AGRAWAL, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition has been filed by amongst others Machhua Matsya Vikas Sahkari Samiti Ltd. , Allahabad for a Mandamus directing respondents Nos. 1 to 3 not to allow Hira Lal, respondent No. 4 to undertake the mining operations over plot Nos. 702 and 703, situated in village Mohabbat Ganj, Allahabad pursuant to the mining permit granted by the District Officer. ( 2 ) STATE of U. P. published a notification dated 2nd January, 1967, in the Official Gazette dated 7th January, 1967 under R. 23 of the Uttar Pradesh Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Minerals Rules) notifying a large number of plots which could be leased out only by auction. At the bottom of this notification what was recited was :-"is ZILE MAIN ATHVA GANGA THATA ANYA NADION KE KINARE KE SABHI CHETRYA JAHAN BALU UPLABDH HO". ( 3 ) CLAIMING himself to be the Bhumidhar of plots Nos. 702 and 703, Hira Lal respondent No. 4 filed a suit number 142 of 1971 in the Court of Civil Judge, Allahabad for injunction and recovery of damages of Rs. 600/- against the State of U. P. and Sub-Divisional Officer. The claim of the respondent No. 4 was that he was the Bhumidhar of the aforesaid two plots and also a Sirdar of several other plots (with which we are not concerned in the present writ petition ). He claimed that the aforesaid two plots were situated on the bank of river Jamuna and during rainy season, they were flooded and when the river receded in winter and summer, the said respondent No. 4 became entitled to exclusive possession and undisturbed use of the land. He claimed that he had the right also to lift the sand, which got collected on the same. The suit was dismissed by the Civil Judge. Respondent No. 4 went up in appeal, which was numbered as Civil Appeal No. 5 of 1973. He claimed that he had the right also to lift the sand, which got collected on the same. The suit was dismissed by the Civil Judge. Respondent No. 4 went up in appeal, which was numbered as Civil Appeal No. 5 of 1973. The appeal was allowed and the suit in respect of the aforesaid plots as well as others decreed for permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants of that suit from interfering with the possession and cultivatory rights of the respondent No. 4 over the plots in question in respect of extraction of sand, the Court observed:- "had the appellant been carrying on the mining operation i. e. removing and extracting the sand from the land, he would be debarred from doing so but if he is not using the land as Miner, I think he cannot be prohibited from cultivating the same. . . . . . . . . . ". The second appeal filed against the aforesaid judgment of the Additional District Judge by the State of U. P. and others, was dismissed by the High Court. ( 4 ) IT appears that thereafter respondent No. 4 applied for granting of permit under Chapter VI of the Minerals Rules. The petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 also applied for being granted the permits. The respondent No. 3 gave the mining permit under Chapter VI to respondent No. 4 in respect of sand, which got collected on plots Nos. 702 and 703, on the condition of deposit of Rs. 1,68,000/- in advance. The permission was for removal of 48 q. m. of minerals from the aforesaid two plots. It allowed six months time to the appellant for the said purpose. ( 5 ) AFTER the grant of mining permit, the present petition was filed challenging the validity of the mining permit on the ground that under the Minerals Rules, 1963, the respondent No. 3 had no power to grant any mining permit. According to the petitioners, the notification under R. 23 (1) of the aforesaid Rules having been made, the respondent No. 3 could let out the right to collect or extract the sand from the aforesaid two plots only by holding public auction. ( 6 ) THE writ petition has been contested by respondent No. 4. According to the petitioners, the notification under R. 23 (1) of the aforesaid Rules having been made, the respondent No. 3 could let out the right to collect or extract the sand from the aforesaid two plots only by holding public auction. ( 6 ) THE writ petition has been contested by respondent No. 4. ( 7 ) WE had given time to the Chief Standing Counsel for filing of the counter-affidavit, but despite time having been granted, no counter-affidavit on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 to 3 has been filed. ( 8 ) FOR examining the validity of the arguments, reference to some of the provisions of the Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 be made. Under sub-rule (4) of R. 1 it is provided that they shall apply to such minor minerals and to such areas as may be specified by the State Government from time to time by notification in the Gazette. The words which are important for the purposes of decision of the writ petition are "mining permit" and "minor minerals. " The definition of minor minerals is as follows :-"minor minerals" means building stones, gravel, ordinary clay, ordinary sand other than sand used for prescribed purposes, and any other mineral which the Central Government has declared from time to time or may declare by notification in the Official Gazette, to be a minor mineral under Cl. (e) of S. 3 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (Act No. 67 of 1957 ). ". 