M.C. JAIN, J.—This is an appeal directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated January 9, 1985 whereby, the learned Single Judge upheld the preliminary objection raised by the respondents that the writ petition is pre-mature. 2. we may state a few relevant facts. Two posts of Lecturer in Bio-chemistry were advertised by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (for short the RPSC) vide advertisement No. 3/82/83 dated July 14, 1982. The petitioner and respondent No. 3 Amarsingh Rathore and one Dr. R. C. Gupta applied for the post. Shri Amarsingh Rathore and Dr. R.C. Gupta were selected. The RPSC published a list of the selected candidates on February 16, 1983. It may be Stated that the petitioner - appellant was holding a post-graduate degree of M. D. in Bio-chemistry, which was obtained from the faculty of Medicine, University of Rajasthan. He entered his services in the Government of Rajasthan as Senior Demonstrator of Physiology on January 17, 1974. That appointment was on temporary basis. The post-graduate degree was obtained by him in 1975, thereafter, the petitioner was given regular appointment on the post of Senior Demonstrator after having been selected by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission.. Subsequent thereto, the petitioner was promoted on the urgent temporary basis to the post of Lecturer in Bio-chemistry. Due to selection of Dr. R.C. Gupta and Amarsingh Rathore, he apprehended his reversion from the post of Lecturer. The petitioner, therefore, challenged the selection of Shri Amarsingh Rathore (respondent No. 3) on the ground that respondent No. 3 was not holding the requisite qualifications. 3. Replies to the writ petition were submitted by respondent No. 2- Rajasthan Public Service Commission as well as respondent No. 3-Shri Amarsingh Rathore and separate rejoinders were filed by the petitioner and no reply was filed on behalf of the State of Rajasthan. 4. The respondents, however, raised the preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition. It was urged by them that till the appointment is madeby the Government, the petitioner has no right to move the Court, as the Government may give or may not give the appointment. No cause of action accrues to the petitioner till the appointment is given to respondent No. 3. It was urged by them that till the appointment is madeby the Government, the petitioner has no right to move the Court, as the Government may give or may not give the appointment. No cause of action accrues to the petitioner till the appointment is given to respondent No. 3. The arguments were heard by the learned Single Judge on this preliminary objection and the learned Judge upheld the preliminary objection and found that the writ petition is pre - mature, so, it cannot be maintained, consequently, the writ petition was dismissed. 5. We have heard Mr. M Mridul, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. H. N Calla, learned counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 and Mr. B.L. Purohit, learned counsel for respondent No. 3 on the preliminary objection decided by the learned Single Judge. 6. We may first of all state that the learned Single Judge proceeded to consider the question in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mrs. Kunda S. Kadam v. Dr. K.K. Soman (l). On behalf of the appellant, two decisions of this Court in Miss Kamlesh Bhardwaj v. State of Raj (2) and Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Jodhpur v. State of Rajasthan (3) were cited. The learned Judge in connection with those two decisions observed that in both the decisions Mrs. Kunda S. Kadams case (supra) was not noticed and that both the cases are distinguishable. According to the learned Judge, Mrs. Kunda S. Kadams case (supra) is fully applicable and on that basis, he upheld the preliminary objection. Certain other authorities have also been referred to by the learned Single Judge. 7. The question that emerges for consideration in the facts and circumstances of this case, is as to whether the petitioner can maintain the petition, when the selections have been made by the RPSC and the selections list has been published and the recommendations have been sent to the Government, but the Government has not acted on the recommendation i. e. the Government has not issued any appointment orders so far. The question is as to whether the selections are open to challenge on the ground of in-eligibility, when the appointments are not given by the Government. The relevant Rules are the Rajasthan Medical Service (Collegiate Branch) Rules, 1962. The question is as to whether the selections are open to challenge on the ground of in-eligibility, when the appointments are not given by the Government. The relevant Rules are the Rajasthan Medical Service (Collegiate Branch) Rules, 1962. By these Rules, the Rajasthan Medical Service (Collegiate Branch)has been constituted and all recruitments have to be made in accordance with these Rules. Part IV deals with the procedure for direct recruitment and Part V deals with the procedure for recruitment by promotion. For direct recruitment, the applications are invited through the RPSC For scrutiny of applications, the relevant rule is Rule 19, which reads as under :- "19. Scrutiny of applications-The Commission shall scrutinise the applications received by them and require as many candidates qualified for appointment under these Rules as seem to them desirable to appear before them for interview; Provided that the decision of the Commission as to the eligibility or otherwise of a candidate, shall be final." 