Research › Browse › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

1985 DIGILAW 1164 (ALL)

Udai Bhan Singh Chauhan v. Union of India

1985-12-04

K.C.AGRAWAL, R.P.SHUKLA

body1985
JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - The question arising is whether subsequent to November 2, 1985. when the Central Government has established the Central Administrative Tribunal (for short the Tribunal), this Court retains the jurisdiction, power and authority under Article 226 of the Constitution to entertain writ petitions in relation to matters concerning recruitment to any Service or post or service concerning members or any Service or persons appointed to any Service or post, as defined in the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (Central Act 13 of 1985). Section 14 (1) of the Act lays down that, as and from the appointed day, save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all Courts (except the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution) in relation to matters specified thereunder shall be exercised by the Tribunal, Section 28 (exclusion of jurisdiction of Courts except the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution) reads as under :- "On and from tho date from which any jurisdiction, powers and authority becomes exercisable under this Act by a Tribunal in relation to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to any Service or persons appointed to any Service or post of service matters concerning members of any Service or persons appointed to any Service or post, no Court (Except the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution shall have, or be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to such recruitment or matters concerning such recruitment or such service matters." 2. In Section 29 (1) of the Act the provision made for transfer of pending cases is to the effect that i "Every suit or other proceeding pending before any Court or other authority immediately before the date of establishment of a Tribunal under this Act, being a suit or proceeding the cause of action whereon it is based is such that it would have been, if it had arisen after such establishment, within the jurisdiction of such Tribunal, shall stand transferred on that date to such Tribunal. Provided that nothing in this Sub-section shall apply to any appeal pending as aforesaid before a High Court or the Supreme Court." 3. Provided that nothing in this Sub-section shall apply to any appeal pending as aforesaid before a High Court or the Supreme Court." 3. Tho issue was raised the other day before a Division Bench in the form of preliminary objection in Writ Petition No. 10888 of 1983, M.B. Shukla and others v. Union of India and others, decided on 28th November, 1985 reported in 1986 UPLBBC 317 (DB). The objection was overruled by the Bench. The validity of the Act had not been challenged, but there are observations contained in the judgment pointing out that no amendment could be made which may result in curtailment of power conferred on High Court under Article 226. The view taken is that the power conferred by this Article is extraordinary distinct from that exercisable keeping in view of Article 225 : The Tribunal has not been Conferred with the jurisdiction to issue Writs, referred to in Article 226 and hence there is no exclusion thereof under Section 28 of the Act so far as the High Court is concerned. In the opinion of the learned Judges constituting the Bench, it is not correct to say that after the issuance of the notification under Section 14 of the Act, the High Courts have ceased to have jurisdiction to entertain writ petitions in service matters. It is another thing that the Court may not exercise this power except on constitutional challenge or exceptional circumstances on the principle of self-restraint. Referring to clause (3) of Article 323-A it is observed that the Parliament may have been conferred power to enact a law which may have effect notwithstanding any provision in the Constitution, but the Parliament has not made provision debarring High Courts from entertaining writ petitions. The word 'proceeding' appearing in Section 29 (1), it was held, does not cover a writ petition, and further that : "As writ petition cannot be deemed to be included in the word 'proceeding' the omission to mention it in proviso cannot by indirect process or reasoning lead to conclusion that it shall be deemed to be included in it". 4. Article 323-A of the Constitution, inserted by the Constitution 42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, (which must be read in conformity with Article 226) in so far as material, provides : 1................ 2. A law made under clause (1) may - (a) ............ 4. Article 323-A of the Constitution, inserted by the Constitution 42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, (which must be read in conformity with Article 226) in so far as material, provides : 1................ 2. A law made under clause (1) may - (a) ............ (b) specify the jurisdiction, powers (including the power to punish for contempt) and authority which may be exercised by each of the said tribunals : (c) .... ... ... ... ... (d) exclude the jurisdiction of all Courts, except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 with respect to the disputes or complaints referred to in clause (1) : (e) provide for the transfer to each administrative tribunal of any cases pending before any Court or other authority immediately before the establishment of such tribunal as would have been within the jurisdiction of such tribunal if the causes of action on which such suits or proceedings are based had arisen after such establishment. 5. Section 28, it will be noticed, enacts almost verbatim what is laid down in Article 323-A (l)/(2) (d) of the Constitution and Section 29 reproduces in essence. Sub - clause (2) of Article 323-A (2). By virtue of clauses (3) of Article 323 A, these provisions are made expressly overriding. An act of the Legislature could not erode against the jurisdiction, power 01 authority conferred upon High Court under Article 226, but where the abrogation brought about has behind it the sanction of amendment made by Parliament in exercise of the constitution powers, the position may not be the same. In Minerva Mills Limited and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1980 SC 1789 (93), Hon'ble Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) affirms that the power of judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution. Immediately thereafter, His Lordship hastens to append the note of caution ; "Of course, when say this should not be taken to suggest that effective alternative institutional mechanism or arrangements for judicial review cannot be made by Parliament." 6. It may, therefore, require consideration upon analysis of the scheme of the Act whether the remedy which is effective alternative institutional mechanism or arrangement for judicial review, and if the answer to this be in the affirmative will that still be regarded to alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution. It may, therefore, require consideration upon analysis of the scheme of the Act whether the remedy which is effective alternative institutional mechanism or arrangement for judicial review, and if the answer to this be in the affirmative will that still be regarded to alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution. Article 32 where under the remedy for enforcement of rights conferred by Part III is itself a fundamental right exercisable as such may not perhaps be placed at par in this respect with the power of judicial review which is conferred by Article 226. That indeed is not the question before us. 7. Section 14 of the Act. which follows closely along the lines of Article 323-A (1).