The Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, New Delhi v. V. Thirunavukkarasu
1985-02-26
SATHIADEV, V.RAMASWAMI
body1985
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- V. RAMASWAMI, J. :— 1. This is an appeal against the judgment in W.P. 5671 of 1981. That was a petition filed by the respondent herein for the issue of a writ of mandamus or other appropriate direction to the appellants herein to consider the petitioner for promotion to Grades I and II of the Central Information Service in the vacancies that arose subsequent to 1964, by taking into the period of temporary service rendered by the petitioner from the year 1964. The petitioner was first recruited as the Field Publicity Officer in a temporary capacity with effect from 25th May, 1964. This post was then included in Grade IV of the Central Information Service. Since then he continued in such a temporary position till 4th January, 1977. On that day, he was regularised in the service in consultation with the Public Service Commission, in accordance with the proviso to R. 6-A of the Central Information Service Rules, 1959. The case of the respondent was that he was regularised with effect from 4th January, 1977 only and that his temporary service for the period from 25th May, 1964, to 4th January, 1977, could not be taken into account for any purpose including the fixing of seniority. The learned Judge, who heard the writ petition, after referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Baleswar Dass v. State of U.P. 1, and N.K. Chauhan v. State of Gujarat 2, held that his service for the period from 25th May, 1964 to 4th January, 1977 should also be counted for the purpose of fixing his seniority. It is against that judgment the present appeal has been filed. 2. In the decision in Baleswar Dass v. State of U.P., the Supreme Court held that:— “The officiating service in a post for all practical purposes of seniority is as good as service on a regular basis.
It is against that judgment the present appeal has been filed. 2. In the decision in Baleswar Dass v. State of U.P., the Supreme Court held that:— “The officiating service in a post for all practical purposes of seniority is as good as service on a regular basis. It may be permissible within the limits for the Government to ignore officiating service and count only regular service when claims of seniority comes before it provided the Rules in that regard are clear and categorical and do not admit of any ambiguity and cruelly arbitrary cut-off of long years of service does not take place or there is functionally and qualitatively substantial difference in the service rendered in the two types of posts.” The learned counsel for the appellant was not able to produce any rule relating to fixing of seniority different from the normal way of making regularisation from the date of appointment even of temporary or officiating services. The only rule on which he could rely is the proviso to R. 6-A which reads as follows:— “Provided further that persons appointed on or before 1st July, 1976 to discharge the duties and functions of the posts included in Grade IV of the Central Information Service make good the shortfall in the filling up of vacancies in the grade by the above mentioned method and who have discharged the duties and responsibilities of the post included in Grade IV of the service for at least five years shall be appointed to the Grade after they are screened by a Selection Committee presided over by the Chairman or a Member of the Committee to determine their suitability for appointment.” It is in exercise of powers under this proviso that the very service of the respondent was regularised. It does not take the appellants any further in fixing the seniority with reference to appointments made in between the original temporary recruitment and the regularisation. On the other hand, we find, even in the latest judgment in G.P. Doval v. Chief Secretary, Govt. of U.P. 1 the Supreme Court has again reiterated the same principle.
It does not take the appellants any further in fixing the seniority with reference to appointments made in between the original temporary recruitment and the regularisation. On the other hand, we find, even in the latest judgment in G.P. Doval v. Chief Secretary, Govt. of U.P. 1 the Supreme Court has again reiterated the same principle. The question that arose for consideration in that decision as put by the Supreme Court itself was— “Where on account of exigencies of services, recruitment to a post within the purview of the Public Service Commission is made by the appointing authority, but at a later date the Public Service Commission puts its seal of approval on such an application, whether the continuous and uninterrupted service rendered by such appointee prior to the approval by the Public Service Commission can and should be taken into computation while determining seniority based on the principle of length of continuous officiation?” The answer given to this question at page 341 is:— “If the first appointment is made by not following the prescribed procedure but later on the appointee is approved making his appointment regular, it is obvious common sense that in the absence of a contrary rule, the approval which means confirmation by the authority which had the authority, power and jurisdiction to make appointment or recommend for appointment, will relate back to the date on which first appointment is made and the entire service will have to be computed in reckoning the seniority according to the length to continuous officiation.” In this case also, though the original appointment was not through the Service Commission, the Public Service Commission later approved and it is on that basis the services were regularised on 4th January, 1977. In the circumstances, therefore, the respondent is entitled to compute the period during which he was functioning as a temporary official also to be taken into account in computing the seniority. In the circumstances, we do not find any grounds to interfere with the judgment of the learned Judge in the writ petition, and accordingly, we dismiss the appeal with costs. Advocates fee is Rs. 250.