ORDER B.L. Yadav, J. - In these fourteen connected writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioners have prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 15th July, 1975 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation refusing to condone the delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act whereas the Consolidation Officer by his order dated 21st Feb., 1974 has condoned the delay in filing the objection by the petitioner the State of U.P. under S. 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). These fourteen writ petitions involve common questions of law and facts and hence they are being disposed of by a common judgment for the sake of convenience. 2. To be very short, the essential facts are these. Raja Padamjit Singh and a Satya Jit Singh of District Shahjahanpur were the original tenure-holders of the land in dispute. The proceedings under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Ceiling Act for the purpose of brevity) were started against them and about 500 acres of land was declared as surplus by the judgment and order dated 30th June, 1966. On 24th Dec. 1966 the possession of the land was taken by the State of U.P., the petitioner in all the fourteen writ petitions. Objections of the tenure-holders were dismissed. Thereafter the appeals were also dismissed by the judgment and order dated 18th April, 1968. Thereupon the contesting respondents preferred Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2335 of 1968 and other connected writ petitions which were dismissed on 21st May, 1969. The tenure-holders preferred applications for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court which were also dismissed. In this way the judgments and orders of the Prescribed Authority declaring about 500 acres of land as surplus became final in the litigation fought up to the Supreme Court. 3. Thereafter notice under S. 4 of the Act was issued placing those 500 acres of land under the consolidation of holdings operations. On 30th Aug. 1969 publication under S. 9 of the Act was issued. On 10th Feb. 1970 objections were filed by the State of U.P.. the petitioners in all the fourteen writ petitions. 3. Thereafter notice under S. 4 of the Act was issued placing those 500 acres of land under the consolidation of holdings operations. On 30th Aug. 1969 publication under S. 9 of the Act was issued. On 10th Feb. 1970 objections were filed by the State of U.P.. the petitioners in all the fourteen writ petitions. But after the notice under S. 9(1) of the Act, the limitation for filing objections is twenty one days on the receipt of the notice or the publication under S. 9(1) of the Act, as the case may be, and as the objections were filed after twenty one days, hence the necessity arose to file applications under S. 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in preferring the objections under S. 9(2) of the Act. Therefore, these applications for condonation of delay were made on 10th Feb. 1970. By S. 53-B of the Act the provisions of S. 5 of the Limitation Act have been made applicable to the applications, appeals and revisions and other proceedings under the Act or the Rules made thereunder. In filing these objections however, the delay was only of three weeks. 4. It is also pertinent to mention that the contesting respondents were shown as tenure- holders of the disputed land and notices in C. H. Form 5 were issued to them showing them as tenure-holders. In the applications under S. 5 of the Limitation Act the delay was sought to be explained on behalf of the petitioners. The Additional Collector, Shahjahanpur filed applications stating therein that the land in dispute had been declared as surplus in the proceedings under the Ceiling Act and has vested in the petitioners and the objections under S. 9(2) of the Act could not be filed within time as the names of the erstwhile tenure-holders continued to be recorded in the revenue papers even though the land was declared as surplus under the provisions of the Ceiling Act and those judgments and orders have become final and were upheld even by the Supreme Court. The tenure-holders, accordingly, are the persons recorded having no right or interest over the land in dispute and the petitioners have also obtained possession over the land declared surplus. Therefore, the names of the tenure- holders in the revenue records were fictitiously recorded without any basis. The tenure-holders, accordingly, are the persons recorded having no right or interest over the land in dispute and the petitioners have also obtained possession over the land declared surplus. Therefore, the names of the tenure- holders in the revenue records were fictitiously recorded without any basis. It was alleged that the entries of the names of the recorded tenure-holders in the revenue papers came to the knowledge of the authorities on 8th Feb. 1970 and after following the procedure prescribed for filing objections on behalf of the State of U.P. objections were filed. It was accordingly prayed that delay in filing the objections may be condoned as the same was not deliberate, and there was no negligence on the part of the petitioners. 