JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This writ petition has been filed by M/s. Mohan Lal Hargovind Dass Tobacco Products Private Limited, Bai- Ka-Bagh, Allahabad for a writ of certiorari quashing the provisions of "The Uttar Pradesh Tendu Patta (Vyapar Viniyaman) (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1980" (U.P. Act No. 5 of 1980) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and for a mandamus directing the respondents not to realise tax on the tendu bags which are exported by it from Uttar Pradesh to Madhya Pradesh or vice versa. 2. In 1972, U.P. Tendu Patta (Vyapar -Viniyaman) Adhiniyam. 1972 (U.P. Act No. 19 of 1972) was enacted "to provide, in the public interest, for the creation of State monopoly in the purchase and distribution of tendu leaves and for matters connected therewith". Sub- section (3) of Section 1 of the Act provides that it shall come into force in such area or areas and on such date or dates as the State Government may, by notification in the gazette appoint, and different dates may be appointed for different areas of Uttar Pradesh. Section 5 places restrictions on sale, purchase and transport of tendu leaves. The material provision of this section is quoted below :- "On and after the appointed day- (a) no person shall sell tendu leaves to any person other than the State Government or an officer of the State Government authorised by it in that behalf or an agent in respect of the unit in which the leaves have grown; (b) no person other than such Government, officer or agent shall purchase tendu leaves from any person other than such Government, Officer or agent, or collect tendu leaves grown on any land of which he is not owner or tenure-holder"; (c) no person other than such Government, officer or agent shall transport tendu leaves except in the following case, namely :- (i) to (iii) .................. Section 18 of the Act confers power on the State Government to make Rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act. Clause (d) of sub- sec. (2) of Section 18 of the Act, as it originally stood, conferred power on the State Government to make Rules laying down the manner in which and the conditions subject to which permits (for transport of tendu leaves) could be issued under Section 5. Section 21 of the aforesaid Act repealed the U.P. Tendu Patta (Vyapar Viniyaman) Adhyadesh, 1972. 3. (2) of Section 18 of the Act, as it originally stood, conferred power on the State Government to make Rules laying down the manner in which and the conditions subject to which permits (for transport of tendu leaves) could be issued under Section 5. Section 21 of the aforesaid Act repealed the U.P. Tendu Patta (Vyapar Viniyaman) Adhyadesh, 1972. 3. As a result of the provisions of the aforesaid Act. State monopoly in the sale, purchase and transport of tendu leaves had been created and accordingly, no cutting, collection, sale, purchase, storage, transport and use of tendu leaves grown within the State could he made except under the provisions and in accordance with them. 4. In 1973, the State Legislature passed the U.P. Tendu Patta (Vyapar Viniyaman) (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam,1973 (U.P. Act No. 6 of 1973). This Act amended Section 5 of the original Act by providing that the State Government or any officer of the State Government authorised by it in that behalf may on such terms and conditions and in such manner as may be prescribed "(a) ........................ (b) Permit any person referred to in sub-cl. (iii) of Cl. (c) of sub-sec. (1) to sell within Uttar Pradesh any tendu leaves which he has been unable to utilise in the manufacture of bidis within Uttar Pradesh or, as the case may be, to export outside Uttar Pradesh: or (c) permit any person, who has purchased any tendu leaves outside Uttar Pradesh to bring them inside the State either for manufacture of bidis within the State or for transporting them elsewhere outside Uttar Pradesh; or (d) Permit any person, who has purchased any tendu leaves within Uttar Pradesh outside any area to which this Act applies to transport them to any area to which this Act applies for the manufacture of bidis". Sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Amending Act which also amended Section 5 of the original, Act, is material for our purpose. This reads as follows :- "(3) A person to whom a permit referred to in sub-cl. (iii) of clause (c) of sub-sec. (1) or in sub-sec. (2) is granted shall be liable to payment of such fee as may be prescribed." 5. This reads as follows :- "(3) A person to whom a permit referred to in sub-cl. (iii) of clause (c) of sub-sec. (1) or in sub-sec. (2) is granted shall be liable to payment of such fee as may be prescribed." 5. Further, Section 6 of this Act amended Section 18 of the principal Act entitling the State Government to impose fees payable for permits under which the tendu leaves could be transported outside Uttar Pradesh and brought inside. Section 5 of the Act, amended by U.P. Act No. 6 of 1973, was given retrospective effect. Rule 4 of the Rules framed under the Amending Act provide for the issue of transport permits in prescribed forms, and that the transport permits shall be subject to the conditions mentioned in that Rule. Rule 4, as originally enacted, did not contemplate the levy of any fee for the grant of the permits. It was subsequently when the Rules were amended by the U.P. Tendu Patta (Vyapar Viniyaman) (Dwitiya Sanshodhan) Niyamavali, 1973 that a fee of rupees three per standard bag tendu leaves became payable by the person applying for issue of permit in Forms TP 5 and TP 6. No fee was payable for other types of permits. 