JUDGMENT N.N. Sharma, J. - This is a defendant's appeal directed against the judgment and decree dated 10-7-1972 of Sri Zaheer Hasan, learned District Judge, Basti who allowed Civil Appeal No. 75-B of 1971 and decreed the suit of respondent for recovery of Rs. 12952/- with costs. Judgment and decree of the trial court dated 20-10-1962 in Original Suit No. 3 of 1956 were reversed. Respondent Sarju Prasad Sahu was Treasurer in district Treasury, Basti and in that connection executed an indemnity bond on 20-5-1952 by furnishing security in the sum of Rs. 40,000/- to indemnify State for any embezzlement, etc. in the stamps which were to be sold by Brij Bhushan Lal an ex-officio stamp vendor in District Treasury, Basti. Brij Bhushan Lal was working in that capacity even prior to the appointment of plaintiff as Treasurer. That appointment was adopted by the respondent also when he stood surety. Appellant was a salaried assistant and servant of the U.P. Government whose surety was plaintiff. The duty of the defendant was to receive a particular quota of stamps given to him by the treasurer or his approved agent etc. to sell them to the purchasers and to make over the sale proceeds to the plaintiffs approved agent for being deposited in the treasury or bank and to keep the stamps left over from sale in the almirah in the single lock and to maintain an accurate account about all these transactions. These obligations.. were legally imposed on the appellant under paras Nos. 82, 84, 85, 86,87,87-A, 88 of Chap. III of the Stamp Manual under the Stamp Act (Act, No. II of 1899) which need not be extracted here. 2. Due to the negligence and illegal encouragement by the Treasury Officer and lack of adequate and efficient supervision by District Magistrate, Basti, appellant used to be present at the counting of the stamps in the double lock and used to bring himself stamps from the double lock and put his signature on the register, although this practice was not in consonance with the mandatory provisions of the Stamp Manual. 3. Thus the appellant got an opportunity to falsify accounts and misappropriate the stamps from time to time. It was in August, 1955 when the Treasury Officer found stamps worth Rs. 3. Thus the appellant got an opportunity to falsify accounts and misappropriate the stamps from time to time. It was in August, 1955 when the Treasury Officer found stamps worth Rs. 13,108/- short and the sale proceeds of the same were embezzled by the defendant who could not account for the stamps of the sale proceeds. 4. The Collector compelled plaintiff- respondent to make good the loss to the tune of Rs. 13,108/- on 24-9-1955 after the accounts were checked. Appellant tried to commit suicide by sprinkling petrol over his person and setting himself on fire. -Ultimately he jumped into a well also and had to be taken out in a precarious condition. He was prosecuted in a Criminal Court under Sections 409, 420, IPC etc. and was convicted. Plaintiff requested defendant-appellant to reimburse him for the aforesaid amount but no payment was done and so the suit was filed by plaintiff for recovery of Rs. 13,108/- from defendant. U.P. State was also made a party to the suit. 5. Defence by the appellant was a denial of the embezzlement. He further maintained that there was no privity of contract between the plaintiff and defendant and if the plaintiff had deposited the money under orders of the Collector the defendant was not liable to reimburse him. 6. It was found by learned Civil Judge that defendant misappropriated stamps worth Rs. 12,952/- from Government Treasury, Basti. 7. The Treasury Officer and the District Officer acted in contravention of the Rules. Defendant took advantage of their negligence and succeeded in the said embezzlement. He used to be present even at the double lock although it was beyond his duties. 8. Learned Civil Judge further found that there was no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant and under the circumstances defendant was not liable to reimburse plaintiff under S. 69 of the Contract Act. 9. Learned Appellate Court found that defendant embezzled the stamps worth Rs. 12952/-. 10. He further found that plaintiff was entitled to be reimbursed under S. 69 of the Contract Act. In the result the appeal was allowed. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 12. The only contention pressed before me on behalf of appellant was that plaintiff failed to prove the embezzlement of the disputed amount. 13. In the result the appeal was allowed. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 12. The only contention pressed before me on behalf of appellant was that plaintiff failed to prove the embezzlement of the disputed amount. 13. Sri S. N. Verma, learned counsel for the appellant took me through the findings recorded by the courts below. His contention was that both the courts below erred in taking into account the judgment of learned Assistant Sessions Judge Ext. 11 in Sessions Trial No. 57A of 1956 recording the conviction dated 1-6-1957 of the revisionist under S. 409, IPC., and sentencing him to imprisonment and fine. Such judgment of criminal court was irrelevant in a civil proceeding vide Radha Mohan v. Bare Lal reported in, 1972 All LJ 15 which posited :- "The judgment of the criminal court is only relevant about conviction and acquittal. The finding recorded by the criminal courts cannot be received as a piece of evidence." 