5. The aforesaid applications under S. 5 of the Limitation Act filed on behalf of the petitioners were contested on behalf of the contesting respondents who alleged that no grounds for condonation of delay were made out and the objections filed under S. 9(2) of the Act deserved to be dismissed as time- barred. Counter-affidavits were also filed in support of the replies of the contesting respondents against the applications of the petitioners for condonation of delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. To these counter- affidavits rejoinder affidavits were filed on behalf of the petitioners. In para 9 of the affidavit filed on behalf of the State it was asserted that even though the land in dispute has been declared as surplus by the Prescribed Authority and the possession has already been taken on behalf of the State but the entries in the records of rights have not been corrected in pursuance of the orders of the Ceiling Authorities which were upheld even by this Court as also by the Supreme Court. The mistake of continuing the names of the tenure-holders over the land which was declared surplus and possession whereof was also taken by the State, came to the knowledge of the petitioners when the Additional Collector (Executive) made an inspection for the first time on 8th Feb. 1970. The stand taken by the petitioners was accordingly that the period of limitation should be counted from the date of knowledge. 1970. The stand taken by the petitioners was accordingly that the period of limitation should be counted from the date of knowledge. In any case, it was prayed that the delay was not caused on account of any negligence but on account of the fact that the names of the recorded tenure- holders continued in the revenue papers even though the judgments in the proceedings under the Ceiling Act had become final against them even up to this Court as also the Supreme Court, and possession was also taken by the State. Hence the delay was not deliberate and once the earlier judgments and orders of the Ceiling Authorities, the High Court and the Supreme Court have become final before the notification under S. 4 of the Act was issued there was no necessity also to get the names of the tenure-holders expunged nor was there any necessity for any declaration of the rights of the tenure-holders as it was also held that the land was surplus and has vested in the State. It was prayed by the petitioners that the delay in filing the objections under S. 9(2) of the Act may he condoned and the objections may be treated to he within time. 6. After considering the material evidence on record of the case the Consolidation Officer has condoned the delay in filing the objections by the petitioners. The revisions were filed before the Deputy Director of Consolidation who has upheld the orders of the Consolidation Officer. Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 3616 of 1971, Chamba Singh v. State of U.P. and others connected writ petitions were filed in this Court which were allowed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice C.S.P. Singh by his common judgment and order dated 20th Feb. 1973 : (reported in AIR 1973 All 552 ) and the cases were remanded to the Consolidation Officer to consider the applications of the petitioners dated 10th June, 1970 afresh and to decide the matter according to law. Thereafter the Consolidation Officer, Shahjahanpur by his judgment and order dated 21st Feb. 1974 again condoned the delay holding the sufficient cause was made out as explanations given by the petitioners were convincing. The applications under S. 5 of the Limitation Act were allowed subject to payment of Rs. 10/- as cost in each case and the parties were directed to appear on 12th Mar. 1974 again condoned the delay holding the sufficient cause was made out as explanations given by the petitioners were convincing. The applications under S. 5 of the Limitation Act were allowed subject to payment of Rs. 10/- as cost in each case and the parties were directed to appear on 12th Mar. 1974 (Annexure 5' to the writ petition.) The contesting respondents preferred revisions before the Deputy Director of Consolidation who by a common judgment and order dated 15-7-75 (Annexure 6 to the petition) allowed all the revisions and set aside the orders of the Consolidation Officer holding that no ground for condonation of delay was made out and all the object ions of the petitioners were rejected as time-barred. It is against this judgment and order that the present fourteen writ petitions have been preferred in this Court. 7. Shri N. P. Misra, the learned Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the petitioners, has urged that the delay was sufficiently explained and sufficient cause was made out. The judgment and orders of the Ceiling Authorities declaring the land in dispute as surplus became final. These judgments and orders were even upheld by this Court as also by the Supreme Court. But by mistake the names of the tenure-holders continued in the revenue records and after the commencement of the consolidation operations the names of the recorded tenure-holders continued and this fact could not come to the notice of the Additional Collector on behalf of the petitioners and as soon as it came to the knowledge of the Additional Collector (Executive) when he made inspection for the first time on 8th Feb. 1970. immediately thereafter the objections were filed and applications for condonation of delay were also filed on behalf of the petitioners. In these circumstances the delay in preferring objections under S. 9A(2) of the Act could not be said to be deliberate. He accordingly urged that the discretion was correctly exercised by the Consolidation Officer in condoning the delay and those findings of the Consolidation Officer could not be said to be perverse nor they necessitated interference by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in the exercise of his revisional powers under S. 48 of the Act. He accordingly urged that the discretion was correctly exercised by the Consolidation Officer in condoning the delay and those findings of the Consolidation Officer could not be said to be perverse nor they necessitated interference by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in