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1985 DIGILAW 1160 (ALL)

Brahmadeo v. Deputy Director of Consolidation

1985-12-04

B.L.YADAV

body1985
JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav, J. - These two petitions arise out of similar facts involving similar question of law, hence it would be convenient to dispose them of by a common judgment. Writ Petition No. 11059 of 1980 is against the order dated 20th July 1980 passed by Assistant Director of Consolidation, order dated 25th September, 1978 passed by Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation and the order dated 16th October 1971 passed by Consolidation Officer in proceedings u/s 9A(2) of U.P. C.H. Act (for short the Act), Writ Petition No. 9127 of 1980 is directed against the order of the same date passed by Assistant Director of Consolidation and the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation an 1 the order dated 25th June 1977 passed by Assistant Consolidation Officer. 2. The facts lie in a narrow compass and they are these. In the basic year the plots in chak No. 53 in village Mahen Babu and other plots No. 870 and 956 were entered in the name of Gajadhar and Harjeet Dubey. Smt. Rama Devi Respondent No. 4 filed objection u/s 12 of the Act alleging that she had objected a gift deed dated 29th February 1960 from Gajadhar and Harjeet Dubey the recorded tenure holders hence her name may be entered in place of the donors but later on she made an application that her objection u/s 12 may be treated as u/s 9A(2) and made an application for condonation of delay. The delay was condoned and her objection was treated to be u/s 9A(2). The Consolidation Officer by his order dated 16.10.1971 decided the case in her favour. It was ordered that her name may be entered in place of donors. In Writ Petition No. 9127 of 1980 the Assistant Consolidation Officer by his order dated 25.06.77 treating the case to be uncontested directed the name of Smt. Rama Devi to be entered in place of donors. 3. It was ordered that her name may be entered in place of donors. In Writ Petition No. 9127 of 1980 the Assistant Consolidation Officer by his order dated 25.06.77 treating the case to be uncontested directed the name of Smt. Rama Devi to be entered in place of donors. 3. After the death of Harjeet Dubey on 22.02.77 Petitioners came to learn about a gift deed in favour of Smt. Rama Devi and the order in her favour, hence they filed appeal against those orders on 23.09.77 and alleged that they were not made parties to the case and were heirs of Gajadhar and Harjeet Dubey donors (i.e. being father's brother's son) hence were entitled to succeed u/s 177 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and donors had not in fact executed any gift deed in favour of Smt. Rama Devi and the gift deed was fictitious, forged and ante dated, and was never given effect to in revenue papers, nor donee entered into possession immediately after the gift deed, hence such gift deed was void and the name of donee may be expunged. An application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of delay was also Sled with allegations that Petitioners were not made parties to the case and they did not know either about the gift deed or orders of Consolidation Officer or Assistant Consolidation Officer. Petitioner's appeal was dismissed and thereafter revision was also filed but met the same fate. Against these orders the present petitions have been filed. 4. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners urged that the Petitioners were not made parties by Smt. Rama Devi nor Petitioners were given any notice for proceedings u/s 9A(2) even though they were heirs of donors and were entitled to inherit them, nor they had any knowledge. It is only after the death of Harjeet Dubey, when the donee tried to interfere in their possession that they came to know about the impugned orders, the delay was accordingly explained and it was prayed that delay in filing appeal may be condoned and same may be decided on merits. He relied on O.P. Kathpalia Vs. Lakhmir Singh (Dead) and Others, AIR 1984 SC 1744 5. He relied on O.P. Kathpalia Vs. Lakhmir Singh (Dead) and Others, AIR 1984 SC 1744 5. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 4, on the other hand, urged that as the Petitioners were not made parties to the case u/s 9A(2), hence in view of Section 11 of the Act, they had no right of appeal. He relied upon Vinkataraman Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation 1984 RD 26 Ram Lakhan v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 585 of 1979 decided on 7th August, 1980 and Lalta Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7179 of 1980, decided on 11th August,(?) 6. Having heard counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners are not without substance. In the instant case, Petitioners were not made parties by Smt. Rama Devi Respondent No. 4 in her objection and she obtained an order ex-parte in her favour against the interest of Petitioners. After the death of Harjeet Dubey, Petitioners came to learn about the impugned orders. The point which falls for consideration is as to whether a person, who is not a party under the facts and circumstances of the case and he gets rights of succession after death of recorded tenant can have right of appeal u/s 11. Relevant statutory provisions of Section 11 can be fruitfully set out below: 11. Appeals (1) Any Party to the proceedings, u/s 9A aggrieved by an order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer or the Consolidation Officer Under that Section, may within 21 days of the order, file an appeal before the Settlement Officer Consolidation. 