JUDGMENT N.N. Mitthal, J. - In this appeal by the Union of India concurrent decisions of the two courts below have been assailed by which an order of removal dated 20th of July, 1970 has been held to be illegal. Of the several grounds on which the order was challenged it is only on four grounds that the order has been held to be invalid and the remaining grounds have been rejected. The grounds which have found favour with the courts below are : that the authorities at that place to which an employee is transferred has no jurisdiction to initiate disciplinary proceedings if the employee has not been joined at that place ; transfer order amounts to reduction in rank if it affects the chances of promotion adversely ; the removal order passed by an Officer Incharge was invalid if he holds a rank inferior to that of the appointing authority. The courts also found that the courts at Kanpur had jurisdiction to try the suit. In this appeal, therefore, only these points require consideration. 2. A brief narration of the case may be desirable here in order to understand the nature of the controversy. The plaintiff respondent held a civil post in the defence organisation and was initially working as a Darban in the clothing factory of the Ordinance organisation at Kanpur to which he had come on transfer from Sbahjahanpur. He was transferred by order dated 24th Oct. 1968, to a similar unit at Khamaria and was struck of from the strength of Kanpur unit on 2-11-1968. He was, as usual, granted necessary expenses for joining at Khamaria within ten days which he failed to avail on the pretext of illness. At Khamaria the General Manager was absent and in his place the Officer Incharge was discharging his duties. He started disciplinary proceedings against the plaintiff and a show cause notice was issued on 24th June 1970. Since the plaintiff did not participate in the proceedings the impugned order of removal was passed on 20-7-70. This order was questioned by way of suit. 3. On behalf of the Government it was urged that the courts at Kanpur had no jurisdiction inasmuch as entire proceedings had taken place at Khamaria and, therefore, no part of cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of Kanpur courts. This order was questioned by way of suit. 3. On behalf of the Government it was urged that the courts at Kanpur had no jurisdiction inasmuch as entire proceedings had taken place at Khamaria and, therefore, no part of cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of Kanpur courts. The plaintiff's stand was that the order of transfer, which also had been challenged, and the orders of removal were served on the plaintiff at Kanpur and, therefore, part of cause of action had arisen there so as to invest the court at Kanpur with requisite jurisdiction. Under Section 20 any court where cause of action or any part of the cause of action has arisen will have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Order of transfer as well as an order terminating the services of an employee would both be ineffective until they are shown to have been served on the employee concerned. Without proof of this fact it would not be possible for the court to proceed in the matter by assuming that such an order had been served. Thus service of an order of this kind must be established and this would, therefore, constitute a part of cause of action necessary for a person to prove before a court can proceed further in the matter. In State of Punjab v. Amarsen the court observed as under: "On an order of dismissal passed by a proper authority and kept on its file without communicating it to the officer concerned or otherwise publishing it will not take affect as from the date on which the order is actually written out by the said authority as such an order can only be effective after it is communicated to the officer concerned or is otherwise published." A learned single Judge of this court in Secretary of Home Department Government of Maharashtra v. Banshidhar and others, AIR 1966 SC 1313 also, took a similar view. In that case plaintiff was an employee in the State of Maharashtra as a Wireless Operator. In that case plaintiff was an employee in the State of Maharashtra as a Wireless Operator. Order of dismissal, however, was served upon him on his home address in district Pratapgarh of U.P. It was held that service of dismissal order gave cause of action to the plaintiff so as to invest the courts at Pratapgrah with necessary jurisdiction to entertain the suit." On behalf of the Union of India support is sought from a Division Bench decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Associated Commercial Engineer v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1980 Lucknow Law Journal 211. In that case a contract for the construction of a dam at Lawa had been executed between the Chief Engineer on behalf of the Governor and the Contractor. The contract was also withdrawn by the Superintending Engineer at Lawa and was communicated to him there. A notice for appointing of an Arbitrator, however, was sent to the State at Bhopal where the suit was filed. It was held that no part of cause of action had arisen at Bhopal and merely sending of notice cannot give any jurisdiction to Bhopal Courts. It was also held that the State does not reside at all places but it can carry on the business. However, the construction of a dam which is a welfare activity of the State cannot be deemed to be a business activity. It was, therefore, held that Bhopal courts had no jurisdiction. Obviously, this case cannot give any assistance to the appellant. 4. In view of the above legal position the courts at Kanpur had necessary jurisdiction and the first contention 011 behalf of the Union of India must fail. 5. The question that next arises is whether the court below was right in holding that the plaintiff had neither been taken on the strength of Khamaria unit nor did he remain on the strength of Kanpur unit and, therefore, the authorities at none of the two places had jurisdiction to take disciplinary proceedings against him and only the highest authority would have jurisdiction in the matter, i.e. the Director General of Ordinance factory. The admitted position on the record appears to be that the transfer order had been served on the plff. and he had been struck of from the strength of Kanpur unit. The admitted position on the record appears to be that the transfer order had been served on the plff. and he had been struck of from the strength of Kanpur unit. He had ten days as joining time and had directions to join at Khamaria which he failed to do. The question that has been posed is whether in such circumstances when he had not actually joined at Khamaria he could be treated to be under the jurisdiction of the authority at Khamaria. Answer to this question is simple. Once an employee is struck off from the strength of a unit of administrative side