JUDGMENT K.P. Singh, J. - By means of this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs : - (a) to issue a writ of certiorari quashing the interview test and the results declared in the examination held by respondent No. 1 in pursuance of the advertisement issued on 9-5-1981. (b) to issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents Nos. 1 and 3 to hold fresh interview test on the basis of results declared in the written examination on 17-9-1981 and to declare the result strictly on the basis of merits. (c) to issue any other writ, order or direction which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. (d) to award cost of the petition to the petitioner. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details The petitioner, who is M. A. in Economics and was fully qualified to appear in the examination to be held under an advertisement published in Hindi daily "AAJ- on 9-5-1981 by the Chairman, Tulsi Gramin Bank, he had submitted his application within time for the post of officer, and had received a written examination call letter for appearing in the written examination to be held on 19-7-1981 at I. I. T. College, Kanpur. He was allotted Roll No. 189. He was found qualified at the written examination for the interview and an interview call letter had also been issued to him (See Annexures 2" and 3' attached to the writ petition). It appears that later on some suspicion arose about some candidates having used unfair means in the written examination. Therefore, it was suggested that they should not be declared successful in the interview and that they should be given zero mark (see Annexure 5'). The petitioner being one of the suspected candidates was not declared successful at the interview, therefore, he was not selected for the post he appeared in the examination. Aggrieved by the declaration of the result the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. The main grievance of the learned counsel for the petitioner before us is that the petitioner was not afforded reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that he had not used any unfair means in the written examination. According to him the suspicion is ill-founded and the opposite parties Nos. 3. The main grievance of the learned counsel for the petitioner before us is that the petitioner was not afforded reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that he had not used any unfair means in the written examination. According to him the suspicion is ill-founded and the opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4 in the present writ petition have acted illegally and arbitrarily in dealing with the claim of the petitioner. It has been very much emphasised that the resolution in Annexure 5' for awarding 'Zero' mark to the petitioner at the interview was wholly perverse and betrayed an arbitrary approach on the part of the authorities. 4. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has submitted in reply that in the circumstances of the present case it was not at all necessary that any notice, should have been issued to the petitioner before issuing Annexure 5'. According to the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party, the opposite party No. 5 in the present writ petition suspected the petitioner as having used unfair means in the written examination on the basis of the statement showing analytical data of established copying cases. 5. In this connection we were referred to Annexure 6' attached with the writ petition. A photostat copy of the letter from Prof. P.D. Gadre dated Sept. 1, 1981 as well as Annexures 1' to 3' attached with the photostat copy note produced before us and placed on the record were also referred. It has been vehemently stressed that the petitioner was found using unfair means on the basis of the result arrived at through computer system. According to the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party 99% result through computer system is correct and no valid explanation can be offered to rebut that result. He has emphasised that even if hearing to the petitioner was essential before issuing Annexure 5 there is no explanation worth the name, therefore, futile writs should not be issued. The relevant extract from the confidential letter of Prof. P.D. Gadre reads as below : "Re; Recruitment of Officer on 19th July, 1981. Report of suspected copying cases : We have scrutinised suspected copying cases of candidates who were sitting adjacent to each other in the examination rooms. The relevant extract from the confidential letter of Prof. P.D. Gadre reads as below : "Re; Recruitment of Officer on 19th July, 1981. Report of suspected copying cases : We have scrutinised suspected copying cases of candidates who were sitting adjacent to each other in the examination rooms. We have four pairs of candidates in whose cases copying from each other has been established beyond reasonable doubt by the basis of large number of identical wrong answers in one or more tests. Generally the following is considered while deciding whether copying has taken place : 1. More than 10 identical wrong answers in one test. 2. Very small number of different wrong answers or wrong blank combination of responses. 3. Large number of identical and blank responses. 4. Number of answers changed by a candidate, the change being identical with the answers given by the other candidate. While the first is the basic evidence the other three are supporting evidence in respect of cheating or copying. The analysis of the combination of responses of the pair of candidates is given in the enclosed statements. The comparison figures in column 12 clearly establish beyond reasonable doubt that copying was resorted to by these candidates. It is suggested that necessary action may please be taken at your end." 