JUDGMENT B. N. Sapru, J. - The petitioner has challenged an order of ti e High Court of Allahabad dated 5-7-1979 reverting the petitioner from the post of an officiating Civil Judge to that of the Munsif. 2. From 11-1-1971 to 24-6-19/4 the petitioner was posted as an officiating Civil Judge, Agra. Certain complaints were received against the petitioner and the matter was enquired into by the High Court both through the Registrar and the Vigilance. As a result of the enquiry, the petitioner was served with a charge-sheet on 7-1-1977. The charge sheet has been filed as Annexure 1 to the writ petition and contains two charges which are reproduced below : - "Charge No. I. - You issued four commissions on 24-4-1974, 25-1-1974, 28-9-1974, 6-1-1974 in Suits No. 43 of 1974, 38 of 1974, 361 of 1973, 16 of 1974 to Sri R.S. Yadav, Advocate, Agra, even though he was not on the approved list of Commissioners for the year 19 4 and also appointed him guardian ad Item in Suits No. 344 of 1972, 22 of 1972 on -5-2974, 11-2-1974 and Receiver in Suit No. 50 of 1974 on 14-2-1974 and thus by corrupt or illegal means and by abusing your position as public servant obtained for Sri Yadav and for yourself pecuniary advantage. Charge No. 2. - You issued interim injunction order on 11-1-1974 in Suit No. 26 of 1974 against nine persons directing them to make supply of 568 wagons of coal and by the interim injunction thus issued the defendants aforesaid were forced to make delivery of the said 5f 8 wagons of coal. The not prohibitory. The order, dated 11-1-1974 made you initially recited that the wagons be supplied or cause be shown by the date fixed but it appears that thereafter on the plaintiffs application on 12-1-1974 the words "or to show cause by the said date" were deleted. In making the interim injunction order and subsequently deleting the portion of the order specified above, you were influenced by extraneous considerations and thus by corrupt or illegal means and by otherwise abusing your position as public servant, you obtained for the plaintiffs undue pecuniary advantage." 3. The petitioners case was referred to the Administrative Tribunal No. 3, U. P, Lucknow. The Administrative Tribunal after an enquiry exonerated the petitioner in respect of charge no and we are No. longer concern with it. The petitioners case was referred to the Administrative Tribunal No. 3, U. P, Lucknow. The Administrative Tribunal after an enquiry exonerated the petitioner in respect of charge no and we are No. longer concern with it. 4. It however, found that the petitioner was partly guilty under the charge No. 2 and recommended that the following punishment be imposed on the petitioner; "(i) Two annual increments of the charged officer may by stopped which may not affect his future increments. (ii) An entry may be made in his character roll. (iii) The charged officer may not be promoted to the next higher post for two years during which time his judicial work may be watched." 5. On receipt of the findings of the Administrative Tribunal, the Administrative Committee of the High Court at its meeting held on 7-10-1978 considered the matter and resolve as follows : - "Resolved that Sri U. C. Dixit deserved the major punishment of removal from service, and that the matter be placed before the Full Court." 6. The matter was placed before the Full Court at the Judges meeting held on 28-10-1978 in which the following resolution was passed in the matter: - "The report/recommendations of the Administrative Tribunal 3 against Sri U C. Dixit were considered and resolved that in view of the finder g recorded by the Tribunal, which are approved, Sri Dixit be reduced in rank to the post of Munsif." 7. The recommendation was sent by the Court through its letter dated 5-12-19/8 to the Government. The Government accept the recommendations of the Court and wrote to the Court by letter, dated 21-6-1979 that it (had taken a decision that the petitioner be reverted to his substantive post of Munsif. The Government requested the Court to take action accordingly and issue an order of reversion. Thereupon, the Court issued Notification No. 741, dated 5-7-1979 ordering that the petition be reverted and posted as a Munsif. It is this order which has been challenged in the writ petition. 8. The charge No. 2 framed against the petitioner was respect of an injunction granted by the petitioner in a suit asking the Railway Administration to make available to the plaintiffs in the suit 568 wagens to transport coal to Firozabad. The order was made ex-parte on 11-1-1974. It is this order which has been challenged in the writ petition. 