JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. - This is plaintiffs Second appeal in a suit for injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with their possession over plot no. 1472 (old), new no, 332 situate in Baker Ganj, Babu Purwa, Kanpur. The suit has been dismissed by both the courts below. 2. Relevant facts are that the plaintiffs claimed to be in possession over 250 sq. yds. of land forming part of plot No. 1472 over which they had certain constructions since 1953. They also claimed that another plot of land measuring 50 sq. yrds. approximately towards south had been taken on licence by plaintiff's father between 1960 and 1967 but thereafter the licence was not renewed. The defendants, claiming to be the owners of both these pieces of land under land acquisition proceedings by the Town Improvement Board, tried to demolish the constructions and were successful in partially demolishing it. In this suit we are not concerned with that portion of the land which was only on licence from the defendants and the claim is confined to remaining land measuring 75' x 30' to the north of the Nala. The defendants disputed that this land forms part of Plot No. 1472 and contended that it was in fact part of plot no. 1274. Documents have been filed on the record to show that plot no. 332 was previously comprised of Plot No. 1274 and some other plots but it did not comprise plot no. 1472 at all. The courts below have come to the conclusion that plaintiffs had failed to prove that the disputed land was part of Plot No. 1472. It has also been held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that this land had been initially taken by his father from Ram Lakshman Janki Trust and that there was no documentary evidence for such grant to the plaintiff. 3. There has been some controversy as to whether the court has rightly recorded a finding about the land being part of plot no. 1274 but suffice to say that there is no evidence of the fact that it was in plot no. 1472. The plaintiffs have tried to rely upon Fard Mutabigat of the year 1348 Fasli but it does not go to establish their case. 1274 but suffice to say that there is no evidence of the fact that it was in plot no. 1472. The plaintiffs have tried to rely upon Fard Mutabigat of the year 1348 Fasli but it does not go to establish their case. It has been pointed that Rule 71 Chapter IX of the Land Revenue Rules has not been complied with in preparing this document on which the defendants rely upon. However, it will be seen that Rule 71 was introduced after 1951. These rules have been framed under Section 234 (d) of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, as amended by Act 1 of 1951 in areas where Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1 of 1951 is applicable. No rules for preparing such land records prevailing in the year 1348 fasli have been shown to me and as such the appellants' contention can not be accepted. The courts have also recorded a finding that the plaintiffs have not been proved to have been in possession since 1953. However, this much is clear that the plaintiffs were in fact in possession in December, 1968 when an attempt was made by the defendants to dispossess them from the land. The question that comes up for consideration is whether in such circumstances the defendants were entitled to take forcible possession from the plaintiffs without having recourse to the procedure established by law. It has not been shown to me how the Nagar Mahapalika or the respondent no. 3 could demolish the constructions without serving any previous notice or taking any proceedings under the law. By utilising the force at their command such as its gangmen and other staff, the respondents could not dispossess the plaintiffs. It is necessary for them to act in accordance with law and within the four corners of the rules framed in this behalf. Even if the plaintiffs be not the owners of the land but were actually in possession over it, some procedure prescribed by law ought to have been adopted before attempt to dispossess the plaintiff was made. In this case it has not been shown to me as to how and under what provision the respondents had taken action for demolishing the existing constructions. In this case it has not been shown to me as to how and under what provision the respondents had taken action for demolishing the existing constructions. Even where the plaintiff in possession of some land fails to prove his title in respect thereof his possession alone is good enough to entitle him to seek protection of his possession unless the defendant proves that it had some better right and was entitled to dispossess him or it could do so under some law. That such a suit was sustainable was upheld in Som Nath v. Dr. S.P. Raju, AIR 1970 SC 846 . In that case it was held that even if a suit for possession was filed against a wrong doer, prior possession itself is sufficient title and the wrong doer can not successfully resist the suit by setting up title in a third person. A case where dispossession has not taken place would stand on a still better footing. Much the same view was expressed by the Supreme Court in Nair Service Society v. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165 . In this case Courts below have failed to record a finding that defendant was the owner of the disputed land. It has also not been found that the disputed land lies in plot No. 1274 and that it had been acquired by the defendant. In the absence of any such finding it can not be said that defendant had a better title than the plaintiff. It has been pointed out that some proceedings under the U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act are going on against the appellants. In that event the appellants would be liable to eviction once the respondents establish their right but until then plaintiff would be entitled to some protection at least against forcible dispossession. 4. It has also been contended that the suit was bad for want of notice under Section 571. It may, however, be recalled that the section has no application where in the suit the only relief claimed was an injunction, the object of which would be defeated by giving a notice or postponement of the commencement of the suit or proceedings. In the present case the respondents had already demolished a part of the construction on 19-12-1968. It may, however, be recalled that the section has no application where in the suit the only relief claimed was an injunction, the object of which would be defeated by giving a notice or postponement of the commencement of the suit or proceedings. In the present case the respondents had already demolished a part of the construction on 19-12-1968. The suit was filed on 21st December, 1968 on the allegation that after demolishing the Khaprail and Tattar room, the Inspector of the respondent had threatened to demolish the Kachcha house also. In these circumstances, the plaintiffs were certainly entitled to institute the suit without serving the notice, otherwise the very purpose of the suit would have been defeated. 5. It has also been contended that plaintiff has failed to allege any such fact as will entitle him to come within this exception. Even though this may be so but apart from the plaint allegations; the court must also look into all attending circumstances and the nature of the relief claimed in order to ascertain whether the postponement of the suit would have defeated the very purpose for which it was intended to be filed. It would have been better if more specific allegation had been made in the plaint but even though the court is certainly entitled to look into the surrounding circumstances and entirety of allegations made in the plaint in order to find out the true nature of the case. On a perusal of the entire plaint I am of the view that necessary allegations were already there and the plaintiffs were entitled to take advantage of the exception contained in Section 571 of the Act. The suit, therefore, could not be said to be bad for want of a notice under Section 571 of the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959. 6. Thus in view of what I have said above, the appeal must succeed and the plaintiffs would be entitled to an injunction. The appeal is allowed and the suit of the plaintiffs is decreed for an injunction restraining the respondents from dispossessing them from the land in dispute otherwise than in accordance with law and from interfering with their possession over the same. In the circumstances of the case, however, the parties are left to bear their own costs throughout.