JUDGMENT - KOTWAL V.S., J.: - (Paras 1 to 3 of the Judgment not meant for reporting.) 4. A bare structure of few facts to resolve the controversy may be necessary as also sufficient. The petitioner has been detained under the provisions of the National Security Act for which purpose the Detaining Authority has formulated three grounds, which are reflected in the order. For that purpose reliance has been placed on certain documents which obviously would be part and parcel of the grounds of detention. The main contention of Shri Canteenwala, the learned Counsel, is to be effect that all these three items squarely and exclusively fall within the purview of the said Act if at all they can be said to formulate any valid ground for detention and as such by reason of bar provided under section 17 of the said Act same cannot be lifted out of the purview of the said Act and brought under the mischief of the provisions of the National Security Act. Shri Canteenwalla, the learned Counsel canvassed multifold contentions as the impugned order suffers from different vices such as (i) it is mala fide as it was passed after pre-determination and after proclamation by the Chief Secretary that certain persons should be rounded up and detained which included the name of the detenu and it is thereafter that the Detaining Authority felt that the detenu's activities which were already in existence prior thereto resulted in adversely affecting the maintenance of the public order, which realisation could synchronise only at that point of time, (ii) that the grounds obviously are stale; (iii) that even taken at the maximum those are not covered by the concept of the 'public order” and lastly (iv) that there is a specific bar under section 17 of the said Act for passing any order of detention under the National Security Act. It is unnecessary to have a deeper probe on the first three grounds as the fourth ground which is a formidable one should govern the fate of this interim proceeding also. 5. The first ground is even ex facie pertaining to the purported illegal activities restricted to liquor business. Thus it is alleged that the detenu has been indulging in transport of illicit liquor on large scale and he has threatened a person whom he suspected to be an informant about his bootlegging activities. 5. The first ground is even ex facie pertaining to the purported illegal activities restricted to liquor business. Thus it is alleged that the detenu has been indulging in transport of illicit liquor on large scale and he has threatened a person whom he suspected to be an informant about his bootlegging activities. The second ground is more or less on the same lines. Now it is apparent that when these two grounds are read properly those reflect a dominant part pertaining to the activities relating to illicit liquor and there is no escape from this inference. In both the grounds there is a reference to the threats given by the detenu to two persons and in fact one of them was also assaulted by the detenu and his associates. However, it is amply clarified through this ground as also through the statements of those persons whose names have not been obviously disclosed that they were made targets of the anger of the detenu only because they were suspected to have informed the police about the bootlegging activities like transport of liquor by the detenu. Consequently those acts have a direct nexus with the activities of the detenu as bootlegger and the anger against those informants flows only out of these activities so that the bootlegging transactions could continue smoothly. In fact both the witnesses have stated that the detenu is known as the prime person in illicit liquor business. A stray reference that one of the witnesses was asked to canvass in Assembly Elections for a particular candidate has really nothing to do with the order of detention. These two items, therefore, squarely fall under the mischief of relevant provisions of the Act as being predominantly concerned with the bootlegging activities, in the context of the alleged apprehension of adversely affecting the maintenance of public order. In so far as these two grounds are concerned the situation is not seriously disputed on behalf of the respondent. 6. However, the main controversy revolves around ground No. 3. According to Shri Bardey, the learned Public Prosecutor, this ground carves out an independent case which can squarely fall under the mischief of National Security Act and it is exclusively on that basis that an argument is canvassed that detention under the National Security Act is well justified. 6. However, the main controversy revolves around ground No. 3. According to Shri Bardey, the learned Public Prosecutor, this ground carves out an independent case which can squarely fall under the mischief of National Security Act and it is exclusively on that basis that an argument is canvassed that detention under the National Security Act is well justified. It is alleged in that ground that on 21st April, 1985 the Sub-Inspector attached to Antop Hill Police Station on the basis of the credible information went at the said spot in Sardar Nagar locality and he noticed a motor car stationary on the road in open place and that the detenu was standing near the car. On sighting the arrival of the police, the driver of the car immediately started the vehicle and bolted away. The police obviously wanted to chase the said car and in order to prevent the said chase the detenu is alleged to have gone in front of the police jeep and actually laid supine on the road claiming that if the police wanted to chase, they will have to first crush him under the jeep. He made a scene though he had to be controlled and it is thereafter that the police jeep started further, though by that time the car in question sped away. It is on that count that the offence under section 353 read with 341 of the Indian Penal Code was registered against the detenu. 