6. Validity of R. 4(2) of the Rules levying the fee at the rate of rupees three per bag was challenged in this court, in Writ Petition No. 3083 of 1973 and other connected Writ Petitions. These petitions were allowed on Aug. 29, 1979. The Division Bench held that as no service was being rendered, levy of fee was unjustified. On this findings, the Bench restrained the respondents from imposing a fee of rupees three per bag as contemplated by R. 4(2) of the Rules. It further directed the State Government to refund the amount of fee, which had been paid during the pendency of the writ petition within a month of the giving of the judgment. After the aforesaid judgment of tins Court, the Governor under Article 213 of the Constitution promulgated the U.P. Tendu Patta (Vyapar Viniyaman) (Sanshodhan) Adhyadesh, 1979. Sub-section (3) of the Adhyadesh is as under :- "(3) A person to whom a permit referred to in Cl. (b) or Cl. (c) or Cl. (d) of sub-sec. After the aforesaid judgment of tins Court, the Governor under Article 213 of the Constitution promulgated the U.P. Tendu Patta (Vyapar Viniyaman) (Sanshodhan) Adhyadesh, 1979. Sub-section (3) of the Adhyadesh is as under :- "(3) A person to whom a permit referred to in Cl. (b) or Cl. (c) or Cl. (d) of sub-sec. (2) is granted shall be liable to pay in the manner prescribed, a tax at the rate of three rupees pet standard bag of tendu leaves." It further provided that fee for permits, which had been levied or collected or purported to have been levied or collected under the principal Act, Rules or Notification shall be deemed to have been validly levied or collected as tax in accordance with law under the principal Act as amended by this Ordinance as if the provisions of this Ordinance were in force at all material times. Section 5 of the Ordinance further entitled any person aggrieved by any judgment, order or direction made by any court or authority to apply for review within three months from the date of the commencement of the Ordinance. It laid down that on review application being made to such Court, for whose review of the judgment the application was filed, shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with the principal at Act, as amended by this Ordinance. 7. In pursuance of the Ordinance, the State of U. P. applied for review in Writ Petition No. 3083 of 1973, M./s. Mohan Lal Hargovind Dass v. State of U.P. and others on 9-10-1979. Notice was issued on this review application on 17-12-1979. This Ordinance was repealed by the U.P. Tendu Patta (Vyapar Viniyaman) (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1980 (LT. P. Act No. 5 of 1980). 8. Statement of Objects and Reasons of the aforesaid Act No. 5 of 1980 mentioned that as it was considered necessary to amend the U.P. Act No. 19 of 1972 with a view to provide (with retrospective effect) that the permit-holders should be liable to pay a tax at the aforesaid rate, so that the amount levied and collected as fee, may be deemed to have been levied 4nd collected as tax, it was amended as such. Relevant provisions of this U.P. Act No. 5 of 1980, having a bearing on the controversy in hand, are found in Sections 4 and 5 of the Amending Act. Relevant provisions of this U.P. Act No. 5 of 1980, having a bearing on the controversy in hand, are found in Sections 4 and 5 of the Amending Act. Section 4 of Amending Act deals with validation, whereas section 5 with Repeal and Savings. 9. Challenging the validity of the U.P. Act No. 5 of 1980, the present writ petition was filed. 10. This writ petition has been contested by the State of U.P. We will take up the points in the seriatim in which they are argued before us. 11. The first argument of the petitioner's learned counsel was that U.P. Act No. 5 of 1980 does not validate the levy of fee which was collected under R. 4(2) of the Niyamavali of 1973, and as such, the petitioner is entitled to the refund of the amount paid as fee in accordance with the direction given by this Court in Writ Petition No. 3083 of 1973. It was further urged in connection with this submission that the provisions of U.P. Act No. 5 of 198O being not the same as they were of the Ordinance repealing the Uttar Pradesh Tendu Patta (Vyapar Viniyaman) (Sanshodhan) Adhyadesh, 1979 (U.P. Ordinance No. 29 of 1979), therefore on the Ordinance having been repealed, the review application in Writ Petition No. 3083 of 1973 has become infructuous, and is liable to he rejected. 