the exercise of his revisional powers under S. 48 of the Act. Sri Misra has relied upon State of West Bengal v. Administrator, Howarh Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749 , State of U.P. v. Bahadur Singh, AIR 1983 SC 845 , Shanti Prasad Gupta v. Dy. Director Camp at Meerut, 1984 Rev Dec. 382 (SC). Data Ram v. State of U.P., 1979 All LJ 637. Ramji Dass v. Mohan Singh, 1978 All Rent. Cas. 496 (1) (SC), Gopal v. Dy. Director of Consolidation of Varanasi, 1976 All LR 770. and Shanti Prasad Gupta v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Camp at Meerut, 1984 Rev. Dec. 382 (SC): 8. Sri R. N. Singh and Sri P. S. Nigam, Advocates. appearing for the contesting respondents urged that the impugned order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation was perfectly correct. There was no error of law apparent on the face of the record of the case and the Deputy Director of Consolidation has correctly exercised his revisional jurisdiction in not condoning the delay. The order of the Consolidation Officer being erroneous in law has correctly been set aside and the delay has correctly not been condoned. In matters of condonation of delay the State could not be treated separately and differently from any private individual and the same standard should be applied as applicable to the private individuals. It was further urged on their behalf that even though there may be some merits in the case, that could not be made a basis for .condonation of delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. In any view of the matter it was urged by them that it was a discretion exercised by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in dismissing the application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act and even though that discretion so exercised may be erroneous but that does not call for any interference in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the respondents have placed reliance on State of West Bengal v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749 and State of Gujarat v. Syed Mohd. The learned counsel for the respondents have placed reliance on State of West Bengal v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749 and State of Gujarat v. Syed Mohd. Baquir-El-Edroos, AIR 1981 SC 1921 . Reliance was also placed on Ibrahim v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, 1973 Rev. Dec. 211 : AIR 1973 All 378 , Sohan v. Abdul Hamid Khan, AIR 1976 All 159 , Mst. Kailashi v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, 1972 All LJ 29, and Gaon Sabha of Rakesh, Ghazipur v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1982 (2) SCC 385 . 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the cases. The short question that falls for consideration in these petitions is as to whether sufficient cause was made out for condonation of delay by the Consolidation Officer in filing the objections by the petitioners and if so whether the Deputy Director of Consolidation was justified in interfering with the findings recorded by the Consolidation Officer condoning the delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. The statutory provision of S. 5 of the Limitation Act having bearing on the question in so far it is relevant is set out below:- "5. Any appeal or application ..................... may he admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making such application within such period." 10. It is well known that the expression 'sufficient cause' has not been defined. It means a cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of S. 5 of the Limitation Act. In order to ascertain whether sufficient cause has been made out, it has to be seen whether it is a bona fide cause 'inasmuch as anything shall not be taken to be done bona fide or in good faith which is not done with due care and attention. Subject to this test I am of the view that the expression 'sufficient cause' should receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. No negligence nor inaction nor lack of bona fides is imputable to the party for the delay in preferring the appeal or making an application, which would think, constitute sufficient cause. 11. Subject to this test I am of the view that the expression 'sufficient cause' should receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. No negligence nor inaction nor lack of bona fides is imputable to the party for the delay in preferring the appeal or making an application, which would think, constitute sufficient cause. 11. In the case of State of West Bengal v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749 relied upon by both the parties it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the expression 'sufficient cause' should receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. It has, however, been held on page 755 (para 27) that expression 'sufficient cause' cannot he construed too liberally merely because the party in default is a Government. But in para 28 thereof it has been held that the learned Solicitor General appearing for the State of West Bengal did not contend that the State must be treated , differently than a private individual. On the other hand, the contention for the State was, in that case, that the reasons given by the appellant which according to him will establish sufficient cause have not at all been adverted to much less considered by the High Court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the learned Solicitor General was perfectly justified in the circumstances of the case. In that case reliance was placed on Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361 . The relevant observation is extracted below (Para 29) : "In construing S. 