Judgment FATHIMA BEEVI, J.: 1. The appellant Kunhappan was convicted by the Sessions Court, Kozhikode, in S.C.No.3/1982 for the offence punishable under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. He was tried on the charge that on July, 31 1980 at about 3.00 p.m. he committed murder by causing the death of one Gopalan by stabbing him with M.O.3 dagger. The occurrence is stated to have happened in the veranda of the Shop of P.W.2. 2. The prosecution case briefly stated is: The appellant had ill-feeling towards the deceased Gopalan after the elopement of his daughter with a christian youth. On the date of the occurrence, the deceased Gopalan was sitting in the Shop of P.W.2 where P.Ws.3 and 4 were also present. P.W.5 was seated in the veranda of the adjacent room. The appellant entered the shop, purchased cigarettes, then moved towards Gopalan and attacked him with the dagger. With an out cry Gopalan ran out of the shop towards the south covering his chest with his hands, fell down on the road. The appellant also followed him for a short distance and he ran towards the south. While Gopalan collapsed on the road, the appellant was pelted with stones and disarmed by P.Ws.1 and 9 the sons of the deceased who reached the place by that time. The injured Gopalan was rushed to the Medical College Hospital, Calicut, where he was pronounced by the doctor as dead. The occurrence was witnessed by P.Ws.2, 3, 4 and 5. The crime was registered against the appellant on recording Ex.P-1 statement of P.W.1 at the Medical College Police Station the next day at 11.15 a.m. The case was investigated by P.W.1 9 and finally charge-sheeted. The appellant who sustained certain injuries was examined by P.W.21 at 5 p.m. on 31.7.1980 and a case was also registered on the basis of his complaint. 3. At the trial, the appellant set up the plea of self-defence in that, there was an encounter between him and the deceased Gopalan at the shop and that he was in fear of danger. The prosecution has examined P.Ws.2, 3, 4 and 5 as eye witnesses to the occurrence. They were however treated hostile and cross-examined as they resiled from the statements to the Investigating Officer that they have seen the appellant stabbing the deceased Gopalan. The prosecution has examined P.Ws.2, 3, 4 and 5 as eye witnesses to the occurrence. They were however treated hostile and cross-examined as they resiled from the statements to the Investigating Officer that they have seen the appellant stabbing the deceased Gopalan. The trial Court accepted the testimony of these hostile witnesses, when they said they had seen the appellant with a dagger in the shop and had also seen the deceased Gopalan running out of the shop covering his chest and short-while thereafter saw Gopalan being removed to the hospital, and found the appellant guilty and convicted and sentenced him as aforesaid. 4. In challenging the conviction, the main contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that there is no credible evidence to sustain the conviction. 5. The question that falls for consideration is whether the conviction solely based on the testimony of the hostile witnesses is warranted. As a legal proposition it is now settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court, that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected wholesale, merely on the ground that the prosecution had dubbed him ‘hostile’ and had cross-examined him. (See- Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka (1979) Crl. L.J. 1374: (1980) 1 S.C.C. 30 : (1980) S.C.C. (Crl.) 59: A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1848). 6. The Supreme Court has stated in Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration (1976) Crl.L.J. 295: (1976) 1 S.C.C. 727 : (1976) S.C.C. (Crl.) 160: (1976) 2 S.C.R. 11 : A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 294 that: “Even in a criminal prosecution when a witness is cross-examined and contradicted with the leave of the Court by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed in regard to a part of his testimony. It is for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed in regard to a part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not been completely shaken, be may, after reading and considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which he finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case, the whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned, and in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally discredited, the Judge should as a matter of prudence, discard his evidence in toto.” Again in K.Thevar v. State of Tamil Nadu K.Thevar v. State of Tamil Nadu (1976) 1 S.C.J. 31: (1975) S.C.C. (Crl.) 753: (1976) Crl.L.J. 708: A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 980 the Court said: “A hostile witness may not be rejected outright but the Court has at least to be aware that prima facie, a witness who makes different statements at different times has no regard for truth. The Court should therefore be slow to act on the testimony of such a witness, and, normally, it should look for corroboration to his evidence.” The decision in Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana (1976) Crl.L.J. 203: (1976) S.C.C. (Crl.) 7: (1976) 1 S.C.C. 389 : (1976) 2 S.C.R. 921 : A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 202 also points out that: “Where the Court gives permission to the Prosecutor to cross-examine his own witness, thus characterising him as, a hostile witness, that fact does not completely efface his evidence. The evidence remains admissible in the trial and there is no legal bar to base a conviction upon his testimony if corroborated by other reliable evidence.” 