(2) (b) (d), refers to the jurisdiction, powers, and authority exercisable immediately before the appointed day by "all Courts" and empowers the Tribunal correspondingly. The exception made therein is conferred to the power of the Supreme Court under Article 136. This is on the positive side ; having laid this down, Section 28 provides as a corollary for the exclusion of jurisdiction, power and authority of all Courts, except the Supreme Court under Article 136. The language employed is to all appearance comprehensive. The provisions require being given harmonious interpretation in the back-drop of the constitutional authority which Article 323-A creates. Sections 14, 28, 29. it appears, and we say this with great respect to the learned Judges of the Division Bench, do not on their face make reservation with respect to the jurisdiction, power or authority which the High Court exercises under Article 226 in service matters and it may require reconsideration whether under these provisions there is dichotomy between the jurisdiction of High Courts referred to in Article 225 on the one hand and the power of High Courts to issue certain writs conferred by Article 226 on the other. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons it is stated, inter alia. "The establishment of Administrative Tribunal under the aforesaid provision of the Constitution has become necessary since a large number of cases relating to service matters are pending before the various Courts. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons it is stated, inter alia. "The establishment of Administrative Tribunal under the aforesaid provision of the Constitution has become necessary since a large number of cases relating to service matters are pending before the various Courts. It is expected that the setting up of such Administrative Tribunals to deal exclusively with service matters would go a long way in not only reducing the burden of the various Courts and thereby giving them more time to deal with other cases expeditiously but would also provide to the persons covered by the Administrative Tribunals speedy relief in respect of their grievances." 8. The term "proceeding", according to Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edition) (1979), page 1084, means "any action hearing, investigation, inquest of inquiry (whether conducted by a court, administrative agency, hearing officer, arbitrator, legislative body, or any other person authorised by law) in which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to be given." 9. Section 141, Code of Civil Procedure, enacts that the procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction. Lest the expression "proceedings" be construed to include proceeding under Article 226, the Parliament while enacting Central (Amendment) Act 104 of 1976 inserted an Explanation which expressly includes proceedings under Article 226. In Udai Bhan Singh and others v. Board of Revenue, 1974 RD, 107 (Full Bench), relied by the learned Judges it was ruled that Section 5 (2) (a) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act has no impact on writ petitions or special appeals arising out of them in which judgments or order passed in suits or proceedings relating to declaration of rights in land covered by a notification under Section 4 of that Act are in challenge. This, it may not be overlooked, was in the context of an Act of the Legislature while, in the present, we are concerned with the meaning which the expression "proceedings" bears in the context of what has been provided in Article 323-A (2) (e) of the Constitution. Has the expression 'proceeding' to be given restrictive meaning in this context also and would that be consistent with the legislative intent ? Has the expression 'proceeding' to be given restrictive meaning in this context also and would that be consistent with the legislative intent ? The competence of the Legislature in this respect is a relevant consideration as is also revealed by the decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Achar Singh v. Ramroop Singh, 1968 ALJ 46, where upholding the contention that Section 5 (2) (a) aforementioned did not apply to an appeal before the Supreme Court, it was laid down - "The State Legislature has not passed any legislation affecting the jurisdiction of this Court. On tho other hand, what the State Legislature has done is only to make provision in respect of matters within its jurisdiction" 10. In case the 'proceeding' within the meaning of Section 29 (1) read in the context of Article 323-A (1' (e) does not exclude an action in the form of writ petition, the proviso to Section 29 (1) assumes significance excluding as it does only an appeal pending before a High Court or the Supreme Court but not a writ petition under Article 226. The Court would also need consider whether to hold that a writ petition would lie in the High Court under Article 226 or Article 227 against an order passed by the Tribunal in a matter over which it has jurisdiction, power or authority under Section 14 would be justified in face of the express provisions contained in Article 323-A/the Act and would not that defeat the object thereof. 11. For the view that the word 'proceeding' used in Section 29 would include writ petitions, we find Support from the decision of the Supreme Court in S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, (1985) 4 SCC 458 We are aware that by this decision only an interlocutory application was disposed of, but it does indicate the view which the Supreme Court has taken about pending writ petitions by holding them to be transferable. 12. The controversy which gives rise is undoubtedly of general importance which may affect a large number of cases and concerns vitally the functioning of the Tribunal created under the Act. 12. The controversy which gives rise is undoubtedly of general importance which may affect a large number of cases and concerns vitally the functioning of the Tribunal created under the Act. We feel that the learned Acting Chief Justice may, in the circumstances, consider referring the following questions for the opinion of a larger Bench : (1) Whether Section 28 read with Section 14 (1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (Central Act 13 of 1985) excludes the jurisdiction, power and authority of this Court exercisable under Article 226/227 of the Constitution in this behalf ? (2) Whether action in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in relation to this subject - matter is "proceeding" within the meaning of the expression used in Section 29 (1) of the Act and, as such, stands transferred on the appointed date of the Central Administrative Tribunal ? 13. Let the papers be placed before the Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice for constitution of a larger Bench.