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner in rejoinder has contended before us that the seating arrangement contained in Annexure 1 referred to by the-learned counsel for the contesting opposite party would indicate that the petitioner was ahead of the other candidate bearing Roll No. 190. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the distance between the two seats was more than a metre and that there was no complaint by the supervisor of the centre regarding any attempt of unfair means by the petitioner (illegible) necessary for the authorities to have afforded an opportunity to the petitioner to dispel the doubt that the petitioner had used any unfair means. According to him, howsoever strong the suspicion might be against the petitioner on the basis of the statement showing analytical data of copying cases contained in Annexure 2 and referred to by the learned counsel for the opposite party but it cannot be inferred that the petitioner had conclusively used unfair means in giving his answers. According to him, howsoever strong the suspicion might be against the petitioner on the basis of the statement showing analytical data of copying cases contained in Annexure 2 and referred to by the learned counsel for the opposite party but it cannot be inferred that the petitioner had conclusively used unfair means in giving his answers. He had also refuted the contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party to the effect that issuance of writs would be futile in the circumstances of the present case. If the petitioner gets an opportunity to explain his position, he can demonstrate that he had not used any unfair means in answering his questions and that the resolution contained in Annexure 5 attached with the writ petition regarding awarding 'zero' mark in the interview was wholly unjustified and arbitrary. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner had placed reliance upon the ruling reported in AIR 1962 SC 1110 , Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P., Allahabad v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta as well as the ruling reported in AIR 1966 All 207 ;Surendra Kumar Mehrotra v. Secy., Board of Technical Education U.P., Lucknow in support of his contention that the petitioner has been deprived of fair opportunity for contradicting the statement showing analytical data of established copying cases contained in Annexure 2 referred to by the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party and also Annexure 6 attached with the writ petition. 8. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has tried to meet the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner on the basis that the cases cited by the petitioner's counsel were distinguishable because they were based upon the statutory rules whereas in the case of the petitioner there is no such rule. 9. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties we think that even if the dates given in Annexure 2 relied upon by the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party are correct, it is difficult to say as to whether the petitioner had used unfair means in answering his question or the candidate bearing roll No. 190 had used unfair means in answering his questions. In such a circumstance if the petitioner gets an opportunity to explain his position in reference to seating arrangement as suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner in his rejoinder arguments, we think that the relevant authority may revise its conclusion. As no opportunity was given to the petitioner to explain his stand about using unfair means the declaration of the result by the authority against the petitioner suffers from violating the principles of natural justice. 9A. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party invited our attention to the ruling reported in AIR 1981 SC 136 , S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and has emphasised the following observation in para 24 : - ".... As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is necessary to observe natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs." 10. According to the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party the petitioner has not been able to give any explanation against the statement of analytical data contained in Annexure 6' of the writ petition and Annexure 2' referred to by the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party : this Court should not issue writs in favour of the petitioner. 11. In our opinion on the facts and circumstances of the present case mentioned above it is difficult to say that only one conclusion is possible to the effect that the petitioner had used unfair means in answering his questions. We think it proper to indicate that the authorities should observe the principles of natural justice before declaring the petitioner as having used unfair means in answering his questions. It is quite possible that after hearing the petitioner with regard to seating arrangements the authority may revise its conclusion. 11 A. However, it is apparent that the opposite parties have proceeded arbitrarily in issuing Annexure 5' attached with the writ petition whereby it has been indicated that the petitioner should be awarded 'zero' mark at the interview. 