JUDGMENT V.K. Khanna, J. - This is a Defendant's second appeal arising out of a suit filed by the Plaintiff-Respondent for declaration that the order of his removal from service was illegal and void and the Plaintiff-Respondent still continued to be in service of the Defendant-Appellants as Turner. 2. Brief facts for the purpose of deciding the present appeal are that admittedly the Plaintiff-Respondent was working as a Turner and was removed from service on 15.06.1965. The Plaintiff preferred statutory appeal to the higher authority which was dismissed on 25.09.1967. Thereafter the Plaintiff filed a writ petition in the High Court on 02.02.1968 which was dismissed on 12.04.1968 on the ground that the Plaintiff can file a suit. 3. The Plaintiff challenged his removal order on the ground that the same was illegal and void for the reasons alleged in paragraph 3 of the plaint. The aforesaid suit was contested by the Defendants on the ground that it was not cognizable by the court and the suit was barred by limitation and that the termination order had been passed in accordance with law. 4. The trial court decided all issues in favor of the Plaintiff and decreed his suit with costs. Feeling aggrieved, the Defendants preferred an appeal which too has been dismissed. The present second appeal has been filed challenging the judgments and decrees of the two courts below. 5. In this second appeal the only question which has been argued is regarding limitation. Admittedly, the Article which is applicable in this case is Article 58 of the Indian Limitation Act. The initial order terminating the services was passed on 15.06.1965. Suit has been filed on 19th November, 1968. The Plaintiff had also preferred a departmental appeal which was dismissed on 25.09.1967. A writ petition was filed which too was dismissed on 12.04.1968 with the observation that the Plaintiff should seek his remedy by filing a suit. The sole question which arises in this appeal is as to whether the limitation starts from 15th June 1965 or the initial order will be deemed to have been merged in the appellate Order dated 25.09.1967. 6. The Appellant has mainly relied on a Supreme Court case reported in Sita Ram Goel Vs. The Municipal Board, Kanpur and Others, AIR 1958 SC 1036 . 6. The Appellant has mainly relied on a Supreme Court case reported in Sita Ram Goel Vs. The Municipal Board, Kanpur and Others, AIR 1958 SC 1036 . In this case relying on the earlier Supreme Court case reported in State of U.P. v. Mohd Nooh AIR 1958 SC 86 the Supreme Court held that there was no question of any merger as the order of dismissal passed was an administrative order. 7. The Respondent's counsel has, however, relied on a latter Supreme Court decision reported in Collector of Customs, Calcutta Vs. East India Commercial Co. Ltd., AIR 1963 SC 1124 in which Mohd Nooh's case has been explained and it has been held that the original order will merge in the appellate order. 8. In the case of Sitaram Goel (Supra) the Supreme Court relying on the case of State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh (supra) held that the departmental enquiry even though culminated in decision on appeal and revision cannot be equated with proceedings before the regular courts of law and that the analogy of the decree of the trial Court merging into a decree of appellate court clearly does not apply to these cases. It was held that when even if the analogy applies, where the decree of the appellate court only affirms the decree of the trial court, this Court has held in the case of State of U.P. v. Mobd Nooh (supra) that the original decree of the trial court remains operative. The decision in the case of Sitaram Goel has been given by a bench of five Judges of the Supreme Court. The latter decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector of Customs, Calcutta (supra) has also been given by five Judges of the Supreme Court. The law on this point has been declared by the Supreme Court itself that it is the declaration given by latter Bench of the Supreme Court of equal strength or more strength which will prevail. It has, therefore, to be seen as to whether on the case of Collector of Customs Calcutta (supra) the Supreme Court has held contra to what has been held in the case of Sitaram Goel. 9. A close scrutiny of Sitaram Goel's case (supra) shows that the principle of merger was negative mainly on the basis of the case of State of U.P. v. Mohd Nooh (supra). 9. A close scrutiny of Sitaram Goel's case (supra) shows that the principle of merger was negative mainly on the basis of the case of State of U.P. v. Mohd Nooh (supra). In the case of Collector of Customs, the Supreme Court specifically adverted to the question in paragraph 4 of the report as to whether the order of the original authority merge into the order of the Appellate Authority even where the Appellate Authority merely dismisses the appeal without any modification of the order of the original authority. It was held : In all these three cases after the appellate authority has disposed of the appeal, the operative order is the order of the appellate authority whether it has reversed the original order or modified it or confirmed it. In law, the appellate, order of confirmation is quite as efficacious as an operative order as an appellate order or reversal of modification. We therefore, feel that on principle when once an order of an original authority is taken in appeal to the appellate authority, which is located beyond territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, it is the order of latter authority which