14. Reliance was further placed in M/s. Karam Chand Ganga Pershad v. Union of India reported in, AIR 1971 SC 1244 which laid down that decisions of civil courts are binding on the criminal courts but the converse was not true. 15. I have carefully gone through these rulings which go to show that the finding recorded by the Criminal Court is not relevant in a civil suit. Sections 40 to 43 of Indian Evidence Act deal with the relevancy of judgments. Obviously the judgment Ext. 11 of the Criminal court was relevant only in the civil proceedings to show the conviction of appellant under S. 409, IPC. It was not admissible for extracting the finding of that judgment in the judgment of civil suit as was done by learned trial court. The extent of admissibility of the judgment of criminal court was to show what order was made, who the parties to the disputes were, what the matter in dispute was and who was held entitled to disputed property as was held in Ramadhar v. Janke reported in, AIR 1956 Pat 49 , So in the present suit also the plaintiff was bound to prove embezzlement of the aforesaid amount by defendant. However, the learned appellate court did not make such use of this judgment of the criminal court to the extent as was done by the trial court. However, the learned appellate court did not make such use of this judgment of the criminal court to the extent as was done by the trial court. He has given various reasons for coming to the conclusion that the stamps of the aforesaid amount were embezzled by the appellant. 16. The next contention of learned counsel for the appellant was about the use of Ext. 9 statement made by appellant in the said trial. The contention was that such statement under S. 342 of old Cr. P.C. (Act No. V of 1898) was totally irrelevant in these proceedings. That statement was not made on oath and was not usable even in the Criminal court in which it was recorded. It should have been ruled out. In this connection reliance was placed upon Vijendrajit Ayodhya Prasad v. State of Bombay reported in, AIR 1953 SC 247 which observed :- "Conviction of the accused cannot be based merely on his statement recorded under S. 342 which cannot be regarded as evidence. But where the prosecution evidence disclosed that the godown was in the possession and charge of the accused and the accused in his examination under S. 342 admitted that he was in charge of the godown, whereupon no further evidence was led on the point, the Magistrate was justified in referring to the statement of the accused under S. 342 as supporting the prosecution case concerning the possession of the godown." 17. The next authority relied upon in this connection has been reported in Miss Hardevi Malkani v. The State, AIR 1969 All 423 , In that case prosecution failed to prove the document on which it was based and there was mere admission by accused of execution 1986 All. L. J./34 V (1) of document in his statement under S. 342. Cr. P.C. aforesaid. It was observed that such gap in the evidence of prosecution cannot be filled by any statement made by the accused in his examination under S. 342, Cr. P.C. This Court quoted with approval the observations made in (1904) ILR 27 Mad 238. 18. L. J./34 V (1) of document in his statement under S. 342. Cr. P.C. aforesaid. It was observed that such gap in the evidence of prosecution cannot be filled by any statement made by the accused in his examination under S. 342, Cr. P.C. This Court quoted with approval the observations made in (1904) ILR 27 Mad 238. 18. The next authority relied upon by learned Advocate for the appellant has been reported in Kishan Chand v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1979 SC 1128 , In that case prosecution failed to prove that the sample contained ingredients which may be adulterated and so it was held that such gap could not he filled in by the stand taken by the accused in his statement. All the ingredients of the offence had to be established by the prosecution apart from the statement of the accused. It is correct that statement of an accused recorded in a criminal proceeding is no evidence within the meaning of S. 3. sub-cl. (2) of Evidence Act which means and includes all statements made in a court by witnesses on oath in relation to matters of fact. However, it does not mean that such statement must be ruled out as irrelevant. A mere look at the definition of the word `Proved' . in S. 3 of the aforesaid Act shall go to disclose that a fact is said to be proved when after considering matters before it, the court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought under the circumstances of the particular case. to act upon the supposition that it exists. Thus it is obvious that this definition of the word `proved' relates to the matters before the Court and is not confined to mere evidence. The statement of an accused or the result of a local enquiry, etc. all are matters before the Court which the court is entitled to take into consideration in deciding a case. 19. A mere look at S. 342 of the old Cr. P.C. or its corresponding