7. In the aforesaid provision of Section 11 the interpretation of clause "any party to the proceedings" has to be ascertained. It is a fact that Petitioners were not made parties by Smt. Rama Devi when she filed objection u/s 9A(2). According to the admitted pedigree the Petitioners had no right of inheritance during life time of Gajadhar and Harjeet Dubey and only after their death Petitioners could claim succession u/s 171 of UP ZA and LR Act. When objection by the donee was filed Harjeet Dubey was alive and right of succession in favour of the Petitioners devolved only after his death. When objection by the donee was filed Harjeet Dubey was alive and right of succession in favour of the Petitioners devolved only after his death. In other words, the Petitioners became necessary parties to claim their legal rights u/s 171, and also to challenge the validity of the gift deed only after death of Harjeet Dubey (i. e. on 22.02.77). 8. In such situation the duty of the judicature is to discover and act upon the true intention of the Legislature" Mens " or " Sentenlia Legis ". The essence of the law lies in its spirit, not in its letter, for the letter is significant only as being the external manifestation of the intention that underlies it "(Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edition, page 24). There is Latin Adage "Animus Imponentis" which obviously means that the intention of the law givers has to be ascertained by the court while interpreting the particular statutory provision. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi Vs. S. Teja Singh, AIR 1959 SC 352 it has been held by the Supreme Court that any statute or any enacting provision must be so construed as to make it more effective and operative. In the present case this cannot be the intention of the Legislature that in all cases a person can become a party to the proceeding, only on the date when a case is filed against him. In some cases like present one at some future point of time when a cause of action accrues or a legal right is created in favour of any person, he can challenge earlier proceedings and his right to become a party would be deemed to have commenced by implication and the date when the objection was filed, but on record he was not impleaded as a party. 9. At this state I consider it proper to have Dictionary meaning of word "Party ". In view of dictum in R.S. Nayak Vs. A.R. Antulay, AIR 1984 SC 684 dictionary meaning of a word can be ascertained to have a correct interpretation. 9. At this state I consider it proper to have Dictionary meaning of word "Party ". In view of dictum in R.S. Nayak Vs. A.R. Antulay, AIR 1984 SC 684 dictionary meaning of a word can be ascertained to have a correct interpretation. In Webster's Third New International Dictionary word ' Party ' denotes one directly disclosed by record to be so involved in the prosecution of defence of a proceeding as to be bound by the decision or judgment therein; one indirectly disclosed by the record as being directly interested in the subject matter of a suit or as having power to make a defence or control the proceedings or appeal from the judgment, meaning of ' party' is. 10. According to "Bourvier's Law Dictionary " " Parties ", in law may be said to be those united in interest in the performance of an act. The term includes every party to a act. In equity all persons materially interested, either legally or beneficially in the subject matter of a suit, are to be made parties to it, either as Plaintiff or Defendant so that there may be a complete decree tha may bind them all--see Christian v.R. Co. 133 U.S. 233. It is not indispensable that all the parties should have an interest in all the matters contained in the suit, but it is sufficient if each party has an interest in some material matter in suit, and it is connected with the others--see Brovn v. Safe Deposit Co. 128 U. S. 403. In the absence of parties, and without their having an opportunity to be heard, a court is without jurisdiction to make an adjudication affecting them; Active parties are those who are so involved in the subject matter in controversy that no decree can be made without their being in court. Passive parties are those whose interests are involved in granting complete relief to those who ask it. 11. According to Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition) Volume 31 in its broadest meaning, the word "party " includes one concerned with, conducting, or taking part in any matter or proceeding, whether he is named or participates as formed party or not. A " party " to a judicial proceeding is one whose interest in subject matter, whether favorable or adverse is such that his presence on the record is either necessary or proper. 12. A " party " to a judicial proceeding is one whose interest in subject matter, whether favorable or adverse is such that his presence on the record is either necessary or proper. 