8. Under rule 19, the applications are scrutinised by the Commission and after scrutiny, the Commission may require as many candidates qualified for appointment under these Rules as seem to them desirable to appear before them for interview. The proviso to rule 19 is very material, which lays down that the decision of the Commission as to the eligibility or otherwise of a candidate shall be final. Under rule 20, the Commission is required to prepare the list of the candidates, whom it considers suitable for appointment to the post concerned arranged in the order of merit and forward the same to the Government. Rule 22 is also material, which is also reproduced hereunder :- "22. Selection by the Government: Subject to the provisions of Rule 7 Government shall select candidates who stand highest in the order of merit in the list prepared by the Commission under Rule 20; Provided that the inclusion of a candidates name in the list confers no right to appointment unless the State Government is satisfied after such inquiry as may be considered necessary that the candidate is suitable in all other respects for appointment in the service." Under Rule 22, the Government is required to select the candidate, who is highest in the order of merit in the list prepared by the Commission under r. 20. The proviso to rule 22 further lays down that the inclusion of a candidates name in the list prepared by the Commission confers no right to appointment unless the State Government is satisfied, after such enquiry, as may be considered necessary that the candidate is suitable in all other respects for appointment to the service. According to the proviso, the State Government is empowered to hold an enquiry so as to satisfy itself as to whether the candidate is suitable in all other respects other than suitability on merit based on the eligibility as determined finally by the Commission under rule 19. The scheme of the Rules appears to be that it is the exclusive domain of the Commission to determine the eligibility as well as suitability and also to determine the order of merit. The appointments have to be made in order of merit. The selected candidates suitability on merit or eligibility can not be examined and considered by the Government. He is to be found fit medically or suitable in other respects. His ente-cedents may also be got verified. Thus, rules, 19, 20 and 22 clearly demarcate the functions of the Commission and of the Government. It would appear from the scheme that in case, the appointment is to be made, when in all other respects the candidate is found suitable, then recommendation of the Commission cannot be given go by So far as the eligibility is concerned, that is not open to question by the Government so decision of the Commission is final in this regard. 9. Under the scheme of these Rules, it is to be seen as to whether the cause of action arises to a candidate for challenge to the selection of any other candidate on the ground of in-eligibility. When the Govt. has no say in the matter to go into the question of eligibility, the cause of action is complete for such a candidate who wants to challenge the selection and appointment consequent thereto on the ground that the selected candidate does not passess the requisite eligibility qualification. If the Government is satisfied that the selected candidate is not suitable in all other respects then the appointment may not be given. If the Government is satisfied that the selected candidate is not suitable in all other respects then the appointment may not be given. In case, the Government holds the candidate suitable in all other respects, then there is no option left to the Government except to give appointment, when vacancy is to be filled in. 10. We may refer here to the decision of the Supreme Court on which the decision has been based by the learned Judge and great emphasis has been laid by the learned counsel for the respondents. 11. In Mrs Kunda S. Kadams case (supra), for selection to the post of Deputy Municipal Commissioner, applications were invited by the Public Service Commission. A request was made to the Public Service Commission by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay though it was open to the Municipal Corporation to adopt the promotion source but instead of adopting the promotion source, the Corporation decided to recruit on application from the open-market. The appellant was already in the service of the Corporation. She submitted an application and after selection her name was recommended by the Public Service Commission to the Municipal Corporation for appointment. While her name was under consideration of the Municipal Corporation, which was the Appointing Authority, respondents No. 1 and 2, challenged the recommendation itself on the score that the appellant did not fulfill the required statutory qualifications. The power of appointment was vested in the Corporation but after taking decision to appoint a particular candidate, the confirmation of the Government was required and on such confirmation a regular appointment could be made. The writ petition was dismissed in limine but the Division Bench allowed the appeal. In appeal, the Division Bench took the view that the appellant did not possess one of the qualifications i.e. 10 years administrative experience and, therefore, quashed the recommendation itself. Thereafter, the appellant preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court allowed the appeal. However, the Supreme Court observed that it was open to the State Govt. even if the Corporation had made an appointment to confirm or not to confirm it, depending on its own view of the matter. Their Lordships, therefore, observed that it was too early for a writ petition to be entertained and decided on the merits. However, the Supreme Court observed that it was open to the State Govt. even if the Corporation had made an appointment to confirm or not to confirm it, depending on its own view of the matter. Their Lordships, therefore, observed that it was too early for a writ petition to be entertained and decided on the merits. It was further observed that the recommendation of the Public Service Commission will be back before the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay. According to law, the Corporation will take its decision and thereafter, in due course, it will go for confirmation to the State Government and if any party is aggrieved by the appointment made, it be time enough for such aggrieved party to challenge the appointment. 