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words. when the period of limitation has expired the decree- holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and his legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown, discretion is given to the Court to condone the delay and admit the appeal. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown, discretion is given to the Court to condone the delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chattappan, (1890) ILR 13 Mad 269. "Section 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words 'sufficient cause' receiving liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence, no inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable'." 12. In the aforesaid case the view has been clearly taken that in favour of the State the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be construed too liberally and further that 'sufficient cause should be interpreted in a liberal way so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party. 13. In the State of U.P. v. Bahadur Singh, AIR 1983 SC 845 (supra) relied upon by the petitioner their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held on page 846 that in a proceeding under the ceiling law the departmental authority has to be apprised of adverse decision, and further decision has to be taken whether the case required to be taken to higher Court. Not that the departmental authorities charged with a duty to implement the law should not be vigilant; but one aspect cannot be overlooked that a departmental authority may delay the moving of higher Court for oblique motives and the public interest may suffer if such cause is thrown out merely on the ground of some delay which is also explainable. In view of this observation, the delay in filing the writ petition was condoned. It may be remembered that this is a case where the delay was caused in filing the writ petition. However, this much is clear that on behalf of the Government there are a number of difficulties in filing the writ petition or preferring an appeal or making an application. It may be remembered that this is a case where the delay was caused in filing the writ petition. However, this much is clear that on behalf of the Government there are a number of difficulties in filing the writ petition or preferring an appeal or making an application. It is only that the departmental authority has to be apprised of adverse position of the cause of action and further decision has to be taken whether the case was one in which proceedings should be initiated at all. In the instant case also as the authorities were continuing pairavi on behalf of the State of U.P. successfully under the Ceiling Act and about 500 acres of land was declared as surplus. Hence there remained nothing to be done on behalf of the State after taking possession of the land declared surplus. But in the instant case publication under S. 9 of the Act was made after these decisions of the ceiling authorities. It was not that the inordinate delay was indicative of the lack of bona fides nor the same was indicative of the inaction or negligence when the objections were filed just with a delay of three weeks inasmuch as publication under S. 9 of the Act was issued on 30-8-1969 and just on 12-11-69 objections were filed by the petitioners. Applications for condonation of delay were also filed. 14. In the instant case after the remand by this Court the Consolidation Officer considered the matter afresh in the light of the directions given by this Court and the Consolidation Officer, Shahjahanpur by his order dated 21-2-1974 (Annexure 5) arrived at the following conclusion : "In my opinion, reasons given by the learned State Counsel are very convincing, so in the interest of justice condone the delay and allow the delay condonation application subject to payment of Rs. 10/- per case." This indicates that the consolidation officer has applied his mind to the cause assigned for the delay in the background of the facts that the ceiling authorities declared the land in dispute to be surplus and even the recorded tenure-holders preferred petitions in this Court which were decided against them and ultimately special leave petitions filed before the Supreme Court also failed. The possession over the plots in dispute declared surplus was also taken by the State of U.P. 15. The possession over the plots in dispute declared surplus was also taken by the State of U.P. 15. The revisions were preferred in the instant case by the contesting respondents and the same were allowed holding that no ground for condonation was made out. The Deputy Director of Consolidation appears to be of the view that the Consolidation Officer has worked under the impression that liberal view in the matter is taken because Government property is involved, whereas the Deputy Director of Consolidation has lost sight of the fact that the Consolidation Officer has also applied his mind as is clear from page 66 of the paper book) which shows that the contention of the ceiling department was that the land in dispute belonged to the ceiling department as the proceedings had become final against the contesting respondents and possession has also been taken by the State of U.P. over the land declared surplus and the names of the tenure-holders were wrongly recorded thereon. It was also stated by the ceiling authorities that they have no knowledge of the publication of the village under S. 9 of the Act as the cases were conducted at Sitapur and not at Shahjahanpur and they have no knowledge of the publication at all and no notices were given to the State of U.P. In this connection the department, therefore, wanted that it should be given benefit of S. 5 of the Limitation