A. Muraleedharan v. State Of Kerala — 1985 DIGILAW 106 (KER)

Judgment :- Muraleedharan, appellant-accused was a junior accountant in the Sub Treasury at Alathur. His father was a peon there and had died in harness. A benign provision for mitigating the hardship of the government servants who die in harness enabled the appellant to get an appointment to a government post. He has been working in the treasury there thereafter. 2. In March 1975, two spurious bills were presented to the treasury : (1) A bill for Rs. 40,750/- purporting to be an advance made to a fertiliser agent by name Krishnan Nair. (2) A bill purporting to be from the A.U.P. School, Nelliampadam for Rs. 13,310.40. There is no controversy now that there is no such fertiliser agent as Mr. Krishnan Nair. The A.U.P. School, Nelliampadam, is a fictitious one. 3. The bills presented to the treasury were certified for payment and the State Bank paid the amounts covered thereby. A sum of Rs. 54,060.40 has thus been lost to the public exchequer. 4. According to the prosecution, it was the accused who forged the bills and authorisation letters, collected the token and received the cash in hand; and it was he who attempted to mollify the treasury officials when the irreconcilable financial transactions were noticed by them. When other officials in the treasury were anxiously on the search for the missing bill, (relating to the payment to the school) the accused asserted that he knew the school and the management and could therefore, without difficulty, obtain a duplicate bill, should there be any query from the Accountant General. The authorities however, reported the matter to the police on the very next day. Investigation was undertaken thereafter. The accused was charged with offences under S. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with S. 5(1)(d) and under Ss. 468, 420, 471, 477A and 201, I.P.C. 5. Before the trial court 21 witnesses were examined on the side of the prosecution and 66 documents marked. The stand of the accused as disclosed from his S. 313 statement was one of total denial. However, in the course of the arguments, the emphasis in the submissions made on behalf of the accused appears to have been for a lenient punishment. The stand of the accused as disclosed from his S. 313 statement was one of total denial. However, in the course of the arguments, the emphasis in the submissions made on behalf of the accused appears to have been for a lenient punishment. The court below records thus : "The learned counsel for the accused argued for mercy only and so both sides had not adverted to the evidence." Understandably, the court below therefore did not undertake a very minute or elaborate discussion of the prosecution evidence; nor did it give detailed reference to the possible infirmity in the prosecution case, the appropriate answer thereto, and the ultimate conclusion on the question of culpability of the accused. The plea of mercy, however, did appear to have its effect on unduly diluting the punishment. Convicting him of the offences under S. 5(1)(d) read with S. 5(2) of the P.C. Act, the court below directed that he be sentenced to imprisonment for six months and be imposed a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. (There is appeal against the sentence, although the punishment is as illusory as would be indicated later, and opposed to the guidelines given by the Supreme Court in the matter of reducing the minimum sentence which Parliament has chosen to prescribe for such serious offences). The accused thought that he would challenge the conviction and sentence. That resulted in the present appeal. 6. Counsel for the appellant highlighted three aspects. (1) The judgment of the court below is not really a 'judgment' in the eye of law. It has not conformed to the requirements of S. 323(353 ?) of the Criminal Procedure Code. (2) There was no proper sanction for the prosecution of the case as obligated under S. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). (3) Even on merits, the prosecution has signally failed to establish the case. I shall examine these contentions seriatim. 7. Is this a 'judgment' by the court below ? The requirements of a 'judgment' as indicated in S. 364(354 ?) Cr.P.C., had been subject-matter of judicial comment in numerous decisions. The section itself is clearly indicative of the basic requirements : the formulation of points for determination, the discussion of evidence and the reasoning in support of the ultimate conclusion. It was agreed by counsel for the appellant that the point for determination had been properly raised. The section itself is clearly indicative of the basic requirements : the formulation of points for determination, the discussion of evidence and the reasoning in support of the ultimate conclusion. It was agreed by counsel for the appellant that the point for determination had been properly raised. Paragraph 10 of the judgment of the court below starts with the statement : "The point that arises for determination is whether the accused a government servant obtained pecuniary advantage by corrupt means and whether he committed cheating and forged document for the same and used it as genuine and whether the accused falsified records and caused evidence of the offence to disappear." Paragraphs 12 to 15 have been devoted for a discussion of evidence in the case, oral and documentary. The witnesses, it was observed, all were officers and could be believed. The fact that there was no suggestion on the side of the accused about such witnesses having any enmity towards the accused was noted. The expert evidence was also adverted to. In relation to the essential ingredients of the offence, the evidence available on record has been considered. The reasoning justifying the ultimate conclusion is also discernible in the judgment of the court below. It cannot therefore be said that there is any infirmity, such a serious infirmity as would justify interference with the judgment of the court below, on the ground of not complying with the requirements of S. 364(354 ?). 