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1985 DIGILAW 1075 (ALL)

Pyarey alias Baba Chirimar v. State of U. P

1985-11-06

BRIJESH KUMAR, S.S.AHMAD

body1985
JUDGMENT Brijesh Kumar, J.- This writ petition had been filed by Pyarey alias Baba Chirimar against order of his detention dated June 4, 1985 under sub-section (3) of Section of the National Security Act, passed by the District Magistrate, Lucknow. After hearing the parties we had allowed the writ petition and had quashed the order of detention by means of our short order dated November 6, 1985. We now proceed to set out the reasons for allowing the writ petition. 2. The order of detention dated June 4, 1985 ordering preventive detention of the petitioner was served upon him on June 5, 1985 along with grounds of detention. A true copy of the order of detention has been annexed as Annexure 1 to the writ petition and a true copy of the grounds of detention has been annexed as Annexure 2. The satisfaction of the detaining authority namely the District Magistrate, Lucknow, to detain the petitioner is based on two grounds mentioned in Annexure 2. The first ground relates to an incident which occurred on September 17, 1984 in which one Panna Lal was murdered. A case was registered against the petitioner and others as Case Crime No. 145/84 under Sections 147/148/149/ 302, I.P.C. at Police Station Mandion. After investigation a charge-sheet had been filed in the Court and the case is still pending. As a supporting material to ground No. 1 a copy of the F.I.R. was furnished to the petitioner along with the grounds of detention. According to the allegations made in the F.I.R. the deceased Panna Lal along with another person namely Sanjay Kumar Misra had gone to cut some wood. As soon as they were to start after cutting the wood accused persons including the petitioner arrived there. The petitioner is alleged to have been armed with single barrel gun and other co-accused were armed with different types of weapons namely spear, pistol, Kanta, and lathi etc. out of the accused persons Ram Asrey and Mool Chandra caught hold of Panna Lal saying that he should be killed upon which Ram Asrey, Naresh Kumar, Kailash, Sumiran, Om Prakash and Mazhar surrounded Panna Lal and assaulted him with their respective weapons. out of the accused persons Ram Asrey and Mool Chandra caught hold of Panna Lal saying that he should be killed upon which Ram Asrey, Naresh Kumar, Kailash, Sumiran, Om Prakash and Mazhar surrounded Panna Lal and assaulted him with their respective weapons. On alarm being raised, witnesses arrived but the petitioner and some other accused persons stood on the way to the village and the petitioner is alleged to have said that he would see any one who even came near. Thereafter the accused persons ran away. Panna Lal is alleged to be lying dead. It is said that the incident had occurred at 11 a.m. The counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the incident in question was directed against an individual and it does not relate to disturbance of public order. We find force in the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. From a perusal of the F.I.R. it is clear that some persons had made assault upon Panna Lal which was directed against him individually. We find that the incident in question is like any other unfortunate occurrence of murder which can adequately be dealt with under the normal and ordinary provisions of relevant law. There does not appear to be any special feature in the incident so as to enable us to find or draw an inference that the incident had an effect of leasing the wave of terror in the area effecting the members of the society in general and disturbing the even tempo of life. The fact that the petitioner and some other accused persons had threatened the witnesses, who had accused arrived on the alarm raised, is also a very common feature in such incidents. It may be noted that the alleged threatening to the witnesses was not coupled with any overt act or under any use of force by the accused persons. Another feature, which is noteworthy, is that besides the witnesses, who are alleged to have arrived, another person namely complainant was also there along with the deceased but no one else was assaulted. All this shows that the assault was directed against an individual. In view of the above we hold that the order of detention cannot be sustained on ground No. 1 as the said incident only relates to problem of law and order and does not pose any problem relating to public order. 3. All this shows that the assault was directed against an individual. In view of the above we hold that the order of detention cannot be sustained on ground No. 1 as the said incident only relates to problem of law and order and does not pose any problem relating to public order. 3. In support of the second ground of detention, a copy of the F.I.R. was furnished to the detenu which was lodged on January 22, 1985 by the Inspector-Incharge, Kotwali, Qaiserbagh, on the basis of which Case Crime No. 49 of 1985 was registered at Police Station, Qaiserbagh, under Section 307, I.P.C. After the investigation a charge-sheet was filed in the Court and the case in still pending. The allegations made in ground No. 2 are that on January 22, 1985 Arun Kumar Gautam, Sub-Inspector Police Station, Qaiserbagh, along with other police personnel were in the lookout of some persons and in that connection they had gone to Shami's Tea Shop near J.C. Bose Road. At about 4.30 p.m. they got an information through an informer that one Aruna Shanker alias Anna along with his two companions, while chasing some persons, were to coming towards the Office of the Lucknow Development Authority. Upon receipt of the above information the Sub-Inspector along with informer and other police personnel proceeded towards the Office of Lucknow Development Authority. As soon as they reached near the gate of Lucknow Inter College they found Aruna Shanker going on Motor Cycle towards the Office of Lucknow Development Authority along with two others. The police party tried to stop the Motor Cycle. Aruna Shanker and the petitioner who were sitting on the pillion of the Motor Cycle fired one shot each from their respective revolvers and they escaped. It has further been stated that as a result of the above incident the public started