Act. The Deputy Director of Consolidation erred in holding that the Consolidation Officer has condoned the delay applying the principle of the sufficient cause too liberally simply because the delay was caused on behalf of the State of U.P. 16. Now the cases relied upon the learned counsel for the petitioners may be examined. In Gopal v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Varanasi, 1976 All LR 770 (supra) it has been held on page 774 that this Court is not slow to interfere even with the orders passed by the lower authorities in the exercise of their discretion if they have travelled beyond the limits of their jurisdiction or exercised it arbitrarily or unreasonably or to have failed to apply their minds to the merits of the application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. Considerations of equity are importunate in their cry that a party benefiting from the sympathetic orders of a Court should not be crucified on the altar of technicalities. Nevertheless, the law dictates its own restraints which neither the Courts can ignore nor equity overcome. Even in the domain of discretionary powers the Courts must be guided by settled legal principles and not by a desire to distribute bounties. The petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution have been allowed by this Court where the condonation of delay has been arbitrarily refused and the authority concerned has not passed a judicial order but acted mechanically or arbitrarily. It is thus clear from the aforesaid case that if the discretion has been exercised mechanically and arbitrarily in refusing to condone the delay, the same can be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution. 17. In Ramji Das v. Mohan Singh, 1978 All Rent Cas. 496 11 (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the discretion should be exercised by the Courts or authorities in such a way that the parties may get an opportunity to fight out a case on merits and not with a view to shut out the opportunity for fighting the case on merits. Further in Shansi Prasad Gupta v. Dy. Director of Consolidation Camp at Meerut, 1984 Rev. Dec. 382 (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held under para 3 of the judgment as stated below : "Whether or not there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay, is a question of fact dependent upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case, and the proposition is well-settled that when order has been passed under S. 5, Limitation Act by the lower Court in the exercise of its discretion allowing or refusing an application to extend them, it cannot be interfered with in revision, unless the lower Court has acted with material irregularity or contrary to law or has come to that conclusion on no evidence. We are aware that the powers of the Director under S. 48 of the Act are wider than those mentioned in S. 115 of the Civil P.C. Even so, the Director cannot lightly interfere with the discretion of Consolidation Officer. unless the order sought to be revised is clearly erroneous or is likely to cause gross miscarriage of justice. We are aware that the powers of the Director under S. 48 of the Act are wider than those mentioned in S. 115 of the Civil P.C. Even so, the Director cannot lightly interfere with the discretion of Consolidation Officer. unless the order sought to be revised is clearly erroneous or is likely to cause gross miscarriage of justice. Such was not the case here ..........................The order of the Consolidation Officer holding that there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay extending time under S. 5. Limitation Act did not suffer from any material irregulairty. or impropriety or illegality, the Deputy Director of Consolidation was not justified in overturning the same in the exercise of his powers under Section 48 of the Act." 18. In view of the two decisions referred to above, it is abundantly clear that in case a discretion has been exercised by the Consolidation Officer in condoning the delay, the same cannot he interfered with in revision by the Deputy Director of Consolidation unless the Consolidation Officer has acted with material irregularity or contrary to law or has come to that conclusion on no evidence. Even though the powers of the Deputy Director of Consolidation under S. 48 of the Act are wider as compared to powers of this Court under S. 115 of the Civil P.C. nevertheless, the Deputy Director of Consolidation cannot lightly interfere with the discretion of the Consolidation Officer unless the order sought to be revised is clearly erroneous or is likely to cause miscarriage of justice. In the instant case the contesting tenure- holders were unsuccessful all through before the ceiling authorities, before this Court and even before the Supreme Court and the land in dispute was declared as surplus. But by mistake of the revenue authorities the names of the tenure-holders continued to he recorded over the land in dispute and when the publication under S. 9 of the Act was made, some delay was caused i.e. three weeks in preferring objections under S. 9A(2) of the Act as the authorities made investigation and came to learn about the orders passed in the proceedings under the Ceiling Act and thereafter it was decided to contest the publication or notice issued under S. 9(1) of the Act. Even in this way the Consolidation Officer was justified in being conscious about the background of the litigation and how the delay was caused. Even in this way the Consolidation Officer was justified in being conscious about the background of the litigation and how the delay was caused. The order of the Consolidation Officer condoning the delay cannot be said to he erroneous nor the same was likely to cause gross miscarriage of justice. 