12. For a proper appreciation of the arguments made before us, we consider it necessary to point out that U.P. Act No. 19 of 1972 had been passed with a view to provide for the creation of State monopoly in the purchase and distribution of tendu leaves. A bare perusal of the provisions contained in the aforesaid Act would show that every grower was obliged to sell tendu leaves to the State Government on the price which had to be fixed by the State Government. No person was entitled to sell tendu leaves to any person other than the State Government and further that no person other than the State could purchase tendu leaves, from any person other than such Government. Prohibition was imposed or the right of transportation of tendu leaves. It was obvious that a restriction on the transport of tendu leaves even before or after the sale of leaves by he Government was an essential part of the creation of monopoly. Prohibition was imposed or the right of transportation of tendu leaves. It was obvious that a restriction on the transport of tendu leaves even before or after the sale of leaves by he Government was an essential part of the creation of monopoly. All the tendu leaves grown, in the area had to be sold to the State Government, so that no person could surreptitiously transport tendu leaves to outside. The restriction on transportation was also imposed for the purpose of putting a check on the cutting of tendu leaves from the State forests. 13. As a result of the aforesaid provisions it would be seen that monopoly had been created by Section 5 of U.P. Act No. 19 of 1972. Article 19(6) of the Constitution, as amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 inter alia lays down that nothing in Cl. (g) of Article 19(1) shall prevent the State Government from making any law relating to the carrying on by the State of any trade, business or industry whether to the exclusion complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise. This provision further precludes the Court from questioning the reasonableness of a law, which creates a monopoly in favour of the State itself to carry on the trade to the exclusion of the citizens. 14. In Akadasi v. State of Orissa, AIR 1963 SC 1047 , the Supreme Court rejected the contention that the creation of the State monopoly was a part (Sic) to be justified by the State by showing that the restrictions imposed by it are reasonable and are in the interest of general public. As a result of the First Amendment of 1951, there are no limitations upon the power of the State Government to create a monopoly in its favour. The law can provide for the exclusion from a service of all citizens or some of them only. It was held by the Supreme Court in Kondala Rao v. A.P.S.R.T.C., AIR 1961 SC 82 that the State is competent to enter into any trade or business like a private individual even without a specific legislation sanctioning such activity, in asmuchas Article 298 of the Constitution, as inserted in the Constitution in 1956, included the right to carrying on trade or business in the "executive power" in the Union or State. 15. 15. In Vrajlal Munilal & Company v. State, AIR 1 966 Madh Pra 301, the validity of Madhya Pradesh Tendu Patta (Vyapar Viniyaman) Adhyadesh was challenged on the ground that it infringed Article 19(1)(1) of the Constitution The Division Bench in that case repelled the contention by ruling that S. 5(1) of M.P. Act being a provision creating a monopoly in favour of the State in the trade of tobacco leaves, was completely protected by the latter part of Article 19(6) of the Constitution, as amended by the First Amendment Act 1951. 16. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that Act No. 5 of 1980 does not provide for the validation of the levy of fee, which had been invalidated by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 3083 of 1973. We are unable to accept this submission. Section 4 of U.P. Act No. 5 of 1980 provides that notwithstanding any judgment or order of any court to the contrary the realisation of fee would be deemed to have been done or taken under the principal Act, as amended by this Act. The intention behind section 4 of this Act, if it is read with Statement of Objects and Reasons, there would be no doubt that U.P. Act No. 19 of 1972 was amended with a view to provided with retrospective effect) that the permit-holders shall be liable to pay tax at the aforesaid rate, so that the amount levied and collected as fee, may be deemed to have been levied or collected as tax. It is not in dispute that the power to legislate includes the power to legislate retrospectively as well as prospectively and in that behalf, tax legislation has no difference from any other legislation. 17. We have seen above that a provision for filing of the review of the judgment, given by the High Court, was made by U.P. Ordinance No. 21 of 1979. This Ordinance has come into force on 28th September, 1979. Subsequently when the Ordinance was repealed, sub-sec. (2) of Section 1 of L.P. Act No. i of 1980 provided that the Act shall be deemed to have come into force on Sept. 28, 1979. As a result of U.P. Act No. 5 of 1980 coming into force w.e.f. 28th Sept. 1979, no time lag was left. Subsequently when the Ordinance was repealed, sub-sec. (2) of Section 1 of L.P. Act No. i of 1980 provided that the Act shall be deemed to have come into force on Sept. 28, 1979. As a result of U.P. Act No. 5 of 1980 coming into force w.e.f. 28th Sept. 1979, no time lag was left. To meet the requirement of a provision, which provided for the decision of the review application filed earlier under the Ordinance Section 5 of U.P. Act No. 5 of 1980 lays