A. M. AHMADI, J. ( 1 ) BY these two writ petitions the election of the concerned respondents to the Senate of the South Gujarat University came to be challenged. When these petitions came up for hearing before me on 26/04/1982 my attention was invited to sec. 59 of the South Gujarat University Act 1965 which inter alia provided for a reference of a dispute involving the election of any member to the Chancellor by the Vice Chancellor. The Chancellor was enjoined to decide the question and his decision was made final under the said provision. It was argued on behalf of the South Gujarat University and the elected respondents that an efficacious remedy was provided by sec. 59 of the Act. Counsel for the University also stated at the Bar that he had instructions from the Vice Chancellor to mention to the Court that on receipt of a representation from the petitioner concerning the election of the respondents he will make a reference to the Chancellor as provided by sec. 59 of the Act On the basis of this statement proceeded to pass the following order: "i am therefore of the opinion that having regard to the wide language of section 59 of the Act the present petition should be treated by the Vice Chancellor as petitions challenging the election of the concerned respondents addressed to him under section 59 if the Act and refer the same to the Chancellor for her decision. The Chancellor will I am sure having regard to the urgency of the matters give an early hearing to the parties and dispose of the dispute at an early date to avoid complications in future. It may be clarified that if any material is used by the Chancellor on advice sought from any source whatsoever against the petitioners the petitioners will be given all opportunity to controvert that material. The Chancellor may also grant an audience to the petitioners and hear them on questions of law and fact before finally adjudicating upon the dispute raised in these two petitions. If after the decision of the Chancellor the petitioners still feel aggrieved it will be open to them to revive these petitions by filing a mere note". ( 2 ) SUBSEQUENTLY Miscellaneous Civil Applications Nos. 381 and 382 of 1982 were filed seeking clarification. If after the decision of the Chancellor the petitioners still feel aggrieved it will be open to them to revive these petitions by filing a mere note". ( 2 ) SUBSEQUENTLY Miscellaneous Civil Applications Nos. 381 and 382 of 1982 were filed seeking clarification. Dealing with these applications I passes the following order on 7/07/1982"it is clarified that it will be open to the Chancellor to direct the Secretary Legal Department to record the evidence and to submit a report to her along with the evidence. Thereafter the Chancellor will proceed to dispose of the matter in the light of the judgment of this Court dated 26/04/1983 as hereby clarified. The Chancellor may direct the Law Secretary to record the evidence and submit the report as early as possible but not later than six weeks so that the questions raised could be adjudicated early. The Civil Applications are disposed of accordingly". ( 3 ) PURSUANT to the above order the petitioners received a letter dated 22/02/1983 from the office of the Chancellor stating that the report of the Secretary Legal Department was received along with the evidence recorded by him. A copy of the said report was sent to the petitioners with a view to giving them an opportunity to controvert the same before the Chancellor took a final decision on the references made to him. The letter proceeds to state as under:"in case you have to say anything against that report you are advised to send failing which it will be presumed that you have nothing to say in the matter and the Chancellor will finally decide the aforesaid references". ( 4 ) ON receipt of this letter Mr. V. M. Trivedi learned advocate for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 1521 of 1982 replied on 2/03/1983 as under:-"therefore Chancellor has to hear the petitioner (and other party) and to decide the dispute referred to her. Therefore petitioner says that petitioner wants personal hearing and wants to make oral submissions through me on the basis of the petition evidence produced on record report submitted by Secretary Shri Satwani and the various High Court and Supreme Court decisions on the point involved in the dispute referred to her". Therefore petitioner says that petitioner wants personal hearing and wants to make oral submissions through me on the basis of the petition evidence produced on record report submitted by Secretary Shri Satwani and the various High Court and Supreme Court decisions on the point involved in the dispute referred to her". Referring to the language of the letter received by him and apprehending that personal hearing may not be granted by the Chancellor he proceeded to add that under the Courts order he was entitled to a personal hearing and took strong exception if it was intended to be denied. To that the Chancellors secretariat replied on 8/03/1983 as under:-"your contentions arguments and pleadings may be put before the Chancellor in the written statement to enable her to take a final decision in the matter". IT became clear from this reply that a personal hearing was not intended to be given. Mr. Trivedi therefore wrote a letter dated 11/03/1983 reiterating his right to a personal hearing and strongly objecting to substituting the same by inviting a written statement. He therefore did not send any written statement as required by the letter of 8/03/1983 Thereupon the Chancellor. after going through the report of the Secretary Legal Department and the evidence placed before her took a final decision in the matter on 21/03/1983 which is produced at Annexure I to the petition No. 1521 of 1982. While taking the final decision the Chancellor observed that the parties had