JUDGMENT - DHABE H.W., J.: - These two civil revisions which involve a common question of law, can be conveniently disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Briefly, the facts are that the applicant was the tenant of the suit premises which partly belonged to the non-applicants in Civil Revision No. 1209 of 1984 and partly belonged to the non-applicants in Civil Revision No. 1210 of 1984. Since the landlords involved were different, the non-applicants in these two revisions, filed two separate applications under Clause 13 of the C.P. Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (for short “the Rent Control Order”) seeking permission of the Rent Controller to terminate the tenancy of the applicant-tenant. Both the rent control cases were disposed of by a common order passed by the learned Rent Controller. The learned Rent Controller in rent control cases filed by the non-applicants in these revisions, granted permission to the non-applicants to terminate the tenancy of the applicant. The applicant preferred an appeal and also a writ petition in this Court, but without success. 3. The non-applicants in these two revisions gave separate quit notices to the applicant-tenant in accordance with the provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and thereafter, filed the instant suits for eviction, arrears of rent, mesne profits in respect of the tenanted portions belonging to them. The applicant by filing its written statements in the said suits resisted the claims of the non-applicants therein. The said suits were, however, decreed by the learned Court of Small Causes. Being aggrieved, the applicant has preferred the instant revisions against the judgments and decrees of the Court below in the said suits. 4. The only question canvassed before me on behalf of the applicant is that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Chhotelal Pyarelal Partnership Firm and others v. Shikarchand )1, reported in 1984 Mh.L.J. 839, since the applicant-partnership firm was necessary to be sued by joining all its partners, the orders passed by the Rent Controller granting permission in the absence of the partners of the applicant-firm being joined as parties were nullities. The submission, therefore, is that since the suit notices in those suits were invalid being preceded by invalid orders of the Rent Controller, the instant suits were not maintainable and therefore, the decrees passed therein were illegal and invalid. The submission, therefore, is that since the suit notices in those suits were invalid being preceded by invalid orders of the Rent Controller, the instant suits were not maintainable and therefore, the decrees passed therein were illegal and invalid. It is, however, urged on behalf of the non-applicants/landlords that the orders passed against the applicant-firm without its partners being joined as parties in the rent control proceedings were not nullities but were merely irregularities. It is, therefore, urged that the quit notices given in the instant suits were legal and valid and the judgement and decrees passed in the suits cannot, therefore, be set aside. 5. In considering the rival contentions, it is first necessary to understand the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case cited supra. An objection was raised in the said case that an application under the Rent Control Order against a registered partnership firm, without its partners being joined as parties, was not maintainable. The submission was hat it was only in view of the provisions of Order 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure that a registered partnership firm could sue and could be sued in its own firm name and since the provisions of Order 30 of the Civil Procedure Code were not applicable to the rent control proceedings, it was necessary to sue the registered partnership firm by joining all its partners in the said proceedings because the partnership firm was not a legal entity and therefore, in the absence of the statutory provision like Order 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the Rent Control Order, it could not maintain a suit in its own name or could be sued in its own name. The Supreme court while upholding the objection raised on behalf of the partnership firm in the said case, held that the firm is not a legal entity but is a compendious name for the partners constituting it and apart from Order 30 of the Civil Procedure Code, it could not sue or be sued in the firm name. It, however, further held that non-joinder of the partners of the firm was a case of mere misdescription of the party which could be corrected at any stage of the proceedings. It, however, further held that non-joinder of the partners of the firm was a case of mere misdescription of the party which could be corrected at any stage of the proceedings. Accordingly in the said case, an amendment to the title clause of the original application under the Rent Control Order was allowed and the partners were allowed to be joined as parties in the said proceedings. 6. It is clear from the above judgment of the Supreme Court that if a registered partnership firm is sued in the firm name in the rent control proceedings, it is a case of mere misdescription of party and therefore the institution of proceedings itself would not be bad or a nullity. It is, therefore, urged on behalf of the non-applicants/landlords that in a case of misdescription, the orders passed by the Competent Authority would not be nullities. In support of his submission, the learned Counsel for the non-applicants/landlords has pressed into service the principle incorporated in section 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 99 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that no decree shall be reversed, or substantially varied or be remanded in appeal on account of any misjoinder or non-joinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in any suit, not affecting the merits of the case or affecting the jurisdiction of the Court. It is his submission that the distinction drawn therein between an action which amounts to an “irregularity” and an action which amounts to a “nullity” recognises a principle of universal application and even though section 99 of the Civil Procedure Code in terms may not be applicable, the principle enshrined therein would be applicable to the rent control proceedings also. In support of this above submission, the learned Counsel has drawn my attention to a decision of the Privy Council in the case of (Mohammad Hussain Khan and others v. Babu Kishva Nandan Bahai)2, A.I.R. 1937 P.C. 233 in which although the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code were not applicable to the proceedings before the Privy Council, the principle in section 99 of the Civil Procedure Code was invoked. 7. 