8. Counsel for the appellant made reference to the decisions in V. K. Kamble v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 1615 : (1977 Cri LJ 1119) and Niranjan v. State, 1978 Cri LJ 636 (Cal). The requirements of a proper judgment as indicated by the Supreme Court, have been satisfied by the judgment in the present case. 9. The decision in 1978 Cri LJ 636 (Cal) (supra) is clearly distinguishable. The judgment extracted in paragraph 2 of the aforesaid decision is so cryptic that it cried violently for interference by the High Court. There is absolutely no comparison between the judgment so set aside by the aforesaid decision, and the one under appeal before this Court. 10. A contention about the judgment not being as elaborate and as prolix as is ideal in the discussion of various aspects comes with ill grace from the appellant. There is absolutely no comparison between the judgment so set aside by the aforesaid decision, and the one under appeal before this Court. 10. A contention about the judgment not being as elaborate and as prolix as is ideal in the discussion of various aspects comes with ill grace from the appellant. Counsel in the court below specifically restricted the consideration of his client's case as one in the area of mercy. In other words, counsel in the court below pressed only on the question of a lenient punishment. The court thereafter concentrated on that plea in that background. In so doing, the court did not act illegally or unproperly. 11. This court cannot be oblivious of the situation confronting the subordinate courts in the matter of disposal of cases before them. They have necessarily to work at a hectic pace. An oppressive pressure of work nags them quite often. Such a court cannot therefore be justifiably blamed for the only reason that the judgment is not as elaborate as the accused would like to have it. The court below has recorded that no arguments were advanced on the merits of the contentions. I would certainly accept that statement as reflecting the correct position. Ordinarily it should be assumed that counsel who had conducted the case on behalf of the accused in the court below was aware that the evidence in the case was so clear and convincing as to sustain conviction. This is the normal and fair interpretation of the conduct of counsel in the court below. It would have been then a quixotic adventure for the court to trump up imaginary attacks on the prosecution case and to slash them down with the materials available in the case. It is also useful in that connection to bear in mind S. 375. Cr.P.C. whereunder the remedy by way of appeal is unavailable to an accused person who had pleaded guilty and had been convicted on such plea. The principle underlying that section would justify the course adopted by the court below in rendering a judgment without elaborate details. I would repel the first ground of attack against the judgment of the court below. 12. Whether there is proper sanction for the prosecution is the next question. 13. The importance of a valid and proper sanction has been emphasised in judicial decisions. It is not an empty formality. I would repel the first ground of attack against the judgment of the court below. 12. Whether there is proper sanction for the prosecution is the next question. 13. The importance of a valid and proper sanction has been emphasised in judicial decisions. It is not an empty formality. It is intended to ensure that a public servant is effectively insulated against unjust harassment in the execution of his responsible duties. An application of mind by the sanctioning authority to all relevant facts and circumstances is therefore rightly insisted upon. 14. The immunity a sanction order has, when it is duly authenticated under Article 166(2) of the Constitution is also to be borne in mind in that connection. The irrebuttable presumption available about the order being made by the Governor has been explained in the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Harnam Singh, AIR 1961 SC 1762 : (1961 (2) Cri LJ 828). Many relevant aspects relating to the proof of a sanction order have been referred to in the Bench decision of this Court in G. V. Nair v. Govt. of India, 1962 Ker LT 690 : (1963 (1) Cri LJ 675). 15. In the present case, the sanction order Ext. P66 passed by the Governor is proved by P.W. 21, Deputy Superintendent of Police in charge of investigation. In his evidence he stated that he conducted the investigation and obtained Government sanction. It is thereafter that he proves Ext. P66. 