7. Shri Bardey, the learned Public Prosecutor canvassed that two things harmoniously flow out of these allegations. The first is that it refers to the existence of smuggled goods that were being transported in the car in question and if that be so then it is unconnected with the bootlegging activities. This is obviously an erroneous reading of the situation. No smuggled goods were involved in that episode. As to what were the goods is not clarified in the information received by the police. They have loosely used that terminology in the matter of information equating those with illicit liquor. The police and the prosecution also accept that they have no material to show that the car carried some articles other than illicit liquor. The entire tenor of the said ground would make it clear that the car itself did contain something to do only with bootlegging activities. The police and the prosecution also accept that they have no material to show that the car carried some articles other than illicit liquor. The entire tenor of the said ground would make it clear that the car itself did contain something to do only with bootlegging activities. The matter, however, is more clarified as rightly contended by Shri Canteenwalla, the learned Counsel inasmuch as the Detaining Authority, has very much relied on the statement of detenu, a copy of which has been supplied and which has been also referred to in various documents. That statement makes it expressly clear that the car in question was carrying tubes smelling of illicit liquor and nothing else, and in order to ward off any danger at the hands of the police that he acted in that behalf, and the car was associated only for bootlegging activities. The Detaining Authority has very much relied on this statement and apart from this, there is no other document worth the name to indicate to the contrary that the car contained any other article. In fact the analysis of the ground as reflected in the final order makes it clear that even this third ground was accepted by the Detaining Authority as being wholly connected only with the illegal activities of bootlegging and not any other activities. It is stated in all these three grounds that the detenu was trafficking in illicit liquor and this included incident of 21st April. The documents relied upon by the Detaining Authority in the process of formulation of grounds are quite relevant and those are relied upon by Shri Canteenwalla, the learned Counsel. The Detaining Authority strongly indicates and it is supported by the statements of the material witnesses that the detenu has been indulging only in bootlegging activities and nothing else. Consequently all the three grounds unmistakably relate and are restricted only to the so-called bootlegging activities. The first contention raised on behalf of the State, therefore, is devoid of substance even ex facie. The learned Public Prosecutor has also not seriously cotroverted this inescapable conclusion and has not pressed it any further. 8. Consequently all the three grounds unmistakably relate and are restricted only to the so-called bootlegging activities. The first contention raised on behalf of the State, therefore, is devoid of substance even ex facie. The learned Public Prosecutor has also not seriously cotroverted this inescapable conclusion and has not pressed it any further. 8. Second ground of attack, however, as vigourously canvassed by Sri Bardey, the learned Public Prosecutor is to the effect that the third ground atleast makes it clear that resistance was offered by the detenu to the police officer for which office has been already registered under the Indian Penal Code. According to him, therefore, the bootlegging activities may fall in one compartment while the other activities by which police were deterred can well be placed in second compartment and it is this second compartment, which according to him, would obviously formulate a ground, which could squarely fall under the mischief of National Security Act. For obvious reasons such a construction is wholly impermissible. 9. Even ex facie reading of the scheme of the two Acts and the legislative intent it becomes manifest that even for the purpose of attracting provisions under the said Act, vis a vis bootlegging activities it is necessary for the Detaining Authority to show that these activities have a nexus with the maintenance of public order which is being adversely affected by reason of the said activities. In other words, dealing in bootlegging activities along with adversely affecting public order are the two features which must co-exist and it is the composite effect of thee features that brings the act within the clutches of the said provision. It is not as if that a person merely dealing in illicit liquor only would fall under the clutches of section 3 of the Act which can be done only if such activities would entail into causing any danger to the maintenance of the public order. 10. It would not be out of place at this juncture to consider the scheme and structure of the Act in so far as is relevant in this proceeding. 