Order The facts-leading to this application are as follows: The State of Tamil Nadu represented by the Special Police Establishment (now C.B.I., Madras) filed a charge sheet against the respondents accused Rajpal Agarwal and Jawaharlal Jawahar complaining of commission of various offences punishable under section 120-B read with Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 23 read with Section 4(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, Section 132 of the Customs Act, etc. In short, the prosecution case was that the two accused are the power of attorney holders for their respective wives doing some partnership business at Delhi. During the period 1964-66, they have committed very many illegal acts at Delhi, Bombay, Kuwait Eden, Madras, Kandla, etc., to wit, obtain licences for import from licence holders, open letters of credit in State Bank of India, Delhi, negotiate Bills of Ladding and Bills of Exchange, etc. Besides these, they have also committed an offence of conspiracy, to cheat the State Bank of India, Delhi by creating two invoices containing false particulars. Fictitious letters of credit and had made dishonest and fraudulent representation to the banks and the companies at Kuwait, Eden, etc. These offences were said to have been committed in India and out of India in 1964 to 1966, and therefore, the investigation went on for some years, and finally a charge sheet was formally filed in 1970. The case was then transferred to the Special Presidency Magistrate, and the prosecution examined 32 witnesses on its side and the prosecution evidence was practically coming to a close in 1973. The investigating Officer of the Special Police Establishment Division (C.B.I.) was in the witness box as P.W.32 and the prosecution wanted to let in secondary evidence of some documents on the ground that the originals are in the possession or power of persons who are in Kuwait, Eden and other foreign countries and hence out of reach. The documents that were sought to be marked under Section 65-A of the Evidence Act are, photostat copies of Shipment pass note, Application for Shipment, Export Manifest, Shippers’ Application, Loading Permit and Clearance Invoice. The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate held that these documents are not admissible in evidence without proof of execution of their originals, and therefore, they were shut out from the evidence on 25.7.78. The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate held that these documents are not admissible in evidence without proof of execution of their originals, and therefore, they were shut out from the evidence on 25.7.78. Now the State, represented by the C.B.I, Madras has come forward with this revision petition stating that the order of the trial Court shutting out the documents is erroneous and that the prosecution is entitled to let in secondary evidence by producing the photostat copies of the originals with the evidence of the Investigating Officer who has seen the originals and the contents thereon. 2. Learned Counsel for the accused would argue that no revision lies against the order of the lower court and that the petition is hit by section 397(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. In other words, the order of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is only an interlocutory order passed in the course of a trial, and therefore, no revision lies. 3. Now, the short point for consideration Is, whether the order of the trial Court in question is a mere interlocutory order or otherwise. 4. Learned Public Prosecutor placed before me several rulings of the Supreme Court in support of the prosecution which are as follows: In Amar Nath v. State of Haryana Amar Nath v. State of Haryana (1977) 2 S.C.J. 421: (1977)Crl.L.J. 1891: (1977) 4 S.C.C. 137 : (1977) S.C.C. (Crl.) 585: 79P.L.R. 695: (1977) MLJ. (Crl.) 561: (1978) 1 S.C.R. 222 : A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2185, the Supreme Court held that the term “Interlocutory order” in Section 397(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It is observed that: “Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397. ……… But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court”. 4. ……… But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court”. 4. In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1978) Crl.L.J. 165: (1917) 4 S.C.C. 551: (1978) S.C.C. (Crl.) 10: (1975) 1 S.C.R. 749: A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 47, the Supreme Court explained the purpose of putting a bar on the powers of a revision under Section 397(2) and added that where the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary and nothing contained in Section 397 (2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. The Supreme Court then observed that the bar under Section 397(2)will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to secure the ends of justice, The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial, and the High Court can examine the matter in an appropriate case under its inherent powers. 5. The next case is reported in Raj Kapoor and others v. State and others Raj Kapoor and others v. State and others (1980) 1 S.C.J. 528: (1980) MLJ. (Crl.) 439: (1980) Crl.L.J. 202: (1980) 1 S.C.C. 43 : (1980) S.C.C. (Crl.) 72: (1980) 1 S.C.R. 1081 : A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 258 and it says that the policy of law is very clear, namely, that interlocutory orders, pure and simple, should not be taken upto the High Court resulting in unnecessary litigation and delay. But, where it is more than a purely interlocutory order and less than a final disposal and if glaring injustice stares the Court in the face, the inherent power of the High Court can be exercised. 6. Learned Public Prosecutor also relied upon two other decisions reported in Easmuke J. Jhaveri v. Shella Dadiani Easmuke J. Jhaveri v. Shella Dadiani (1981) Crl.L.J. 958:(1981) Mah.L.J. 304: 83Bom. L.R. 196 Bombay High Court) and R.Srinivasan v. G.Shanmugha Bombay High Court) and R.Srinivasan v. G.Shanmugha (1984) MLJ. (Crl.) 188: (1984) Crl.L.J. 377 (Madras High Court). 