S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) IN this appeal defendant No. 1 in special civil suit No. 51 of 1978 on the file of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Junagadh has challenged the decree for possession passed by the learned trial Judge on 29 ( 2 ) IN order to highlight the grievances voiced by the appellant through his learned Advocate before us it is profitable to have a look at the relevant facts. Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 are the original plaintiffs in the suit while respondent No. 5 is original defendant No. 3. Original plaintiffs are trustees of a registered public trust known as Pir Shiraji Sha Dargah Trust. Defendant No. 2 Khalifa Shri Mahmadsha who is since deceased was the Khalifa of the trust. It is the case of the plaintiff-trustee that defendant No. 2 was managing the institution and the lands thereof as Khalifa. After some time he started mismanaging the same. Followers of Dargah applied to the Charity Commissioner in 1963 under section 50a of the Bombay Public Trusts Act for sanctioning the scheme and for appointing trustees. The Charity Commissioner by his order dated 27-11-1964 sanctioned the scheme and appointed the plaintiffs as first trustees. Defendants appeal against the Charity Commissioners order failed. Thus the plaintiffs submitted that they were duly appointed trustees of the public trust. That the present appellant-defendant No. 1 was Kamdar and special advisor of defendant No. 2. That he took defendant No. 2 under his thumb. In the meantime the plaintiffs on the sanctioning of the scheme took possession of the trust property in April 1966 and entered upon management thereof. That the trustees were contemplating to give the land bearings No. 50 for cultivation on Ek-Sali basis to one Pole Kana by an agreement dated 26-5-1966. But when the said Pole Kana went to take possession of the land the present appellant did not allow him to enter upon the suit land and he claimed to be in possession thereof in his own right. It is in these circumstances that the plaintiffs after filing a criminal complaint against the present appellant. filed the aforesaid civil suit for possession of the suit property from defendant No. 1 on the strength of title. It is in these circumstances that the plaintiffs after filing a criminal complaint against the present appellant. filed the aforesaid civil suit for possession of the suit property from defendant No. 1 on the strength of title. According to the plaintiffs the appellant is a rank trespasser he has illegally been inducted in the land by defendant No. 2 and he has no right to retain possession thereof and the trust was entitled to enter upon possession. It was further contended that if any document was entered into between defendant No. 2 and defendant No. 1 on the other and if any amount was received by defendant No. 2 from defendant No. 1 the said transaction would not be binding on the trust or the plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs were entitled to be put in possession of the land. . . . . . . . . ( 3 ) WE have been taken through the relevant evidence on record and the decision rendered by the learned trial Judge and the reasons given by the learned trial Judge while answering the concerned issues against the appellant. Mr. Mishra for the appellant ultimately highlighted the following contentions for our consideration:-1 That the suit was barred by limitation (issue No. 2 ). 2 That the suit was not maintainable till the document dated 13-12-1962 was declared null and void by the plaintiffs filing a separate suit issue No. 5 ). 3 The learned trial Judge while ruling out ex. 66/5 from the record as insufficiently stamped. had no jurisdiction to impose penalty. That consequently that part of the decree of the trial court is contrary to law and without jurisdiction. 4 Possession of the appellant is protected under sec. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and consequently. the suit for possession was required to be dismissed. We shall deal with the aforesaid contentions in support of the appeal as canvassed by Mr. Mishra in the same sequence in which they were raised. ( 4 ) SO far as the first contention is concerned it has to be stated to be rejected. It must be kept in view that the suit has been filed by the trustees of the registered public trust. It is filed on the strength of title for possession against the alleged trespasser. ( 4 ) SO far as the first contention is concerned it has to be stated to be rejected. It must be kept in view that the suit has been filed by the trustees of the registered public trust. It is filed on the strength of title for possession against the alleged trespasser. According to the appellant he was inducted on the land by the Khalifa defendant No. 2 by a document dated 13-12-1962. The suit is filed in 1968. Thus it is within six years. As per Article 65 of the Limitation Act suit for possession on the strength of title can be filed within 12 years of the date on which possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. It can therefore straightway be held that the suit as filed was within limitation. This is not a suit for cancellation of document as submitted by Mr. Mishra. Therefore the