10. It would not be out of place at this juncture to consider the scheme and structure of the Act in so far as is relevant in this proceeding. Preamble suggests that it was realised that the public order was adversely affected every now and then by the dangerous activities of certain persons including the bootleggers and, therefore, having regard to the resources and influence of the persons by whom, the large scale on which, and the manner in which, the dangerous activities were being clandestinely organised and carried on in violation of law by them as bootleggers, the Governor of Maharashtra was satisfied that circumstances existed which rendered it necessary for him to take immediate action to have a special law in this State to provide for preventive detention of these three classes of persons and for matters connected therewith. It is on this foundation that the ordinance was promulgated whereafter it was transformed in the Act coming into force from 11th June, 1981. The preamble, therefore, makes if clear the purport and object to curb and prevent the dangerous activities of the bootleggers as also other two classes of persons which affected the maintenance of public order. 11. Section 3 empowers the State Government to pass a detention order if it is satisfied with respect of any person that with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order, it is necessary so to do and make an order of detention. Thus the order of detention could be passed under section 3 of the Act. 12. Section 2 of the Act becomes relevant as it contains certain definitions. Sub-clause (b) defines bootlegger as being the person, who distills, manufactures, stores, transports, imports, exports, sells or distributes any liquor, intoxicating drugs or other intoxicant or who knowingly expends or applies any money or supplies any vehicle or other conveyance or any other material in furtherance or in support of doing any of the activities or who abets in any manner the doing of any such thing. 13. Sub-clause (a) of section 2 then defines “acting in any manner in the case of bootlegger, when he is engaged or is making preparation in any of these activities as bootlegger which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order”. 14. 13. Sub-clause (a) of section 2 then defines “acting in any manner in the case of bootlegger, when he is engaged or is making preparation in any of these activities as bootlegger which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order”. 14. To complete the circuit, explanation to section 2 makes the situation further clear as to when a public order shall be deemed to have been affected adversely and this concept is prescribed if any of the activities of such persons including the bootleggers directly or indirectly is causing or calculated to cause any harm, danger, or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to the life of public health. 15. Thus the bootlegger is defined as mainly a person dealing in illicit liquor. Such a person can be said to be acting in any manner prejudical to the maintenance of public order if he engages himself in such activities as a bootlegger, which could adversely affect the maintenance of public order. Such a situation of affecting public order adversely would arise if the activities are such which tend to cause any danger or harm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or section thereof. It is on consideration of this composite picture that the State Government after being satisfied that it is essential to prevent such bootlegger from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order that it can pass an order of detention under section 3 of the Act. Thus all the requirements of section 2 and section 3, which if read together, must co-exist and it is then and only then that the validity of the order can be upheld as being justified. 16. The argument canvassed by Shri Bardey, the learned Public Prosecutor, which is indicated hereinabove that the activities can be segregated in two compartments is obviously fallacious. As stated he sought to canvass that pure and simpliciter bootlegging activity like sale, manufacture or transport of illicit liquor would fall in first category while in other act, such as threats, assaulting or resisting public servant would fall in second category and further submission is that the first category would embrace the provisions of the Act while the second category would embrace the provisions of the National Security Act. The fallacy is obvious and hardly requires any serious comments to expose the hollowness. As stated, having regard to all the classes under section 2 read in the context of section 3 the legislature has taken care to clarify every situation as to what would be the bootlegging activity and as to what would amount to adversely affecting the public order. In the first instance, it would over the cases where the person is engaged in any of his activity as bootlegger and secondly such activities should adversely affect the maintenance of public order and which can be done only if it is shown that he directly or indirectly causes harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity or danger to the life of general public or section thereof. Thus this analysis makes it clear that a person merely being styled as bootlegger is not the complete requirement of the Act as it must be shown further that his activities, which again are to be the activities in the capacity as bootlegger tend to cause harm, alarm or danger to the people or generating feeling of insecurity or danger to the life and it is then that such an activity would be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and if all these three things co-exist them an order of detention can be passed under section 3 with an object of preventing him from continuing such activities. Therefore, a direct nexus is envisaged between the bootlegger and his activities vis a vis the concept of maintenance of public order, and such concept of public order as prescribed by the act itself is transplanted into the symptoms as causing danger or insecurity for the public. Applying these principles to the facts as alleged through the grounds of detention, the fallacy of the submission on behalf of the respondents becomes further clear. It is abundantly clear now that it is now as if that even as per the allegations the detenu who is claimed to be bootlegger