7. The legal position is therefore clear that even though a witness is declared hostile, the Court can accept and act upon that part of his evidence which appears to be truthful, if there is some reliable evidence from independent source to lend assurance to the truth of the same. A witness who makes different statements at different times has no regard for truth. A witness who makes different statements at different times has no regard for truth. When the witness does not come up to the mark in his general regard for truth, then even if he makes consistent allegation in regard to certain facts, it would be plainly unsafe to rely implicitly on that evidence and we should look for extra guarantee that this is not vitiated by his general indifference to truth. The requirement of corroboration as in the case of the evidence of an accomplice is a rule of prudence for satisfying the test of reliability. Corroboration must therefore be by evidence which is not of the same brand or suffers from the same infirmity as that which is required to be corroborated. 8. The Supreme Court in Muluwa v. State of M.P. Muluwa v. State of M.P. (1976) 1 S.C.C. 37 : (1976) Crl.L.J. 717: (1975) S.C.C. (Crl.) 759: A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 989 stated thus: “The evidence of an infirm witness does not become reliable merely because it has been corroborated by a number of witnesses of the same brand; for, evidence is to be weighed and not counted.” In C.Chellappan v. State of Kerala C.Chellappan v. State of Kerala (1979) Crl.L.J. 1335: (1979) 4 S.C.C. 312 : (1979) S.C.C. (Crl.) 1029: A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1761 the Court said: “It is equally well settled that one tainted evidence cannot corroborate another tainted evidence because if this is allowed to be done then the very necessity of corroboration is frustrated.” 9. The Supreme Court also pointed out in Harnam Singh v. State of H.P. Harnam Singh v. State of H.P. (1975) 2 S.C.J. 226: (1974) S.C.C. (Crl.) 951: (1975) Crl.L.J. 276: (1975) 3 S.C.C. 343 : A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 236 that the evidence of a hostile witness is not sufficient to corroborate the evidence of a partisan witness. The evidence of a hostile witness suffers from serious infirmities, as statements of a witness having no regard for truth and such evidence cannot be corroborated by evidence of another hostile witness whose evidence is of the same nature. Having regard to the decisions referred to and the principles stated, we feel that the prosecution has not been able to lead satisfactory evidence to prove the case and the conviction recorded by the trial Court against the appellant is unsustainable. 10. Having regard to the decisions referred to and the principles stated, we feel that the prosecution has not been able to lead satisfactory evidence to prove the case and the conviction recorded by the trial Court against the appellant is unsustainable. 10. P.Ws.2, 3, 4 and 5 are the eye witnesses examined by the prosecution as persons having direct knowledge of the incident. P.W.2 is the shop-keeper. P.Ws.3 and 4 stated to have seen present in the shop, while P.W.5 was seated in the veranda ofthe adjacent room. P.W.2 in the first instance said that he had seen the appellant inflicting a stab on the deceased while he was seated in the bench. But the changed his ground and said that he did not see the actual attack and had only seen the appellant moving towards Gopalan and the latter going out of the shop with hands on his stomach. P.Ws.3, 4and 5 from the very start denied having witnessed the attack on the deceased Gopalan. They only said that they have seen the appellant and the deceased in the shop and both of them were going out of the shop. All these witnesses have been confronted with their statements given before the Investigating Officer. Some of them denied having made those statements and none admitted what they have said to the Investigating Officer is the truth. The witnesses have thus different versions and have contradicted themselves and have proved to be unreliable witnesses who do not have a consistent case. The evidence of all these witnesses thus suffers from serious infirmities and they are incapable of corroborating each other, and it would be quite unsage to accept their evidence as the basis for a conviction. The circumstance that the appellant and the deceased were seen in the shop does not reveal that the deceased Gopalan received the injury at the hands of the appellant in the manner alleged by the prosecution. The witnesses do not say that Gopalan had injuries when he left the shop. They have not stated that the appellant received any injury in the course of the incident. A correct and true account of the incident is not spoken to by any of the witnesses. The witnesses do not say that Gopalan had injuries when he left the shop. They have not stated that the appellant received any injury in the course of the incident. A correct and true account of the incident is not spoken to by any of the witnesses. The medical evidence only reveals that a fatal injury was sustained by Gopalan, that he sustained other minor abrasions and lacerations and that in the course of the same incident, the appellant had also sustained injuries. The witnesses do not speak to that case. It is therefore a case where there is no cogent and convicting evidence which the Court can safely accept for the purpose of recording the conviction against the appellant. The Court also erred in having found the appellant guilty on unreliable and inadmissible material. The conviction cannot be sustained. 11. In the result the appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence against the appellant are set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charges. He shall be set at liberty forthwith, if his detention is not required otherwise. Appeal allowed.