down that every application for review filed under Section 5 of the Adhyadesh and pending on the date of publication of this Act, shall be, disposed of in accordance with the said section, as if the said Adhyadesh continued to be in force. It is, therefore, not correct to argue that as a result of repeal of the Adhyadesh, review application filed under Section 5 of the same elapsed. Clause (b) of Section 5 of U.P. Act No. 5 of 1980 further has provided that anything done or any action taken under the provisions of the principal Act, as amended by the said Adhyadesh shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of the principal Act, as amended by this Act, as if the provisions of this Act were in force at all material times. Consequently, we are unable to find any substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that neither did Ordinance No. 21 of 1979 nor does U.P. Act No. 5 of 1980 purported to cure the defect, which had been found by this Court in Writ Petition No. 3083 of 1973. While dealing with this argument, we should not be taken to have upheld that the State Legislature was competent to impose tax by U.P. Act No. 5 of 1980. This aspect of the matter would be dealt with by us separately. 18. The next submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that, the Bill which resulted in passing U.P. Act No. 5 of 1980 was not presented to the Governor for assent under Article 200 of the Constitution, with the certificate of the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly signed by him that it was a Money Bill, therefore, the non-compliance of this mandatory provision rendered the imposition of tax as invalid. 19. 19. The definition of "Money Bills" has been given in Article 199 of the Constitution. Article 199(4) to which the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was centered, reads as under:- "(4) There shall be endorsed on every Money Bill when it is transmitted to the Legislative Council under Article 198, and when it is presented to the Governor for assent under Article 200, the certificate of the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly signed by him that it is a Money Bill." The submission of the petitioner's learned counsel was that the certificate of the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, signed by him, was a necessary condition for obtaining the assent of the Governor under Article 200 and as this was not done, the imposition of tax by U.P. Act No. 5 of 1980 was in contravention of the mandatory provision. 20. On behalf of the State Government, counter-affidavits have been filed. stating that a compliance of Article 199 was made. In para 3 of the supplementary counter-affidavit of Lalit Mohan Tripathi, who was posted as Deputy Secretary, U.P. Vidhan Sabha, it was stated that as Sri Banarasi Das, who was then the Speaker of U.P. Legislative Assembly resigned from the Speakership on the Twenty sixth of Feb. 1979, the office of the Speaker fell vacant, with the result that Jagannath Prasad, the then Deputy Speaker performed the duties of the office of the Speaker till 17th Feb. 1980 as per the Notification No. 460/49 (San)-80, dated 18th Feb. 1980, published in the U.P. Extraordinary Gazette Dated 18th February, 1980. As Sri Jagannath Prasad, the Deputy Speaker, was performing the duties of the office of the Speaker, he certified that Bill of U.P. Act No. 5 of 1980, passed by the U.P. Legislative Assembly on 6th Feb. 1980, was a Money Bill. The Bill was presented to the Governor for his assent under Article 200 of the Constitution with the certificate of the Deputy Speaker dated 15th February, 1980. This Money Bill was reserved by the Governor and forwarded it to the President of India for his assent, who accorded the same on March 4, 1980. It was therefore that the U.P. Tendu Patta (Vyapar Viniyaman) (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam came into force and was published in the U.P. Gazette dated 5th March, 1980. 21. This Money Bill was reserved by the Governor and forwarded it to the President of India for his assent, who accorded the same on March 4, 1980. It was therefore that the U.P. Tendu Patta (Vyapar Viniyaman) (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam came into force and was published in the U.P. Gazette dated 5th March, 1980. 21. From the facts stated above, it is clear that a vacancy had occurred on account of resignation submitted by the Speaker in Feb. 1979. As the Speaker was not available, the Deputy Speaker performed his duties. In that capacity he gave the certificate as was required by Article 199(4) of the Constitution. With this certificate, the bill was presented to the Governor for assent. We are, on this fact, satisfied that there was no breach of Article 199(4) of the Constitution, hence it is not possible to hold that U.P. Act No. 5 of 1980 is invalid on the ground suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 22. In State of Punjab v. Satyapal, AIR 1969 SC 903 , the Supreme Court was called upon to deal with the legal position, which would emerge in the absence of the Speaker. It observed : "Wherein the absence of the Speaker at the time of the passing of the Money Bills, the Deputy Speaker acts as the Speaker under Article 180(2), he can effectively certify the Money Bills under Article 199(4) though Article 199(4) mentions only the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly." 23. The view of the Supreme Court was that the provisions of Article 199(4) could not be considered as mandatory, but as directory. Giving reasons for holding it to be directory, the Supreme Court observed :- "If the Constitution saw the necessity of providing a Deputy Speaker to act as the Speaker during the latter's absence or to perform, office of the Speaker when the office of the Speaker is vacant, it stands to reason that the Constitution could never have reposed a power of mere certification absolutely in the Speaker and the Speaker alone". 