12. We fail to appreciate if the petitioner is permitted to appear at the interview test why should he be given zero mark. 12. We fail to appreciate if the petitioner is permitted to appear at the interview test why should he be given zero mark. The merit of the petitioner should have been examined by the Interview Board and thereafter his result might have been withheld on the ground that he had used unfair means in the written test, but the awarding of 'zero' mark to the petitioner at the interview examination and the suggestion to the effect contained in Annexure 5' attached with the writ petition appear to us quite arbitrary and perverse. On this ground alone the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed that the declaration of the petitioner's result as failure should be quashed. The ends of justice demand that the authorities should give fair opportunity to the petitioner to explain his position about using unfair means in answering his questions in the written test and also the merit of the petitioner at the interview should be judged by the authorities concerned without being biased in any manner. 13. In 1984 All Civil J 351, Km. Madhulika Mathurv. Gorakhpur University a Full Bench of this Court has indicated vide para 29 as below : "The Superintendent,Examination Centre or the Invigilator had not reported that any of the petitioners was noticed resorting to copying; the Examiner is not stated to have detected or even suspected that these petitioners for themselves availed of any unauthorised aid. The petitioners have no occasion absolutely to plead their innocence. In our opinion even if the scheme devised were to serve as a deterrent on its procedural aspect this suffers from arbitrariness and it cannot be classed as fair, just or reasonable. This certainly is not what one might claim as fair play in action." 14. In the present case the resolution contained in Annexure 5 attached with the writ petition and the circumstance of awarding zero mark to the petitioner at the interview test appear to us as most unfair, unjust and unreasonable. The declaration of the petitioner as unsuccessful in the examination suffers from violation of principles of natural justice as well as arbitrariness on the part of the authorities concerned and their biased attitude towards the petitioner. The declaration of the petitioner as unsuccessful in the examination suffers from violation of principles of natural justice as well as arbitrariness on the part of the authorities concerned and their biased attitude towards the petitioner. The ends of justice demand that the declaration of the petitioner's result as unsuccessful candidate should be quashed and the authorities should be asked to re-examine the case of the petitioner in the light of the observation made above. 15. In 1979 All WC 380 : ( AIR 1979 All 209 ) Ghazanfar Rashid v. Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P., Allahabad a Full Bench of this Court has observed as below vide para 21 : - "These principles are well settled but the real difficulty arises in their application to the particular facts of a case. While applying these principles it must be borne in mind that in case of no evidence the order would be vitiated only when there is not a single piece of evidence direct or indirect, oral of documentary, or even circumstantial evidence based on probabilities to sustain the decision of the authority concerned, but if there is some evidence of circumstantial nature, which may even include probabilities, it would not be a case of no evidence. Inadequacy of evidence does not fall within the principle of no evidence; If there be any evidence, howsoever weak it may be in its probative value, it will not be a case of no evidence and the High i Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the finding. Similarly, while considering the question of arbitrariness it must be kept in mind that if two views are possible on the material on record, and if the Examination Committee has bona fide taken one view, it is not open to the High Court to interfere with that finding merely because a different view is possible, The High Court can interfere if the ordet is wholly arbitrary and so capricious that no reasonable person could come to the conclusion on the material on record, but if a person can reasonably come to that conclusion, the High Court has no j urisdiction to interfere with the order. An arbitrary decision of a quasi-judicial authority would be perverse and liable to be quashed. An arbitrary decision of a quasi-judicial authority would be perverse and liable to be quashed. It is* however, not permissible to assume possibilities of circumstances in support of the examinee's innocence and then to interfere with the decision of the Examinations Committee on the ground that there was no conclusive evidence to hold the examinee guilty of the charge of use of unfair means. If several probabilities are available in the circumstances of a case, some of which support the examinee's innocence, while other circumstances support the decision of the Examinations Committee holding the examinee guilty, in that situation it is not permissible to interfere with the decision of the Examinations Committee as that would amount to appraisal of evidence." 