16. It was contended that the sanction order was by the Government and not by the appointing authority, as envisaged under Section 6 of the Act. Under the section, sanction has to be granted by the appointing authority. In the case of the category to which the accused belongs, the appointing authority, ordinarily, is the Director of Treasuries. However, in the light of the special nature of the appointment of the accused, this contention is untenable. P.W. 16, District Treasury Officer proves that Ext. P38 appointment order is signed on behalf of the Governor of Kerala. That clearly shows that the accused was appointed by the Government. (As noted earlier his father had died in harness and the accused was appointed by the Government under the orders enabling such an appointment, as an exception to the general recruitment through the Public Service Commission). P38 appointment order is signed on behalf of the Governor of Kerala. That clearly shows that the accused was appointed by the Government. (As noted earlier his father had died in harness and the accused was appointed by the Government under the orders enabling such an appointment, as an exception to the general recruitment through the Public Service Commission). There was no suggestion to P.W. 16 in the cross-examination which would in any way affect the admissibility or evidentiary value of Ext. P38. 17. Counsel for the appellant referred to the decisions in In re R. Sivraj, 1981 Cri LJ 260 (Mad) and Madhusudan Prasad v. State of M.P., 1981 Cri LJ 571 (Madh Pra) in an attempt to show that the sanction has not been properly proved. These decisions have no applications to the facts of the present case. In the former case, the sanction order had not been produced. It was not part of the evidence. The observations in paragraph 13 of the judgment have to be understood in the background of those significant facts. As noted earlier, the order of the State Government sectioning the prosecution is part of the evidence in the present case. 18. In the second case it is clear that the conviction would not have stood even if there was a sanction order. This is evident from paragraph 10 of the judgment. It is unnecessary to discuss the observations in that judgment, in view of the positive evidence available in the present case as regards sanction. 19. The view of the court below that there is proper sanction, is not opposed to any of the principles laid down in the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P., AIR 1979 SC 677 : (1979 Cri LJ 633), on which reliance was made by counsel for the appellant. 20. It is useful in this connection to refer to the observations contained in G. V. Nair's case (1963 (1) Cri LJ 675) (Ker) (supra) : "It is stated that the Secretary who signed the order has not been examined to prove that he was present when the Governor applied him mind and sanctioned the prosecution. This contention is not well founded." 21. Some criticism was made based on a sentence in the evidence of P.W. 21 when he was cross-examined on the question of sanction. This contention is not well founded." 21. Some criticism was made based on a sentence in the evidence of P.W. 21 when he was cross-examined on the question of sanction. In answer to a suggestive question he stated : "If it is said that the sanction is not proper, I do not know about the same." As the Public Prosecutor submitted, this sentence cannot be pressed into service to establish that there was no proper sanction. It is quite possible that the investigating officer might have felt that the validity or propriety of a sanction must be a matter for a Court to decide and consequently it would have been improper for him to express an opinion thereon. In any view of the matter, this stray sentence is too tenuous a ground to make good a substantial contention that there was no proper sanction at all for the prosecution. I must reject the second contention also in the above circumstances. 22. Whether the evidence in the case would bring home the charge against the accused is the next question. 23. In order to ensure that every material evidence is examined having regard to the peculiar circumstances of the case, counsel for the appellant and the Public Prosecutor placed the evidence in a very exhaustive and detailed manner before this Court. Despite the strenuous effort made in that behalf, counsel for the appellant could not effectively assail the prosecution evidence which proves beyond doubt the charge levelled against the accused. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the following points should be established by the prosecution before the accused could be convicted. (1) That the accused was an employee in the Treasury during the relevant period. (2) That the accused was working in the particular bill passing section. (3) That he received amounts which were not really due and (4) That he employed means like forgery etc. in so receiving the payment. 24. On the first two points there is abundance of evidence. P.W. 4, Head Accountant of the Sub-Treasury, P.W. 5, Junior Accountant of the 'Bill Passing Section' of that Treasury, P.W. 7, Sub-Treasury Officer, and P.W. 8 Junior Accountant, among others give uncontradicted evidence about his employment in the Treasury and in the Bill Passing Section. 