7. It is true that the principle enshrined in section 99 of the Civil Procedure Code is a principle of universal application, and the order which suffer from merely an irregularity, cannot be held to be nullity if it would affect the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. It cannot be said in the instant case that the non-joinder of partners individually has affected the merits of the case because the rent control proceedings were contested by the partners without objection about their joinder upto the stage of the High Court. As regards the question of lack of jurisdiction, the learned Counsel for the non-applicant has drawn my attention to the decision of this Court in the case of (Erandol Taluka Gramodyog Utpadak Sahakari Society v. M/s. Sunil Waste Corporation)3, 1970 Mh.L.J. 923. An objection to the execution of the decree was raised in that case on the ground that under section 164 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act a statutory notice before filing the suit was mandatory and in its absence, the decree was a nullity. This Court held that the said objection which related to the maintainability of the suit, was not the one relating to the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to pass the decree and therefore, the said objection to the execution of the decree was not maintainable. The question therefore to be considered would be whether in a case of misdescription, the objection is one relating to the jurisdiction of the Court to pass an order or decree against such a party. In the case of (Kuldip Thakur v. Sheomangal Prasad Thakur and another)4, A.I.R. 1957 Patna 4, the Patna High Court held that in a suit filed by an unregistered firm in its own name, the decree passed in its favour was not nullity. The above decision of the Patna High Court fully supports the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the non-applicants. 8. In appreciating the contention raised on behalf of the non-applicants, it may be seen that according to the concept of the partnership firm, the persons who are individually called partners, are collectively called a “firm” and the name under which their business is carried on is called a firm name. Such a firm is not a legal entity. 8. In appreciating the contention raised on behalf of the non-applicants, it may be seen that according to the concept of the partnership firm, the persons who are individually called partners, are collectively called a “firm” and the name under which their business is carried on is called a firm name. Such a firm is not a legal entity. However, when a firm' name is used, it is the only convenient method for denoting the partners who compose the firm at the time when that name is used and a plaintiff who sues the partners in the name of their firm in truth sues them individually, just as much as if he had set out all their names. See (Western National Bank of City of New York v. Perez Triana and Co.)5, 1891(1) Q.B. 304. The above concept of partnership is referred to with approval by the Supreme Court in the case of (Her Highness Maharani Mandalsa Devi v. Ramnarain Private Ltd.)6, 1966 Mh.L.J. 273. As already pointed out, a proceeding instituted against the firm in its firm name without the partners being joined as parties, suffers from misdescription as held by the Supreme Court in Chhotelal Pyarelal's case cited supra which is the main plank of the contention raised on behalf of the applicant itself. The application filed in the rent control proceedings in the firm name without the partners being joined as a party, is not a nullity is also supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Purushottam Umedbhai and Co. v. M/s. Manilal Sons)7, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 325. In the said case a partnership firm registered outside India to which the provisions of Order 30 of the Civil Procedure Code were not applicable, sued in the firm name and in that context, it was observed by the Supreme Court that the plaint in the name of the firm without the partners being joined as parties, was a case of mere misdescription and the plaint in the name of the firm was not a nullity. If the application filed under the Rent Control Order against the firm was not a nullity, then the order passed by the Rent Controller in the case on the basis of the said application cannot also be said to be a nullity or a void order. 9. If the application filed under the Rent Control Order against the firm was not a nullity, then the order passed by the Rent Controller in the case on the basis of the said application cannot also be said to be a nullity or a void order. 9. Of course, it was open to the applicant to raise an objection in the rent control proceedings for non-joinder of partners. However, the said objection was admittedly not raised in the said proceedings although they were contested upto the stage of High Court. The prosecution of the rent control proceedings till the stage of High Court would reveal that the partners of the firm have actually participated in the proceedings. In fact, an appeal and the writ petition is filed by one of the partners of the applicant-firm. No prejudice is, therefore, caused or at any rate is shown to be caused by the non-joinder of the partner as parties to the rent control proceedings. It is, not therefore, open to the applicant to urge that since the partners were not joined as parties in the rent control proceedings, the orders passed against it by the Rent Controller are nullities. 10. It may further be seen that the orders passed in the rent control proceedings against the applicant firm are sought to be executed or used against the firm itself in the instantly suits, which in view of the provisions of Order 30 of the Civil Procedure Code could be sued in the instant suits in its own name. The orders are not sought to be enforced against any individual partner as such. Since the applicant-firm can be sued legally in its own name in the instant suits, there is no reason why the orders passed in its name by the Rent Controller should not be enforced against it in the instant suits if they are not nullities. In a given case, where a particular order could be shown to be unenforceable against a particular partner, it may be possible to resist such an order or decree on the ground that it was passed in the firm's name without the said partner being joined as a party. In a given case, where a particular order could be shown to be unenforceable against a particular partner, it may be possible to resist such an order or decree on the ground that it was passed in the firm's name without the said partner being joined as a party. However, in the instant case, as shown above, the order is sought to be enforced against the firm in the instant suits which could be sued in its firm name in view of the provisions of Order 30 of the Civil Procedure Code. The objection raised on behalf of the applicant, therefore, cannot be given effect to. In the result, the instant revisions fail and are dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there would be no order as to costs. Revisions dismissed. -----