been given an opportunity of oral hearing producing their evidence and inspection of documents etc. by the Secretary Legal Department on behalf of the Chancellor as per the consent order of the Court. She therefore felt that no further oral hearing appeared necessary. Without giving any oral hearing she therefore proceeded to dispose of the references made to her. The petitioners have therefore once wain approached this Court with the plea that the rule of audi alteram partem was breached inasmuch as the Chancellor failed to grant audience as per this Courts order of 26/04/1982 ( 5 ) THERE is no doubt that this Court had by its order of 26/04/1989 the relevant part whereof is reproduced earlier expected the Chancellor to grant an audience to the petitioners and to hear them on questions of law and fact before finally adjudicating upon the disputes raised in the petitions. There can be no doubt that by the use of the expression grant an audience the Court expected the Chancellor to give a personal hearing to the parties to the reference. In other words the Court had while passing the above order recognised the right of the parties to a personal hearing before the Chancellor before the final adjudication of the references. By stating that no oral hearing appears necessary the Chancellor had overlooked this Courts order of 26/04/1982 whereby an audience was to be granted to the parties to the reference. There can therefore be no doubt that the Chancellor by refusing to grant a personal hearing to the parties to the reference did not in terms comply with this Courts order of 26/04/1982. ( 6 ) THE learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the Chancellor submitted that since she had given the petitioners an opportunity of submitting a written statement on the report of the Secretary Legal Department by the letter of 8th March 1983 the princrinciple of natural justice stood complied with. He submitted that the principle of natural justice did not mean that in every case a personal hearing must be given to the parties to the dispute. In support of this contention he invited my attention to the observations of the Supreme Court in Madhya Pradesh Industries v. Union of India A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 671 wherein Subba Rao J. speaking for the Bench observed in paragraph 10 as under:-"it is no doubt a principle of natural justice that a quasi judicial Tribunal cannot make any decision adverse to a party without giving him an effective opportunity of meeting any relevant allegations against him. . . . The said opportunity need not necessarily be by personal. hearing. It could be by written representation. Whether the said opportunity should be by written representation or by personal hearing depends upon the facts or each case and ordinarily it is in the discretion of the Tribunal". Again in Union of India v. Jyoti Prakash Miller A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 1093 the question which arose for consideration was whether Article 217 (3) of the Constitution guarantees a right of personal hearing. In that case the question at issue was the true date of birth of the respondent. Again in Union of India v. Jyoti Prakash Miller A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 1093 the question which arose for consideration was whether Article 217 (3) of the Constitution guarantees a right of personal hearing. In that case the question at issue was the true date of birth of the respondent. Under Article 217 (3) of the Constitution the question had to be decided by the President and his decision was final. The short question which arose for consideration was whether it was imperative for the President to give a personal hearing before deciding the question at issue. Dealing with this question the Court observed as under in paragraph 25 of the judgment:-"article 217 (3) does not guarantee a right of personal hearing. In a proceeding of a judicial nature the basic rules of natural justice must be followed. The respondent was on that account entitled to make a representation. But it is not necessarily an incident of the rules of natural justice that personal hearing must be given to a party likely to be affected by the order". THERE can be no doubt that the principle of natural justice does not in all cases expect the Tribunal or authority dealing with a quasi judicial matter to give a personal hearing to the concerned parties. But as observed in the Madhya Pradesh Industries case (supra) the question whether the opportunity to be granted should be by written representation or by personal hearing depends upon the facts of each case and ordinarily is left to the. discretion of the Tribunal. If this Court had not made a specific order for the grant of audience it could perhaps be validly argued that the Chancellor was not bound to give a personal hearing to the concerned parties. But once this Court by its order dated 26/04/1982 in no uncertain terms expected the Chancellor to grant an audience. the Chancellor was bound to give a personal hearing before answering the reference. I am therefore of the opinion that having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case and having regard to the specific order of this Court for grant of an audience to the concerned parties it cannot be validly argued on the strength of the aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court that the matter lay within the discretion of the Chancellor to grant or refuse a personal hearing. ( 7 ) REALISING this difficulty the learned Advocate General invited my attention to the amendment in section 59 of the Act by Gujarat Ordinance No. 3 of 1983 dated 25/01/1983. This Ordinance has since become an Act. By the said amendment. section 59 has been substituted. The relevant part of the substituted section reads as under:- 59 Where any question arises as to:- (1) x