19. State of West Bengal v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality AIR 1972 SC 749 (supra) was the case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as by the contesting respondents. In this case it was held that there should he no discrimination between the State and the private litigant in the matter of condonation of delay. In the instant case, there was no discrimination made with the private individual nor the State was placed on better footing. From the ratio of the case of State of U.P. v. Bahadur. AIR 1983 SC 845 (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners it is clear that there may be so many difficulties and the compelling reasons for the State authorities not to move very quickly as at a number of stages information has to be sent to the authorities concerned for making up their mind and thereafter a final decision is taken. In view of these facts the authorities on behalf of the State cannot act so quickly as a private litigant can. Similar view has been taken in Gaon Sabha of Rakesh, Ghazipur v. Deputy Director of Consolidation 1982 (2) SCC 385 . 20. In Sonah v. Abdul Hamid Khan, AIR 1976 All 159 (supra) it was held that it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations, namely, expiration of the limitation for making an appeal gives rights in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties and this legal right should not be light-heartedly disturbed and if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown, the applicant is not entitled as a matter of right for condonation of delay. The discretion is given to the Court to condone the delay and admit the appeal. But there is no quarrel with the principles of law laid in this case. The discretion is given to the Court to condone the delay and admit the appeal. But there is no quarrel with the principles of law laid in this case. But under the facts and circumstances of the case I am of the view that the Consolidation Officer has considered the cause for the delay and he has correctly appreciated the evidence on record and he was justified in condoning the delay, whereas the Deputy Director of Consolidation erred in reversing the judgment even though the discretion exercised by the Consolidation Officer was not perverse nor it was based on no evidence. Ibrahim v. Dy. Director of Consolidation 1973 Rev. Dec. 211 : AIR 1973 All 378 (supra) was a case in which it was held by this Court that if the Consolidation Officer has exercised his jurisdiction in condoning the delay in an arbitrary manner or upon a ground which is not material, the Deputy Director of Consolidation can interfere with the order. But in the instant case the exercise of discretion by the Consolidation Officer in condoning the delay cannot he said to be arbitrary nor it can he said that it was based on a ground which was not material. Hence this case appears to be of no assistance to the learned counsel for the respondents. Further in State of Gujarat v. Syed Mohd. Baquir-EI-Edroos, AIR 1981 SC 1921 (supra) the Supreme Court has held in connection with an application under O. 22 R. 4. C.P.C. that no application for substitution having been made within ninety days nor any application for setting aside the automatic abatement having been made within sixty days following that date (Art. 121 of the Limitation Act) the application had actually been made in that behalf which was itself barred by time by more than three months and a half. In that case the clerk of the learned counsel for the respondents was served with a copy of the application on 23rd Feb. 1979 and no reason good or bad or indifferent was assigned for the failure of the counsel right from 20th Feb. 1979 up to 29th August, 1979 to move the Court either for having legal representative brought on record of the case or for having got the abatement set aside which had taken place. 1979 and no reason good or bad or indifferent was assigned for the failure of the counsel right from 20th Feb. 1979 up to 29th August, 1979 to move the Court either for having legal representative brought on record of the case or for having got the abatement set aside which had taken place. It was held by the Supreme Court that in law (his knowledge of) the death of the respondent must be attributed to the appellant State and his negligence in not moving the application in time must be deemed to be that of the appellant. Under these facts the Supreme Court held that there was no good reason for condonation of delay and the appeal abated and lastly it was dismissed as a consequence thereof. The facts of that case are entirely different from the facts of the case before me. Hence the case of State of Gujarat v. Syed Mohd. Baquir-El-Edroos (supra) is not indistinguishable. 21. In Gaon Sabha of Rakesh Ghazipur v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, ( 1982 (2) SCC 385 ) (supra) it was held that the merits of the case need not be looked into while condoning the delay or while considering the fact as to whether sufficient cause has been made out or not. In the instant case the merits of the case have not been taken into account. Rather a reference has been made out that the earlier Ceiling Act litigation was decided in favour of the State and the land in dispute was declared as surplus. The orders of the ceiling authorities were maintained by this Court as also by the Supreme Court. These proceedings were decided at Sitapur and not at Shahjahanpur. Hence the delay was caused as the facts came to the knowledge of the Additional Collector (Executive) very late while he was making an investigation on 8th Feb. 1970 and the objections were filed within two days from