12. From the facts, it would appear that the Municipal Corporation could dis-regard the recommendation made by the Commission and the decision of the Corporation is subject to confirmation by the State Government. It does not appear from the facts of the case that the question of eligibility of the candidate could not be gone into by the Municipal Corporation or by the State Government. From the facts, it would rather appear that every question was left open to be gone into by the Corporation as well as by the Government. It appears that no finality was attached to the scrutiny of the applications made by the Commission with regard to the eligibility conditions. As no finality was attached to the determination of the question of eligibility, so, their Lordships of the Supreme Court took the view that it was too early for a writ petition to be entertained and decided on the merits. Their Lordships were not called upon to examine the question as to whether the writ petition can be entertained on the ground of challenge to eligibility, which has been finally considered by the Commission. We see no reason as to why a candidate should wait till the appointment is made, when he wants to challenge the very selection. The process of appointment at times is very much protracted. When the very basis is being attacked and if the petitioner may be successful in his challenge of eligibility, then there will be no-question of making any appointment even when the Government is satisfied with regard to the suitability of the selected candidates in all other respects. The process of appointment at times is very much protracted. When the very basis is being attacked and if the petitioner may be successful in his challenge of eligibility, then there will be no-question of making any appointment even when the Government is satisfied with regard to the suitability of the selected candidates in all other respects. In our opinion, it would be an appropriate stage to challenge the selection without waiting for appointment being given to the selected candidates. 13. Mr. B. L. Purohit, learned counsel for respondent No. 3 has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Manmohan Singhal v. State of Raj.(4). That was a case of recommendation having been made by the Departmental Promotion Committee. Agrawal, S. proceeded to consider the scheme of the Rajasthan Service of Engineers (Buildings and Roads Branch) R. 1954. The provisions of rule 24A and r. 26 were taken into consideration and it was observed. "On consideration of the aforesaid provisions contained in rule 25A, I am of the opinion, sub-rule (13) of rule 24A deals with both the situations, i. e. where consultation with the Commission is necessary and also where consultation with the Commission is not necessary. In both the cases, the lists prepared under clause (c) of sub-rule (11) have to be finally approved by the Government. The provisions of sub-rule (13) of rule 24A cannot be confined only to those cases, where consultation with the Commission is necessary. Such a construction of sub-rule(13) would create an anomalous situation in the sense that in case, where consultation with the Commission is not necessary the D.P.C. will be the final authority in the matter of selection and the Government will have no say in the matter, whereas, in cases, where the consultation to the P.S.C. is necessary the approval of the Government would be required for the recommendations of the D.P.C. In my opinion, in cases, where consultation to the PSC is necessary, sub-rule (13) lays down an obligation upon the appointing authority to take into account the comments of the Commission but in other cases, where consultation with the Commission is not necessary, the Appointing Authority is entitled to examine the recommendations of the D.P.C. and to accept the same or not to accept them. The aforesaid construction, finds support from sub-rule(14) of rule 24A, which provides that the appointment has to be made out of the lists, which are finally approved under sub-rule(13). If the provisions of sub-rule (13) are confined to cases, where consultation with the Commission is necessary, the result would be that there will be no power of appointment in respect of persons selected by the D.P.C. in cases where consultation with the Commission is not necessary. This could not be the intention of the rule making Authority. A more reasonable construction would be that sub-rule (14) of rule 24A makes provision for appointment of persons, who have been selected by the D.P.C. in all cases, i.e. cases, where consultation with the Commission is necessary as well as cases where consultation with the Commission is not necessary and this would mean that sub-rule(l3) of rule 24A is applicable to all such cases and that the lists forwarded by the D.P.C. under clause (c) of sub-rule (11) are required to be finally approved by the Appointing Authority even in those cases where consultation with the Commission is not necessary." 