24. 24. In fact, according to the view of the Supreme Court taken in this case, even if there was some irregularity in the following of the procedure Article 212(1), which provides that the validity of any proceeding in the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity or procedure, would come into effect. Sri Jagdish Swarup attempted to argue that the matter relating to non-compliance of Article 199(4) was not a procedure. We are not able to sustain the submission. State of Punjab v. Satyapal, AIR 1969 SC 903 , (supra) was also a case of non-compliance of Article 199(4) of the Constitution. Moreover, the heading under which Article 199 is to be found in the Constitution is "Legislative Procedure". That being so, we cannot uphold the submission of the petitioner's learned counsel. In our view. when the Deputy Speaker acts as the Speaker during the absence of the Speaker, he can exercise the power to certify a Bill as Money Bill under Article 199(4). 25. The next submission of the petitioner's learned counsel was about Article 301 of the Constitution. He urged that Article 301 of the Constitution guarantees a right of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India and as the tax imposed by Section 5 of U.P. Act No. 19 of 1972, as amended by U.P. Act No. 5 of 1980 would impede the said right, Section 5 is liable to be struck down on that ground. 26. The main object of Article 301 is to allow free flow of the stream of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India. The object of the freedom declared by this Article is to ensure that the economic unity of India cannot be broken up by internal barriers; See Atiabari Tea Company v. State of Assam, (1961) 1 SCR 809 : AIR 1961 SC 232 . This Article is fully subject to Articles 302, 303 and 304 of the Constitution. We are since concerned, in this case, only with Article 304, it is not necessary for us to deal with other Articles. Article 304 reads as follows :- "304. Notwithstanding anything in Article 301 or Article 303. This Article is fully subject to Articles 302, 303 and 304 of the Constitution. We are since concerned, in this case, only with Article 304, it is not necessary for us to deal with other Articles. Article 304 reads as follows :- "304. Notwithstanding anything in Article 301 or Article 303. the Legislature of a State may by Law- (a) impose on goods imported from other State or the Union Territories any tax to which similar goods manufactured or produced in that State are subject, so, however, as not to discriminate between goods so imported and goods so manufactured or produced; and (b) impose such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within that State as may be required in the public interest :" The effect of Article 304(a) is to treat imported goods on the same basis as goods manufactured or produced in any State. So far as Article 304(6) is concerned, it empowers the State Legislature to impose reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade with other States or within its own territory. A Bill imposing such a restriction can be introduced in the State Legislature only with the previous sanction of the President. The idea of obtaining previous sanction is not far to seek. This has been elaborately dealt with by the Supreme Court in Atiabari Tea Company v. State of Assam, AIR 1961 SC 232 (supra). 27. Admittedly, in this case, no previous' sanction was obtained before moving the Bill in the Legislative Assembly. It, however, appears that after the Bill had been passed and was presented to the Governor, he reserved the same for the consideration of the President of India, under Article 201 of the Constitution. The President gave his assent on 4th March, 1980. It was subsequently that it was published in the official gazette on 5th March, 1980 and, thereafter, came into force. 28. The question that crops for decision is about the effect of subsequent assent. Article 255 of the Constitution has dealt with, such a contingency. It provides that the absence of previous sanction to a Bill does not invalidate an Act, if the Bill, as passed, received the assent of the President. 