was threatening or assaulting any member of public at large but he has selected his targets even as per the allegations which are hardly two or three, whom he suspected to be police informants vis-a-vis his bootlegging activities on account of which his business of illicit liquor was being adversely affected. This position is clarified through the statements of these witnesses themselves as motive for alleged threat is restricted to this feature. Consequently, therefore, the so-called threat has thus a direct nexus with the bootlegging activities themselves and this act of threat or assault directed only against such persons who were adversely affecting his illicit business of liquor tantmount to calculating causing alarm, fear or danger to these restricted people or to generate a feeling of insecurity or danger to their life, all of which flows out of the foundation of business of illicit liquor and as such activity of bootlegger. Therefore, it is manifest that there is an interwoven, well-knit, strong and inseparable blend between all these features making nexus between alleged acts of threats, assault or even resistance to public servants in the discharge of their duties with the bootlegging activities and it is this composite form which tends to calculate alarm, harm or danger or feeling of insecurity among these people and which consequently tends to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. That is how the circuit even on facts becomes complete as per the allegations unfolded in the grounds. Consequently it is not permissible to consider the so-called acts of threat or assault de hors or independently of main object which revolves around bootlegging activity which forms a pivot for the entire field of activities. All these acts including dealing in illicit liquor and even threatening and assaulting so-called suspected informants thus obviously fall within the prescribed limits embracing all the requirements of the provisions of section 2(a) and 2(b). 17. It is true that the provisions of National Security Act have also foundation with the nexus to the maintenance of public order. Thus if the appropriate Government is satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order it can make an order that such a person should be detained under section 3. The concept of maintenance of public order may be common as also the requirement that person should be prevented from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order may also appear to be on common pattern. To that extent one of the requirements may be overlapping nonetheless field of operation of two Acts is distinct and well defined. To that extent one of the requirements may be overlapping nonetheless field of operation of two Acts is distinct and well defined. A person acting in high-handed manner affecting the smooth and harmonious tempo of the society and posing a danger to the public at large and creating a problem in contrast with the question of law and order and in a fit case be deemed to be acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Such acts can be acts independent on their own as a person may not be a bootlegger or a slumlord or drug-offender and his acts could not be connected with any such activities. A generalised situation is envisaged where his acts may amount to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. This concept is clarified by reason of provisions contained in section 3(1) and 3(2) of the National Security Act, which indicate the dimensions of the activities which may be prejudicial to the Defence of India, to the security of India, to the security of State or prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community and it is in that vein that a generalised category has been incorporated that it may include a person who is required to be prevented from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 18. It is thus apparent that the provisions of the said Act would squarely apply to the three categories of persons, who have been carved out and clubbed together while in respect of others a generalised situation is contemplated under the National Security Act. In a given case no doubt it can be argued with some justification that the alleged activity of a bootlegger is thoroughly and hopelessly unconnected with his capacity as bootlegger in which event the situation may perhaps defer inasmuch as he could shed out his capacity as bootlegger vis a vis the said activities and would fall in the generalised category as contemplated under National Security Act. Such cases, however, are rare. In any event in the instant case it is manifestly established even on showing of the Detaining Authority itself that the alleged activities were obviously in the capacity as bootlegger and could not be de hors or independent of that capacity. Such cases, however, are rare. In any event in the instant case it is manifestly established even on showing of the Detaining Authority itself that the alleged activities were obviously in the capacity as bootlegger and could not be de hors or independent of that capacity. Giving threats and even assaulting restricted number of persons picking them as being informants of the police and that too vis a vis bootlegging activities could squarely be covered under the provisions of section 2 and section 3 of the said Act. This would, therefore, squarely apply to the grounds reflected in grounds Nos. 1 and 2. This would equally apply even in respect of ground No. 3 inasmuch as even ex facie it is manifest that the whole object of the detenu in the purported act was to delay the police machinery from indulging in the chase of the car in question which was obviously to see that the car is not intercepted and this object is further hedged in by obvious motive to see that the car which contained illicit