JUDGMENT B. N. Sapru, J. - The petitioner, Shitla Prasad, was appointed as a Conductor with effect from 18th Apr. 1980 on a temporary basis in the vacancy caused by the suspension of Sri Uma Shanker Tiwari in the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation by an order dated 29th Apr., 1980. This appointment continued from time to time in short term leave vacancies. The last order of appointment made in favour of the plaintiff is dated 21st Aug.. 1981, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure 'I' to the counter-affidavit. In this order it was stated in Cl. (3) that the service conditions would be governed by the rules and regulations to be framed under S. 45 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. The petitioner was served with the charge- sheets on the ground that he has committed certain irregularities and an explanation was called. A regular enquiry was held and the charges were found proved by the Assistant Regional Manager who by an order dated 23rd Jan., 1982 (Annexure 'V' to the writ petition) removed the petitioner from service. 2. It is against this order that the present writ petition has been filed. 3. The argument of the learned counsel advanced on behalf of the petitioner has to be seriously considered. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that under Cl. 14(c) of the Model Standing Order it is provided that where a workman has been found guilty of the charges framed against him and it is considered fit to award a punishment specified in the Model Standing Orders he has to be given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation against the penalty proposed to be inflicted upon him. It is not disputed in this case that after the petitioner had been found guilty no opportunity of making representation as against the penalty proposed to be inflicted was given to him and the order of removal from service was passed straightway. 4. According to the respondents no standing orders have been framed by the respondent-Corporation in respect of its employees whose number was more than 50,000 except for those employees who are employed at the Central Workshop, Kanpur and The Regional Workshop, Kanpur. It is, therefore, submitted on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner cannot rely upon the Model Standing Order 14 and can get no benefit of it. 5. It is, therefore, submitted on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner cannot rely upon the Model Standing Order 14 and can get no benefit of it. 5. It is then urged that the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation is a statutory Corporation and was constituted with effect from 1st June, 1972 and it succeeded to the assets and liabilities of the erstwhile U.P. Government Roadways vide Notification No. 3242/xxx-2- 159-N/72 dated 30th June, 1972 published in the gazette dated 15th July. 1972. It is submitted that it was clearly provided that the corporation would frame its own service rules and until then the existing rules applicable in the erstwhile U.P. Government Roadways would continue to apply, and as such all those rules and regulations applicable to the employees of the erstwhile U.P. Government Roadways, were applicable to the employees of the Corporation. 6. It is then submitted that the petitioner having been employed in the Corporation on temporary basis for a fixed term from time to time and was governed by the rules and regulations applicable to other employees of the Corporation including the terms and conditions mentioned in the order of appointment. It is also the case of the respondents that the last order of appointment of the petitioner was dated 21st Aug., 1981. It clearly shows that the petitioner's services were to be governed by the rules and regulations which were framed by the Corporation under S. 4512)(c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. The relevant regulations were published and enforced with effect from 19th June, 1981. Regulation 64 deals with the procedure for awarding penalty. No provision has been made in regulation for giving a second opportunity to show-cause against the proposed punishment and it is no longer necessary to afford a second opportunity of showing cause against the proposed punishment. Consequently it is stated that there was no need to give any opportunity to the petitioner against the proposed penalty of removal from service. 7. The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 came into force on 23rd Dec. Consequently it is stated that there was no need to give any opportunity to the petitioner against the proposed penalty of removal from service. 7. The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 came into force on 23rd Dec. 1963, Section 12-A reads as follows : "12-A. Temporary application of Standing Orders.-11) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 3 to 12, for the period commencing on the date on which this Act becomes applicable to an industrial establishment and ending with the date on which the standing orders as finally certified under this Act come into operation under S. 7 in that establishment the prescribed model standing orders shall he deemed to be adopted in that establishment. and the provisions of S. 9, sub-sec. (2) of S. 13 and S. 13-A shall apply to such model standing orders as they apply to the standing orders so certified." 