JUDGMENT V.K. Mehrotra, J. - Petitioner Bahori Singh made an application for allotment of a shop situate in Qasba Etmadpur belonging to Smt. Bhagwan Devi. The shop was earlier in the tenancy of one Bulla Khan. The landlady obtained a decree for his adjustment as he had fallen in arrears of rent. This, decree was passed on April 12, 1977. The landlady obtained possession over the shop the same day. 2. Vijai Prakash Gupta, who has sworn the counter affidavit in this petition on behalf of Smt. Bhagwan Devi, is her son and is a practicing lawyer. He needed a Chamber. When possession had been obtained of the shop in dispute, the door in the wall intervening between it and the adjoining shop which also belonged to Smt. Bhagwan Devi was got removed by her. A chamber was then set up in the entire accommodation thus made available. Vijai Prakash occupied it and is still in occupation thereof. 3. The order of allotment of June 16, 1978 mentioned that no evidence other than that of her son was adduced by Smt. Bhagwan Devi in support of her objection dated February 28, 1978 to the prayer for allotment made by Bahori Singh. According to the order, there was disparity between what was stated in the objection and the evidence of the son of Smt. Bhagwan Devi. The shop was reported to be vacant by the Supervisor Kanungo, who was asked to submit a report, after receipt of the application for allotment and the objection. 4. Section 18 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 permits a revision being filed against an order of the nature passed by the allotting authority. Under it, if the order suffers from an error of the nature mentioned in the provision which is akin to the provisions contained in Section 115 CPC it can be set aside by the Revising Authority. Smt. Bhagwan Devi assailed the order of allotment in a revision. After hearing the parties, the Revision was disposed of by the Vth Addl. District Judge, Agra by order dated August 2, 1980. The revision was allowed. The order of allotment in favor of Petitioner Bahori Singh was set aside. In the body of the order, it has been mentioned that the genuineness of the need put forward by Smt. Bhagwan Devi was not considered by the allotting authority. The need was found to be genuine. The revision was allowed. The order of allotment in favor of Petitioner Bahori Singh was set aside. In the body of the order, it has been mentioned that the genuineness of the need put forward by Smt. Bhagwan Devi was not considered by the allotting authority. The need was found to be genuine. The Addl. District Judge felt that the finding recorded by the allotting authority was perverse and, as such, the error in the order was of the nature amenable to correction u/s 18 of the Act. 5. Learned Counsel for Bahori Singh urged that the power exercised by the Revising authority u/s 18 was similar to the one exercisable u/s 115 CPC which did not permit interference with a conclusion of fact howsoever erroneous it be. Also, that in the absence of an application for release being made by the landlady the accommodation could not, in effect, be released in her favor as done by the Addl. District Judge. A mere prayer in the objection to the allotment of the house could not be treated to be the same as an application for release. Further, no order of release could be made after order of allotment had actually been passed. Learned Counsel also urged that a release order could not be passed while deciding a revision u/s 18. In respect of these submissions, he placed reliance upon D.L.F., Housing and Construction Company (P.) Ltd., New Delhi Vs. Sarup Singh and Others, AIR 1971 SC 2324 ; Krishna Dutt Kali v. Molid. Yasin 1979 AWC 102 ; Shantanu Kumar v. State of U. P. 1979 AWC 585 ; Smt. Shanti Devi v. District Judge, Ghaziabad 1980 U.P. 1 RCC 368 ; Pt. Mani Lal Tripathi v. Smt. Kamla Devi 1982(2) ARC 471 and Ajab Singh v. 1st Addl. District Judge Allahabad 1985 AWC 672 . 6. From the order passed by the allotting authority as well as one passed by the Addl. District Judge it is established beyond doubt that after obtaining a decree for adjustment, the landlady obtained actual possession of the shop in question and that, thereafter, her son was in occupation thereof and was using it as his Chamber. The order of the Addl. District Judge it is established beyond doubt that after obtaining a decree for adjustment, the landlady obtained actual possession of the shop in question and that, thereafter, her son was in occupation thereof and was using it as his Chamber. The order of the Addl. District Judge further shows that on the material on the record, it was clear that no other place, apart from the one presently being used for the purpose, was available to the son of the landlady for being used as Chamber. 7. Without going into the correctness or otherwise of the submissions made by the counsel for Petitioner Bahori Singh, it appears to me that the circumstance that the accommodation in question forms part of the area which is being used as a Chamber for his practice by the son of the landlady since the year 1977, cannot be overlooked in deciding relief to the Petitioner who was a mere allotted of the shop and had never been put in possession thereof. Grant of relief Under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary. Where, as in the present case, the court feels that it would be unjust to disturb the possession of the landlady's son over the shop in question, which now forms part of the accommodation used by him as a Cbaviber, after a lapse of nearly eight years, it would not be a fit case for grant of relief to the Petitioner even if the order passed by the Addl. District Judge may be in excess of jurisdiction. Law in that respect is settled. If authority is needed, it can be found in pronouncements of the Supreme Court and of this Court, some of which were made in A.M. Allison Vs. B.L. Sen, AIR 1957 SC 227 ; Pooran Singh and Others Vs. Additional Commissioner and Others, AIR 1957 All 276 ; Parahu v. Deputy Director of Consolidation 1964 AWK 155 and Matru Lal v. The Distt. Judge, Meerut 1983 (1) ARC 571. 8. In conclusion, the petition fails and is dismissed though the parties are left to bear their own costs.