25. As noted earlier, there are two payments connected with the charge; (1) A sum of Rs. 25. As noted earlier, there are two payments connected with the charge; (1) A sum of Rs. 13,310.40 paid towards a bill purported to have been submitted on behalf of U.P. School, Nelliampadam and (2) A sum of Rs. 40,750/- paid under a bill purported to be that of the B.D.O., Alathur. P.W. 12, the Assistant Educational Officer has given evidence that there is no school by name U. P. S. Nelliampadam. He had not signed in any Bill supported by Ext. P3 authorisation. There is no Headmaster by name Radhakrishnan Nair, who is stated to have signed Ext. P. 3. Similarly P.W. 16, Sadanandan who was the Upper Division Clerk of the Block Development Officer during the relevant time has given evidence that the B.D.O. has not received a sum of Rs. 40,750/-. P.W. 18 is the B.D.O., Alathur. He has denied having signed Ext. P. 7. Bill, the register of licensed manure dealers. There is no dealer by name 'A. R. Krishnan Nair', the name occurring in Ext. P. 7. The payment effected by the Treasury was not reflected in the Accounts of the B.D.O. Thus the misappropriation of the amounts which had been paid from the Treasury is clearly established. That the Bills and authorisations in respect of the two payments had been forged and that the payments were obtained in the name of a fictitious institution and a fictitious person are thus proved beyond doubt. 26. The only further question is about the involvement of the accused in the various activities connected with the misappropriation of the amounts. 27. It is desirable in this connection to bear in mind that the Sub Treasury, Alathur and the State Bank of Travancore are in close proximity. The distance can be covered by three minutes of walk. Having regard to the proximity between the two institutions and the fact that Alathur is a comparatively small place, it is not unnatural that those who work in the Treasury and in the Bank would appear to each other as familiar faces. This has a bearing in the appreciation of the evidence of the various witnesses in relation to the intimate connection the accused had with the crucial acts constituting the offence. 28. The treasury officials were disconcerted when accounts did not tally and a bill was missing. They lost not time in intimating the Police about the situation. This has a bearing in the appreciation of the evidence of the various witnesses in relation to the intimate connection the accused had with the crucial acts constituting the offence. 28. The treasury officials were disconcerted when accounts did not tally and a bill was missing. They lost not time in intimating the Police about the situation. The quick action on the part of the treasury officials would improbabilise the suggestions of counsel for the appellant that the treasury officials wanted some scape goat when the misappropriation was detected and that they pitched upon the accused to save their own skin. It is an artificial and unnatural conduct on the part of fairly high placed officials of a treasury in which the accused was working. 29. In relation to the bill for Rs. 13,310,40/-, the relevant documents are Exts. P. 2 (copy of the Bill), P. 2(a), P. 3, P. 4, P. 4(a), P. 6 and P. 6(a). The general practice in relation to the payment of a bill is spoken to by P.W. 1. Token number 550 had been issued in relation to a bill which has serial No. 81 of Ext. P. 2, which relates to the 'Upper Primary School, Nelliampadam.' The Sub-Treasury Officer passed the Bill for payment and sent it to the State Bank along with the authorisation Ext. P. 3 in favour of the accused. The authorisation is entered in the debit scroll Ext. P. 4, the relevant entry being Ext. P. 4(a). When it went to the State Bank of Travancore, payment was effected. P.W. 3, Mohan, Cashier of the Bank has given evidence on the material facts including payment effected to the accused. 30. Similarly, in relation to the sum of Rs. 40,750/-, the relevant bill is Ext. P7 and the letter of authorisation Ext. P8. The payment was effected under Ext. P10. 31. P.W. 2 who is the Head Cashier of Alathur Sub-Treasury gives very clear evidence about the active role of the accused in relation to Ext. P7. He states that he verified the bill and called the token number. The evidence continues. "Muraleedharan then came. He is the accused. The accused signed Ext. P7 in my presence. I initialled Ext. P7(a)." P.W. 2 also refers to the authorisation and about the encashment of the bill. P7. He states that he verified the bill and called the token number. The evidence continues. "Muraleedharan then came. He is the accused. The accused signed Ext. P7 in my presence. I initialled Ext. P7(a)." P.W. 2 also refers to the authorisation and about the encashment of the bill. The evidence of P.W. 2, if acceptable, would therefore clearly show that it was the accused who singed Ext. P7. The signing by the accused in Ext. P. 7 would to a large extent establish the prosecution case. I do not see any reason whatever to disbelieve the evidence of P.W. 2. In cross-examination P.W. 2 was asked whether it was the presence of accused in Court which prompted the witness to give evidence about the accused signing Ext. P. 7. His reply was that he said so as the accused signed the concerned papers in his presence. The criticism about the next sentence (that had it not been for the presence of accused, he could not say that Exts. P7 and P8 were signed by accused) has no merit in the light of the clear statement referred to above. The witness explains how he was acquainted with the accused as an employee of the Treasury as the accused used to be in the Bank on many occasions in connection with various transactions. The suggestions in the cross-examination that the witness gave evidence against the accused for fear of the police has no basis and is to be rejected. P.W. 14, Kamaruddin, Cashier of the State Bank has given evidence that the accused received payments in respect of the two Bills. He said that the accused signed in his presence in Ext. P3 the endorsement : "Received contents." 