JUDGMENT - M.H. KANIA, Ag.C.J.:---This is an appeal against a judgement of Bharucha, J., making absolute the Writ Petition aforesaid filed by the respondents herein who were the petitioners before Bharucha, J. in the aforesaid writ petition. The appellants before us are the respondents to the original writ petition. 2. The appeal is on board before us for admission. As the matter has been argued for some time before us, we propose to set out briefly our reasons for the order which we propose to pass. 3. The facts: One Hemant B. Mafatlal died on August 16, 1971. On March 28, 1974, an assessment of his estate was made for the purpose of his estate duty. The matter was carried in appeal to the Appellate Controller of Estate Duty who disposed it of by an order dated March 17, 1975. There after, an appeal was preferred to the Appellate Tribunal which passed its order thereon on August 26, 1977. We are not concerned with this order of the Tribunal. However, on November 5, 1976, that is after the order of the Appellate Controller and before the order of the Tribunal, appellant No. 2, first Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, issued a notice to the respondents under section 59(b) of the Estate Duty Act stating that he had reason to believe that property chargeable to estate duty has escaped assessment and had been under assessed. By the said notice, he required the respondents to deliver to him within a stipulated time an account of all property in respect of which estate duty was payable. Pursuant to an objection by the Chartered Accountants of the respondents and their demand for reasons, the appellant No. 2 by his letter dated September 18, 1978 informed the said Chartered Accountant that the assessment was sought to be re-opened as the office of the Controller and Auditor General which had scrutinised the assessment has pointed out certain errors in the valuation of certain shares of Mafatlal Gagalbhai Co. Private Limited and Surat Cotton Co. Private Limited. Private Limited and Surat Cotton Co. Private Limited. By the said letter, the appellant No 2 stated that the said shares should have been correctly valued according to the provisions of section 37 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 (referred to hereafter as "the Estate Duty Act") as the section 37 applies to all the cases of valuation of shares of private limited companies where transfer of the shares is restricted. The said letter also pointed out some other errors in the order of assessment. However, before us, it is the agreed position that the re-opening sought is only on the basis of the statements made in the said letters on September 18, 1978 regarding the applicability of section 37. This notice of reassessment was challenged in the petition. The learned trail Judge took the view that the opinion of an internal auditor of the Income-Tax Department on a point of law could not be regarded as information within the meaning of section 147(b) of the Income-tax Act. He took the view that the same was the position under section 59(b) of the Estate Duty Act and, in view of this, he came to the conclusion that there was no valid justification for the re-opening of the assessment. In the result, Bharucha, J. quashed the said notice dated November 5, 1976 issued by the appellant No. 2 under section 59(b) of the Estate Duty Act and restrained the appellant from taking any proceedings to enforce the same. It is the correctness of this decision of the learned trial judge which is disrupted in this appeal. 4. The contention of Mr. Dhanuka, learned Counsel for the appellants was that an audit note may contain information as well as an opinion and, in so far as the audit note contained information, it could constitute valid basis for the re-opening for the assessment under section 59(b) of the Estate Duty Act or section 147(b) of the Income-Tax Act. In support of this contention, Mr. Dhanuka referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in (Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society v. Commissioner of Income-tax New Delhi)1, reported in 119(1979) I.T.R. 996. In support of this contention, Mr. Dhanuka referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in (Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society v. Commissioner of Income-tax New Delhi)1, reported in 119(1979) I.T.R. 996. In that case it has been held by the Supreme Court that the opinion of the audit party on a point of law held by the Supreme Court could not be regarded as 'information' enabling the I.T.O. to initiate assessment proceedings under section 147(b) of the Income-tax Act. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court in that connection which find place at pages 1003 and 1004 of the said Report run as follows :- "But although an audit party does not possess the power to so pronounce on the law, it nevertheless may draw the attention of the ITO to it. Law is one thing, and the communication another. If the distinction between the source of the law and the communicator of the law is carefully maintained, the confusion which often results in applying section 147(b) may be avoided. While the law may be enacted or laid down only by a person or body with authority is that behalf, the knowledge or awareness of the law may be communicated by any one. No authority is required for that purpose. In the present case, an internal audit party of the income-tax department expressed the view that the preceipts from the occupation of the conference hall and rooms did not attract section 10 of the Act and that the assessment should have been made under section 9. While section 9 and 10 can be described as law, the opinion of the audit party in regard to their application is not law......." This decision lays down that a noted of an audit party or an auditor which conveys information as to certain provisions of law can be regarded as information within the meaning of section 147(b) of the Income-tax Act, but in so far as the audit note contains an opinion on the incorporation of certain provisions of law or their applicability, it cannot constitute information as contemplated within the aforesaid provisions. 5. In (Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City-III v. H.D. Dennis others)2, reported in 135(1982) I.T.R. 1, it has been inter alia held by a Division Bench of this Court that information within the meaning of section 147(b) of the Income-tax Act may consists of facts or a law. 5. In (Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City-III v. H.D. Dennis others)2, reported in 135(1982) I.T.R. 1, it has been inter alia held by a Division Bench of this Court that information within the meaning of section 147(b) of the Income-tax Act may consists of facts or a law. The information must be fresh or subsequent to the original assessment. The opinion expressed by the department or by the Central Board of Direct taxes is not law. Law is that which is laid down either by the Legislature or Judicial decisions and it is a charge in such law which constitutes a fresh subsequent information. 