liquor or atleast rubber tubes smelling of illicit liquor were not recovered by the police. It is entirely for that purpose that the so-called resistance was offered to the public servant by the detenu in the discharge of his duty though in an unusual manner without resorting to violence but by delaying their departure making a show that he would commit suicide under the police jeep and persuade in consuming some more time which was conveniently utilised by his car driver speeding away. All the three grounds, therefore, unmistakably fall under the purview only of section 2 of the Act provided of course if there exists the basic requirement that even these activities had a direct nexus with the maintenance of public order or whether it merely creates a problem of law and order, more so as a distinction between the two concept “law and order” and “public order” is now well settled and well-recognised. It is only the second concept that would entail into justification for passing an order of detention as the first concept will destroy any such justification. 19. I am fortified in this view by the decisions of different Division Benches of this Court, though the under current of ratio is identical and in consonance with the view that I am inclined to adopt in this proceeding. 19. I am fortified in this view by the decisions of different Division Benches of this Court, though the under current of ratio is identical and in consonance with the view that I am inclined to adopt in this proceeding. Those were recorded in (Lallaprasad Chunilal Yadav v. State of Maharashtra another)1, Cri. Appln. No. 1386 of 1981, decided on 24-9-1981, (Danial John Salvaraj v. Commissioner of Police, Pune)2, Cri. Writ Petn. No. 400 of 1982, decided on 2/3-9-1982 and (Harun Habibulla Shaikh v. Commissioner of Police, Thane)3, Cri.Writ Petition No. 349 of 1984, decided on 8-8-1984 in which survey of several cases in that field has been taken by the said Benches. It is unnecessary to re-state the observations in all the decisions as those are on common pattern to the effect that if the facts alleged in the grounds are intimately connected with the bootlegging activities of the bootlegger and also has nexus with the maintenance of public order then they are obviously relevant for the purpose of detention under the ordinance though “independently they might also amount to offences under the Penal Code”. It is further observed as:- “Threats were given to the people in the neighbourhood because he suspected them to be police informants. If this is so, then obviously this conduct of the detenu, who is a bootlegger is closely connected with his bootlegging activity and in order to effectively carrying out this bootlegging activity, he had indulged in this type of activities.” 20. It is also indicated that the so-called prejudicial activities need not necessarily be committed when the detenu was either actually engaged or was making preparation for engaging in any of the activities as bootlegger and that “if some nexus is established in the two then it is enough”. 21. It is unnecessary to multiply the illustrations though it has been aptly observed time and again that it mainly depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 22. 21. It is unnecessary to multiply the illustrations though it has been aptly observed time and again that it mainly depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 22. Applying all these ratios in the context of structure of relevant provisions of Act and the legislative intent, it becomes manifest that there is direct nexus between the bootlegging activities and alleged acts in question and one cannot be divorced from other as those acts as alleged against the bootlegger have no existence in vacuum unless those are integrally blended and connected with his object to ensure smooth working of his bootlegging activities and the target selected and motive for the alleged acts making the situation further transparent. 23. Read in proper perspective, therefore, it would be clear that the alleged activities as reflected in three grounds ex facie would fall only under the provisions of the said Act. Once this premise is accepted on facts, then question is rightly posed that the operation of bar as reflected in the provisions of section 17 of the Act comes into play. Section 17 read as: - “Section 17: On and after the commencement of this Act, no order of detention under the National Security Act, 1980, shall be made by the State Government or any of its officers under that Act, in respect of any slumlord, bootlegger or drug-offender in the State of Maharashtra, on the ground of preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order where an order of detention may be or can be made against such person under this Act.” 24. Even the plain reading of this section makes it manifest that when a case can squarely fall under the provisions of this Act then it is impermissible to lift that item and transplant it into the provisions of National Security Act. In other words, if at all detention order can be passed then it shall be done only under the said Act and under no other provisions. The Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider this aspect, in two decisions viz., (Ismail v. State of Maharashtra)4, 1982 Cri.L.J. 582 and (Shivaji Bapu Chavan v. Sharwari Gokhale)5, 1982(84) Bom.L.R. 13. Challenge to the vires was negatived. Some other aspects were also considered. The Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider this aspect, in two decisions viz., (Ismail v. State of Maharashtra)4, 1982 Cri.L.J. 582 and (Shivaji Bapu Chavan v. Sharwari Gokhale)5, 1982(84) Bom.L.R. 13. Challenge to the vires was negatived. Some other aspects were also considered. It was indicated that the authority cannot be permitted to pick and choose, but must resort only to that remedy which is legally permissible. 