14. The learned Judge concluded by observing "the provisions of sub-rule(3) of rule 26 confer a power on the Government in the matter of making the final selection of the suitable candidates in all cases irrespective of the fact, whether consultation with the Commission is necessary or not and, therefore, the list that is, forwarded by the D.P.C. cannot be considered as final till it is approved by the State Government." 15. In that case, a preliminary objection was raised by the respondents with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition that it is pre-mature. As no order had been passed by the State Government accepting the recommendations or making promotions on the basis of the said recommendations, it cannot be said that the petitioner had a cause of action for challenging the recommendations of the D.P.C.. A support was taken from the decision of Mrs. Kunda S. Kadams case (supra). The learned Judge considered the scheme of the rules and upheld the preliminary objection and the writ petition \vas held to be premature. This case is clearly distinguishable if examined in the light of the scheme of the rules applicable to the present case as considered above. Kunda S. Kadams case (supra). The learned Judge considered the scheme of the rules and upheld the preliminary objection and the writ petition \vas held to be premature. This case is clearly distinguishable if examined in the light of the scheme of the rules applicable to the present case as considered above. In the scheme of the rules, the Government has no say in the matter of considering the eligibility. It has simply say in the matter of adjudging the suitability in other respects and not in respect to eligibility. It cannot even give a go by to the order of merit. Thus, Manmohan Singhals case (supra) has no application to the present case. 16. Mr. Purohit also emphasized on the observations made in Manmohan Singhals case (supra) by the learned Judge regarding accrual of the cause of action. The learned Judge observed that the cause of action for the petitioner to challenge the recommendation made by the D.P.C. can arise only when the State Government acts upon such recommendation and issues order prejudicial to the petitioner and till then the petitioner can not have any cause of action to challenge the recommendations of the D.P.C. It may be stated that the question of cause of action is attached or linked with the power of the State Government. The State Government is whole and sole in the matter and can disregard the recommendations of the D.P.C. In view of such powers of the State Government, this observation regarding accrual of cause of action has been made. 17. We may refer to a decision of the Division Bench of this Court, which in our opinion, throws some light on the question under consideration. In Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Dr.(Miss.)Damyanti Dadhich etc.(5) cited by Mr. Mridul in Para 15, it has been observed that where the RPSC has made recommendations regarding the selected candidates, but the appointment have not been made by the Government, a petition challenging the validity of procedure of selection at that stage is maintainable. It was observed that if the screening test for the petitioners could not be lawfully held, they are entitled to challenge it right away without waiting for decision of the Government on the recommendations of the Commission regarding appointment to the posts. It was observed that if the screening test for the petitioners could not be lawfully held, they are entitled to challenge it right away without waiting for decision of the Government on the recommendations of the Commission regarding appointment to the posts. If it was legally permissible to hold the screening test together, in respect of all candidates including the petitioners, the writ petitions would fail on merits rather than on the ground of their so-called unripeness." It is true that in that case, the validity under challenge was to the peocedure of selection adopted by the RPSC and the selections were challenged on that ground but that does not make much difference. The very selections were under challenge In the present case, the selection is under challenge on the ground of eligibility and the question of eligibility is not open for the Government. The appointment, as a result of selection is only consequence of selection. 18. In Krishi Upaj Mandi Samitis case(supra), an argument was advanced that merely because the names of the writ petitioners appeared in the list of selected candidates, it did not confer any right on them to be appointed on the post of Lower Division Clerks, and that, no writ or mandamus can be issued directing the market committees to proceed to make appointments of the writ petitioners on the post of L.D.Cs, in the existing vacancies. The Division Bench considered the case of State of Haryana v. Subhash Chandar Marwaha (6),State of Punjab v. Saroj Devi (7) and Dr. Ramsingh v. University of Sagar, Sagar (8). In that case, the Director of the Board, who was the Appointing Authority, had issued an order directing the market-committees concerned to issue appointment orders to the selected candidates. As a matter of fact, in some of the cases, the order of appointment had actually been issued by the Secretary of the respective Market Committees. The Director, who was the Appointing Authority in accordance with rule 64-I of the 1975 Rules as amended, had approved the selection and directed the concerned Market-Committees to issue orders of appointment to