6. In the present case, the show cause notice issued by the First Assistant Controller of Estate Duty which is dated September 18, 1978, shows that the ground for re-opening given was that the shares of Mafatlal Gagalbhai Co. Pvt. Ltd. Bombay and Surat Cotton Company Pvt. Ltd. Bombay should have been correctly valued according to the provisions of section 37 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 as that section applies to all cases of valuation of shares of private limited companies where alienation of shares is restricted. It is further stated in the said notice that the provisions of sections 37 of the Estate Duty Act were not applied in the valuation of the said shares in the original assessment order, and that had resulted in under assessment of the value of the said two companies. A perusal of the reasons given in the said letter for taking action under section 59(b) of the Estate Duty Act again shows that the reasons given is that the said shares should have been rightly valued according to the provisions of section 37 of the Estate Duty Act. The reason No. 5 set out in the said letter contains a reference to instruction No. 771 dated October 29, 1974 issued by the Central Board of Direct taxes, after consultation with Ministry of law, Government of India on the scope of the section 37 of the Estate Duty Act. It is no where set out in the said letter that the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty was not aware, at the time when the original assessment was made, of the provisions of section 37 of the Estate Duty Act. It is no where set out in the said letter that the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty was not aware, at the time when the original assessment was made, of the provisions of section 37 of the Estate Duty Act. The audit note on the basis of which re-opening of the assessment is sought to be justified has been produced before us and is a pert of Exhibit 1' on record. By the side audit note, what is pointed out is that unquote shares held by the deceased in his individual capacity as also in the name of H.U.F. No. II and M.H.B. Trust in the aforesaid companies were wrongly valued according to the provisions of Rule 1-D of the Wealth Tax Rules, 1957 and that the Central Board of Direct Taxes had revised its stand by its instruction No. 771 referred to earlier. A perusal of Instruction No. 771, which is also part of Exhibit 1' shows that by the said instruction it is directed that circular No L-D/ED of 1968 dated March 26, 1968 issued by the Central Board did not apply to valuation of shares covered by section 37 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 and that valuation of such shares was governed by the Board's letters dated May 3, 1965 and July 5, 1965 respectively. It is clear from the perusal of this instruction that it is based on an opinion expressed by the Central Board and does not represent the decision of the Central Board in any matter referred to it by way of appeal or otherwise for determination. We may mention here that the letter dated 5, July 1965 referred to in the said instruction is a letter from the Secretary of the Central Board to the Controller of the Estate Duty, governs the mode of valuation of shares in a private limited company when articles of association contained restrictions provisions as to the alienation of shares. The circular of 26th March, 1968 being Circular No. L-D/ED of 1968, provides that the value of assets forming part of dutiable estate of a deceased individual for the purpose of estate duty should be taken at the same value as was determined for the purpose of wealth tax in the year referred to in the circular. The circular of 26th March, 1968 being Circular No. L-D/ED of 1968, provides that the value of assets forming part of dutiable estate of a deceased individual for the purpose of estate duty should be taken at the same value as was determined for the purpose of wealth tax in the year referred to in the circular. It was as result of this circular which operated at the time when the original assessment was made that the shares of the aforesaid companies were valued according to the provisions of Rule I-D of the wealth Tax Rules. The said circular pointed out that it was decided by the Board that the basis of valuing an asset for estate duty should be the same as the basis adopted for wealth tax assessment in respect of the year immediately preceding the death of an individual provided the accountable person agreed to this. A perusal of documents clearly shows that the said instructions No. 771 of 1974 represents nothing more than a change of view on the part of the Central Board of Direct taxes regarding the valuation of the type of shares referred to earlier. 7. In (Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Hyderbad v. Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan Bahadur and others)3, reported in 72(1969) ITR 376, it has been held by the Supreme Court that the opinion of the Central Board of Revenue regarding the correct valuation of securities for purpose of estate duty expresses in an appeal preferred by the accountable person is 'information' within the meaning of section 59(b) of the Excise Duty Act. In the present case, as we have already pointed out, the said instruction No. 771 of 1974 does not represent the decision of the Central board of Direct taxes on any appeal or other like proceedings, but merely represents an opinion of the Central Board. In these circumstances, it is clear that there was, in the present case, no information on the basis of which a notice of reassessment could be given under section 59(b) of the Estate Duty Act and the said notice dated 18th September, 1978 is clearly bad in law. The learned trail Judge was, in our view with respect, justified in taking this view, for the reasons which we have already indicated above. 8. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no orders as to costs. The learned trail Judge was, in our view with respect, justified in taking this view, for the reasons which we have already indicated above. 8. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no orders as to costs. Appeal dismissed. -----