28. The question that crops for decision is about the effect of subsequent assent. Article 255 of the Constitution has dealt with, such a contingency. It provides that the absence of previous sanction to a Bill does not invalidate an Act, if the Bill, as passed, received the assent of the President. This view was taken by the Supreme Court in Jawaharmal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 764 , Mangalore Ganesh Biri Works v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 589 , Abdul v. State of Kerala, AIR 1976 SC 182 . In para. 16 of Abdul v. State of Kerala (supra), the Supreme Court said:- "We may observe that requirement of the proviso regarding the sanction of the President has been satisfied. It is no doubt true that the assent of the President was given subsequent to the passing of the Bill by the Legislature, but that fact would not affect the validity of the impugned Act in view of the provisions of Article 255 of the Constitution". 29. So far as State Legislatures are concerned, restrictions placed must be firstly in the public interest and, secondly, the restrictions should be reasonable. It has been held that the exercise of the power to tax may normally be presumed to be in the public interest. The obvious purpose of taxation for the raising of revenue, without which, no Government can run. Consequently, in our opinion, the requirements of Article 304(b) were satisfied, as a result whereof, the provisions of U P. Act No. 5 of 1980 cannot be held to be ultra vires contravening Article 301 of the Constitution. This argument, also therefore, fails. 30. The last point urged by the petitioner's learned counsel in all of these cases was about legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact sub-sec. (3) of Section 5 by the Amending Act of the year 1979. This sub-section makes a provision for levy of tax @ rupees three per standard b.4g of tendu leaves on the persons, to whom permits are granted as referred to in clause (b) or Cl. (c) or Cl. (d) of sub-sec. (2) of the Act. The tax leviable under the aforesaid provision, according to the petitioner, is on the permit and as the State Legislature had no competence to make such law, the same is ultra vires. (c) or Cl. (d) of sub-sec. (2) of the Act. The tax leviable under the aforesaid provision, according to the petitioner, is on the permit and as the State Legislature had no competence to make such law, the same is ultra vires. The incidence of the tax is the grant of permit for transportation of tendu leaves out side the State of U.P. 31. Justifying the imposition of tax on tendu leaves, the learned Advocate General relied 'on "Entry No. 56" of List II of the Constitution. This Entry reads as under: "Taxes on goods and passengers carried by road or on inland water ways". This Entry authorises a tax, the incidence of which is on goods and passengers (carried by roads or inland water ways), even though the tax is measured by the fares, or by the distance travelled. Under this Entry, no tax can be imposed on the permits under which a person may be authorised to export or transport goods. This Entry has been interpreted as of a regulatory or compensatory character. In dealing with the interpretation of this Entry, the Supreme Court held in International Tourist Corporation v. State of Haryana, AIR 1981 SC 774 as under :- "We have held that the Haryana Passengers and Goods Taxation Act is a law made pursuant to the power given to the, State Legislature by Entry 56 of List II. Having regard to Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, (1961) 1 SCR 809 : AIR 1961 SC 232 Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (1963) 1 SCR 491 : AIR 1962 SC 1406 and Bolani Ores Ltd v. State of Orissa (1975) 2 SCR 138 : AIR 1975 SC 17 it as to be held that the power exercisable under Entry 56 of List II is the power to impose taxes which are in the nature of regulatory and compensatory measures. In the last of the cases mentioned it was said by the Court, "Entry 57 of List II empowers legislation in respect of taxes on vehicles....... Suitable for use on roads.........." 32. In Atiabari Tea Company v. State of Assam (supra), this question was considered by the Supreme Court in detail. In the last of the cases mentioned it was said by the Court, "Entry 57 of List II empowers legislation in respect of taxes on vehicles....... Suitable for use on roads.........." 32. In Atiabari Tea Company v. State of Assam (supra), this question was considered by the Supreme Court in detail. In this case, the provision under challenge was that of the Assam Taxes (as goods carried by roads or inland water ways), under which the State of Assam was entitled to levy taxes on goods carried by road and inland water ways. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the aforesaid levy by finding the Act to be within the legislative competence of the State Legislature, as it was covered by Entry 56 of List II of the Constitution. In subsequent cases also, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of levy of taxes under the aforesaid Entry, if it was found to be compensatory or regulatory. 33. The tax, in the instant case, is not on goods, but on permits. The levy was on the permits given under the Tendu Patta Adhiniyam, 1979 for transport outside the State. This has nothing to do with the carrying of goods by road or inland waterways. Sub-sec. (3) of Section 5 in fact, does not confine itself to the tendu pattas, which are to be carried by roads or inland water ways. Irrespective of the conveyances, which are to be utilised in carrying or transporting tendu pattas, that tax @ rupees three per standard bag is leviable. Consequently, the legislation, on the basis of Entry, 56, cannot be justified. Entry 56, as stated above, is meant for the purposes different than that for which sub-section (3) of Section 5 had been enacted. 