8a. Chapter II deals with grant of mining lease. R. 23 of Chapter IV provides that the State Government may notify in Gazette specific areas which may be leased out by auction. Sub-Rule (3) of R. 23 lays down as follows:-"on the publication of a notification under sub-rule (1) the provisions of Chapters II, III and VI of these rules shall not apply to the area or areas in respect of which the notification has issued. Such area or areas may be leased out according to the procedure described in this Chapter. ". Such area or areas may be leased out according to the procedure described in this Chapter. ". ( 9 ) IN the instant case, the argument of the petitioners counsel was that since a notification in respect of sand in question had been made by the State of U. P. under R. 23 of the aforesaid Rules, the respondent No. 3 had no power to give "mining Permit" under Chapter VI of the Rules. ( 10 ) THE submission of the petitioners learned counsel appears to be well-founded. Sub-rule (3) of R. 23 rules out the applicability of Chapter VI amongst others to the area or areas in respect of which the notification under sub-rule (1) of R. 23 has been issued. As a result of this Notification, Chapter VI which permitted the respondent No. 3 to give mining permit in respect of the collection of sand from plot Nos. 702 and 703, could not apply. The granting of mining permit, therefore, was against the sub-rule (3) of R. 23, which is mandatory. No power had been conferred on the respondent No. 3 to adopt a method different than mentioned in Chapter IV for leasing out the right of extraction of sand. ( 11 ) RULE 68 of course confers power of relaxation of rules in special cases, if it is of opinion that in the interest of mineral development, it is necessary so to do. In the instant case, the State Government has not passed any order under R. 68. The respondent No. 3 did not have option to waive with the requirement of letting out the right of extraction otherwise than by public auction. The mining permit, therefore, granted to the respondent No. 4 by respondent No. 3 is not justified by the rules. In fact, granting of the mining permit resulted in the breach of sub-rule (3) of R. 23 of the Chapter IV of the Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963. While considering the question as to whether a particular rule is mandatory or directory, no test or invariable formulae to determine this question can be laid down. For this purpose, the object of the particular provision is required to be considered. While considering the question as to whether a particular rule is mandatory or directory, no test or invariable formulae to determine this question can be laid down. For this purpose, the object of the particular provision is required to be considered. If, after considering the object of the Rule it is found that the intention of the rule-making authority is to make a specific provision with regard to a certain matter for the purposes of the avoidance or prevention of public mischief, the provision has to be held as mandatory. The object of sub-rule (3) of R. 23 as the aforesaid Rules is to restrict the discretion of the District Officer by providing that the right of extraction of minor minerals could be given only by public auction. The power to waive with sub-rule (3) of R. 23 was kept in reserve by the State Government for exercise by it. ( 12 ) IN Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.), Sindri v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344 , Chandrachud, C. J. observed that sales of public property, when the intention is to get the best price, ought to take place publicly. ( 13 ) IN State of U. P. v. Shiv Charan Sharma, AIR 1981 SC 1722 , the Supreme Court observed that public auction with open participation and a reserved price guarantees public interest being fully subserved. ( 14 ) LEST we are understood to have laid down that in every case public auction must take place and that the Government has no power to give the property of its own by tender. We wish to make it clear that we have no such intention. What we are at present dealing with is a limited question and that was since the rules applicable to the matter in question do not confer any discretion on the respondent No. 3 to let out the right of extraction of sand by giving mining permit, the letting out the same by giving the permit to respondent No. 4 was against the mandate of sub-rule (3) of R. 23 of the aforesaid Rules. Granting of "mining Permit" by respondent No. 3 to respondent No. 4 has resulted in the breach of statutory provision. Granting of "mining Permit" by respondent No. 3 to respondent No. 4 has resulted in the breach of statutory provision. ( 15 ) COUNSEL for the respondent No. 4 by placing reliance on the notification, reference to which has been made above, urged that like other plots, which are mentioned therein, since plot Nos. 702 and 703 had not been described, the State could not be said to have issued a notification under sub-rule (1) of R. 23 in respect of the sand regarding which mining permit had been issued to him. Consequently the submission made by the learned counsel was that