ORDER S.D. Agarwala, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution arising out of proceedings under the U.Y. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The property in dispute is a shop situate at Soron Darwaza (Subhash Gate) Mohalla Jai Jai Ram, Kasganj, district Etah. The petitioner Smt. Kiran Devi is the landlady. Shri Bhagwan Saran son of late Lala Madan Mohan Agarwal is the tenant and is respondent No. 2 in the petition. Respondent No. 2 took the shop in dispute on rent by a registered lease deed for a period of 10 years which was to expire on 31-5-1977. Since the tenant did not vacate in spite of expiry of the period of lease, the petitioner landlady filed an application on 2-7-1977 for release of the shop in dispute under the provisions of S. 21(1)(a) of the Act. The release application was filed on the ground that the petitioner required the accommodation for carrying on the business for her husband and her son. It was alleged that the husband and son of the petitioner had acquired necessary qualification, training and experience in Wireless and Radio mechanism and they wanted to set up their business of Radio Sales and Service in the disputed accommodation. In the petition for release it was further specifically alleged that Bhagwan Saran had purchased a shop No. 174 situated in Mohalia Mohan, Ward No. 3 in the town of Kasganj. This shop was purchased by Bhagwan Saran in the name of his minor sons Anil Kunar and Sunil Kumar. It was also alleged that the shop No. 174 is in possession of Bhagwan Saran and that he is carrying on business of cloth in the said shop. This fact goes to show that the tenant Bhagwan Saran had an alternative accommodation in which he can shift his business without any loss or hardship. 2. The tenant contested this application. It was alleged by the tenant that the shop in dispute is not required bona fide by the landlady for setting up her husband and her son in the Radio Sales and Service business. 2. The tenant contested this application. It was alleged by the tenant that the shop in dispute is not required bona fide by the landlady for setting up her husband and her son in the Radio Sales and Service business. It was further denied that the shop No. 174 has not (sic) been purchased by him but the said shop had been purchased by his father Madan Mohan Agarwal in favour of his minor sons Anil Kumar and Sunil Kumar and that in the said shop his father was doing separate cloth business. The tenant further alleged that, in fact, he had separated from the family and that he had nothing to do with his father or his business. It was also alleged that the landlady wanted to get the shop vacated so that she may let it out to some other tenant on higher rent. It was also alleged that the landlady has residential house in her possession at Kasganj and has also large number of properties including the shop at Marher. 3. In reply to the contentions raised by the tenant opposing the release application, it was specifically urged by the petitioner that she had no other shop at Kasganj in which the business of Radio Sales and Service can be established by her husband and son. The petitioner's son had received a training and certificate in the year 1975 and thereafter licence was obtained for running the Radio and Electronic Sales and Service shop in May, 1976. Since the lease of the disputed shop was to expire in May, 1977, she filed (sic) the release of the shop in July, 1977. 4. It may be stated here that during the pendency of the case before the prescribed authority, Madan Mohan Agarwal, father of the tenant Bhagwan Saran died and consequently it was further urged before the prescribed authority by the petitioner that after his death on 3-2-1981, the tenant Bhagwan Saran is the only adult male member in the family. The matter was examined by the prescribed authority in detail and by an order dated 30th July, 1981 the application of the petitioner was allowed by the prescribed authority. The prescribed authority recorded a categorical finding that the petitioner had a bona fide need for the disputed shop to establish her son and husband in the Radio Sales and Service business. The prescribed authority recorded a categorical finding that the petitioner had a bona fide need for the disputed shop to establish her son and husband in the Radio Sales and Service business. She has no other accommodation available at Kasganj. The tenant Bhagwan Saran had purchased the shop No. 174 deliberately in the name of his minor sons so that he may not have to vacate the disputed shop. It was further found that the sale consideration for the said shop had been paid by Bhagwan Saran and that it is not established on record that the terms between Bhagwan Saran and his father Madan Mohan Agarwal were not cordial. It was also observed by the prescribed authority that Bhagwan Saran had got the shop No. 174 renovated and it is suitable with sufficient accommodation for his business. In this view of the matter, on a comparison of the need of the landlady, qua the tenant, it was found that the need of the landlady was pressing and as such the release application was allowed. 5. The judgment of the prescribed authority dated 30-7-1981 was challenged in appeal under S. 22 of the Act. The appeal came up for hearing before the IVth Additional District Judge, Etah who by his judgment dated 26th April, 1982 set aside the judgment of the prescribed authority and dismissed the application under S. 21 of the Act. The appellate Court reversed the finding recorded by the prescribed authority and held that the need of the landlady was not bona fide or genuine. On the question of hardship, the appellate Court recorded a finding that no serious loss was likely to be caused to the petitioner by refusal to grant the release. 