8. The charge No. 2 framed against the petitioner was respect of an injunction granted by the petitioner in a suit asking the Railway Administration to make available to the plaintiffs in the suit 568 wagens to transport coal to Firozabad. The order was made ex-parte on 11-1-1974. While issuing the injunction order the Court issued notices and fixed 13-2-1974 for objections by the respondents. Thereafter on an another application by the plaintiffs, the Court on 12-1 1974 the following were deleted from the injunction order ; - "Order to show cause by the said date." 9. The charge is that that respondents in the suit were not allowed an opportunity of showing cause against the injunction order. 10. The record of Original Suit No. 26 of 1974 is before this Court in which the aforesaid order was made. It transpires that on 13-3-1974 the Court granted two months time to the defendants to file a reply to application No. 8/C on which the injunction order had been issued on 11-1-1974. The application for extension of time was not opposed by the plaintiff. Subsequently, the order of injunction was vacated by another Judge to whom the suit had been transferred by an order dated 31-8-1974. 11. The factual position is that no wagons were allotted to the plaintiffs in the suit as a result of the injunction order. 12. The Administrative Tribunal has recorded the following findings on charge No. 2 "In view of the above facts and circumstances, our conclusion is that the order dated 11th January, 1974 which the charged officer passed in Suit No. 26 of 1974 was an improper order, and it appears that in passing this order he was influenced by some extraneous considerations and he was thus guilty of misconduct. On the basis of the evidence available before us, we are however, unable to attribute in this matter any corrupt Motive to the charged officer, or the say that he actually obtained any pecuniary advantage for the plaintiff Society." The reasons which led to the Administrative Tribunal to record this finding, are that the injunction order was mandatory in nature and has not a prohibitory order and that such an interim injunction is not normally passed in a pending suit. The Administrative Tribunal found that the order in any should not have been made without notice to the defendants and in effect, it decreed the suit. The Administrative Tribunal noticed that the deletion of the words "or to show cause by the said date" from the order dated 11-1-1974 was improper. 13. Having found that there was no evidence to attribute any corrupt motive to the petitioner and having further found that the petitioner did not obtain any pecuniary advantage out of the order, it nevertheless recorded a finding that the petitioner was guilty of misconduct. In this connection the following observations in the findings of the Administrative Tribunal are relevant - "It would however, suffice to say in this connection that on the administrative side, it i3 open to us to examine the circumstances in which the judicial order in this case was passed by the charged officer in order to determine whether or not there has been any failure on the part of the charged officer to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty ; or whether or not there has been any misconduct on his part." 14. The record of the case indicates that on the basis of impropriety in the order, a finding has been recorded that the petitioner was guilty of misconduct for which the should be penalised. 15. In the case of Union of India v. J. Ahmad, AIR 1979 SC 1022 the question considered was as to when negligence in the discharge of duties or error in the performance of the duty by the Government servant would constitute misconduct. It was observed as follows : "Code of conduct as set out in the Conduct Rules clearly indicates the conduct expected of a member of the service. It would follow that the conduct which is blameworthy for the Government servant in the context of Conduct Rules would be misconduct. If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with due and faithful discharge of his duty in service, it is misconduct Sec Pearce v Foster, (1886) 1 7 QBD 536 at p. 542. A disregard of an essential condition of the contract of service may constitute misconduct, see Laws v. London Chornicle (Indicator Newspapers), (1959) 1 698. If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with due and faithful discharge of his duty in service, it is misconduct Sec Pearce v Foster, (1886) 1 7 QBD 536 at p. 542. A disregard of an essential condition of the contract of service may constitute misconduct, see Laws v. London Chornicle (Indicator Newspapers), (1959) 1 698. This view was adopted in Sharda Prasad Onkar Prasad Tiwari v. Divisional Supdt., Central Railway, Nagpur Division, Nagpur, 61 Bom LR 1596 : AIR 1961 Bom 150 and Satuhha K. Vaghela v. Moosa Raza, (1969) 10 Guj LR 23. The High Court has noted the definition of misconduct in Strouds Judicial Dictionary which runs as under : - Misconduct means, misconduct arising from ill motive, acts of negligence, errors of judgment, or innocent mistake, do not constitute such misconduct." 