32. The extensive forging by the accused of documents connected with Ext. P. 7 is further proved by the evidence of P.W. 7 who was the Sub-Treasury Officer during the relevant time. She is familiar with the handwriting, initials and signature of the accused as the accused had been working with her for about 5 months. She has sworn to the facts that all the entries in Ext. P. 3 are in the handwriting of the accused. The signature in Ext. P3 has been put by the accused. Counsel for the appellant made much of her statement that the signature in Ext. P. 3 is not 'a real signature' of the accused. She has sworn to the facts that all the entries in Ext. P. 3 are in the handwriting of the accused. The signature in Ext. P3 has been put by the accused. Counsel for the appellant made much of her statement that the signature in Ext. P. 3 is not 'a real signature' of the accused. There is, however, no difficulty in understating her statement in the background of surrounding circumstances. No doubt, Ext. P3 is not signed by a person named Murali or Muraleedharan. But the signature has been put by the accused. She is competent to give evidence to that effect, when she is familiar with the slants, stresses and general pattern of writing of the accused. She has also given evidence about Ext. P7 containing the handwriting of the accused in relation to all the relevant entries. She speaks about token No. 130 relating to the bill Ext. P7 for Rs. 40,750/-; and she states : "The writings in this in black ink, red ink and green ink are all the handwriting of the accused. The signature seen on top of the letters S.T.O. are not mine. I was the S.T.O. at the relevant time. The handwriting in which the writing "contents received" occurred as also the signature therein are those of the accused. However, the signature is not the real signature of the accused." The explanation given earlier about the 'signature' and 'real signature' applies to the above statement also. Ext. P8 letter, the letter dated 19-3-1975 purporting to be of the B.D.O. Ext. P. 28, and the proceedings dated 19-3-1975 purporting to be of the B.D.O. Ext. P. 29, and the letters Exts. P. 30 to P. 33 have all been shown to be in the handwriting of the accused. Her evidence will appear to have further and additional support from the comparison of the handwriting and signatures of the accused as revealed from the application for casual leave submitted by the accused. 33. P.W. 7 also speaks about another material circumstances relating to the missing bill in relation to the payment of Rs. 13,310.40. When P.W. 8 informed her about the missing of the relevant bill, there was an attempt to trace it and a search was made in the almirah in the custody of the accused. The bill was not located there. The accused was not present at that time. 13,310.40. When P.W. 8 informed her about the missing of the relevant bill, there was an attempt to trace it and a search was made in the almirah in the custody of the accused. The bill was not located there. The accused was not present at that time. He had gone for his meals. On his return he was enquired about it by P.W. 7. The answer of the accused is very significant and crucial. The accused said : "The bill must be somewhere there. Even if it is not traced, it does not matter. The school is known to me. If the Accountant General queries about it, we can obtain a duplicate bill and send it on." 34. There is other corroborative evidence of P.W. 8 and P.W. 4, which clearly makes out that it was the accused who had suppressed the original of the bill of which Ext. P. 2 is the carbon copy. When enquired about it, he attempted to mislead all, lulling them to a false sense of security by giving a patently false statement. Counsel for the appellant submitted that a presence of mind, or even a rash valiant pose, on the part of the accused might have prompted the accused to give such an assurance to the distressed co-workers. Such a pose, even if vain and foolhardy, is not sufficient to charge him with a crime - counsel submitted. This is not a case where a school by the name as given in Ext. P. 3 was in existence and the accused making a reckless statement claiming acquaintance with the authorities of the school. The positive evidence in the case is that the school itself is non-existent. In that view, he could not possibly claim acquaintance with anyone in that school. The attendant circumstance would clearly make out that the accused knew the falsity of his version and that he deliberately attempted to mislead his co-workers after having effectively suppressed the original of the bill. 35. I do not find any material contradiction in the evidence given on that aspect by P.Ws. 4, 7 and 8. 36. Counsel for the appellant attempted to make a suspicious circumstance from the missing bill. 35. I do not find any material contradiction in the evidence given on that aspect by P.Ws. 4, 7 and 8. 