6. Aggrieved by the decision dated 26-4-1982, the landlady has filed the present petition in this Court. 7. This petition initially came up for hearing before Hon'ble B. N. Sapru, J. After hearing the learned counsel for some time the Court was of the view that in view of death of Madan Mohan Agarwal on 3-2-1981, the case required further investigation and consequently the case was remitted to the Court below for decision on three issues after giving an opportunity to the parties of leading evidence. Three issues remitted to the Court below by order of Hon'ble B. N. Sapru, J. dated 23-12-1983 are as follows :- "(1) Whether Respondent Bhagwan Saran has inherited proprietary or tenancy rights in shop No. 174 Mohalla Mohan, Ward No. 3 Kasganj consequent upon the death of Madan Mohan? (2) Whether the sons of Bhagwan Saran are carrying on business in the aforesaid shop or the shop is available to Bhagwan Saran; (3) Whether the aforesaid shop is suitable as an alternative accommodation to Bhagwan Saran? 8. In the order dated 23-12-1983 it was further observed that it will be open to the appellate authority to make the sons of Bhagwan Saran, namely, Anil Kumar and Sunil Kumar parties to the proceedings so that they can give their version regarding the shop. 9. After the issues were remitted by this Court, the Court below made Anil Kumar and Sunil Kumar, sons of Bhagwan Saran as parties to the proceedings. The sons consequently also led evidence in the Court. The Court below by an order dated 21-4-1984 remitted the finding to this Court. It recorded a finding that Madan Mohan Agarwal had executed a will in favour of his grandsons And Kumar and Sunil Kumar and as such Bhagwan Saran did not inherit proprietry rights in the shop No. 174 which was the subject-matter of the will from his father Shri Madan Mohan Agarwal. The issue No. 1. consequently was decided in negative. 10. So far as the second issue was concerned, it was held that the sons of Bhagwan Saran are not carrying on business in shop No. 174 but the shop is also not available to Bhagwan Saran for carrying on the business. 11. In regard to the third issue, it was held that the shop No. 174 is suitable for cloth business. It has, however, much shorter space available in it as compared to the disputed shop. In case the shop No. 174 is made available to Bhagwan Saran, Bhagwan Saran will feel dearth of space as compared to the shop in dispute in running his cloth business in shop No. 174. 12. After the above mentioned findings were remitted to this Court, the case was again listed before Hon'ble B.N. Sapru, J. He released the case and thereafter this case was directed to be listed before me. 13. 12. After the above mentioned findings were remitted to this Court, the case was again listed before Hon'ble B.N. Sapru, J. He released the case and thereafter this case was directed to be listed before me. 13. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. 14. 1 will now deal with various contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner challenging the findings recorded by the Court below as well as the findings remitted to this Court by judgment dated 21-4-1984. 15. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the finding recorded by the lower appellate Court that the need of the petitioner cannot be said to be bona fide or genuine, is a finding wholly vitiated in law, inasmuch as the Court below has not considered the material evidence on the record and has also misread whatever evidence it has considered. 16. The first aspect on which the Court below has held against the petitioner is that since petitioner's husband and her son are already having a laboratory in a room in her own house, the need of the petitioner is not bona fide or genuine. It is not disputed on record that the house in which the laboratory has been installed primarily is not the own house of the petitioner. This by itself is a wrong assumption on which the Court below has proceeded. The copy of the affidavit filed in support of the release application has been attached as Annexure `1' to the petition. In para 22 it was specifically stated by the petitioner that the house in which the laboratory has been fixed primarily was the rented house. In the written statement this fact has not been denied. It is, therefore, clear that as stated above, the Court below has proceeded on a wrong assumption that the house in which the laboratory had been temporarily located, is the own house of the petitioner. It was the own case of the petitioner that her husband and son had set up a laboratory in the sleeping room of the son in the rented house in which they were living. It was the own case of the petitioner that her husband and son had set up a laboratory in the sleeping room of the son in the rented house in which they were living. Instead of considering the material evidence on record as to whether this place was sufficient for carrying on the business or not, the Court below on this very basis has held that since the petitioner's husband and son are having laboratory in the house, their need is not genuine. This also is a very strange approach. In the affidavit filed in support of the release application, specific averment has been made that the laboratory had been set up in the bedroom to obtain licence and was not used for doing any business nor actually any business was carried out. In the written statement, the respondent-tenant did not aver that the petitioner's husband and son can carry on business in the house in which the laboratory has been set up, neither it was set up that the customers can come there. Even without any case having been set up on the part of the tenant, the lower appellate Court simply on the basis that there was a laboratory in the bed-room of the son of the petitioner dismissed the case of the petitioner as being not genuine or bona fide. No evidence has been considered which was relevant for coming to this finding and the approach of the appellate Court in this regard is, in my opinion, wholly perverse. 