16. In industrial Jurisprudence amongst other, habitual or gross negligence constitute misconduct but in Management, Utkal Machinery Ltd. v. Workmen, Miss Shanti Pathaik, (1966) 2 SCR 434 : AIR 1966 SC 1051 , in the absence of standing orders governing the employees undertaking unsatisfactory work was treated as misconduct in the context of discharge being assailed as punitive. In S. Govinda Menon v. Union of India, (i967) 3 SCR 566 : A1 t 1967 SC 1274, the manner in which a member of the service discharged has quasi judicial function disclosing abuse of power was treated as constituting misconduct for initiating disciplinary proceedings. A single act of omission or error of judgment would ordinarily not constitute misconduct though if such error or mission results in serious or atrocious consequences the same may amount to misconduct as was held by this Court in P. H. Kalyani v. Air Force Calcutta, (1964) 2 SCR 104 ; AIR 1963 SC 1756 , wherein it was found that the two mistakes committed by the employee while checking the load-sheets and balance charts would involve possible accident to the aircraft and possible loss of human life and, therefore, the negligence in work in the context of serious consequences was treated as misconduct. It is, however, difficult to believe that lack of efficiency or attainment of highest standards in discharge of duty attached to public office would ipso facto constitute misconduct. It is, however, difficult to believe that lack of efficiency or attainment of highest standards in discharge of duty attached to public office would ipso facto constitute misconduct. There may be negligence in performance of duty and a lapse in performance of duty or error of judgment in evaluating the developing situation may be negligence in discharge of duty but would not constitute misconduct unless the consequences directly attributable to negligence would be such as to be irreparable or the resultant damage would be so heavy that the degree of culpability would be very high. An error can be indicative of negligence and the degree of culpability may indicate the grossness of negligence. Carelessness can of ten be productive more harm than deliberate wick end-ness or malevolence. Leaving aside the classic example of the sentry who sleeps at his post and allows the enemy to slip through, there are other more familiar (examples) instances of which (are) a Railway cabin man signalling in a train on the same track where there is a stationary train causing headlong collision, a nurse giving intravenous injection which ought to be given intramuscular causing instantaneous death a pilot overlooking an instrument showing snag in engine and the aircraft crashing causing heavy 1 of life. Misplaced sympathy can be a great evil. (See Navinchandra Shakerchand Shah v. Manager Ahmedabad Co-operative Department Stores Ltd , (19/8) 19 Guj LR 108 at p. 120. But in any case, failure to attain the highest standard of efficiency in performance of duty permitting an inference of negligence would not constitute misconduct nor for the purpose of Rule 3 of the Conduct Rules as would indicate lack of devotion to duty i "12. The High Court was of the opinion that misconduct in the context of disciplinary proceedings means misbehaviour involving some form of guilty mind or mens rea. We find it difficult to subscribe to this view because gross or habitual negligence in performance of duty may not involve mews but may still constitute misconduct for disciplinary proceedings." 17. In the instant case, the Administrative Tribunal has correctly found that the order of injunction and its subsequent modification were improper orders. We are of the opinion that the petitioner committed a grave error in granting the injunction and then modifying it without hearing the respondents. In the instant case, the Administrative Tribunal has correctly found that the order of injunction and its subsequent modification were improper orders. We are of the opinion that the petitioner committed a grave error in granting the injunction and then modifying it without hearing the respondents. It is not conduct expected of an officer who has reached the rank of a Civil Judge. 18. Nevertheless we are satisfied that the offending orders do not constitute misconduct within the meaning of Service Rules. There is no evidence of any immoral turpitude on the part of the petitioner and he could not be punished for having committed misconduct or for having not maintained absolute integrity in devotion to duty. We are consequently satisfied that the impugned order cannot be sustained. 19. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 5-7-1979 (Annexure 2 to the writ petition) is quashed. However, in the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.