12. In view of the aforesaid meaning of the word " party " it is evident that if a person is concerned with conducting or taking part in any matter or proceeding he is a party even though he may not have been imp leaded or made a party by the other side. Further the words u/s 11 of the Act are, '" any party" and not " any person imp leaded as party. " Legislature cannot make such provision that if an interested person is not made a party by the other side he cannot file an appeal, and he is helpless. Assuming he does not file an appeal he shall have to file an objection afresh which would go barred by Section 11A in case he files a civil suit for cancellation of the order of Consolidation Officer or Assistant Consolidation Officer that can abate u/s 5. In case he does not file an appeal or objection during consolidation operation, and if he prefers to file a suit after denotification u/s 52, his suit would be barred by Section 49 of the Act. By enacting Section 11 and using word "any party " the intention of the Legislature cannot be to deprive a person from right of appeal. The interpretation of a particular statutory provision has to be effective and operative. I am accordingly, of the view that Petitioners have a right of appeal even though they were not imp leaded as a party in the objection filed by Smt. Rama Devi, Respondent No. 4. 13. Ram Lakhan v. Deputy Director of Consolidation (supra) (relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Respondent) was a case based on different facts. In that case after the death of last male tenant, rights were claimed by Petitioners. As she was widow she had a right to file an objection at the time when objections were filed by Petitioner, and others, as cause of action accrued in her favour immediately after the death but in the instant case cause of action, coupled with legal rights, accrued in favour of Petitioners at much later date after death of Harjeet Dubey, accordingly that case is of no assistance. 14. 14. Now the next point is as to whether consolidation authorities were justified in refusing to condone the delay. The case of the Petitioners has to be considered about the condo nation of delay as the Petitioners were not made parties by the Respondent No. 4 nor they had any knowledge before the death of Harjeet Dubey. 15. In the case O.P. Kathpalia Vs. Lakhmir Singh (Dead) and Others, AIR 1984 SC 1744 the Supreme Court has held as follows: In the application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act praying for condoning the delay in preferring the appeal it was specifically stated that the orders under appeal were made in the absence of the Appellant and on his back and without communicating the same to him ordinarily the view of the court dealing with facts in an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act would not be interfered unless the failure to exercise jurisdiction would lead to miscarriage of justice viewed from this angle, the Appellant had made out a very convincing and just-cause for condoning the delay in preferring the appeal. 16. In the instant case also Petitioners were not made parties to the objection, legal rights of inheritance in their favour, accrued, at some future time and they filed appeal alleging that neither they were made parties to the objection filed by the Respondent No. 4 for they had any prior knowledge of the impugned orders, hence observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in O.P. Kathpalia's case (Supra) are quite applicable and facts of the present case are also similar, hence Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation and Deputy Director of Consolidation should have condoned the delay and the refusal to condone the delay has resulted in miscarriage of justice. I am conscious about the limitations on this Court in exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Normally the condo nation of delay is not interfered with unless there are some exceptional circumstances. But under the peculiar facts of present case, refusal to condone the delay has resulted in miscarriage of justice, I am accordingly of the opinion that a case for interference under Article 226 has been made out. 17. Lalta Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation (Supra) (relied upon ' on behalf of the Respondent) was on different facts. But under the peculiar facts of present case, refusal to condone the delay has resulted in miscarriage of justice, I am accordingly of the opinion that a case for interference under Article 226 has been made out. 17. Lalta Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation (Supra) (relied upon ' on behalf of the Respondent) was on different facts. It was held by this Court in that case that sufficiency or insufficiency of the cause condoning the delay did not raise any controversy of jurisdictional nature. Similarly the case Venkataraman Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation (Supra) was also based on different facts and on the facts of that case it was held that finding on sufficiency or otherwise for cause shown for condo nation was not liable to interference. But as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in O.P. Kathpalia's case (Supra) if refusal to condone the delay leads to miscarriage of justice in that event interference can be made. 18. I am of the view that the observation made above that sufficient cause for condo nation of delay was made inasmuch as Petitioners were not made parties nor did they have any knowledge about the impugned orders and the gift deed in favour of the done. Under these circumstances the delay is condoned and consequently the impugned orders are rendered manifestly erroneous and cannot be sustained. 19. In view of the discussions made herein before both the writ petitions succeed and are allowed. All the impugned orders are quashed. The consolidation officer is directed to decide the case afresh in accordance with law after affording the parties to lead evidence, and after hearing them. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.