that date. The delay was taken to be sufficiently explained and was accordingly condoned by the Consolidation Officer. It was not a fact that the merit of the case was made the basis for condonation of the delay by the Consolidation Officer. In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh, AIR 1984 SC 1744 the facts in brief were that in an eviction suit the landlord made an application for withdrawal of the rent deposited by the tenant. It was not a fact that the merit of the case was made the basis for condonation of the delay by the Consolidation Officer. In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh, AIR 1984 SC 1744 the facts in brief were that in an eviction suit the landlord made an application for withdrawal of the rent deposited by the tenant. The application for fixation of standard rent by tenant was also pending and the tenant had also applied for fixation of the interim rent. An order for payment of interim rent at the agreed rate was found to be interpolated. An appeal against that order was filed with an application for condoning the delay. The application for condonation of the delay was dismissed by the District Judge as also by the learned single Judge of the High Court. The matter was taken to the Supreme Court and their Lordships of the Supreme Court held (under Para 27 page 1754) that : "A just and convincing cause wholly sufficient to condone the delay was thus made out. More so because failure of the learned district judge and the learned single judge of the High Court to condone delay resulted in the gross miscarriage of justice inasmuch as the tenant lost protection of the Act for his failure to comply with a non est injudicious order, which was a nullity in the eye of law. In this background we find it difficult to uphold the view of the learned district judge and the High Court." 22. Similarly in the instant case also the delay was sufficiently explained and condoned. The contesting respondents having lost the case before the Prescribed Authority under the Ceiling Act and the land in dispute having been declared as surplus, this order became final and was finally upheld by the Supreme Court. By no stretch of imagination it could be assumed that the respondents have any rights in the land in dispute. But by mistake of the revenue authorities the names of the respondents continued. By no stretch of imagination it could be assumed that the respondents have any rights in the land in dispute. But by mistake of the revenue authorities the names of the respondents continued. When the land in dispute was brought under the consolidation operations by publication under S. 9(1) of the Act the fact could not come to the notice of the authorities and it is only when the Additional Collector (Executive) made investigation that the decision of the Ceiling authorities came to the knowledge as also the fact of the commencement of the consolidation operations, thereafter the decision was taken by the relevant authorities to File objections along with an application for condonation of delay. In these circumstances, I am of the view that in case delay was not condoned, the petitioners would be deprived of their rights under the provisions of the Act even though under the Ceiling Act the respondents have lost all their rights and by no stretch of imagination it could be assumed that they can get any rights. The delay being otherwise sufficiently explained the Consolidation Officer was justified in condoning the delay. As held in the case of O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh (supra). in case the delay was not condoned this would lead to gross miscarriage of justice inasmuch as the petitioners would lose the protection of the Act. 23. Under the circumstances. it cannot he said that the order of the Consolidation Officer is illegal and the same is based on no evidence. There was no justification for the Deputy Director of Consolidation for making an interference and is held by the Supreme Court in the case of Shanti Prasad Gupta v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, 1984 Rev. Dec. 382 (supra) unless the order of the Consolidation Officer sought to he revised was clearly erroneous or was likely to cause miscarriage of justice. The Deputy Director of Consolidation cannot interfere in revision. There cannot he said to he any material irregularity in "the order of the Consolidation Officer. I am of the considered opinion that the Deputy Director of Consolidation was not justified in interfering with the order of the Consolidation Officer condoning the delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. 24. The Deputy Director of Consolidation cannot interfere in revision. There cannot he said to he any material irregularity in "the order of the Consolidation Officer. I am of the considered opinion that the Deputy Director of Consolidation was not justified in interfering with the order of the Consolidation Officer condoning the delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. 24. In view of the discussions made hereinbefore, the impugned order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 15-7-1975 (Annexure 6') is erroneous in law and deserves to be quashed by issuing a writ of (sic). 25. In the result, all the petitions succeed and are allowed. The order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 15th July, 1975 is quashed. Under the circumstances of the case there shall however be no order as to costs. The proceedings under Ss. 9 and 9-A(2) of the Act could not be decided on merits for the last fifteen years. The ends of justice, accordingly require that the Consolidation Officer would take immediate steps to decide the cases on merits as expeditiously as possible.