8. It is not suggested by the respondents that the U.P. Government Roadways or the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation are not an industrial establishment within the meaning of S. 2(e) of the aforesaid Act. It is therefore, to be seen whether the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 applied to the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation which had admittedly not framed any Standing Orders for employees like the petitioner. Section 12-A(1) has already been quoted above. It becomes applicable to an Industrial establishment. It provides that Model Standing Orders shall be deemed to be adopted by any industrial establishment till it has framed standing orders and are finally certified under the Act. To hold that the Act would not apply to industrial establishments which came into existence after the date of enforcement of the aforesaid Act, would exclude practically all industrial establishments which came into existence after the Act was enforced and which had not framed Standing Orders and got them certified under the Act. This would defeat the intent underlying the Act. 9. It is admitted that the regulations framed by the Corporation have not been notified under S. 13-B of the Act. Had the regulations been notified under the Act the Industrial Standing Orders would not have applied to the Corporation. This has been settled by the Supreme Court in its decision in the case of the U.P. State Electricity Board v. Hari Shanker Jain, reported in AIR 1979 SC 65 , 1976 Lab IC 1720 (All). Had the regulations been notified under the Act the Industrial Standing Orders would not have applied to the Corporation. This has been settled by the Supreme Court in its decision in the case of the U.P. State Electricity Board v. Hari Shanker Jain, reported in AIR 1979 SC 65 , 1976 Lab IC 1720 (All). In that case the State Electricity Board had made regulations under the powers conferred upon it under sub-sec. (c) of S. 79 of the Electricity (Supply) Act (1948). These regulations have been notified under S. 13-B of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. It was consequently held that the regulation would govern the employees and not the Standing Orders. In para 9 of the judgment it was observed as follows : "We have already shown that the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act is a Special Act dealing with a specific subject, namely the Conditions of Service, enumerated in the Schedule, of workmen in industrial establishments. It is impossible to conceive that Parliament sought to abrogate the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act embodying as they do an elaborate procedure, including a quasi- judicial determination by a general incidental provision like S. 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act. It is obvious that Parliament did not have before it the Standing Orders Act when it passed the Electricity (Supply) Act and Parliament never meant that the Standing Orders Act should stand pro tanto repealed by S. 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act. We are clearly of the view that the provisions of the Standing Orders Act must prevail over S. 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act in regard to matters to which the Standing Orders Act applies." 10. It would be clearly seen from this judgment that if the regulations had not been notified under S. 13-B of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, the Standing Orders would have governed the employees and not the regulations framed by the Board. 11. The learned counsel for the respondent Sri S. K. Sharma has strongly relied upon U.P. Government Notification No. 2828(LL)/XVIII-450(LL)-50, dated 18th Nov., 1950. 11. The learned counsel for the respondent Sri S. K. Sharma has strongly relied upon U.P. Government Notification No. 2828(LL)/XVIII-450(LL)-50, dated 18th Nov., 1950. Under that Notification it has been provided that in Uttar Pradesh nothing contained in the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 shall apply provided that in Uttar Pradesh this Act shall apply to all Industrial establishments employing less than 100 workmen and in which the employers voluntarily apply for certification of the Standing Orders. On the basis of the notification Sri S.K. Sharma argued that in Uttar Pradesh the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 does not apply to any establishment which employees more than 100 workmen and in which the employers have not made an application for certification. Section 1(3) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, provides that it applies to every industrial establishment wherein one hundred or more workmen are employed, or were employed on any day of the preceding twelve months; provided that the appropriate Government may, after giving not less than two months' notice of its intention so to do, by notification in the official Gazette, apply the provisions of this Act to any industrial establishment employing such number of persons less than one hundred as may be specified in the notification. 12. Sri S.K. Sharma relying on the aforesaid proviso to S. 1(3) of the Act argued that S. 1(3) restricts the operation of the Act instead of extending it. This argument cannot be accepted. The proviso confers a power on the appropriate Government of applying the provisions of the Act to any industrial establishment employing such number of persons less than 100, as may be specified in the notification. It will be clear that under S. 1(3) of the Act, the Act applies to every industrial establishment employing 100 or more workers as employees. By virtue of the proviso to the S. 1(3) the Act can be made applicable to any industrial establishment employing less than 100 industrial workers. 13. In view of the fact that the petitioner's, services have been terminated without complying with the Model Standing Order 14 of the Standing Orders, the order of removal cannot stand. 14. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. The impugned order 1 Annexure 5 to the writ petition) dated 23rd Jan., 1981 is quashed. 13. In view of the fact that the petitioner's, services have been terminated without complying with the Model Standing Order 14 of the Standing Orders, the order of removal cannot stand. 14. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. The impugned order 1 Annexure 5 to the writ petition) dated 23rd Jan., 1981 is quashed. The petitioner shall be treated as in the employment since the date of the aforesaid order. It will be open to the respondents to proceed with the enquiry against the petitioner from the stage at which it was left. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.