provision S. 313, Cr. The statement of an accused or the result of a local enquiry, etc. all are matters before the Court which the court is entitled to take into consideration in deciding a case. 19. A mere look at S. 342 of the old Cr. P.C. or its corresponding provision S. 313, Cr. P.C. (Act No. 2 of 1974) shall go to disclose that the answers given by the accused in such examination may be taken into consideration in such enquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed. It is correct that such statement may not have the force of sworn evidence and a conviction based on such statement alone cannot be maintained but the court may take into consideration such statement in order to determine whether the issue of the guilt is proved or not and to that extent it stands practically on the same footing as other evidence although technically it is not evidence in the case within the meaning of the Evidence Act. In a summons case a plea of inquiry by the accused in his examination is sufficient to sustain it conviction. 19A. All the authorities cited by learned Advocate for the appellant related to the use of statements of accused in criminal trial. No authority was cited to show that such statements made by the accused were not usable as admissions in a civil proceedings. The standard of proof required in Civil and Criminal Proceeding is entirely different. In a civil case a mere preponderance of probability, due regard being had to the burden of proof is sufficient basis of decision and in a criminal case, however, a high degree of assurance is necessary. Benefit of reasonable doubt has to he extended in criminal cases to accused where prosecution must prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt. In civil cases parties are tied down by their pleadings. It is not so in a criminal case. Accused must be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved to be guilty and the onus on the prosecution never shifts. Prosecution has to prove its case affirmatively beyond all reasonable doubt. 20. In civil cases parties are tied down by their pleadings. It is not so in a criminal case. Accused must be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved to be guilty and the onus on the prosecution never shifts. Prosecution has to prove its case affirmatively beyond all reasonable doubt. 20. Admissions made by an accused in his previous examination in criminal proceedings or insolvency proceedings are relevant and admissible under Sections 17 and 18 of Evidence Act provided such admission is clear and unambiguous and has to be taken as a whole. See Mohd. Bakhsh v. Emperor, AIR 1941 Sindh 129 and Akal Sahu v. Emperor, AIR 1948 Pat 62. 21. There is a presumption about genuineness of such statement under Section 80 of Indian Evidence Act. 22. The next contention put forward on behalf of appellant was that even if such statement was to be treated as an admission it could be usable only if defendant could have been confronted with it and an opportunity should have been afforded to him to explain such admission as contemplated by S. 45, of the Evidence Act. In this connection reliance was placed upon Sita Ram v. Ramchandra Nago reported in, AIR 1977 SC 1712 which posited : "An admission is relevant and it has to be proved before it becomes evidence. The provisions in Evidence Act that 'admission is not conclusive proof are to be considered in regard to two features of evidence. First, what weight is to be attached to an admission. In order to attach weight it has to be found out whether the admission is clear, unambiguous and is a relevant piece of evidence. Second, even if the admission is proved in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act and if it is to be used against the party who has made it, it is sound that if a witness is under cross-examination on oath, he should be given an opportunity if the documents are to be used against him, to tender his explanation and to clear up the point of ambiguity or dispute, this is a general salutary and intelligible rule. Therefore, a mere proof of admission, after the person whose admission it is alleged to be has concluded his evidence, will be of no avail and cannot be utilised against him". 23. Therefore, a mere proof of admission, after the person whose admission it is alleged to be has concluded his evidence, will be of no avail and cannot be utilised against him". 23. In the instant case Brij Bhushan Lal, defendant, P.W. 1 was confronted with the statement Ext. 9. He admitted that it was his statement although he denied that he had misappropriated stamps worth Rs. 13108/- He conceded that at the relevant period he was ex officio stamp vendor. 24. He further conceded that there could he some clerical mistake in the entries of the accounts. 25. Learned Advocate for the appellant further argued that both the courts below did not discuss the evidence on record. They wrongly relied on the report Ext. 3 drawn by Sri P. C. Gautam, P.W. 1 who went into the accounts under orders of the higher authorities and testified that from a perusal of the entries made in the register about the receipt of stamps by the defendant he found shortage in court fee stamps of Rs. 6588/- and in copying stamps of Rs. 6364/- as detailed by him in his report Ext. 3 and the supplementary report submitted by him on 21-9-1957. There was nothing in his cross-examination to shake his testimony on this point. 