease was granted by an order dated 2nd August, 1969 and due instrument in that regard came to be registered by 30th October, 1969 under Registration No. 1145. The lease was to expire by 29th October, 1989. Somewhat similar are the facts with regard to each petition. Suffice it to mention, therefore, that when the impugned orders were made under section 4-A(1) the lease under the original sanction had not expired and the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu purported to follow the mandatory request from the Central Government so as to prematurely terminate the said lease. 3. Mr. Usgaocar and Mr. Mario Bruto D'Costa, appearing for the petitioners, made four common points. Firstly, they contend that the provisions of section 4-A(1) have no retrospective operation so as to enable the Government to make an order with regard to the existing leases. In other words, the contention is that the orders with regard to premature termination of mining leases is being made on the basis that section 4-A(1) retrospectively operates. Firstly, they contend that the provisions of section 4-A(1) have no retrospective operation so as to enable the Government to make an order with regard to the existing leases. In other words, the contention is that the orders with regard to premature termination of mining leases is being made on the basis that section 4-A(1) retrospectively operates. Secondly, it is contended in the group of petitions in which Mr. Usgaocar is appearing, that the orders have been passed mala fide. In the group of petitions wherein Mr. D'Costa appears, the ground of mala fide is not direct, but it is submitted that as the other leases were being prematurely terminated the petitioners therein were also being subjected to the same treatment and as such the termination is affected by mala fides. Thirdly , it is contended that before making the order, neither of the Governments had given any show cause notice to any of the mine holders and thus the process of making the order is affected by reason of violation of the principles of natural justice. Lastly, the counsel contended that such orders should be made as speaking orders so that the parties concerned are aware of the reasons as to why the orders are being made. 4. As far as the ground of mala fide is concerned, the allegations contained in the petition mainly relate to one Mr. Naik said to be the Minister for Industries and Mines and his alleged strained relations with the petitioners since 1970. These allegations are available in paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the first of the petitions and on the basis thereof it is contended that the present action under section 4-A(1) by the Central Government was vitiated by reasons of those mala fides. We have carefully gone through the allegations on which reliance was placed. We find it difficult to hold that those allegations contain any averment against the Central Government or any of its officials. Said Mr. Naik is also not arrayed as a party. Further under the provisions of section 4-A, it is the Central Government which is required to form an opinion so as to make a mandatory request to the State Government for the purpose of taking steps to terminate prematurely a mining lease. Allegations contained in all these paragraphs do not contain even a whisper against any of the officials of the Central Government. Allegations contained in all these paragraphs do not contain even a whisper against any of the officials of the Central Government. Charges of mala fide are easy to make but difficult to establish. By its very nature these are quasi-criminal and require clear proof. We have hardly any material to connect Mr. Naik with the request of the Central Government. We, therefore, do not find any substance in this charge. 5. That takes us to the other three submissions which are legal submissions. As far as the first of the submissions is concerned, the question is of mere application. It is no doubt true that when the leases were granted to the petitioners the provisions of section 4-A were not on the statute book, and the power for such premature termination of the mining lease was conferred upon the Government by amendment that was inserted by Act No. 56 of 1972. The effect of that statutory amendment is clearly to introduce and spell out on enabling power in favour of the Government which is the grantor of such leases so as to provide for premature termination of the mining lease on stated reason by stated modality. Such provision for termination of mining lease by reason of the statute in fact should be operative against all the leases. That is plain in the language of the section. The submission that in effect section 4-A(1) is retrospective does not appear to us to be sound. What section 4-A(1) does is to enable statutorily after it comes into force, the concerned Governments to make an order for premature termination of the lease. The very fact it operates upon the lease shows that the lease must be in force. In substance, section 4-A(1) is a statutory term added to every lease. The plenary power of the Legislature to provide for such term cannot be doubted. It has no other purpose but to provide for the contingency when the lease in force could be put an end to. The mechanics of sub-section (1) of section 4-A are quite indicative of such an applicative position. Firstly, it does not operate ipso facto. Secondly, it requires the Central Government to form an opinion. It has no other