A. S. SRIVASTAVA. J. ( 1 ) DEVENDRA Kumar Goyal alias Babua resident of 5/89, Guru Tej Bahadur Road, Masooabad, Aligarh, has by this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenged his detention by the District Magistrate, Aligarh (hereinafter referred to as the detaining authority) by an order dated 20. 9-84 passed under Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act, 1980 (hereinafter) referred to as the Act ). ( 2 ) THE petitioner was arrested on 21-9-84 in pursuance of the aforesaid order of detention dated 20-9-84 and was lodged in the District Jail, Aligarh. The detaining authority sent copies of the order of detention, the grounds of detention and all relevant material to the State Government on the same day, i. e. 20-9-84 On 29-9-84 the State Government approved the order of detention of the petitioner. On the same day the State Government also informed the Central Government about the order of detention vide Radiogram No. 111/21 209/84-CK 6 dated 29-9-84 as contemplated under Section 3 (6) of the Act. The State Governments order of approval was also communicated to the petitioner through the Superintendent, Distt. Jail, Aligarh. ( 3 ) ON 7-10-84 the petitioner made a representation against the order of his detention which was received by the detaining authority on the same day i. e. 7-10-84. The representation was forwarded by the detaining authority to the State Government on 9. 10-84 alongwith its comments thereon. It was received in the concerned Section of the State Government on 10-1984. On that date several other representations made under the Act were pending in the Section. On account of increase of number of detentions in the State during that period by two to three times then the number of detention made during this period in previous years, the entire staff of the Section worked day and night in clearing up representations received against these orders of detentions serially. The turn of the petitioners representation came on 15-10-84. It may also be pointed out that during this period, 13th (Second) Saturday of the months and 14th October, (Sunday) were holidays. The section took three days, i. e. 16th, 17th and 18th October, 1984, to examine the representation of the petitioner at various levels. On 19. The turn of the petitioners representation came on 15-10-84. It may also be pointed out that during this period, 13th (Second) Saturday of the months and 14th October, (Sunday) were holidays. The section took three days, i. e. 16th, 17th and 18th October, 1984, to examine the representation of the petitioner at various levels. On 19. 10-84 it was placed before the joint Secretary (Home) who, after examining the same, forwarded it to the Home Secretary on the same day. The Home Secretary submitted it to the Government for final orders. It was ultimately rejected by the State Government on 23-10-84. ( 4 ) THE case of the petitioner was placed before the Advisory Board only 1-10-84, i. e. before the representation of the petitioner dated 7-10-84 was received by the State Government. On 15- 10. 84 the representation dated 7-1984 which was received by the State Government on 10-10. 84 was also placed before the Advisory Board. After receipt of the report from the Advisory Board the State Government confirmed the detention order on 16-11-84. ( 5 ) THE grounds on which the detention of the petitioner has been ordered by the detaining authority are as under; 1. On 4-10. 83 Sri Shailesh Krishna, I. A. S. City Magistrate, Aligarh, raided the residence of the petition wherein various categories of blank forms and forged proforma connected with the Motor Vehicles Department of the State of Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa were recovered The seals of officers of the Motor Vehicles Department and forged permits were also recovered alongwith the incriminating articles. Besides machines used for making the aforesaid documents were also found. During the course of raid, a pass-book of the Central Bank of India with Rs. 64,000/ as balance and 11/2 kg. of opium were also recovered by him. Two cases (Crime No. 413/ 1983 and 414/1983) registered at the police station against the petitioner under Sections 420/467/468 109 IPC, and under Section 9 of the Opium Act are under investigation by the CID Agra Sector. 2. On 2-6. 84 the petitioner had come to Aligarh from outstation. On 4. 6. 84 at about 2. Two cases (Crime No. 413/ 1983 and 414/1983) registered at the police station against the petitioner under Sections 420/467/468 109 IPC, and under Section 9 of the Opium Act are under investigation by the CID Agra Sector. 2. On 2-6. 84 the petitioner had come to Aligarh from outstation. On 4. 6. 84 at about 2. 30 P. M. he met late Sardar Mohan Singh and in his presence told his son Bindey that alongwith manufacturing of forged documents relating to vehicles he had also started manufacturing forged passports in Allahabad and Varanasi and that the administration could not prevent told Bindey that on that very day a rich party was coming to Aligarh Railway Station to receive one such pass port from him. When this information reached P. S. Banna Devi through an: informer, it was duly entered in the general diary at Serial No. 27 at 15. 10 P. M. 3. On 1-8. 