sub-rule (3) of R. 23 do not apply. We are not in agreement with his submission. The plots were given in respect of the sand. No number of plots can be given inasmuch as the State could not know as to which particular plot would get sand accumulated or collected. It was for this reason that a general notification had been made intimating that the said Notification was in respect of all the plots which were situated on the bank of rivers Ganga and Jamuna and others, over which sand got collected. This could be the only move under R. 23 (1) of the aforesaid Rules for notifying that the right of extraction of Balu which got collected in the plots situated on the bank of rivers, would be let out for mining operations only by public auction. It has not been disputed, nor it could have been disputed that minerals vest in the State. "minor Minerals" have been defined in the Mineral Rules to mean building stones, gravel, ordinary clay, ordinary sand other than sand used for prescribed purposes and any other mineral which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a minor mineral. Minor minerals vest in the State in which the land is situated. In our opinion, as the description of specific numbers of the plots over which sand would got collected was not possible, it is incorrect to argue that no notification under sub-rule (1) of R. 23 of the aforesaid Rule, had been made by the State of U. P. in respect of the same. In our opinion, as the description of specific numbers of the plots over which sand would got collected was not possible, it is incorrect to argue that no notification under sub-rule (1) of R. 23 of the aforesaid Rule, had been made by the State of U. P. in respect of the same. ( 16 ) COUNSEL for the respondent No. 4 also urged that as in the Civil suit, the rights of respondent No. 4 with regard to the plots in question had been followed, he had the right to extract sand and for this purpose, he was not required to either participate at the public auction or to obtain mining permit. We do not agree with this submission. We have quoted a part of the judgment of the Additional District Judge, by which the only right recognized by the Court was that of cultivation. With respect to extraction and collection of sand, it was specifically provided that the respondent No. 4 had no right to do so and the same was subject to the provisions of Minor Minerals Rules. ( 17 ) FOR what we have stated above, we find that the mining permit granted to the respondent No. 4 was against sub-rule (3) of R. 23 of the aforesaid Rules but there is a difficulty in granting final relief to the petitioners in the instant case. The difficulty is that the period for which the mining permit was granted, would be over by the end of December, 1985. Under the permit, mining operation had to be done within six months. Operations had started on 8th July, 1985. If we were to direct respondent No. 3 to hold a public auction in respect of the sand in question, he would be required to follow the procedure provided by R. 27 of the Rules aforesaid. Cl. (a) of the aforesaid Rule requires "at least thirty days before the auction is to be held, the District Officer shall notify, in the manner given below, the date, time and place of auction and the terms and conditions of the lease". The compliance of this provision is mandatory. We do not have any power to call upon the respondent No. 3 to waive with the same. Consequently, it appears that in the circumstances of the present case holding of the public auction has become impossible. The compliance of this provision is mandatory. We do not have any power to call upon the respondent No. 3 to waive with the same. Consequently, it appears that in the circumstances of the present case holding of the public auction has become impossible. The right of the respondent No. 4 would be extinguished by the end of this year. Since no useful purpose would be served by issuing the writ, we consider it to be appropriate, in this case, to decline to do so. ( 18 ) IN K. N. Guruswamy v. State of Mysore, AIR 1954 SC 592 , the Supreme Court found that although the lease given was illegal, but as the relief of cancellation of the same would be meaningless, it refused to do so. The relevant portion of the judgment of that case is quoted below:-"none of it can be ignored. We would therefore in the ordinary course have given the appellant the writ he seeks. But, owing to the time which this matter has taken to reach us (a consequence for which the appellant is in no way to blame, for he has done all he could to have an early hearing), there is barely a fortnight of the contract left to go. We were told that the excise year for this contract (1953-54) expires early in June. A writ would therefore be ineffective and as it is not our practice to issue meaningless writs we must dismiss this appeal and leave the appellant contest with an enunciation of the law. " ( 19 ) FOR what we have stated above, we reject the writ petition summarily. This is being done under R. 2 of Chapter 22 of the Rules of Court. ( 20 ) BEING not satisfied that the present case raised any substantial question of law of general importance, we reject the prayer for leave to Supreme Court made orally. Petition dismissed. .