B. K. BEHERA, J. ( 1 ) SOLELY on the basis of a dying declaration said to have been made by Sukri Toki (to be referred to hereinafter as the deceased) that her husband (appellant) had shot an arrow at her which ultimately resulted in her death, as deposed to by the only witness (P. W. 1), a covillager of the appellant and the deceased, Mr. R. N. Panda, Sessions Judge, Koraput, has held the charge against the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (the TCodet, for short) established and has recorded a finding that on the 12th April, 1980 the appellant committed murder of the deceased and accordingly the appellant has been convicted under Section 302 of the Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. ( 2 ) MR. Mohanty for the appellant bas assailed the order of conviction as absolutely unfounded as according to him, the evidence of P. W. 1 was not worthy of credence and with the injuries that the deceased had on her person, she could not have made a Statement naming her husband to be the author of the crime. Regard being had to the serious infirmities in the evidence to be referred to hereinafter. Mr. Das, the learned Additional Standing Counsel, has very candidly and fairly submitted, which it is the duty of the State Counsel to do appearing as he does for the state and not for a private party interested for the persecution of the accused and not his prosecution, that he wound not support the order of conviction as the evidence on record with regard to the dying declaration could not be accepted. ( 3 ) IT has been a settled principle of law that an order of conviction can be based solely on a dying declaration of the deceased. It is equally well-settled that the evidence on which the prosecution seeks reliance to establish the, dying declaration requires the strictest scrutiny and closest circumspection. In the instant case, there was no proof of any motive on the part of a husband to kill his wife. This would keep the Court on guard to examine the evidence with extraordinary care. It is equally well-settled that the evidence on which the prosecution seeks reliance to establish the, dying declaration requires the strictest scrutiny and closest circumspection. In the instant case, there was no proof of any motive on the part of a husband to kill his wife. This would keep the Court on guard to examine the evidence with extraordinary care. ( 4 ) THE doctor (P. W. 6) who had conducted the autopsy had found a punctured wound 2t x lh/2t x 4 on the middle of the chest of the deceased between the two breasts ante-mortem in nature and had, on dissection, found that both the left side of the heart and the left side lung had been punctured. The death was owing to the external and consequent internal injuries producing shock and haemorrhage, as opined by him. P. W. 1 had testified that while he was proceeding to collect salap juice, he noticed the deceased standing on the verandah of her house with a bleeding injury on her chest when she was crying and broken arrow was lying on the ground nearby and to his query as to what had happened to her, she gave out that her husband had shot an arrow at her. He (P. W. 1) asked her to keep the broken arrow and she picked it up and kept it under the thatch of the house. P. W. 1 proceeded on his way and on returning to his village in the evening, found the deceased lying dead. With the injuries that the deceased had on her person to the heart and lung, it would not be possible on her part, as has rightly been submitted at the Bar, to make a statement to P. W. 1 naming the appellant to be the perpetrator of the crime and further proceed to pick up the arrow and then kept it under the thatch in the manner deposed to by P. W. 1. ( 5 ) KAKE Singh alias Surendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh1, one of the grounds for discarding the evidence relating to the dying declaration was that the doctor, who held the autopsy, had not categorically stated that at the time the deceased was burnt, he was conscious or could give any coherent statement. ( 5 ) KAKE Singh alias Surendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh1, one of the grounds for discarding the evidence relating to the dying declaration was that the doctor, who held the autopsy, had not categorically stated that at the time the deceased was burnt, he was conscious or could give any coherent statement. In the instant case, although the prosecution sought reliance solely on the dying declaration, it had not taken care to bring out in the medical evidence that a dying declaration could be made by the deceased with the injuries on her person. In a case of this nature, the prosecution should take care to bring in such evidence and if the matter is left in obscurity, it is the Courts duty to remove the obscurity by putting questions to the Medical Officer in the interests of justice and to get at the truth. We do hope that in such cases, Court of Sessions would take care to do this. ( 6 ) APART from the aforesaid improbabilities in the evidence we have no hesitation in holding that P. W. 1 had scant regard for truth and that his evidence could not be stamped with truth merely because it had not been brought out by the defence that he was interested for the prosecution or inimically disposed of towards the appellant. If the evidence of a witness has no intrinsic worth, such evidence is not to be accepted merely because of his disinterestedness. If, on the other hand, the evidence of a witness is worthy of credence, such evidence is not to be mechanically rejected merely because it has been shown that he is a witness who can be said to be interested for a successful termination of the trial. ( 7 ) THERE was no evidence other than that of P. W. 8 that in a meeting of the Panchayat after the death of the deceased, P. W. I had told about the statement said to have been made by the deceased naming her husband as her killer. It is important to keep in mind that although P. W. 8 did say about it, P. W. I himself had not given evidence that he had made any such statement. It is important to keep in mind that although P. W. 8 did say about it, P. W. I himself had not given evidence that he had made any such statement. In his evidence, P. W. 1 had claimed to have informed the father and the brother of the deceased regarding the dying declaration made by the deceased. Neither the father nor the brother of the deceased had been examined by the prosecution in support of such evidence. ( 8 ) IN the First Information Report lodged by this witness (P. W. 11, he had claimed to have informed the villagers about what he had from the deceased. There was no other evidence of anyone that P. W. 1 had disclosed about any such statement having been made by the deceased. ( 9 ) THE trial Court did not take due note of the evidence of P. W. 7 who was no other person than the cousin sister of the deceased and according to her, when she went to the house of the deceased a little before sunset and noticed that the deceased had a bleeding injury on her chest and that a blood-stained arrow lying on the floor, the deceased was unable to talk. Thus this witness had gone to the scene when the arrow was lying on the floor. According to P. W. 1, on being asked by him, the deceased picked up the arrow and kept it under the thatch. Even assuming that P. W. 1 had gone to the house of the deceased, at about the same point of time, P. W. 7 had also gone and her categorical statement was that the deceased was unable to talk. She had also stated that she had not heard any conversation between P. W. 1 and the deceased. ( 10 ) ANOTHER suspicious feature which had escaped the attention of the trial court was that while according to P. W. 1, the deceased picked up the arrow and kept it under the thatch of her house, P. W. 8 had given evidence that in the meeting of the Panchayat, P. W. 1 had stated that he had kept the arrow under. the thatch of the house of the appellant. the thatch of the house of the appellant. ( 11 ) IF as claimed by P. W. 1, he had seen the deceased with a bleeding injury on her chest and as the medical evidence would show, there must have been profuse bleeding, it was highly unlikely that he would still proceed to collect salap juice without informing anyone of the village about such an incident. Evidently, to explain away this inaction and conduct on his part, this witness (P. W. 1) had gone to the length of making a statement in the First Information Report, which could not, of course, be treated as substantive evidence, that he had asked the deceased as to whether she would live or die and the deceased had stated that she would not die. All this would show as to how untruthful was P. W. 1, but the trial court, in spite of all these infirmities and improbabilities, accepted his evidence and in our view, unjustifiably so. ( 12 ) THE belated First Information Report two days after the occurrence without giving any reasonable explanation would tell its own tale and would further seriously affect the evidence of P. W. I and the bona fides of the prosecution case against the appellant as it could be that after due deliberation, a false report had been made at the police station naming the appellant as the author of the crime. ( 13 ) WE thus final that although the deceased had died a homicidal death, the prosecution had failed to establish that the appellant was the author of the crime. ( 14 ) IN the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant is set aside. The appellant be set at liberty forthwith. K. P. Mohapatra, J.-I agree. Appeal allowed.