17. The other circumstance which has been considered in respect of this finding is that the petitioner by a rent note dated 1-7-1976 has let out another shop to one Ram Autar. It is not denied that Ram Autar was already a tenant in the shop for a very long time and the only purpose for executing the rent note dated 1-7-1976 was for enhancing the rent. It is not a case where a shop which was lying vacant was let out on 1-7-76. It is not denied that Ram Autar was already a tenant in the shop for a very long time and the only purpose for executing the rent note dated 1-7-1976 was for enhancing the rent. It is not a case where a shop which was lying vacant was let out on 1-7-76. In case the shop was vacant, no doubt it would be a relevant circumstance that instead of utilising the shop the petitioner let out the shop to some other person but where the shop was not at all vacant and the agreement is only for the purposes of enhancing the rent, it cannot possibly be said that by mere executing a rent note dated 1-7-76, the petitioner's need becomes non-genuine or fictitious. As is clear from the record the petitioner enhanced the rent as Ram Autar was occupying the shop for a very long time and on the other hand, the lease of the shop in favour of the tenant Bhagwan Saran was likely to expire very shortly and it was also clear that Bhagwan Saran had an alternative accommodation where he could run his business. The petitioner, therefore, rightly filed a release application for eviction of the respondent No. 2 and only enhanced the rent so far as Ram Autar was concerned. The Court below acted illegally and with material irregularity in not considering the material evidence on the record, as stated above, in respect of this finding as also misread the relevant evidence just to find that the petitioner's need was not genuine. In my opinion, the submission raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is well founded. It is necessary in the interest of justice that the matter should he reconsidered in proper perspective. 18. In N. S. Datta v. Vllth Addl. Dist. Judge, Allahabad, 1984 All Rent Cas 133 : 1984 All LJ 256, this Court took the view that if a person makes a stop-gap arrangement in the absence of his being able to carry on the business properly, this fact is of no consequence. Merely because, the petitioner's son opened a laboratory in his own bedroom for the purposes of obtaining a licence to equip himself to carry on the business of Radio Sales and Service, it would be unfair to hold that his requirement is no longer there and that the need is not bona fide. Merely because, the petitioner's son opened a laboratory in his own bedroom for the purposes of obtaining a licence to equip himself to carry on the business of Radio Sales and Service, it would be unfair to hold that his requirement is no longer there and that the need is not bona fide. In fact, this circumstance would, on the other hand, show that there was a genuine effort on the part of the son of the petitioner in opening a laboratory in the bedroom so that he may complete all the process which is required for the purposes of carrying on regular business in a proper accommodation. As stated above, the approach of the lower appellate Court in regard to this finding is wholly a perverse approach. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further challenged the finding recorded by the Court below that greater hardship will be caused to the respondent No. 2 in case the application for release is allowed. The case of the petitioner is that respondent No. 2 has an alternative shop No. 174 situated in Mohalla Mohan, Ward No. 3 in the town of Kasganj. This shop was purchased benami by Bhagwan Saran in the name of his minor sons. After the death of Madan Mohan Agarwal, father of Bhagwan Saran the shop which is very near to the shop in question is lying vacant and is available with the respondent No. 2 and hence the question of hardship to the respondent No. 2 does not arise. 20. I have examined the finding given by the lower appellate Court in the judgment dated 26-4-1982 in regard to the availability of the shop No. 174. This finding is vitiated in law. I have also examined the findings recorded by the judgment dated 21-4-1984 which were remitted to this Court. In my opinion, these findings are also vitiated in law. They are based on a wholly perverse approach. In fact, this is one of those cases where if the facts are seen in the proper perspective, it would be discovered that the tenant is a very clever person and he has made out one circumstance after another and has got written documents with a view to deprive the petitioner of the shop in dispute. In fact, this is one of those cases where if the facts are seen in the proper perspective, it would be discovered that the tenant is a very clever person and he has made out one circumstance after another and has got written documents with a view to deprive the petitioner of the shop in dispute. The conduct of the respondent No. 2 shows, how a person can take undue advantage of the provisions of an Act which had been promulgated with the object of regulating the eviction of tenants in the interest of general public. The Act did not contemplate to protect dishonest tenants. 