36. Counsel for the appellant attempted to make a suspicious circumstance from the missing bill. The evidence in the case and the attendant circumstance clearly indicate that it was the accused, who had exercised his crooked intellect in planning a chain of illegal acts, including the suppression of the bill. If his co-workers who were unaware of his evil design, could not, despite their best efforts, trace the bill (the accused had left the office in the meantime for his meals) that circumstance cannot be pressed into service to seek an acquittal for the accused. 37. The evidence of P.W. 4 was attacked by counsel for appellant on the ground that he had given some signed statements to his departmental authorities and consequently he was under a feeling that he could not depart from the version given earlier. According to counsel this circumstance would affect the acceptability of his evidence. I am unable to countenance such a contention. It is well-known that even during the pendency of criminal proceedings, other proceedings such as disciplinary proceedings are initiated. The decisions of the Supreme Court clearly hold that such parallel proceedings could be continued legally and legitimately. The fact that some statements have been given in the disciplinary proceedings would not in any way affect the evidence given in the criminal case. That evidence has to be evaluated on its own merits and in the light of the other materials and circumstances obtaining in the criminal case itself. 38. The fact that the treasury officials had intimated the police authorities under Exts. P22 and P23 about the misappropriation of amounts, as soon as the same was detected, would also lend assurance to the acceptance of the prosecution evidence in the present case. 39. Thus, on a consideration of the entire evidence in the case, I am clearly of the view that the prosecution has established, beyond doubt, the case against the accused. The conviction entered by the Court below was, therefore, fully justified. It is perhaps the fallacy, the fatuity and futility in the defence attempt that prompted counsel for the accused in the Court below to abandon any arguments on the merits of the case and a virtual admission of the guilt before that Court. 40. The conviction entered by the Court below was, therefore, fully justified. It is perhaps the fallacy, the fatuity and futility in the defence attempt that prompted counsel for the accused in the Court below to abandon any arguments on the merits of the case and a virtual admission of the guilt before that Court. 40. Before parting with the case, this Court has necessarily to make a reference to the illusory nature of the punishment as awarded by the Court below. The minimum punishment imposable under the Statute is imprisonment of not less than one year. The punishment can extend up to 7 years. Special reasons have to be recorded in writing for imposing a sentence of imprisonment less than one year. The necessity to give sound and cogent reasons for imposing a lesser punishment than the minimum sentence had been emphasised by the Supreme Court in Meet Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 1141 : (1980 Cri LJ 802). A reason which is common to a large class governed by the Statute cannot be said to be special to each of them. Special reasons in the context of the sentencing process are reasons special to the accused in the case or special to the facts and circumstances of the given case. The fact that the accused lost his job or that he is a married man with children is totally irrelevant in that context. Such a fact will not constitute special reasons justifying a lesser punishment than the minimum fixed. The Supreme Court was in that decision, considering a case under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Offences committed by the white collared section of the society, cannot be viewed lightly. Suppression of corruption is a matter of acute necessity, when dark forces endeavour to institutionalise corruption itself. 41. The Court below was not apparently convinced about the reasons put forward by the accused for a lesser punishment such as his being the only son or his mother being laid up or his having three unmarried sisters. It even noted that the accused had with him such a substantial sum of Rs. 54,060.40, by resorting to the forgery of the two bills. Yet it observed : "Any how some leniency must be shown to the accused .........." This is not the proper approach at all. It even noted that the accused had with him such a substantial sum of Rs. 54,060.40, by resorting to the forgery of the two bills. Yet it observed : "Any how some leniency must be shown to the accused .........." This is not the proper approach at all. The Courts are not expected to divagate from the guidelines given in the matter by the highest Court of the land as indicated earlier. It is astonishing that those who are in charge of the prevention of corruption in the State hierarchies also did not notice this disturbing aspect of an innocuous punishment given to the accused in the case. It is to be hoped that much more serious attention would be given to such matters by those concerned with the suppression of corruption among the government servants in the State. 42. The appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.