x x x x (2) whether a person has been duly elected or appointed as or is entitled to be or ceases to be entitled to be a member of any authority or other body of the University (B) it shall be referred to the State Government. . . . . . . . THEREFORE by the newly inserted section instead of the Chancellor to whom the dispute could be referred the law now provides that the dispute shall be referred to the Government and the decision of the State Government shall be final. The Statement of Objects and Reasons indicates that since the Governor of Gujarat happens to be the Chancellor of all Universities except M. S. University Baroda the duty to decide such disputes devolved upon him and in view of the recent trends of the Courts the Chancellor is called upon to give hearing to the parties before deciding the disputes. In view of the august position of the Governor it was thought advisable to absolve him from entertaining controversial disputes. It was for this reason that the law was amended to provide that the references shall be made to the State Government instead of the Chancellor While frankly conceding that the said provision was not instead to be retrospective and references pending before the Chancellor at the commencement thereof had to be disposed of by him the learned Advocate General stated that having regard to the spirit and the intention discernible from the language of the amended provisions and the1a Statement of Objects and Reasons this Court may refuse to make a back reference to the Chancellor on the ground that personal hearing was denied to the petitioners. The right to a personal hearing is an important right and the Cour will not lightly deny the same to the concerned parties more so in a case like this where the petitioners did not file a written statement since this Court had by its order of 26/04/1982 expected the Chancellor to grant an audience. However in order to curtail the time that may be consumed for personal hearing I direct that the petitioners will submit a statement in the form of written arguments within fifteen days from today. The counsel for the petitioners will also indicate in the said written statement the main points which they would like to emphasise at the time of personal hearing. It will be open to the Chancellor to allot time for personal hearing which may not be less than an hour for each petitioner. Proportionate time may be given to the concerned respondents. ( 8 ) THE learned Advocate General raised one further point bearing on the language of Article 361 (4) of the Constitution. Article 361 (1) says that the Governor shall not be answerable to any Court for the exercise and performance of the powers and duties of his office or for any act done or purported to be done by him in the exercise and performance of those powers and duties. Clause (4) of Article 361 on which reliance was placed by the learned Advocate General next provides that no civil proceedings in which relief is claimed against a Governor of a State shall be instituted during his term of office in any Court in respect of any act done or purporting to be done by him in his personal capacity whether before or after he entered upon his office as Governor until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered or left at his office stating the nature of the proceedings the cause of action therefore the name description and place of residence of the party by whom such proceedings are to be instituted and the relief which he claims. In the first place it must be realised that this is not a `lis against the Governor for any act done or purporting to be done by him whether before or after he entered upon his office as the Governor of the State. In the first place it must be realised that this is not a `lis against the Governor for any act done or purporting to be done by him whether before or after he entered upon his office as the Governor of the State. No relief is claimed against him for any act of commission or omission by him. He is merely called upon to perform his statutory duty as a Chancellor under sec. 59 of the Act on the reference having been made to him by the Vice Chancellor. Apart from the fact that the reference has not been disposed of by the present Chancellor and therefore it is not any act cone or purporting to he done by the present Chancellor that is the subject matter of review by this Court Article 361 (4) call only be invoked if relief is claimed against the Governor in any civil proceeding instituted during his term of office in respect of any act done or purporting to be done in his personal capacity. In such a case two months notice would be required before the institution of any such proceedings. Since the Governor in his capacity as the Chancellor is charged with the duty to adjudicate upon the reference made to him under section 59 of the Act it cannot be said that civil proceedings of the type contemplated by Article 361 (4) of the Constitution have been instituted against him for specific reliefs all that the Court expects is that the Chancellor should dispose of the reference made to him under section 59 of the Act after giving a personal hearing to the concerned parties ( 9 ) IN view of the above order passed by the Chancellor dated 21/03/1983 is set aside and the matter will go back to the Chancellor for disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made hereinabove from the stage immediately prior to the date of the said order. The petitioners are directed to file their written arguments within fifteen days from today as stated earlier and if they fail to do so it will be assumed that they do not desire to avail of the opportunity of hearing including the opportunity of personal hearing After the written arguments are received the Chancellor will intimate the date for personal hearing to the concerned parties. (ATP) Order modified. .