JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - This petition is directed against the order dated June 9, 1982, Annexure 4, passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, U.P., Lucknow, opposite party No. 1. The facts necessary for the disposal of the writ petition are as follows : - 2. Umar Uddin, the husband of the petitioner Smt. Mukiza Begum held stage carriage permit No. 291 covered by vehicle No. UPO 2850 on Budaun-Kakrala-Usait-Alapur-Minun-Deherpur route. This permit was valid upto June 6, 1980. Before this date Umar Uddin, the permit-holder, died on June 13, 1979. After his death the petitioner moved an application on July 4, 1979 under Section 61(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 before the Regional Transport Authority, Rohelkhand Division, Bareilly, opposite party No. 2. It appears that the case of the petitioner was that she had succeeded to the interest of the deceased Umar Uddin and she was also in possession of the vehicle. Another application was made by the petitioner under sub-section (2) of Section 61. In this application she stated that her husband Umar Uddin had died leaving her four daughters. The daughters, it appears, made an endorsement that they had no objection to the transfer of permit in favour of the petitioner. On July 7, 1979 Naqi Uddin, a brother of the deceased Umar Uddin and predecessor-in-interest of opposite parties 5/A to 5/F filed suit No. 69 of 1979 in the Court of Civil Judge, Budaun. This was a suit for partition. The case of Naqi Uddin was that he was also an heir of the deceased Umar Uddin. It is not disputed by the petitioner that in the said suit she admitted the title of the brothers of the deceased husband Umar Uddin. On July 10, 1972 a joint application was made by the three brothers of the deceased Umar Uddin, namely, Shakoor Uddin opposite party No. 3, Rais Uddin opposite party No. 4 and Naqi Uddin the predecessor-in-interest of opposite parties 5/A to 5/F, under Section 61(2) of the Act. The Regional Transport Authority, opposite party No. 2 by its order dated April 25, 1980 rejected the application of Umar Uddin's brothers and allowed the application of the petitioner under Section 61(2). This transfer of permit in favour of the petitioner was endorsed on the permit and the permit was renewed thereafter for a period of three years. The Regional Transport Authority, opposite party No. 2 by its order dated April 25, 1980 rejected the application of Umar Uddin's brothers and allowed the application of the petitioner under Section 61(2). This transfer of permit in favour of the petitioner was endorsed on the permit and the permit was renewed thereafter for a period of three years. Against the order of the Regional Transport Authority Shakoor Uddin, Naqi Uddin and Rais Uddin preferred an appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. During the pendency of this appeal Naqi Uddin died and his heirs were brought on record, these heirs are opposite parties 5/A to 5/F. Thereafter by order dated June 9, 1982, Annexure No. 4, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal set aside, the order of the Transport Authority and directed that along with the name of the petitioner, the names of opposite parties 3 to 4 and 5/A to 5/F shall also be endorsed on the permit. This is the order which is under challenge in the present petition. 3. Sri U.K. Dhaon learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that the question of title was immaterial for the purposes of Section 61(2) of the Act. According to him under this provision the permit could be transferred only in favour of one person and that person must be in possession of the vehicle covered by the permit. 4. Section 61(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 under which orders have been passed by the two authorities reads as follows : - "61(2). The transport authority may, on application made to it within three months of the death of the holder of a permit, transfer the permit to the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicles covered by the permit." The Regional Transport Authority in its order dated April 25, 1980 held that the petitioner alone could obtain transfer of the permit in view of the fact that she alone was in possession of the vehicle being the widow of the deceased. It further appears that temporary permits had been granted in her favour before the passing of this order. Thus the control of the vehicle vested in petitioner alone and the opposite parties Nos. 3 to 5 were not in possession and control of the vehicle. It further appears that temporary permits had been granted in her favour before the passing of this order. Thus the control of the vehicle vested in petitioner alone and the opposite parties Nos. 3 to 5 were not in possession and control of the vehicle. The appellate authority observed that under the above provision all the co-sharers who have succeeded to the possession of the vehicle jointly and have made application for transfer under Section 61(2) of the Act within three months of the date of the death of the permit holder are entitled to an order of transfer of the permit in their favour. The appellate authority did not appreciate the distinction between the terms "succeeding to the interest" and "succeeding to the possession". If the former expression had been used in Section 61(2) of the Act all persons succeeding to the interest of the deceased permit holder would have become entitled to transfer of the permit in their favour but under the latter expression it is not possible. The legislature knows the distinction between the words "interest" and "possession" and it deliberately used the word "possession" instead of the word "interest". In my opinion the view taken by the Regional Transport Authority was correct and the appellate authority was not correct in upsetting that view. The word possession in Section 61(2) refers to actual physical possession and not constructive possession. 