the selected candidates and forwarded region-wise lists of selected candidates to the respective committees for the purpose of issuing orders of appointment to the persons, whose names were included in such lists. But, there were no powers to set aside the orders of the Director. But, there were no powers to set aside the orders of the Director. It was observed that the State Government had no right or authority to set aside the selections and direct that fresh selections be made according to only one of the methods prescribed for making selections viz. by calling a list of eligible candidates from the local employment exchange of the area. The Division Bench negatived the contention that the writ petitions are premature. It is true that in that case, some orders of appointment have been issued and a direction was given by the Director, who was the Appointing Authority and who had forwarded region-wise lists of selected candidates to the respective market committees for the purpose of issuing orders of appointment. The observations made in the case, however, do lend some support tor the view that the writ petition is not premature. 19. In Miss Kamlesh Bharadwajs case(supra), an appeal was preferred before the Division Bench, which is Dr. (Miss) Damyanti Dadhichs case(supra). The view of the learned Judge on the question of pre mature character of the writ petition was approved by the Division Bench with the reasoning extracted above. On the question of pre-mature character of the petition, the learned Single Judge observed that "the selections list have not only been published but it has been sent to the Government. Mr. Singhvis contention was that the Government may still consider the selection list and appoint or not appoint the petitioners, is not sustainable. The reason being that once the recommendation of the Public Service Commission to the Government is sent on the basis of merit, the Government has got no power of veto." The learned Judge further observed that "the Government can consider is whether their character or antecedent are such, which can disentitle them from their appointment inspite of their merit. There is a very far far fetched possibility of one or two persons being not appointed of the entire list because they may have some had adverse antecedent either of conviction or of such activities which may disentitle them. That being so, by and large the recommendation of the Public Service Commission contained in the selection list are final and all that the Government required is to make an enquiry about the conduct and then issue formal orders of appointment. That being so, by and large the recommendation of the Public Service Commission contained in the selection list are final and all that the Government required is to make an enquiry about the conduct and then issue formal orders of appointment. In view of this, it cannot be said that writ petitions have been filed at pre-mature stage." 20. We agree with the view of the learned Single Judge, which has been affirmed by the Division Bench with its own reasoning. The observations of the learned Single Judge, in our opinion, are apt so far as the present case is concerned and the same reasoning has been adopted by us while considering the scheme of the rules 19, 20 and 22. 21. The petitioner has come at the stage when he felt that his prospects of selection and proper order of merit and consequent appointment are under threat. The petitioners apprehension may be genuine when the selections list have been published, which according to him, contained the name of respondent No. 2 3, who in view of the petitioner was not eligible. The possibility of non-appointment of respondent No. 3 is a remote possibility. In such a situation, in our opinion, the petitioner has a genuine grievance to be redressed in connection with the selection of respondent No. 3 and consequent appointment of respondent No. 3 to the post of Lecturer. We may state that the vary consideration of a candidate by the RPSC who should be excluded from consideration affecting the prospects of selection of other candidates and assignment of proper place in the order of merit and consequently their appointment, furnishes a good cause of action, In our opinion, the writ petition was entertainable and was not pre-mature. 22. The learned counsel for the parties state that respondent No. 3 has been given appointment on the post of Lecturer in Bio-chemistry. On that basis, as well, the appeal deserves to be allowed. 23. For decision on merits, the writ petition will have to be sent back to the Single Bench. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the case is sent back to the Single Bench for disposal on merits. Parties shall bear their own costs of this appeal. 24. Mr. Mridul, however, submits that the State of Rajasthan may be restrained from effecting reversion of the petitioner from the present post. Mr. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the case is sent back to the Single Bench for disposal on merits. Parties shall bear their own costs of this appeal. 24. Mr. Mridul, however, submits that the State of Rajasthan may be restrained from effecting reversion of the petitioner from the present post. Mr. Calla on the basis of instructions given by the Deputy Secretary, Medical and Health Shri G. K. Goswami stated that the petitioner is not going to be reverted at present. In any case, it would be proper that for some time, the petitioner may not be reverted. It is, therefore, ordered that the State Government shall not revert the petitioner for a period of 3 weeks. In the meantime, the petitioner may move the Single Judge to obtain any interim relief.