ORDER B.L. Yadav, J. - The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the orders passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Meerut, Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation), Meerut and the Consolidation Officer, Meerut, dated 15-3-1975, 23-12-1972 and 11-9-1972 respectively, in proceedings pertaining to the title under S. 9-A(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Land Holdings Act, 1953. 2. Shorn of details the facts are these. In the basic year plots Nos. 34/3-18-0. 132/1-13-0, 133/2-8-0, 134/16-6-0 and 172/2-0-0 in Khata No. 203 were recorded in the name of the petitioners under Clause 4 of the Khatauni. An objection was filed by the petitioners alleging that both of them being members of the joint Hindu family were in possession over the land in dispute for the last more than 25 years and they have acquired Sirdari rights and now Bhumidhari rights. Earlier a regular Civil Suit No. 1594 of 1966 was filed by Ch. Goverdhan Singh and 5 others as plaintiffs against the petitioners in the representative capacity for the relief of a permanent injunction restraining defendants 1 and 2 (the present petitioners) from taking exclusive possession over the land in suit and also restraining them from interfering with the user of the land as pasture land used by the plaintiffs and other residents of the village. The said suit was contested by the petitioners alleging that they have acquired Sirdari rights and that the suit was not maintainable. The plea of jurisdiction was also raised as also the plea of non-joinder of parties and issue No. 4 was whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the case. The suit was dismissed by the judgment and decree dated 3-12-68 and in that suit petitioners were held to be sirdars. The appeal filed on behalf of the plaintiff was also dismissed on 26-3-69 and that judgment and decree became final and would operate as res judicata against the claim of the Gaon Sabha, as the earlier suit was filed in representative capacity purporting to be under 0. 1 R. 8, C.P.C. and it was on behalf of all the residents of the village and the allegations in the plaint contained the case that could have been set up by the Gaon Sabha. That suit was fought out till the first appellate Court. Hence the Gaon Sabha, respondent 4 was bound by that judgment and decree. 1 R. 8, C.P.C. and it was on behalf of all the residents of the village and the allegations in the plaint contained the case that could have been set up by the Gaon Sabha. That suit was fought out till the first appellate Court. Hence the Gaon Sabha, respondent 4 was bound by that judgment and decree. It was prayed that the names of the petitioners may be recorded as sirdar/bhumidhar and the entries in the basic year under Clause 4 were incorrect and may be expunged. 3. The Gaon Sabha contested the case of the petitioner and alleged that the earlier suit would not operate as res judicata as the definition of `land' as given under S. 3(14) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. (hereinafter referred to as the Act), did include the pasture land and the earlier suit was not maintainable in the Civil Court. The Gaon Sabha and the State Government were not made parties to that suit. Hence that suit being not maintainable in ,-the Civil Court, the judgment and decree rendered therein would not operate as res judicata nor were binding against the interest of the Gaon Sabha and in respect of the land in dispute the petitioners cannot acquire sirdari rights and their objection was liable to be dismissed. 4. The consolidation authorities rejected the claim of the petitioners and held that the judgment and decree passed by the Munsif and the learned Civil Judge would not operate as res judicata nor they were binding as the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and that land has vested in the Gaon Sabha. 5. It has been urged by Sri P.R. Shivhare, learned counsel for the petitioners that the judgment and decree dated 3-12-68 passed by the Munsif, Ghaziabad in Civil Suit No. 1594 of 1966 has been confirmed in appeal by the judgment and decree dated 26-3-69 passed by the Civil Judge and hence that would operate as res judicata or in any case as a constructive res judicata. All that could have been stated by the Gaon Sabha was alleged by the plaintiff in that suit and it was held by the Civil Judge and Munsif that the Civil Court has jurisdiction and at that time the plaintiff of that suit alleged and proved that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to-try the suit, hence they cannot resile from that stand taken in the suit and the appeal. It was also held that the State Government and the Gaon Sabha were not made parties and as the definition of `land' under S. 3(14) of the Act did not cover pasture land. hence the suit would he maintainable only in the Civil Court and the Gaon Sabha was bound by the earlier judgment and decree. 6. Sri A. Rathore, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents refuted the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners and urged that the earlier judgment would not operate as res judicata, that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit and the definition of `land' under S. 3(14) of the Act did cover pasture land, that the petitioners did not acquire sirdari and bhumidhari rights and their objection was correctly dismissed. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The main points for determination in the instant case are (1, whether the earlier judgment and decree dated 3-12-68 passed in Suit No. 1594 of 1966 (Ch. Goverdhan Singh v. Shakti Singh & others), as confirmed in appeal by the judgment and decree dated 26-3-69 filed in the Civil Court, in respect of which allegations were made by the plaintiffs that it was a pasture land and the relief was for a permanent injunction, would operate as res judicata or constructive res judicata or whether respondent 4 was bound by that judgment and decree; and (2) whether the pasture land was covered by the definition of `land' as given under S. 3(14) of the Act. 8. As regards the first point, I am of the opinion that the earlier judgment and decree of the Civil Court would certainly operate as res judicata or in any case as a constructive res judicata. The earlier suit was filed for a relief of permanent injunction in respect of the pasture land and it was a representative suit filed under 0. 1. The earlier suit was filed for a relief of permanent injunction in respect of the pasture land and it was a representative suit filed under 0. 1. R. 8, C.P.C. As no relief against the State Government and the Gaon Sabha was claimed hence the State Government and the Gaon Sabha were not made parties. No relief against the revenue paper entries were claimed by the plaintiffs in that suit, hence the Gaon Sabha and the State Government were correctly not made parties. In a suit for permanent injunction only those persons are the necessary parties who are interfering with the possession of the plaintiff. It is a settled view of this Court that in case the plaintiffs do not seek any relief against the State Government or the Gaon Sabha nor they claim any relief in respect of the entries in revenue papers, the plaintiffs are not obliged to implead the State Government and the Gaon Sabha and such suit was cognizable by the Civil Court only. (See Purshottam v. Narottam, 1970 All U 505). 9. In the instant case the plea about the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was also raised and issue No. 4 was framed about the plea of jurisdiction and it was held that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the case. Further another plea about the non-joinder of necessary parties was also raised and issue No. 3 was framed on that point and it was held by the Civil Court that the suit was not barred by the non-joinder of the necessary parties. A certified copy of the judgment has been filed as Annexure-D to the petition, which I have perused. As in the earlier suit the residents of village has filed the suit and they had led evidence, fought out the case diligently and had preferred appeal also, which they lost, hence it cannot be said that the earlier suit was of collusive nature and further it is well settled that a party cannot be permitted to take inconsistent position in the Court, to blow right and loose, to blow hot and cold as regards the plea of jurisdiction. This doctrine applies not only to the successive stages of the same suit but also to another suit. 10. This doctrine applies not only to the successive stages of the same suit but also to another suit. 10. In the instant case in the earlier suit the plaintiffs alleged and proved that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit and that suit was not barred by non-joinder of necessary parties, i.e. State Government and the Gaon Sabha and the findings were recorded in their favour in the earlier suit. The plaintiffs preferred appeal also and that also met the same fate. Hence those findings regarding the Civil Court having jurisdiction to entertain the suit and that that suit was not barred by non-joinder of necessary parties (State Government and the Gaon Sabha) became final and now the plaintiffs or the Gaon Sabha cannot be permitted to take contradictory plea that what was taken in the earlier suit. (See Hari Narain v. Ram Raj, 1969 Rev Dec 33. Abdul Qayum v. Fida Hussain, AIR 1915 All 463 Kartar Singh v. Nanda, AIR 1926 All 664, It is thus crystal clear that the earlier suit in respect of the land in dispute was maintainable in the Civil Court and as the similar plea has been raised in the present case by the Gaon Sabha and the earlier suit was fought out on merits, the appeal was also filed. Hence that judgment and decree in that suit would operate as res judicata, or in any case as constructive res judicata and respondent 4 cannot be permitted to wriggle out of that position. 11. The next question that falls for determination is as to whether the definition of 'land' as given under S. 3(14) of the Act would cover pasture land or not, which was alleged to be the nature of land in respect of which the earlier suit was filed. It is better to set out statutory provisions of S. 3(14) of the Act, which is as under : "3(14). `Land' except in Sections 109,143 and 144 and Chap. It is better to set out statutory provisions of S. 3(14) of the Act, which is as under : "3(14). `Land' except in Sections 109,143 and 144 and Chap. VII means land held or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry which includes pisciculture and poultry farming." It is thus clear that in the aforesaid definition the pasture land has not been included, whereas in the definition of land in the earlier Acts, i.e. U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939, the definition of land read as follows : "Section 3(10) - `Land' means land which is let or held for growing of crops or as grove land, or for pasturage. It includes land covered by water used for the purpose of growing Singhra or other produce, but does not include land for the time being occupied by a building or appurtenant thereto other than buildings which are improvements." 