purpose but to provide for the contingency when the lease in force could be put an end to. The mechanics of sub-section (1) of section 4-A are quite indicative of such an applicative position. Firstly, it does not operate ipso facto. Secondly, it requires the Central Government to form an opinion. Thirdly, after such opinion is formed that opinion has to take the shape of mandatory request forwarded to the State Government and fourthly, upon receipt of such a request that Government is entitled to make an order for the purpose of premature termination of the running lease and making the said mining lease available to the Government Corporations which are established obviously in the interest of regulation of mines and mineral development. This well-knit scheme is an applicative scheme. It operates notwithstanding and by very reason of the existence of other leases. That being the position, we do not think that the application of section 4-A(1) can be treated as retrospective. That would run counter to the obvious intent of section 4-A(1) itself and there is nothing to indicate that the existing or running leases are out of the applicative field of section 4-A(1). We must make it clear that we are not dealing with the validity of the provisions of section 4-A(1) but only with the problem of its application. 6. The scheme of section 4-A(1) shows, as stated earlier, that it is the Central Government which after consultation with the State Government forms the opinion with regard to the expediency in the interest of regulation of mines and mineral development so as to request the State Government to make an order for premature termination of a given mining lease. Undoubtedly, the Central Government has to form the opinion in that regard and after forming such opinion has to make the binding request to the State Government upon receipt of which the law mandates that the State Government has to make an order prematurely terminating a given mining lease and in the very same process granting a fresh mining lease in favour of the Government Company or Corporation owned or controlled by Government, as it may think fit. The provisions thus indicate a well-knit three-fold process operative and concerning two Governments in that the Central Government after consulting the State Government forms an opinion with regard to the expediency in the interest of regulation of mines and mineral development in the given area. Upon formation of such an opinion, that Government makes a binding request to the State Government for the purpose of prematurely terminating a given mining lease and thirdly, the State Government makes an order for prematurely terminating such lease and grant of lease in favour of the Government Company or the Corporation as stated in section 4-A, sub-section (1) of the Act. All these statutory results ensue only after the opinion is formed by the Central Government. Essentially the process by reason of the statutory indication is subjective to that Government. Satisfaction of the Central Government in this regard is arrived at after consulting the State Government. It does not depend on any objective facts so as to necessitate a speaking order. As the statutory claim stands, the making of the order by the State Government after receipt of the request is compulsory. That order gives effect really to the request made by the Central Government. We do not see how such an order which is the consequence of the request that ensues from the Central Government should partake into the character of a speaking order as is being contended. It is not that anything is being objectively decided. The statute enjoins upon the State Government once the Central Government requests it, to make an order of the kind mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 4-A. That order, no doubt, has two facets, one terminating the running lease and the second granting it to the Government Corporation mentioned in the section. By the very nature of the statutory mechanics provided by the section, the possibility of having a speaking order for the purpose of termination of the lease is ruled out. The only thing the order ex facie would indicate are the factors with regard to the request having been received from the Central Government and the effect that is being given to it by the State Government. 7. As we indicated earlier, all this process is rooted in, and depends upon the formation of the opinion by the Central Government after due consultation with the State Government. 7. As we indicated earlier, all this process is rooted in, and depends upon the formation of the opinion by the Central Government after due consultation with the State Government. That formation of opinion is the foundation for the purpose of premature termination of the lease by reason of the enabling provisions of section 4-A(1). It is obvious that such premature termination of the running lease leads to civil consequences and in many cases that may partake penal characteristics. The mining leases are business venture. By very nature of things they involve interest in property. Lease itself is a property, though of a derivative kind. When it is terminated it does give rise to consequences including the loss of property and possibility of giving rise to liabilities. It is well-known that on the basis of such leases and the expectancy of working of the same over the period even the running contracts are undertaken, investments are made, labourers are engaged an even parties set up machineries and other establishments. Premature termination of lease is likely to affect all this including the frustration of contracts and we think that such premature termination, therefore, operates to jeopardy of the propriety interests of the lessee. No doubt lease is not an absolute property; on the other hand, a derivative specie of property, rights of reversion remaining with the grantor. Nonetheless, when the action, by reason of the force of the statute leads to consequences of the kind which we indicated above, it will have to be processed as fairly as possible, in keeping with principles of justice. 