25. The impact of the bar prescribed under section 17 of the said Act has been well accepted by the said two ratios and which are in consonance with the plain mandate of the legislature as reflected in section 17. It is thus observed and with respect very aptly and correctly as by present ordinance three categories of persons viz. persons belonging to classes of slumlords, bootleggers and drug-offenders are classified to be dealt with under the Ordinance. By section 17 of the Ordinance it is made clear that after commencement of Ordinance no order of detention under the National Security Act shall be made in respect of these three categories of persons in the State on the ground of preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It appears from the preamble to the Ordinance that public order was adversely affecting because of the dangerous activities of those persons. This has created a special problem in the State and to deal with these special problems this special law was adopted. All the persons covered by present Ordinance are equally detained. Classification contemplated by Ordinance is for the persons belonging to special class for whom a special legislature was thought. It was further observed that to some extent some of the provisions of the two Acts may overlap though the authorities will not be permitted to pick and choose. 26. It was in effect held that when the person belonging to either of these three classes can well be detained under the provisions of the said Act then no order of detention can be validly recorded under the provisions of the National Security Act. 27. 26. It was in effect held that when the person belonging to either of these three classes can well be detained under the provisions of the said Act then no order of detention can be validly recorded under the provisions of the National Security Act. 27. It is clear that the terminology used in section 17 of the Act contemplates the permissibility of an order of detention which “may be” or “can be” made against such persons under that Act, meaning thereby that if an order of detention “may be” or even “can be” issued under that Act then no order of detention can be passed under the National Security Act. The employment of these two terms “may be” or “can be” has its own implication. 28. Having regard to the factual aspect as unfolded through the grounds it becomes manifest that an order of detention might be or could be passed under those provisions. This obviously is subject to the contention on behalf of the detenu that even otherwise no nexus with public order has been established as at the most it may be a question of law and order and this argument is available even in respect of an order which is purported to have been passed under the National Security Act and in that case also it is contended that there is no nexus with the public order. However, I am not considering any of the other contentions, as indicated at the threshold and proceeding on the footing that the Detaining Authority was satisfied that there was a nexus with the maintenance of public order and alleged activities were prejudicial to the maintenance of such public order. If that be so then when an order of detention could be legitimately passed or might have been passed under the said Act on the facts of the instant case then recording of an order of detention under the National Security Act on the same grounds is wholly impermissible under the legislative mandate contained in the bar of section 17 of the Act. It may not be irrelevant to note that as per explanation 2 to section 2 of the National Security Act in a particular contingency vis-a-vis essential supplies, the order under National Security Act is excluded if a valid order under the Prevention of Black marketing Act can be passed. It may not be irrelevant to note that as per explanation 2 to section 2 of the National Security Act in a particular contingency vis-a-vis essential supplies, the order under National Security Act is excluded if a valid order under the Prevention of Black marketing Act can be passed. This indicates that purposely the operation of field from this Act is excluded in certain cases, where it would quite squarely fall in other Acts. It is also interesting to note that the terminology used by the Detaining Authority suggesting as to how the activities affected the maintenance of public order as the people experience sense of insecurity and fear to their life etc. has been practically borrowed from the terminology used in the explanation to section 2 of the said Act which again indicates that this provision perhaps was present in the mind of the Detaining Authority at that time. 29. The net result of these analysis would be that taking the material at the maximum and without probing into the finer shades and without adopting any process of appreciation as such, it would be apparent even on the surface that an order of detention could be passed, if at all it was justified, only under the provisions of the said Act and if that be so then no order can be passed under the National Security Act as there is a legal bar as prescribed under section 17 of the Act. Consequently Shri Canteenwalla, the learned Counsel, cannot be said to be unjustified atleast in the prima facie view that this order appears to have been without jurisdiction. To put it in other form almost as the other side of the coin that this order would offend the legislative mandate as prescribed by section 17 of the Act. If that be so then the learned Counsel is further justified in submitting that it would be just and proper to grant some interim relief in favour of the detenu. [Rest of the judgment not meant for reporting] Release on parole subject to conditions imposed. -----