12. By comparing the aforesaid definitions of land as contained under S. 3(10) of the U. P. Tenancy Act, and that under S. 3(14) of the Act there appears to be a noticeable change. The pasturage appears to have been deliberately omitted from the definition of land under S. 3(14) of the Act. 13. There is a Latin maxim "Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget", which obviously means that when you have plain words of statute capable of only one interpretation, no explanation of that is required'. There is yet another maxim "A verbis legis non estrect dendum", which means that you must not vary the words of a statute. 14. Craies on Statute Law, VIIth Edition, page 66 observed as follows : "The intention of the legislature is not to be speculated on..... in a Court of law or equity, what the legislature intended to be done or not to be done can only be legitimately ascertained from what it has chosen to enact, either in express words or by reasonable and necessary implication." (See Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales, 1950 AC 235, IRC v. Dowdall O'Mahoney & Co., 1952 AC 401 . 15. 15. I am of the view that it cannot be assumed that the pasture land might have been omitted inadvertently from being mentioned clearly in the definition under S. 3(14) of the Act, but in that event also it is not the duty of the Court to create or supply the "causus omissus", which means that the words of a statute need not be extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not been made. A Court has to interpret the words of legislature as they stand and even though there appears to be some intercellular space in the language used in an Act, we cannot add or amend or by construction we cannot make good the deficiencies which are left there. 16. In the instant case the pasturage or pasture land which was included in the definition under S. 3(10) of the U. P. Tenancy Act, was deliberately omitted by the legislature under S. 3(14) of the Act. This cannot be unintentional. This should not go unnoticed. The only irresistible inference is that if it was a `pasture land', in that case that would not be covered by the definition of `land' under the Act. I am of the view that the other correlative inference is that the Revenue Court is not the forum for suit in respect of pasture land, and the Civil Court was the only forum. 17. As the earlier suit was maintainable in the Civil Court in respect of the land in dispute and that judgment and decree became final and that was a suit fought out on merit, hence respondent 4 was bound by the judgment and decree in the earlier suits. The earlier suit was also filed by the plaintiff, who were the residents of the village and that was a representative suit and all the allegations were made in the suit which could have been made by the Gaon Sabha. The Gaon Sabha was also a body for the benefit of the entire residents of the village and the same duty was performed by the plaintiffs by filing a suit to restrain the present petitioners, who were defendants there, from taking exclusive possession over the land in suit and thereby interfering with the usage of the land as pasture land used by the plaintiffs and other residents of the village. I am accordingly of the view that the judgment and decree in the earlier suit was binding on respondent 4, even though the State and the Gaon Sabha might not have been made parties in the earlier suit, inasmuch as the interest of the Gaon Sabha and the State was represented by the plaintiffs there and all the evidence were led that could have been led by the Gaon Sabha or the State. Hence there appears to be no way out than to accept the finality of the earlier judgment and decree rendered by the Civil Court. Respondent 4, the Gaon Sabha being bound by the earlier judgment and decree, cannot challenge the petitioner's claim and rights on the commencement of the consolidation proceedings. In spite of the judgment and decree in the earlier suit, the names of the petitioners could not be entered in the main tenants column as sirdar/bhumidhar and hence for that limited purpose the petitioners filed objection under S. 9-A(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and that should have been allowed by the consolidation authorities. 18. In view of the discussions made hereinbefore, the consolidation authorities have committed an error apparent on the face of the record. 19. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. The orders dated 15-3-1975, 23-12-72 and 11-9-72 are hereby quashed. As a necessary corollary the petitioners shall be entered in the revenue papers sirdars/bhumidhars over the plots in dispute and they would be assessed to land revenue according to law.