question of shorter period of limitation would not arise. Article 65 of the Limitation Act squarely answers the plea of limitation as canvassed by the appellant against him. The suit cannot be said the be time barred. The finding of the learned trial Judge on issue No. 2 therefore has to be upheld. ( 5 ) THAT takes us to the second contention of Mr. Mishra. It is submitted that the suit was not maintainable in view of the document dated 13-12-1969 as it was not got declared null and void by the plaintiffs. In our view the aforesaid contention covered by issue No. 5 was rightly rejected by the learned trial Judge. There are diverse reasons why this contention cannot be of any avan to the appellant. Firstly the document dated 13-12-1982 is not on the record of the case. It is already ruled out by the learned trial Judge as inadmissible in evidence without payment of proper stamp duty and it is ordered to be taken on record on payment of stamp duty and penalty. The appellant inspite of being given sufficient time has not paid up the penalty. The document has therefore remained impounded on record. Consequently there is no question of getting this document declared null and void by the plaintiffs. The appellant inspite of being given sufficient time has not paid up the penalty. The document has therefore remained impounded on record. Consequently there is no question of getting this document declared null and void by the plaintiffs. But even that apart there is no impediment in the way of the plaintiffs in straight way filing a suit for possession against the appellant who according to them is a trespasser on the suit land when the plaintiffs contend that the document under which he is alleged to have been inducted was not binding on the plaintiff trust. It must be kept in view that as per sec. 36 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act no immovable property of a public trust can be alienated in favour of any one by a trustee without express permission of the Charity Commissioner. And if such alienation is made it shall be invalid. Admittedly no such permission was taken in the present case. Consequently the transaction entered into by defendant No. 2 in favour of the present appellant remained null and void and not binding on the trust. It was not necessary for the trustees to sue for getting such a declaration and then to file the suit for possession. This is not a voidable document to which the trust was a party. This document merely represented an abortive attempt on the part of defendant No. 2 he trying to alienate the trust property in favour of an unauthorised person. Such a document which was not binding on the public trust cannot pose any impediment in the way of the trustees in suing for possession on the strength of title against the trespasser like the appellant. Consequently. the finding reached by the learned trial Judge on issue No. 5 is also well sustained. The second contention of Mr. Mishra therefore fails. ( 6 ) SO far as the third contention is concerned it is equally devoid of any merits. Mr. Mishra placing reliance on decisions of this court in 19 G. L. R. 686 and 1983 Guj Law Herald (unreported judgment) item No. 43 at page 29 submitted that if the learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that the document dated 13-12-1962 was insufficiently stamped he could have impounded it but could not have refused declaration straightway. He should have followed the procedure of sending the document to the Collector for imposing penalty. He should have followed the procedure of sending the document to the Collector for imposing penalty. In our view the said contention on the facts of this case cannot be of any avail to the appellant. The reason is obvious. Against the order of the learned trial Judge impounding the document and levying penalty a revision application was filed in this court being civil revision application No. 874 of 1977 which was dismissed by P. D. Desai J. (as he then was) as incompetent and not falling under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thereafter the suit proceeded to trial and ultimately resulted in a decree. Even assuming that procedure of imposing penalty as adopted by the trial court was unauthorised the grievance about the same is now too stale and has become of academic nature. Once the suit has proceeded to trial and resulted in a decree such a decree cannot be voided only because of this procedural flaw. If the suit was at the stage of trial and had not resulted in a decree it would have been possible to direct the learned trial Judge to follow the procedure of sending the impounded document for recovering proper stamp and imposing penalty to the Collector. The appellant has missed the bus. Years have rolled by. The order impounding the document and imposing penalty has become final. It is now well settled that order of the trial court admitting in evidence a document on payment of stamp duty or admitting it as sufficiently stamped as per the provisions of the Stamp Act cannot be challenged in any higher court may be a revisional of an appellate court as laid down by sec. 35 of the Indian Stamp Act 1899 see J. M. A. Raju v. Krishnamurthy XVII G. L. R. 210 (F. B. ). it is in these peculiar facts that it must be held that the grievance made by Mr. Mishra of procedural irregularity and illegality has become stale and otiose. 