34. It is essential, to validate taxation that there be legislative authority for every tax that is to be levied. Article 265 of the Constitution provides : ..no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law". 35. Taxation, in order to be valid, must have been enacted by a legislature, which is competent to do so. If, therefore, under List II, a tax imposed by the State Legislature is not covered, the imposition of that tax would he beyond legislative competence of the legislature imposing the same. 36. 35. Taxation, in order to be valid, must have been enacted by a legislature, which is competent to do so. If, therefore, under List II, a tax imposed by the State Legislature is not covered, the imposition of that tax would he beyond legislative competence of the legislature imposing the same. 36. It was suggested by the learned Advocate General that the power of taxation is so unlimited and so searching in extent, that while judging the question of legislative competence, a court has to have a wide outlook and is, for that purpose, required to construe the entries liberally. With the proposition of law, that a entry should be liberally construed which entities levy of a particular tax, one may not have any difficulty, but it is not possible to uphold the tax, which is beyond the legislative competence of a State levying it. 37. We have found above that Entry 56 of List II of the Constitution relied upon by the State does not justify enactment of sub-sec. (3) of Section 5 of the Act in so far as it purports to levy tax on the permits obtained for transportation. 38. By Article 19(6) of the Constitution (As amended by First Amendment Act 1951), what cannot be challenged, is the reasonableness of the provision providing for the State monopoly. But the said provision will, not afford protection to other provisions made by the Act, which are not incidental or helpful to the operation of the monopoly. Consequently, Article 19(6) does not afford any assistance to the respondents to justify sub-section 131 of Section 5 of the Act. This provision is separate and distinct from those which provide for the State monopoly. 39. In Akadasi v. State of Orissa, AIR 1963 SC 1047 (supra) what the Supreme Court said on this controversy is relevant. which runs as under :- "A law relating to "a State monopoly cannot, in the context, include all the provisions contained in the said law whether they have direct relation with the creation of the monopoly or not. The said expression should be construed to mean the law relating to the monopoly in its absolutely essential features. If a law is passed creating a State monopoly, the Court should enquire what are the provisions of the said law which are basically and essentially necessary for creating the State monopoly. The said expression should be construed to mean the law relating to the monopoly in its absolutely essential features. If a law is passed creating a State monopoly, the Court should enquire what are the provisions of the said law which are basically and essentially necessary for creating the State monopoly. It is only those essential and basic provisions which are protected by the latter part of Article 19(6). If there are other provisions made by the Act which are subsidiary, incidental or helpful to the operation of the monopoly, they do not fall under the said part and their validity must be judged under the first part of Act. 19(6)". Sub-section (3) of Section 5 aforesaid is separate and distinct from those sections under which monopoly has been created. Consequently sub-sec. (3) of section 5 aforesaid, does not get immunity from challenge. Enactment of this provision has to be justified by showing the Entry of List II under which the State Legislature had competence to enact. 40. We have already dealt with Article 265 of the Constitution. With regard to this Article, the Supreme Court said in K.T. Moopil Nair etc. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1961 SC 552 as follows :- "Article 265 imposes a limitation on the taxing power of the State in so far as it provides that the State shall not levy or collect a tax. except by authority of law, that is to say, a tax cannot be levied or collected by a mere executive fiat. It has to be done by authority of law, which must mean valid law. In order that the law may be valid, the tax proposed to be levied must be within the legislative competence of the Legislature imposing a tax and authorising the collection thereof and. secondly, the tax must he subject to the conditions laid down in Article 13 of the Constitution." 