84 one Bindu alias Babu, resident of Pahasu, distt. Bulandshahr, was arrested in connection with three cases i. e. Crime No. 382/ 84 under sections 147 /148/149/307 IPC, Crime No. 386/84 under section 4/25, Arms Act and Crime No. 387/84 under sections 379/411 IPC. An Amhassador Car bearing No. URD 3972 was also recovered from the possession of Bindu. The forged Registration Certificate of this car purported to have been issued from the office of the R. T. O. Kanpur was prepared by the petitioner. On the statement made in this connection by Bindu after his arrest, a case (Crime No. 413/84) under Sections 467 468 471 473 474 IPC was also registered at P. S. Banna Devi against the petitioner. It has been argued by the petitioners learned counsel that the activities for which the petitioner has been detained are such which are not prejudicialt to the maintenance of supplies and services within the meaning of Section 3 (2) of the Act, Firstly, the expression supplies and services in the section should be read conjunctively. Secondly, sucht activities at best cause wrongful gain to the petitioner himself and wrongful loss to the state or to individuals balding licences for plying vehicles like private buses and vehicles. But these activities ultimately provide facilities to the public at large who have to face difficulties in travelling by the State transport and by the Railways on account of problems like over-crowding, unpunctuality and sometimes advanced unauthorised reservations. But these activities ultimately provide facilities to the public at large who have to face difficulties in travelling by the State transport and by the Railways on account of problems like over-crowding, unpunctuality and sometimes advanced unauthorised reservations. By enabling more vehicles to ply on unauthorised permits, the petitioner is relieving the general public from such hardships and, to that extent, he is rather providing facilities to the community at large sometimes at cheaper rates also. Therefore such activities of the petitioner cannot be deemed to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public services within the meaning of Section 3 (2) of the Act. Reliance in this connection has been placed on Krishna Murari Agarwala v. The Union of India and others. ( 6 ) WE do not agree with the above contention. The very nature and magnitude of activities of the petitioner are such that unless they are interdicted by a preventive detention order, the activities are likely to be repeated. The repetition of such activities till he is tried and indicated in a criminal trial cannot effectively be prevented except by the petitioners detention. It cannot be disputed that the services which are affected or likely to be effected in consequence of the petitioners activities of issuing forged permits and passports are (i) the Transport Office maintained by the State Government for issuing permits under the Motor Vehicles Act for plying of private buses, public carriers and private vehicles and tractors etc. and (ii) Passport Office maintained by the Government of India for issuing passports to enable Indian Citizens to visit other countries. It does not also require an argument to say that such services are public services and are rendered by such offices in connection with the affairs of the State. Such services rendered by such offices are services essential to the community. Any act which affects such services in a manner which either jeopardizes its normal functioning in any manner whatsoever is to be affecting it prejudicially. ( 7 ) THE petitioner by his activities is only promoting (i) illicit transport of passengers and goods by vehicles holding forged permits and (ii) illicit movement of citizen of this; country to bordor and other countries and vice-versa. ( 7 ) THE petitioner by his activities is only promoting (i) illicit transport of passengers and goods by vehicles holding forged permits and (ii) illicit movement of citizen of this; country to bordor and other countries and vice-versa. In other words, the petitioner by selling such forged permits and passports to such intending persons is indulging in an act of running clandestines offices parallel to the aforesaid offices maintained by the State for rendering services to the community. These activities, therefore, cannot but be held to be prejudicial to the maintenance of service essential to the community. If the contention of the petitioners counsel in this regard is accepted it would lead only to absured consequences. The case of Krishna Murari Agarwala (supra) relied upon by the petitioner is of no assistance to him. The detenu in that case was a partner of a firm called Bharat Oil Company which was dealing in the storage and sale of high speed diesel oil. Under the Petroleum Act, 1934 the detenu was required to carryon his business of storage and sale of diesel oil only after obtaining a licence from the Prescribed Authority. The District Authorities could grant licence to a dealer for such business only to the extent of 22,000 litres and, if the dealer wanted to store high speed diesel oil to the extent of more than 22,000 litres, he had to get a licence from the Chief Controller of Explosives, Nagpur. The petitioner had secured licence for storage of light diesel oil which was valid upto March, 31, 1975 and had applied for renewal of the licence thereafter and had also complied with all the necessary formalities in that connection. But on the date in question i. e. on 17-10. 74 the licence of detenu had not been renewed. On that date when the godown of the detenu was searched by the excise authorities about 1. 