JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - By this writ petition an order dated 9th January, 1985 passed by the District Magistrate, Banda Respondent No. 1 requisitioning a go-down belonging to the Petitioner under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is sought to be quashed. All the Respondents are represented and have filed counter affidavits. The Petitioner has filed two rejoinder affidavits. Keeping in view the nature of the controversy involved in the writ petition we are of opinion that it is a fit case which may be finally decided at this very stage as contemplated by the 2nd proviso to Rule 2 of Chapter XXII of the Rules of Court. We have accordingly heard counsel for the parties on the merits of the writ petition. 2. The impugned order has been challenged by the Petitioner mainly on two grounds: (i) that the same having been passed without serving any notice upon the Petitioner as required by Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act is liable to be quashed; and (ii) that even otherwise the go down in question could not have been requisitioned, inasmuch as the Respondents really do not require it. 3. As regards the first submission made by counsel for the Petitioner it may be pointed out that the fact that the impugned order was passed under the provisions of the Act stands admitted in paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit of Mahesh Kumar Divied. The question which requires to be considered is whether any notice as contemplated by Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act was served on the Petitioner or not before passing the impugned order. In paragraph 10 (b) of the writ petition it has been specifically stated by the Petitioner that no notice before passing the order of requisition was given to the Petitioner u/s 3 of the Act. In the counter affidavit there is no assertion that the case of the Petitioner in this behalf was incorrect and that any notice was served on the Petitioner as required by Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. In Daud Ahmad Vs. In the counter affidavit there is no assertion that the case of the Petitioner in this behalf was incorrect and that any notice was served on the Petitioner as required by Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. In Daud Ahmad Vs. The District Magistrate, Allahabad and Others, AIR 1972 SC 896 it was held by the Supreme Court while dealing with Section 3 of the Act as it then stood that the application of the doctrine of audialteram partum to the exercise of any statutory power depends primarily on the purpose and provisions of the Act. The principle of natural justice has been applicable to administrative enquiries or quasi-judicial enquiries. It is the nature, of the power and the circumstances and conditions under which it is exercised that will occasion the invocation of the principle of natural justice. Deprivation of property affects rights of a person. If under the Requisition Act the landlord is to be deprived of the occupation of the premises the District Magistrate has to hold an enquiry. The said observations were made even though in Section 3 of the Act as it then stood there was no specific provision of giving a notice. The decision of the Supreme Court is dated 4th February 1972. The State Legislature gave effect to the decision of the Supreme Court by amending Section 3 of the Act by U.P. Act No. 38 of 1972 which was published in the U.P. Gazette Extra Ordinary, dated 5th October, 1972. Indeed, Section 3 of the Act was substituted. Section 3 Sub-section (1) along with Clause (a) thereof as substituted which is relevant for the purposes of the present writ petition reads as follows: 3. (I) Where the District Magistrate is of opinion that any accommodation is needed or likely to be needed for .any public purpose, not being a purpose of the Union, and that the accommodation should be requisitioned, the District Magistrate of the date of the service of such notice on him why the accommodation should not be requisitioned, and (b).... 4. Since the specific assertion in the writ petition that no notice as contemplated by Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act was given before passing the impugned order has not been disputed in the counter affidavit, we have no reason not to accept the said assertion. 4. Since the specific assertion in the writ petition that no notice as contemplated by Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act was given before passing the impugned order has not been disputed in the counter affidavit, we have no reason not to accept the said assertion. The impugned order of requisition, therefore, cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed. 5. As regards the second submission made by counsel for the Petitioner we are of opinion that it is not necessary to go into that question inasmuch as the impugned order is being quashed on the basis of the first submission itself. If fresh proceedings for acquisition are initiated against the Petitioner and a notice is served on him it would be open to him to raise the said plea before the authority concerned. 6. In the result this writ petition succeeds and is allowed and the impugned order of requisition dated 9th January, 1985 passed by the District Magistrate, Banda is quashed. In the circumstances of 'he case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.