41. Suggestion was also made by the learned counsel for the State that since by permitting, the State parts with its right over which it has absolute monopoly, therefore. the State was entitled to charge for parting of right with respect to the same. The counsel urged that for the said purpose, no tax is required to be imposed, and as such, even if sub-section (3) of Section 5 aforesaid could not be justified on the basis of Entry 56 of List II. the State was entitled to charge for parting of right with respect to the same. The counsel urged that for the said purpose, no tax is required to be imposed, and as such, even if sub-section (3) of Section 5 aforesaid could not be justified on the basis of Entry 56 of List II. the State should be held to have a right to realise rupees three per standard Bag. This submission is not acceptable. We have dealt with the provisions of the main Act and the amendments above in detail. Those provisions would show that it was subsequently when a Division Bench of this Court held that R. 4, as initially enacted, was invalid that the present sub-sec. (3) of Section 5 aforesaid, imposing tax was enacted. The Amending Act of 1979 was passed as a Money Bill. Sub-section 13) of Section 5 was a piece of legislation amending tax. It is under this provision that the realisations are being made. It is not open to the State Government to justify realisation by calling the same to be some thing different than tax. 42. For what we have said above, we find that sub-sec. (3) of Section 5 is beyond the legislative competence. Since the validity of validating Act, depends on the legislative competence, and as we have found above that it could not impose tax on permits to be granted for transportation, therefore Section 4 of the Amending Act dealing with the validation would also be liable to be held to be beyond legislative competence. 43. In the Municipal Corporation. City of Ahmedabad v. New Shrock Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., AIR 1970 SC 1292 , the Supreme Court observed :- "The most important condition, of course is that the legislature must possess the power to impose the tax for, if it does not, the action, must ever remain ineffective and illegal..... whichever method is adopted it must be within the competence of the legislature and legal and adequate to attain the object of validation. If the legislature has the power over the subject matter and competence to make a valid law, it can at any time make such a valid law and make it retrospective so as to hind even past transactions. If the legislature has the power over the subject matter and competence to make a valid law, it can at any time make such a valid law and make it retrospective so as to hind even past transactions. The validity of a validating law, therefore, depends upon whether the legislature possesses the competence which it claims over the subject matter and whether in making the validation it removes the defect which the Courts had found in the existing law and makes adequate provisions in the validating law for a valid imposition of the tax." 44. The next question is whether tax imposed could be treated as price or fee charged by the State Government for parting with its exclusive right to trade in tendu patta. We have noted above that R. 4 of the Act as initially made providing for fee was held by this Court to be illegal. for not having provided for service to he rendered to the individuals who pay the same. This Judgment has become final. After the Judgment, the Legislature intervened and repealed the old provisions by re-enacting sub-sec. (3) of Section 5. It is true that this traditional view that there must he actual quid pro quo fora fee has undergone a change in the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court, but as the old provisions have been repealed and the section now provides for the levy of tax, it is not possible to uphold the tax on this basis. The Amending Act of 1979 was moved as a Money Bill. Justification pleaded is as a tax. It was suggested that validation clause of the Amending Act prevents unjust enrichment by those who have passed on this burden of the fee, hence the said section be not struck down. This is not possible to be accepted. For upholding the above provision. it was necessary that the same was valid. As it is not so, it has to go along with sub-sec. (3) of Section 5 of the Amending Act. 45. We, therefore, allow the writ petition by holding that sub-sec. (3) section 5 and section 4 of the validating Act. 1979, are beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. 46. In view of the above finding, the review applications filed by the State of U.P., for the review of the Judgments in the writ petitions decided earlier are rejected. 47. (3) section 5 and section 4 of the validating Act. 1979, are beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. 46. In view of the above finding, the review applications filed by the State of U.P., for the review of the Judgments in the writ petitions decided earlier are rejected. 47. In the result, the writ petition No. 10 of 1980 succeeds and is allowed. The respondents are restrained from realising the tax under sub-sec. (3) of section 5. They are further directed to return the amount realised from the petitioner at an early date. 48. The review petitions in writ petitions Nos. 3083 of 1973, 5316 of 1972, 2884 of 1973, 3562 of 1973, 3679 of 1973, 3964 of 1973, 4166 of 1973 and 4167 of 1973, are dismissed. The petitioners of these cases (who tiled writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution I will be entitled to refund of the various amounts which had been paid by them. 49. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.