8. As we indicated, the formation of opinion of the Central Government is basic or founding phase for the operative mechanics of section 4-A(1). Undoubtedly, the formation of opinion is a subjective matter. Law enjoins the consultation with the State Government before the opinion is so formed. By reason of the consequences which we have indicated which are likely to ensue once the opinion is formed and mandatory request is made, we think that it is implied in the provisions of section 4-A(1) that the Central Government would act before forming the opinion in consonance with the principles of fairness as far as may be applicable in a given contingency. It is not as if always the power would be exercised by reason of any emergent circumstances. It is not as if always the power would be exercised by reason of any emergent circumstances. On the other hand, in most of the cases the power would be exercised for the purposes of regulation of mines and mineral development. Therefore, keeping in view the civil and penal consequences to which a lessee may be subjected to, we think that the Central Government is duty bound to act fairly in that it should make known to the lessee its intention with regard to forming of the subjective opinion for the purpose of premature termination of the lease. The modality in this regard must be left to the Central Government and to the contingencies of each case. 9. Such an implied duty to act fairly by reason of the consequences will have to be read as a part of the provisions permitting premature termination of the running lease. There is ample evidence offered by the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, that the basic principles of natural justice for affording opportunity are required to be followed whenever the leases are either forfeited or put to an end. Rule 27 of these Rules deals with the conditions of leases. The provisions of that Rule further indicate that care is taken to spell out express duty cast upon the authority to give notice in writing to the lessee to show cause as to why action forfeiting or terminating the lease should not be imposed. Sub-rule (4) and sub-rule (5) point to this reasoning. Sub-rule (4) deals with the lapse on the part of the lessee covered by Clauses (i), (j) or (l) of the conditions and requires the Government concerned to give notice in writing to the lessee to show cause with regard to such lapse and the consequent action flowing therefrom. It is only if a lessee fails to show cause that the Government is enabled to terminate the lease. So are the provisions of sub-rule (5) that operate upon the default in payment of royalty or commission or any other breach of any of the statutory conditions of the lease. The integral scheme of the Rules thus affords evidence that whenever penal consequences are likely to ensue by reason of the State act, care is taken to provide for the procedure which is in consonance with the principles of natural justice. The integral scheme of the Rules thus affords evidence that whenever penal consequences are likely to ensue by reason of the State act, care is taken to provide for the procedure which is in consonance with the principles of natural justice. As we indicated in the earlier part of the judgment, what section 4-A(1) does is nothing but to add statutory term to each of the leases and subject the same to its operation. If that be so, we feel that the principle which operates expressly upon the provisions available in sub-rule (4) or (5) should be extended impliedly to matters of the process of forming opinion for the purpose of premature termination of the given mining lease. The underlying principles, in our view, would be applicable to that process notwithstanding that the process itself is a subjective process of forming the opinion by the Central Government. That process in fairness should be resorted to by the Central Government depending upon the circumstances available in each case. The minimum that we expect of the Central Government in all cases in necessity of notifying every lessee likely to be affected before it forms the opinion about its intentions in that regard. Once such a notice is given, it would imply that the mining lessee would be free to make a representation which could be taken into consideration before the opinion is formed. To the extent that such opportunity of making representation to the Central Government should be available to the mining lessee, we think the process of subjective formation of opinion will have to accord itself, to the principles of fairness and justice. We do not find anything in the provisions of section 4-A(1) which disables the Central Government from following such principles of fairness, by affording such an opportunity, by making it known to the concerned lessee that the Central Government is likely to take steps which would involve premature termination of the lease. Looking to the consequences which appear in some way confiscatory in character, we think that the Central Government is bound to act fairly and, therefore, afford an opportunity to each of the lessees of making representation. 