26. Learned Advocate for the appellant further argued that the plaintiff's witnesses did not specifically state about the dates when stamps were issued to defendant and the shortage into stamps. Courts below simply mentioned that the witnesses have proved the plaintiff's case. It could not be regarded as appreciation of evidence as contemplated by O. XX, R. 4, of the Civil P.C. as pointed out in Abbasali Shah v. Mohammad Shah reported in, AIR 1951 Madh B 92 and M/s Kuldip Oil Industries Ltd. v. Ch. Pratap Singh, AIR 1959 All 505 , Mubarak Hussain v. Syed Shah Hamid Huss, 38 Ind Cas 509 : AIR 1916 Pat 262, Ambor Ali v. Nichar Ali, AIR 1950 Assam 79 and Jagan Nath v. Bindeshwari Prasad reported in, AIR 1917 Oudh 374, So the prayer was that this case should be remanded to the court below for writing a proper judgment. 27. All these contentions are not weighty. It was plaintiff's case that defendant obtained court-fee stamps worth Rs. 48,450/- and copy stamps worth Rs. 8780/- from 1-7-1955 to 23-8-1955. He made the sale of court-fee stamps worth Rs. 27. All these contentions are not weighty. It was plaintiff's case that defendant obtained court-fee stamps worth Rs. 48,450/- and copy stamps worth Rs. 8780/- from 1-7-1955 to 23-8-1955. He made the sale of court-fee stamps worth Rs. 30607.8 Annas only. Thus on 23-8-1955 court-fee stamps worth Rs. 10182/- and copy stamps worth Rs. 8061/- were with him which he could not account for as was obligatory on him. A perusal of questions Nos. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 in Ex. 9 shall go to disclose that all these details were specifically put to him. He admitted to have been the maker of all these entries and alleged that there was some clerical mistake in the said accounts, The courts below were not satisfied by the statement of the defendant in this court that this entire shortage was due to clerical errors or someone else was responsible for it. This report of Sri P.C. Gautam, Inspector of Stamps, P.W. 1, who went into these accounts as a person skilled in the examination of documents is admissible as secondary evidence of the original accounts under S. 65. sub-cl. (g) of Evidence Act. It was open to him under that section to give evidence as to the general result of examination of the documents done by him specially when his statement on this point could not be shown as incorrect by cross-examination. Similarly there is statement of Sarju Prasad Sahu. P.W. 1. who testified about this embezzlement. In his examination in chief he testified about the entrustment of these stamps to defendant. These statements were believed by learned courts below. It was found by learned appellate court that it was not a case of clerical mistake or error but there was shortage and manipulations in the accounts for which defendant was accountable. He worked up to 23-8-1955 when Treasury Officer demanded the account from him, he refused to comply. He took leave for two days and during the same night of 23rd and 24th Aug. 1955 made abortive attempts to commit suicide. All those circumstances were also considered by learned appellate court. Such burns, etc. on his person were admitted by defendant himself in his cross-examination. Defendant admitted that the stamps of the aforesaid value were entrusted to him which he could not account for to the extent given above. 1955 made abortive attempts to commit suicide. All those circumstances were also considered by learned appellate court. Such burns, etc. on his person were admitted by defendant himself in his cross-examination. Defendant admitted that the stamps of the aforesaid value were entrusted to him which he could not account for to the extent given above. Under the circumstances it is not possible to hold that the judgment is not supportable on the evidence on record. It is purely a finding of fact and' it is not for this court in second appeal to disturb the same merely on the ground that a detailed discussion of the evidence was not made by the courts below in their judgments. So I find that the aforesaid embezzlement of stamps worth Rs. 12952/- by defendant has been made out on evidence on record. 28. No argument was addressed before me by learned counsel for the appellant on the point that plaintiff was not entitled to reimbursement. In this connection learned appellate court rightly found that plaintiff was bound to pay this loss to the State on account of this embezzlement made by the defendant. So on the general principles of equity also plaintiff was entitled to be reimbursed by the defendant for that loss. Learned Advocate for respondent also pointed out that the position of defendant was that of agent and of plaintiff was that of Principal and so agent is liable for the loss actually sustained by principal on account of breach of duty by the agent. 29. In this connection he also referred to Para 785 at page 469. Vol. I of Halsbury's Laws of England Fourth Edition. I need not dilate on this point as this liability of defendant to plaintiff was not assailed before me. 30. In the result appeal is dismissed with costs.