6. Learned Public Prosecutor also relied upon two other decisions reported in Easmuke J. Jhaveri v. Shella Dadiani Easmuke J. Jhaveri v. Shella Dadiani (1981) Crl.L.J. 958:(1981) Mah.L.J. 304: 83Bom. L.R. 196 Bombay High Court) and R.Srinivasan v. G.Shanmugha Bombay High Court) and R.Srinivasan v. G.Shanmugha (1984) MLJ. (Crl.) 188: (1984) Crl.L.J. 377 (Madras High Court). In the Bombay case, it was held that an order which touches the important rights or liabilities of the parties cannot be said to be interlocutory. It was also held that the orders which substantially affect the rights of the parties or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be termed as ‘interlocutory’. It was further held that an order under Section 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code (attachment of the property in dispute) can never be embraced by the term “Interlocutory order”. In the Madras case, the learned single Judge held relying on RajKapoor v. State (Delhi Admn.) RajKapoor v. State (Delhi Admn.) (1980) 1 S.C.J. 528: (1980) MLJ. (Crl.) 439: (1980) 1 S.C.R. 1081 : (1980) 1 S.C.C. 43 :A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 258 that in between interlocutory orders and final orders, there is tertium quid (there is more than an interlocutory order and less than a final disposal) and therefore the order complained of, namely, summoning of a witness as a Court witness even before any evidence was adduced is “more than an interlocutory order” because it completely disrupts the normal procedure of trial of case…”. 7. Applying these principles of law to the facts of our case, it is clear to me that the shutting out of secondary evidence by the trial Court substantially affects the rights of parties, and therefore, calls for interference by this Court. As pointed out at the outset, after a long lapse of time, the prosecution case was staring completion and the Investigating Officer of the C.E.I. was in the witness box. The offences complained of against the accused are very serious in nature involving Foreign Exchange Regulation Act , Customs Act and conspiracy and cheating the banks in India and Foreign Countries. The prosecution wanted to let in secondary evidence in the shape of certain documents which are in the custody of persons out of the reach of this Court. It other words, these documents are in Eden, Kuwait and other foreign countries. The prosecution wanted to let in secondary evidence in the shape of certain documents which are in the custody of persons out of the reach of this Court. It other words, these documents are in Eden, Kuwait and other foreign countries. The Investigating Officer says, he lad gone there, took photostat copies of those documents with the permission of the concerned authorities and now seeks to let in secondary evidence regarding the existence, condition and contents of the documents. Section 65 of the Evidence Act clearly permits the same case when the original is shown or appears to be in the possession of any person out of tie reach of the proceeds of Court. Therefore, the position is this. The documents sought to be marked are photo copies taken from the original in the custody of the concerned departments of the Government of Eden and the Government of Kuwait and the Investigating Officer swears that he has seen the originals during the course of investigation and could get only the photostat copies of the same. There isno reason why they should not be received in evidence under Section 65 of the Evidence Act. It must be remembered that the originals are beyond the process of the Court, and therefore, the prosecution is entitled to let in secondary evidence by producing the photostat copies of the originals upon the evidence of the Investigating Officer. To expect the prosecution to prove the execution of the originals is to ask for an impossibility and that is where Section 65 of the Evidence Act comes into play. 8. The result of my discussion is that the order of the trial Court is not a mere interlocutory order, and therefore, the application is maintainable, and it is hereby held that the documents are admissible in evidence under Section 65 of the Evidence Act. The revision petition is allowed. 9. Learned Counsel for the respondent represents that the petitioner has not argued the question of admissibility of the documents and, therefore, the matter may be heard on that point. Hence, post the matter for being heard on 19.10.1984. This petition having been posted for being mentioned on Friday the 30th day of November, 1984 in the presence of Mr. Kannappa Rajendran, Government Advocate (Crl. Side) on behalf of the petitioner and of Mr. Hence, post the matter for being heard on 19.10.1984. This petition having been posted for being mentioned on Friday the 30th day of November, 1984 in the presence of Mr. Kannappa Rajendran, Government Advocate (Crl. Side) on behalf of the petitioner and of Mr. G.Gopalaswami, Advocate for the first respondent and the second respondent not appearing in person or by Advocate and having stood over for consideration till this day, the Court made the following order. 10. Heard both sides. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of the revision petition alone were argued and that the question of admissibility of the documents was not argued. Therefore, the learned Counsel prays that an opportunity may be given to him to argue the question of admissibility of the documents and that too by a different Judge. There are no merits in this contention. The maintainability of the petition involves the consideration of the admissibility of the documents which has been rejected by the trial Court. In other words, the question was whether the order passed by the trial Court was an interlocutory order or a final order, and in that context, the admissibility or otherwise of the documents has also been considered incidentally and a finding has been recorded. It will not be correct to contend that the argument regarding the admissibility of the documents has to be advanced separately since they both cannot be dissociated. Again, the argument that the order of this Court in the main Criminal Revision Case No.528 of 1978 in ab initio void is wholly untenable especially in view of Section 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code. V.K. ----- Revision Petition allowed.