10. It is an admitted position that no such opportunity was afforded to any of the petitioners whose leases were in force and are prematurely terminated. 10. It is an admitted position that no such opportunity was afforded to any of the petitioners whose leases were in force and are prematurely terminated. The process of forming the opinion by the Central Government, therefore, in all these cases with regard to the leases in force cannot be sustained and consequently is adjudged as contrary to the principles of natural justice. 11. All the petitioners have submitted that they want to make their representations to the Central Government in this regard and have given undertaking to this Court that till the Central Government makes up its mind for making the mandatory request and the leases are worked out, they would abide by the conditions which are part of their undertakings. These undertakings enjoin upon the mining lessees that during this period they will not extract the silica more than two and half feet below the surface or the ground level and they and they would carry on the extraction under the supervision of the State Government so that the eventual mineral development processes are not affected. We are satisfied that these undertakings do take care of the public interest involved in mineral development. Each of the petitioners is granted two weeks' time to file separate undertaking in these terms. 12. Upon our holding as above, the process of forming of the opinion by the Central Government as presently reflected in the eventual order that was made by the State Government is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the stage of formation of opinion by the Central Government. Each of the petitioners to make the representation to the Central Government for its consideration within three weeks from today. Such representations may contain all the points as the petitioners may deem fit to put before that Government. The Central Government may, if it is so advised and things fit, even hear the petitioners, but nonetheless with or without such hearing, take into account those representations before formulating its opinion for the purpose of making the mandatory request to the State Government to take steps to prematurely terminate the leases of the petitioners and grant leases in favour of the Government Company or Corporation, like the one mentioned in the impugned order of 28th October, 1983. All this process of considering representations and, making the mandatory request should be completed by 5th July, 1985 looking to the urgency that is being felt with regard to regulation of mines and in particular the mineral like silica, which is available in dunes and beaches of this part of the country. 13. We cannot but emphasize that the mineral like silica-sand makes the dunes and beaches that have given distinctive dress to this territory. The gorgeous seas that skirt the shores of this region abound in this mineral wealth. But that is not merely an item for exploitation or expropriation. But it also is an item needing preservation and protection. Sands herein offer a vital link to man standing between the sea and shore and a boundary of land from water. If not properly planned or wisely developed and allowed to be extracted unmindful of its result the very balance it maintains is likely to be affected leading to hazardous results to human growth. The unique and distinctive sea-front not only makes the geography of this area bountiful, but surely beautiful. Aesthetics and economics are intermingled in a fine way in these fine sands. Climatic as well as ecological reasons exit as to why the mineral development of this side should be undertaken with total perspective and be well-planned and its exploitation undertaken to enrich rather than impoverish this natural treasure. All these factors we hope will be kept in view by every authority concerned so as to preserve, protect and prospect to greater use the basic natural wealth that is under their management. 14. In the result, to the extent indicated above, these petitions are allowed, the impugned order made by the Government of goa, Daman and Diu, Industries Labour Department dated 28th October, 1983 is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Central Government with a direction that if the representations are made within the stipulated time as stated above, that Government would take the representations into account and then proceed to form its opinion as required by section 4-A(1) of the Act. We make it clear that this process does not affect any other proceedings which might have been initiated by the concerned Government with regard to determination of the leases either because the initial grant was void or because there was any default committed by the given lessee. We make it clear that this process does not affect any other proceedings which might have been initiated by the concerned Government with regard to determination of the leases either because the initial grant was void or because there was any default committed by the given lessee. The concerned Government is free to pursue such an inquiry and make the orders in those grants. Rule absolute. No costs. Petitions allowed. -----