is the operative order after the appeal is disposed of: and as the High Court can not issue a writ against the appellate authority for want of territorial jurisdiction it would not be open to it to issue a writ to the original authority which may be within its territorial jurisdiction once the appeal is disposed of, though it may be that the appellate authority has merely confirmed the order of the original authority and dismissed the appeal. Reliance was placed by the Supreme Court on the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay Vs. Amritlal Bhogilal and Co., AIR 1958 SC 86 8 in which at page 871 it was held that as a result of the confirmation or affordance of the decision of the Tribunal by the appellate authority the original decision merges in the appellate decision and it is the appellate decision alone which subsists and is operative and capable of enforcement. (Emphasis provided) 10. In the case of Collector of Customs (supra) main reliance was placed on the decision in the case of State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh (supra). The Supreme Court in connection with this case held: As was pointed out in Madan Gopal Rungta Vs. (Emphasis provided) 10. In the case of Collector of Customs (supra) main reliance was placed on the decision in the case of State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh (supra). The Supreme Court in connection with this case held: As was pointed out in Madan Gopal Rungta Vs. Secretary to The Government of Orissa, AIR 1962 SC 1513 , Mohd. Nooh's case AIR 1958 SC 86 , was a special case, which stands on its own facts. The question there was whether a writ Under Article 226 could be issued in respect of a dismissal which was effective from 1948. The relief that was being sought was against an order of dismissal which came into existence before the constitution came into force and remained effective all along even after the dismissal of the appeal and the revision from that order. It was in those special circumstances that this Court held that the dismissal had taken place in 948 and it could not be the subject matter of consideration Under Article 226 of the Constitution, for that would be giving retrospective effect to the Article. The argument based on the principle of merger was repelled by this Court in that case on two grounds, namely, (i) that the principle of merger applicable to decrees of Court would not be applicable to departmental tribunals, and (ii) that the original order would be operative on its on strength and did not gain greater efficacy by the subsequent order of dismissal of the appeal or revision. In effect, this means that even if the principle of merger were applicable to an order of dismissal like the one in Mohd Nooh's case (supra), the fact would still remain that the dismissal was before the Constitution came into force and therefore the person dismissed could not take advantage of the provisions of the Constitution, so far as that dismissal was concerned. That case was not concerned with the territorial juristic-life of the High Court where the original authority is within such territorial jurisdiction while the appellate authority Is not and must therefore, be confined to the special facts with which it was dealing. We have therefore no hesitation in holding consistently with, the view taken by this Court in A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar Vs. M. Venkitachalam Potti and Another, AIR 1956 SC 246 as well as in Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay Vs. We have therefore no hesitation in holding consistently with, the view taken by this Court in A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar Vs. M. Venkitachalam Potti and Another, AIR 1956 SC 246 as well as in Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay Vs. Amritlal Bhogilal and Co., AIR 1958 SC 86 8 that the order of the original authority must be held to have merged in the order of the appellate authority in a case like the present and it is only the order of the appellate authority which is operative after the appeal is disposed of." (Emphasis provided). 11. From what has been quoted above from the decision in the case of Collector of Customs (supra), it, therefore, becomes clear that the Supreme Court in this latter decision has clearly held that the case of State of U.P. v. Mohd Nooh (supra) was confined to the special facts with which ,it was dealing otherwise the principle of merger was clearly applicable and that the order of the original authority would merge in the order of the appellate authority and that it is the appellate decision alone which subsists and is operative and can be enforced. 12. In view of what has been held by the Supreme Court in the latter decision in the case of Collector of Customs (supra) I am of the opinion that at the time of the filing of the suit, the appeal having been disposed of, the initial order passed had merged in the appellate order and that was the only order which was subsisting and was operative and was capable of enforcement. There is no dispute that in case the limitation is taken from the date of dismissal of the appeal, the suit had been filed within limitation. In my opinion, therefore, the view taken by the two courts below on this question cannot be said to be suffering from any error of law requiring interference in exercise of the powers u/s 100 Code of Civil Procedure. 13. No other point has been pressed before me. 14. For the reasons stated above the present second appeal fails and is dismissed, However, there shall be no order as to costs in this appeal.