running helter-skelter. The officers and the officials of Lucknow Development Authority got terrorised. Traffic on the road had stopped and an atmosphere of terror had gripped the area. In connection with the above ground it has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that if a person fires at a police party to scare it away while the police party is trying to arrest the person it does not amount to public disorder. It has been submitted that such as incident is not directed against the public. In connection with the above ground it has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that if a person fires at a police party to scare it away while the police party is trying to arrest the person it does not amount to public disorder. It has been submitted that such as incident is not directed against the public. In support of his contention the counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon two cases namely 1985 SC page 18 Ajay Dixit v. State of U.P. and others and 1985 ALJ page 514 Bundu v. State of U.P. and others. On behalf of the State reliance has been place upon 1985 ALJ 1151 Kali Charan v. State of U.P. and others. In the case of Ajay Dixit (supra' decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court ground No. 2 was to the effect that the detenu had collected 'goondas' in his house and when the police party reached in order to arrest the 'goondas' the detenu had fired at the police party for which a case, was registered under Section 307/34, I.P.C. While dealing with ground Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 of that case it was observed that the charges mentioned therein were not of such magnitude as to amount to apprehend disturbance of public order nor there was evidence that by conduct of the detenu public order was endangered or there could be a reasonable apprehension about it. In Bundu's case (supra) one of the grounds was that the detenu along with his associates was carrying illegal arms and ammunition's in two stolen cars on the S.T. Road. They were intercepted by the police party headed by Inspector-Incharge of Police Station Banna Devi. While they were passing through in front of Police Station Banna Devi. The detenu and his associates had resorted to firing indesparation on the police force which had resulted in stoppage of traffic on the National High Way. The passengers of vehicles plying on that road and other passers by were all terror striken and had started running helter-skelter for safety. It has been held that the detenu and others had resorted to firing only to scare away the police party to escape arrest. It did not result in public disorder. The passengers of vehicles plying on that road and other passers by were all terror striken and had started running helter-skelter for safety. It has been held that the detenu and others had resorted to firing only to scare away the police party to escape arrest. It did not result in public disorder. In Kali Charan's case one of the grounds was that the detenu along with his companions, armed with illegal weapons, was trying to raise illegal constructions on Janam Bhumi near Keshav Devi Temple in the 1 city of Mathura. On receiving this information police force arrived to check the illegal activity of the detenu, when it is said that the detenu, with the intention of killing the police personnel, opened fire at the police party, the act of the detenu and his associates resulted in panic and fear in the area and the members of the public ran helter-skelter to save their lives. While dealing with this ground the case of Bundu v. State of U.P. and others, 1985 ALJ 514 has been distinguished on facts. It has been observed that in Bundu's case the culprits had resorted to firing to scare away the police party to escape their arrest but in Kali Charan's case the facts were different as they were trying to raise illegal construction at Janam Bhumi near the place of the Temple in the heart of the City and a thickly populated locality. While further dealing with the question a reference has been made to a case reported in 1985 ALJ 132 Shiv Shanker v. Incharge, Police Station, Hazaratganj, Lucknow, wherein an observation has been made that the act of firing on the police party which is supposed to be the custodian of law and order and is responsible for maintaining public order is too serious an act and has to be distinguished from firing upon an individual with whom the culprits may have grievance. It has further been observed that such incidents have wider ramification and they have the effect of causing disturbance to public order. It has further been observed that such incidents have wider ramification and they have the effect of causing disturbance to public order. Rut in view of decision in Ajay Dixit's case (1985 SC 18) we find that merely act of firing or assault resorted to upon the police party by itself will not lead to the conclusion that the problem relates to maintenance of public order for the only reason that the assault has been directed against custodians of law and order. Other relevant facts and circumstances, the background and context in which the incident took place in each case will have to be seen and scrutinised before holding that the matter relates to law and order or public order. In the present case the police party tried to intercept the petitioner while he was going on a Motor Cycle along with two others at J.C. Bose Marg near the Office of the Lucknow Development Authority. The petitioner and one of his companions are admittedly said to have find om shot each and escaned. No inference other than this can be drawn that the firing was resorted to only to scare away the intercepting party to escape arrest. No firing was directed against the public or passers - by nor anyone including member of the police party is alleged to have received injury, it cannot be said that such an incident would disturb the even tempo of the life. The facts of Kali Charan's case are entirely different and we find that the facts of this case are nearer to the facts of Bundu's case (supra). 4. In the result we find that the detention order could not be passed on the second ground as well. The order of detention is not sustainable and we have already quashed the same by means of our short order dated 6 November, 1985. There will be no order as to costs.