5. Sri P.G. Saxena, learned counsel for the opposite parties tried to support the view taken by the appellate authority by reference to Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act. Under this provision the term "person" has been defined to included persons also. On this basis the learned counsel tried to argue that the submission of Sri Dhaon that only one person was entitled to transfer of permit in his favour was not correct. It may be that in a given case more than one person may succeed to the possession of a vehicle and in that event the transfer under Section 61(2) can be effected in favour of more than one person. That, however, is not really the question involved here. In the present case the deceased had left him surviving his widow and four daughters but the daughters had made an application surrendering their right of transfer in favour of their mother, namely, the petitioner. That, however, is not really the question involved here. In the present case the deceased had left him surviving his widow and four daughters but the daughters had made an application surrendering their right of transfer in favour of their mother, namely, the petitioner. The learned counsel, therefore, cannot derive any benefit by referring to Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act. I, however, agree with Sri Saxena that there is no bar under Section 61 (2) against transfer of permit in favour of more than one persons. 6. The learned counsel also referred to Sections 13 and 18 of the General Clauses Act. Section 13 says that in all Central Acts and Regulations, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, (1) words importing the masculine gender shall be taken to include females ; and (2) words in the singular shall include the plural, and vice verso. Section 18 provides that in any Central Act or Regulation made after the Commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of indicating the relation of a law to the successors of any functionaries or of corporations having perpetual succession, to express its relation to the functionaries or corporations. In my opinion, reference to these sections is irrelevant as it is the case of the petitioner that she alone succeeded to the possession of the vehicle and being in actual control of the same can get transfer of permit under Section 61(2). 7. The learned counsel for the opposite parties cited the following authorities. In my opinion, they have no application to the facts of the present case : - (1) AIR 1971 SC 2184 (Syed Shah Gulam Ghouse Mohiuddin and Others v. Syed Shah Ahmad). (2) AIR 1974 SC 1274 (M/S. Ramautar Lal Jain v. Maya Kaur and Others). The case of Syed Shah Gulam Ghouse Mohiuddin and Others (supra) was relied upon for the proposition that amongst co-sharers possession of one is deemed to be possession of all. This was a case in which adverse possession was claimed in respect of immovable property. It was in this context that it was observed that possession of one co-owner was not by itself adverse to other co-owners. Here the question of title is not at all involved and the question of adverse possession is also not in question. This was a case in which adverse possession was claimed in respect of immovable property. It was in this context that it was observed that possession of one co-owner was not by itself adverse to other co-owners. Here the question of title is not at all involved and the question of adverse possession is also not in question. The only question is as to which party was in actual control and therefore in possession of the vehicle which was covered by the permit. 8. In Ramautar Lal Jain's case (supra) a question arose whether in the case of death of an applicant for the grant of a stage carriage permit the heirs can apply for substitution in place of the original applicant. It was held that there was no legal right to the grant of a permit and therefore, the Regional Transport Authority had jurisdiction and discretion in the matter of allowing or refusing substitution. It was further observed that if the proceedings were likely to be delayed or a substitution was detrimental to the interest of the public, the Regional Transport Authority was not bound to allow substitution. This case has no application to the facts of the present case. It is not a decision under Section 61(2) of the Act but is a decision under Section 46 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 9. Sri P.C. Saxena had also relied upon a decision reported in 1976 Transport and Accident Cases, 196, for submitting that mere possession does not confer title. It may be that possession may not confer title but the question of title is already being investigated in the Civil Suit (Civil Suit No. 67 of 1979) filed by Naqi Uddin, one of the brothers of the petitioner's deceased husband. Under Section 61(2) the question to be determined is not of title but of possession. 10. In view of the above the petition deserves to be allowed. The petition is accordingly allowed and the order dated June 9, 1982 (Annexure No. 4) passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, opposite party No. 1, is hereby quashed and that passed by the Regional Transport Authority, Bareilly, dated April 25, 1980 is hereby restored. There shall be no order as to costs.