16. The learned Judges of the aforesaid Full Bench case have also observed as below in para. 9 of the judgment : "If the Examinations Committee, relying on the report of the Screening Committee as well as on the answers of an examinee bona fide arrives at the conclusion that 'the examinee used unfair means in answering the questions, it is not open to the High Court to interfere with that decision merely because the High Court may take a different view on re-assessment of those circumstances. It is the function of the appellate Court to take a different view of the evidence and not the function of a supervisory Court to interfere with the order on the ground of a different possible view. While it is open to the High Court to interfere with the order of a quasi-judicial authority if. it is not supported by any evidence or if the order is passed in contravention of the statutory provisions of law, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, but the Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the order merely on the ground that the evidence available on the record is insufficient or inadequate or on the ground that a different view could possibly be taken on the evidence available on the record. The Examinations Committee has jurisdiction to take decision in the matter of use of unfair means not only on direct evidence but also on probabilities and circumstantial evidence. There is no scope for importing the principles of criminal trial while considering the probative value of probabilities and circumstantial evidence. The Examinations Committee has jurisdiction to take decision in the matter of use of unfair means not only on direct evidence but also on probabilities and circumstantial evidence. There is no scope for importing the principles of criminal trial while considering the probative value of probabilities and circumstantial evidence. The quasi-judicial authorities including the Examinations Committee are not bound by technical rules of evidence and procedure as are applicable to Courts." 17. In the present case the petitioner was not given an opportunity to explain his position, yet a conclusion has been arrived at that the petitioner had used unfair means in answering his questions on the basis of analytical data contained in Annexure 2'. In the above reported Full Bench ruling the examinee had been given an opportunity to explain the charge against him. Moreover in the present case the opposite parties have acted arbitrarily in issuing 'Annexure 5' wherein 'zero' mark at the interview. Therefore, the observations in the abovementioned Full Bench ruling do not stand in our way in granting relief to the petitioner to which he is entitled in law. 18. In 1985 All WC 717, Arun Kumar Singh v. University of Gorakhpur through its Registrar a Division Bench of this Court vide para. 4 has made the following noteworthy observation : - "On the other hand, there is also the danger of equating guilt with more suspicion. In one decision of this Court, to which one of us was a party, similarity or resemblance of answer has been recognised as a pertinent basis for determining whether unfair means have been used. We express our concurrence with that view but hasten to add that the matter requires a deeper probe because the feature of similarity is not an absolutely untrammelled factor. Its impact may vary from proof to mere suspicion, depending upon the degree to which it is perpetrated and the subj ect in the context of which it manifests itself. In a pure arts subject, for instance, there is room for innovation, variety and ingenuity of expression. On the other hand, in a subject like Physics or Chemistry there is hardly any room for difference or novelty. In such subjects answers are in the natural course likely to tally. Usually in such cases, the stock answer being with such phrases as "let us suppose" or "let us construct" etc. On the other hand, in a subject like Physics or Chemistry there is hardly any room for difference or novelty. In such subjects answers are in the natural course likely to tally. Usually in such cases, the stock answer being with such phrases as "let us suppose" or "let us construct" etc. While dealing with such matters one should not be surprised at the similarity which is exhibited in the answers. Furthermore in the matter of resemblance also, it may be emphasised that similarity in the mistakes is more indicative of the use of unfair means than mere similarity in the correctness of answers. If the mistakes are varied in character and are repeated by a group of examinees, it may not necessarily lead to the conclusion that they were the result of use of unfair means. On the other hand, if the mistakes are of a fantastic nature and are repeated in identical fashion by a large group of examinees, the inference of copying would be well-founded." 19. No doubt similarity of mistakes committed by the petitioner as shown in Annexure 2' produced by the opposite party before us or Annexure 6' attached with the writ petition lead to stronger suspicion, but it cannot take place of conclusive proof or absolute rule. Since the authorities have arrived at the conclusion regarding the petitioner's using unfair means in the written examination without affording him an opportunity to explain his position and had also issued Annexure 5' for awarding 'zero' mark to the petitioner at the interview, we think that the declaration of the petitioner as unsuccessful candidate in the circumstances of the present case, is patently erroneous and is the result of arbitrary approach by the authorities concerned. The declaration of the petitioner as unsuccessful candidate in the examination held by the respondent No. 1 in pursuance of the advertisement issued on 9-5-81 suffers from patent error of law and is the result of arbitrary approach by the authorities concerned and is in violation of the principles of natural justice, therefore, it deserves to be quashed. 20. We accordingly allow the writ petition and quash the result declaring the petitioner as unsuccessful candidate and direct the authorities concerned to re-consider the claim of the petitioner in the light of the observations made above. There would be no order as to1 costs.