64 lakhs litres of light diesel oil was found stored. The allegation against him therefore, was that he had stocked huge quantity of light diesel oil without waiting for the licence to be cleared by the I Chief Controller of Explosives at Nagpur. On these facts it was held that even if this ground be taken at its face value, it did not disrupt or disturb the essential supplies to the community. On these facts it was held that even if this ground be taken at its face value, it did not disrupt or disturb the essential supplies to the community. ( 8 ) IT was then urged that the expression supplies and servicest in Section 3 (2) of the Act are to be read conjunctively and, therefore, this case is not at all attracted by this section and the petitioner could not, therefore, be detained in exercise of powers under section 3 (2) of the Act reads as under: The Central Government or the State Government may, if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. ( 9 ) IT is evident from the section itself that in the expression supplies and services, the words supplies and services cannot be read conjunctively merely because these two words are interposed by the word and. The word is used because the words supplies and services are words of different and distinctive connotation. Therefore we do not agree that these two words should be understood conjunctively. They should be understood disjunctively. ( 10 ) IN Gauhati High Court, this question was raised in Dinbandhu Chaudhary v. Sate of Assam1 also. While taking the above view it was further observed therein that: A person may be detained for preventing him to act in a manner prejudicial to the services essential to the community or he may be detained for distrupting supplies as well. Of course, sometimes the effect of such acts may telescope into each other. ( 11 ) THEREFORE, we do not agree with the view of the petitioner. We are clearly of the opinion that the petitioner was indulging in activities, which were prejudicial to the maintenance of services essential to the community. The repetition of such activities could, therefore, be lawfully prevented by the detaining authority in the exercise of powers under Section 3 (2) of the Act. We are clearly of the opinion that the petitioner was indulging in activities, which were prejudicial to the maintenance of services essential to the community. The repetition of such activities could, therefore, be lawfully prevented by the detaining authority in the exercise of powers under Section 3 (2) of the Act. ( 12 ) HOWEVER, inspite of the fact that the detaining authority had powers to pass the order of detention of the petitioner in exercise of his powers under Section 3 (2) of the Act, we find it unable to uphold the same because it has been rendered illegal in the case by non-compliance of Section 10 of the Act by the State. Section 10 reads as under: Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, in every case where a detention order has been made under this Act, the appropriate Government shall, within three weeks from the date of detention of a person under the order, place before the Advisory Board constituted by it under Section 9, the grounds on which the order has been made and the person affected by the order, and in case where the order has been made by an officer mentioned in sub-section (3) of Section 3, also the report by such Officer under Section (4) of that section. ( 13 ) THIS section places a duty on the appropriate Government (here the State of U. P. ). to place (i) the grounds of detention, (ii) the representation, if any, and (iii) the report of the detaining authority before the Advisory Board. It also fixes a deadline by which the papers are to be placed before the Advisory Board by prescribing a period of three weeks from the date of detention of a. person. It is now well settled that the provisions of this section are mandatory and any noncompliance thereof renders the detention illegal. A reference in this connection may be made to Faisal Molik v. State of U. P. ( 14 ) IN the present case the petitioner was arrested on 20-9-1984 on the basis of the detention order dated 20-9-1984. Three weeks from the date of his detention expired on 12-10-1984. On 7- 10-1984 the petitioner made a representation for challenging his detention which was received by the State Government on 10-10-84. This representation was not placed by the State Government before the Advisory Board on or before 12. 10. Three weeks from the date of his detention expired on 12-10-1984. On 7- 10-1984 the petitioner made a representation for challenging his detention which was received by the State Government on 10-10-84. This representation was not placed by the State Government before the Advisory Board on or before 12. 10. 1984. It was placed on 15-10 1984. i. e. after expiry of the period stipulated by Section 10. The detention of the petitioner is, therefore, vitiated on this ground. ( 15 ) IT has been urged in this connection by the counsel for the State that the State was not obliged to place the representation of the petitioner before the Advisory Board if it was not existing on the date on which his case was referred to-the Advisory Board, i. e. on 1-10-84. This argument of the State Counsel is based on the words if any after the words representation in the section. It is contended that these words make it clear that the State was under a duty to send the representation of the petitioner also to the Advisory Board if it was filed on or before. 