35 of the Indian Stamp Act 1899 see J. M. A. Raju v. Krishnamurthy XVII G. L. R. 210 (F. B. ). it is in these peculiar facts that it must be held that the grievance made by Mr. Mishra of procedural irregularity and illegality has become stale and otiose. Even otherwise such a grievance cannot help the appellant at such late stage as even assuming that penalty may be imposed by the Collector it cannot help the appellant in getting the document admitted in evidence at such late stage especially when inspite of number of opportunities being given to the appellant to pay up the deficit stamp and penalty and to get the document admitted in evidence at the stage of trial the appellant for the reasons best known to him did not think it fit to do so. Consequently the document dated 13-12-1962 is irretrievably lost to the appellant so far as its admissibility on the record of the case is concerned The third contention of Mr. Mishra therefore also fails and is repelled. ( 7 ) THAT takes us to the last contention of Mr. Mishra. He submitted that the appellant was put in possession by defendant No. 2 pursuant to the document dated 13-12-1962 which was not a registered document. Still the appellant was entitled to protection of his possession under sec. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act as he had paid Rs. 12 0 to defendant No. 2 and had done his best in discharging his obligation under the document. It is not possible to countenance this submission of Mr. Mishra. Sec. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act on which strong reliance was placed by Mr. Mishra is required to be reproduced at this stage:-"where any person contracts to transfer for consideration ally immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty and the transferee has in part performance of the contract taken possession of the property or any part thereof or the transferee being already in possession. continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract then notwithstanding that the contract though required to be registered has not been registered or where there is an instrument of transfer that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract; provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof". A mere look at the aforesaid provision shows that this passive equity would be available to only those transferees who are claiming such equity against transferors or their assigns meaning thereby the concerned transactions are authorised but have not been completed in accordance with law whether being Registration Act or any other law for the time being in force. Even if we agree with Mr. Mishra that non-affixing of proper stamp on the document can be treated to be non-completion of the document in the manner prescribed by the Stamp Act being law for the time being in force such equity would not be available to the appellant against transferor if the original transaction was itself unauthorised. We have seen earlier that the said transaction was hit by sec. 36 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. It is also noteworthy that in the present case passive equity is sought to be availed of not against the transferor viz. defendant No. 2 or his assigns but against the plaintiffs-trustees who are third parties and who claim possession of the property on the strength of their title against the appellant who is a trespasser. It has been rightly found by the trial court that defendant No. 2 had no right to part with possession of the trust property in favour of the appellant without following the procedure of law. It cannot be disputed that procedure of sec. 3 of the Public Trusts Act was observed in breach. It has been rightly found by the trial court that defendant No. 2 had no right to part with possession of the trust property in favour of the appellant without following the procedure of law. It cannot be disputed that procedure of sec. 3 of the Public Trusts Act was observed in breach. Consequently such transaction can never bind the trust represented through its duly appointed trustees. For such unauthorised act of the transferor which is not binding on the trust the appellant cannot claim any equity against the trust which is not a transferor. It is pertinent to note that neither the trust nor any of its duly appointed trustees is a party to the document dated 13-12-1962. They are all third parties. Against such third parties passive equity of sec. 53-A cannot be pressed in service by the alleged transferee for protecting his possession which ex-facie is unauthorised. Consequently sec. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be of any avail to the appellant. ( 8 ) THE learned trial Judge was also right in taking the view that in any case when the document itself is impounded and is not on record no benefit can be derived by the appellant from that document for supporting his case under sec. 53-A. On an overall view of the matter therefore protection of sec. 53-A is also not available to the appellant. That disposes of the last contention of Mr. Mishra. (The rest of the judgment is not material for the reports.) appeal dismissed. .