21. It is not disputed that the property was taken by the respondent No. 2 from the petitioner by a lease deed for a period of ten years. The term of the lease was to expire in May, 1977. On 3rd Dec., 1965 (1975), nearly about year an half before the expiry of the said lease, a registered partition deed was got executed between the father and son, namely, Madan Mohan Agarwal and Bhagwan Saran and his wife Smt. Radha Devi. In this partition, as I find nothing was to be partitioned. The only purpose of executing this partition deed was to state therein that the relations of father with the son were not cordial. After this partition deed was executed on 25th Feb., 1976, shop No. 174 was purchased in the name of Anil Kumar and Sunil Kumar, the minor sons of Bhagwan Saran. The vendor of shop No. 174 filed an affidavit clearly stating therein that the consideration for sale of shop No. 174 was paid by Bhagwan Saran. The partition deed as well as the sale-deed were executed by Bhagwan Saran so that the petitioner in any subsequent litigation could not urge that Bhagwan Saran had an alternative shop. It has further come in evidence that after the purchase of the said shop it was renovated and the shop now stands reconstructed. No business is being carried on by anybody there. The sons Anil Kumar and Sunil Kumar are also are not carrying on their business. In spite of this finding, it is not conceivable, how the Court below has recorded a finding that on a comparison of the hardship of the landlord and tenant, the hardship of the tenant Bhagwan Saran would be greater. 22. The sons Anil Kumar and Sunil Kumar are also are not carrying on their business. In spite of this finding, it is not conceivable, how the Court below has recorded a finding that on a comparison of the hardship of the landlord and tenant, the hardship of the tenant Bhagwan Saran would be greater. 22. It is very interesting to note that when the matter was remitted by this Court and Anil Kumar and Sunil Kumar were made parties to these proceedings, they conceded that the property was purchased benami. Yet the Court below in his judgment dated 21-4-1984 stated that the affidavit of vendor was of no value and recorded a finding that Madan Mohan Agarwal became the owner of the property in dispute. It is pertinent to note at this stage that the tenant did not stop his land by not creating other documents to disassociate himself from the shop No. 174. He after the death of his father Madan Mohan Agarwal produced a will alleged to have been executed by Madan Mohan Agarwal, his father which was not registered and neither signed by Madan Mohan Agarwal. Only thumb impressions were alleged to be there on the alleged will and this was produced to show that after the death of Madan Mohan Agarwal, the rights in the shop went to his sons, Anil Kumar and Sunil Kumar. The Court below in its judgment dated 21-4-1984 held that the will is not beyond suspicion. Yet the Court below acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction in finding against the petitioner relying ultimately on the will. It has further found that the shop is not available with Bhagwan Saran. A further finding has been recorded by the Court below that in case shop No. 174 is made available to Shri Bhagwan Saran. Shri Bhagwan Saran will feel dearth of space as compared to the present shop. These findings are also, in my opinion, vitiated, as they are self-contradictory. The lower appellate Court had found categorically that the shop was lying vacant but merely because technically the shop belongs to Anil Kumar and Sunil Kumar, therefore, it held that the shop was not available to Bhagwan Saran. There is no evidence on record that the relations between Bhagwan Saran and his sons are strained. The lower appellate Court had found categorically that the shop was lying vacant but merely because technically the shop belongs to Anil Kumar and Sunil Kumar, therefore, it held that the shop was not available to Bhagwan Saran. There is no evidence on record that the relations between Bhagwan Saran and his sons are strained. This finding also in the judgment dated 21-4-1984 in my opinion, is clearly vitiated in law. It is not necessary that in every case there should be equal alternative accommodation available, then only the application for release can be allowed. Dearth of space alone cannot possibly be a basis for holding that the alternative accommodation is not suitable. The approach in regard to this finding is also erroneous. 23. From an overall reading of the judgment dated 21-4-1984 it is clear that the shop No. 174 is lying vacant. It has been reconstructed. It has been purchased in the names of the sons of Bhagwan Saran benami and it is situated near the shop in dispute. These are relevant facts which will have a bearing on the finding in regard to hardship. I am definitely of the opinion, that the approach of the Court below in recording a finding in regard to the question of hardship is wholly erroneous and perverse and the entire case in regard to this question needs re-examination by the Court below again in the right perspective after considering the facts- and circumstances of the case. The submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner has substance. 24. In the result, I allow the petition, quash the judgment of the lower appellate Court dated 26-4-1982 and 21-4-1984. The entire case is remanded to the lower appellate Court for decision afresh after considering the entire material evidence on record. The application for release was filed in 1977. Eight years have already elapsed. The husband and son of the petitioner are ageing and in order to do justice to the cause, it is necessary that this matter may be taken at top priority and be disposed of very expeditiously. I accordingly direct the lower appellate Court to dispose of the appeal within three months from the date of the certified copy of this judgment is filed before the appellate Court. The petitioner shall be entitled to her costs from the respondent No. 2.