JUDGMENT R.M. Sahai, J. - 'Equity follows law but not slavishly nor always'. It is this conflict between law and fairness, rule and equity which stands highlighted in this defendants' second appeal, arising out of suit for ejectment and damages, filed by respondents who were minors in 1949 when their father died. It has been found by both the Courts below that as their uncle had no source of income they were maintained by their father's cousin (mausa) who as their de facto guardian sold their house to appellant. From sale consideration he purchased another house and shop for the respondents and settled them. The appellant who had purchased respondents' house constructed a new pucca house in place of old one. On attaining majority the respondents, whose father was only a shoe- maker earning Rs. 2 to Rs. 3/- per day by daily going to market and had left no assets except the house which was converted by their de facto guardian to their benefit and enabled them to stand on their own, did not hesitate in filing the suit to grab the property of appellant which of course had become valuable. According to trial Court it having been established that sale deed executed by the guardian was for consideration and for benefit of minors it was binding on them. The appellate Court did not reverse or disagree with this finding but in view of law laid down by this Court in Mst. Anto v. Mst. Reoti, AIR 1936 All 837 (FB) based on elucidation of law by Privy Council in respect of alienation by de facto guardian amongst Mohammadan in Immambandi v. Sheikh Haji Mutsaddi, 16 All LJ 800 : AIR 1918 PC 11 held that Sale-deed was void and inoperative. 2. In Immambandi's case (supra) the Privy Council after quoting Hediya and Fatawa-I- Alamgiri held, "That under the Mohammedan law a person who has charge of the person or property of a minor without being his legal guardian, and who may, therefore, be conveniently called a 'de facto' guardian, 'has no power to convey to another any right or interest in immoveable property which the transferee can enforce against the infant nor can such transferee, if let into possession of the property under such unauthorised transfer, resist an action in ejectment on behalf of the infant as a trespasser. It follows that, being himself without title, he cannot seek to recover property in the possession of another equally without title. It did not use the expression that transfer by a de facto guardian was void. It was held to be so by this Court in Mst-Anto's case (supra) on basis of what was said by Privy Council. The Full Bench held : "It seems to us that if as laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council, the transaction was invalid from its very inception, it must be regarded as a void transfer and it must therefore be open to the subsequent transferees to set up its invalidity." But the declaration by Privy Council was qualified. It quoted extract from Fatawa-i Alamgiri and observed that transferor even if she was mother could not resist or challenge purchaser's status. That right was exclusively of minor. A de facto guardian under Mohammedan law could be mother or brother. But the anxiety to protect interest of minors due to social custom has been so intense that even they have not been permitted to alienate. At same time any transfer made by a de facto guardian cannot be challenged by himself. They themselves are prevented from seeking declaration or challenging transferee's status. It was observed' : "The above case shows that even where the mother believes she is vested with authority as her husband's executrix, and in that belief purports to deal with minor's property, a purchaser let into possession by her is liable to be ejected at the instance of the minor. Her own subsequent denial of authority does not affect the purchaser's possession; but if the transaction is impugned by the rightful owner. viz, the infant - the onus is on the vendee to establish the foundation of his title, that is, that his vendor possessed in fact the authority under which she purported to act." 3. Rationale of it appears to be fair play. Because no one can take advantage of his own wrong. And this is the foundation for equitable principle which finds expression in estoppel. For instance if transfer is by mother, a de facto guardian, on whom the property devolves due to death of the minor can she seek declaration that sale made by her was invalid. On the illustration given by Privy Council she could not. And this is the foundation for equitable principle which finds expression in estoppel. For instance if transfer is by mother, a de facto guardian, on whom the property devolves due to death of the minor can she seek declaration that sale made by her was invalid. On the illustration given by Privy Council she could not. Because she being the author of wrong cannot be permitted to turn round and convert it to her own advantage. 4. Even in Imambandi's case ( AIR 1918 PC 11 ) (supra) it was observed by Privy Council: "Having regard to the object in view, this dictum appears to their Lordships to apply to all forms of property which, like a 'kar, combine both security and permanency. But it does not exclude the discretion of the Judge to sanction any alteration of investment in the interests of the infant". 5. An unenforceable transfer and a void transfer are two different concepts. These extracts indicate that a transfer by de facto guardian is not enforceable by the guardian or the transferee. It does not prevent minor from enforcing it.. Even the Court has been given discretion to enforce it in interest of minor. Same is not true if a transfer is void. No further need be said as even assuming that transfer by the de facto guardian was inoperative and the respondents on attaining majority could repudiate it should a Court of law grant decree in favour of a person who by seeking adherence to strict rules in causing hardship and injustice. Courts in our country are courts of equity, justice and good conscience as well. They administer justice in accordance with law but tempered with equity and fairness. The forum of Court and machinery of law should not be permitted to be utilised, by unscrupulous litigant for gaining undue benefit and advantage resulting in hardship. A party having a legal right should not be permitted to avail himself for the purpose of injustice, injury or oppression. And if that is done, 'equity will exert its authority and grant its remedies to prevent injustice'. Doctrine of promissory estoppel, propricatry Remedies, Undue Enrichment etc. are extended concepts of equity. They have been evolved and developed by Courts of law to relieve a person by not giving effect to a bargain or agreement which is unconscionable. 6. And if that is done, 'equity will exert its authority and grant its remedies to prevent injustice'. Doctrine of promissory estoppel, propricatry Remedies, Undue Enrichment etc. are extended concepts of equity. They have been evolved and developed by Courts of law to relieve a person by not giving effect to a bargain or agreement which is unconscionable. 6. On facts found there could be no better case than this for discretionary justice by court. The respondents took full advantage of sale made by their de facto guardian. Sale consideration was utilised not only for purchasing a house for them but also a shop in which they established their business and flourished. Yet they filed the suit and want to deprive of the appellant of their house which they have constructed after spending good amount. By strict adherence to rules the appellant shall suffer gross injustice. This could not have been the intention of Textual Mohammedan Law. Safeguard was provided interest of minor and not to furnish him with material to act dishonestly. 7. The question then is what should be done. Should the suit be dismissed as was done by trial Court or equities can be adjusted in any other manner? After giving anxious consideration, it appears ends of justice shall be served if appellant is granted value of his property. That should have advantage of applying the law as laid down in various decisions subject to equitable adjustment. 8. In the result, the second appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the lower appellate Court is modified and it is directed that the decree for eviction shall not be implemented unless market value of the property is valued and the respondents pay the same to the appellant after deducting sale consideration for which it was sold. The appellant shall be entitled to its costs in all the Courts. But the decree for costs shall be enforceable only if the decree modified by this Court is put in execution.