all his' ties at that place get shapped. He cannot claim any salary or any other benefit from the unit from where he has been transferred from the date he was struck off from its strength. If he reports at the transferee unit he would get salary not from the date from which he joins but from the date he was struck of from the strength of the transferor unit. If he joins there after some delay he has to explain about it to the administrative authority at the place of his posting. Should he fall ill after the transfer he has to submit his medical certificate and obtain leave from the transferee unit and thus he must be deemed to have came under the administrative control of the transferee unit. An employee failing to join at the place of his posting cannot be deemed to be in a state of suspended animation to be administratively dealt with only by the Director General. The mere fact that he failed to join at the place of his posting will not take away the administrative jurisdiction of the authorities there. I cannot, therefore, agree with the court below that it was only the Director General who was competent to deal with the matter ; but the correct position appears to be that the administrative authorities at Khamaria had necessary jurisdiction in the matter. The findings of the court below to the contrary, therefore, are erroneous and must be set aside. 6. It is next urged that the view of the court below that the transfer to Khamaria amounted to reduction in rank since the plaintiff's chances of promotion there had been reduced. The findings of the court below to the contrary, therefore, are erroneous and must be set aside. 6. It is next urged that the view of the court below that the transfer to Khamaria amounted to reduction in rank since the plaintiff's chances of promotion there had been reduced. Promotion of an employee will depend upon placement in seniority and is bound to be different in different units. His placement in Kanpur unit may be different than the placement which the plaintiff was likely to get in Khamaria unit which will certainly depend upon the length of service. This alone, however, cannot mean that his chance of promotion have been reduced. It is equally possible that he may be placed advantageously on his transfer to Khamaria. In such a situation it is difficult to visualise that the plaintiff would have asked for a lower placement at Khamaria on the basis of the placement that he had at Kanpur. Thus merely because there is a chance of his being placed lower at the place of his transfer cannot entitle the plaintiff to assail the transfer order that it would result in reduction of his rank. The view of the court below on this point also is erroneous and deserves to be set aside. 7. The appellant however, appears to be on a weak ground on the last question i.e. Whether an Officer Incharge could take disciplinary proceedings against the plaintiff. In Lekhraj Khurana v. Union of India, AIR 1971 Supreme Court 2111. it was held that a person holding a civilian post which is connected with the defence and for which he is paid salary from the defence estimates cannot claim protection of Article 311 and is not entitled to invoke the principles of natural justice even under the general law of Master and Servant. However, he can certainly challenge his termination on the ground of breach of a statutory rule relating to the conditions of service. Admittedly, the respondent was civilian employee in a factory connected with defence department. It is also not disputed that his salary was paid out of the defence estimate. The question to be seen, therefore, is whether there has been branch of any statutory rule governing his service. Admittedly, the respondent was civilian employee in a factory connected with defence department. It is also not disputed that his salary was paid out of the defence estimate. The question to be seen, therefore, is whether there has been branch of any statutory rule governing his service. For the respondent my attention has been drawn to Rule 2 (d) of Central Civil Services (Classification Control & Appeal) Rules 1965, according to which : "Central Civil Services and Central Civil post includes a civilian service or civilian post, as the case may be, of the corresponding class/in the Defence services" Defence service has also been defined to mean in Rule 2 (e) as : "Services under the Government of India in the Ministry of Defence, paid out of the Defence Services Estimates, and not subject to the Army Act 1950 (46 of 1950) the Navy Act 1957 (62 of 1957) and the Air force Act 1950 (45 of 1950). 8. According to Rule 2 these rules apply to every Govt, servants including every civilian Govt, servant in defence service subject to certain exceptions. That the plaintiff was a person to whom these rules apply would also be clear from Part V of the Schedule which deals with civil post in defence service. Serial No. 2 deals with class III and IV posts under the Director General of Ordinance branch. The Director of Ordinance Services for Army Ordinance Corps, Civilians Personnel is mentioned there as the appointing as well as the punishing authority. It is undisputed that Director of Ordinance services and General Manager of Ordinance Factory are of equal rank and in view of this parties are agreed that in the present case the General Manager of Khamaria unit was the competent authority to take disciplinary proceedings in the matter. Actually the proceedings here were initiated and the removal order was also passed by the Officer Incharge who was working in place of the General Manager. 9. Attention has been drawn by the respondent to Rule 42 (4) of Central Civil Services Rules according to which an order of removal could not be passed by any authority below the rank of the appointing authority. 9. Attention has been drawn by the respondent to Rule 42 (4) of Central Civil Services Rules according to which an order of removal could not be passed by any authority below the rank of the appointing authority. It is no where in the evidence that the Officer Incharge was holding a rank equivalent to that of the General Manager or that he had been authorised to exercise powers of the General Manager during his absence. As pointed out by the court below even the order of removal does not indicate that the Officer Incharge had passed it in his capacity as the General Manager. In the absence of any proof that the Officer Incharge was either holding a rank equivalent to that of the General Manager or that he had been authorised to act as General Manager it cannot be said that the impugned order had been passed by an authority competent to do so. In the circumstances, the finding that the order of removal was correct and must be upheld. Even though I have disagreed with the court below on two other questions yet it does not affect the result. 10. The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.