1-10-84. We do not agree with this contention. ( 16 ) A detenu files a representation for challenging his detention under Section 8 of the Act which reads as under: (1) When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, but ordinarily not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than ten days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford a representation against the order to the appropriate Government. This section permits five to ten days to the detaining authority to communicate to a detenu the grounds on which the order has been made. A detenu will file representation on receipt of the grounds of detention. While prescribing time during which grounds are communicated to detenu, this section prescribes no time for the detenu to file his representation. It follows as a corollary that the detenu will make a representation only after grounds are furnished to him. Under Section 10, the representation of the detenu has also to be placed before the Advisory Board within three weeks from the date of his detention. It follows as a corollary that the detenu will make a representation only after grounds are furnished to him. Under Section 10, the representation of the detenu has also to be placed before the Advisory Board within three weeks from the date of his detention. The State cannot refuse to perform this duty cast upon it by section 10, in case the representation of the detenu is received with the time stipulated if for any reason it was not made by the detenu or received by the State by the date when it forwarded grounds of his detention to the Advisory Board. The words if anyt only indicate that the State well perform this duty of placing the representation of the detenu within the stipulated period if there is any. such representation with the State Government. These words do not absolve the State from performing duty cast upon it by this section if the representation is received by the date it places the grounds of detention etc. before the Advisory Board. This intention of the section is clear from the word and used before the words representation if any which as to be understood conjunctively. Therefore, this section places a duty on the State also to place before the Advisory Board representation of the detenu, if an)T, received within the period stipulated by this section. As pointed out by this Bench in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 16161 of 1984 Bundu alias Babu v. State decided on 23-1-85, this Court has in Gama alias Lamboo v. State Hab as Corpus Petition No. 13987 of 1983 decided on 16-3-84 held that the State is under an obligation to send to Advisory Board even a second representation made by and detenu if received by it before expiry of the period prescribed by Section 10. ( 17 ) IN the above view of she matter, we are clearly of the opinion that there has been a violation of Section 10 of Act and, therefore, the order of detention of the petitioner is illegal. ( 18 ) BEFORE parting with this case, we will advert to another ground vehemently canvassed by the petitioner for challenging the order of detention with which we do not agree. This argument is hased on the following observation of Shelat. ( 18 ) BEFORE parting with this case, we will advert to another ground vehemently canvassed by the petitioner for challenging the order of detention with which we do not agree. This argument is hased on the following observation of Shelat. J. made in the case of Khairul Haque (1969) Writ Petition No. 246 of 1969 (S. C.) quoted by the Supreme Court in K I. Singh v. The State of Manipur2, at page 444:the appropriate Government is to exercise its opinion and judgment on the representation before the sending the case alongwith the detenus representation to the Advisory Board. If the appropriate Government will T release the detenu the Government will not end the matter to the Advisory Board. If however the Government will not release the detenu the Government will send the case along with the detenus representation to the Advisory Board. While making the above submission the learned counsel probably did not notice that the case in which the above observation has been quoted by the Supreme Court was not a case under the National Security Act but under Orissa Preventive Detention Act 1970 as extended to Manipur and the provisions of the two Acts might be different. In this connection it may also be noticed that in para 20 of this case the Supreme Court has reproduced another part of the decision of the case of Khairul Haque as under:the Court again reiterated that under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution, there was a dual obligation on the appropriate Government and dual right in favour of a detenu namely (1) to have his representation, irrespectively of the length of detention, considered by the appropriate Government, and (2) to have once again that representation in the light of the circumstances of the case considered by the Advisory Board before it gave its- opinion. It, was emphasised that the two obligation of the Government to refer the case of the detenu to the Advisory Board and to obtain its report on the one hand and to give an earliest opportunity to the detenu to make a representation and consider the representation on the other, are two distinct obligations independent of each other. It, was emphasised that the two obligation of the Government to refer the case of the detenu to the Advisory Board and to obtain its report on the one hand and to give an earliest opportunity to the detenu to make a representation and consider the representation on the other, are two distinct obligations independent of each other. ( 19 ) AFTER examining the various provisions of National Security Act, there is no doubt that the two obligations of the Government to refer the case of the detenu and his representation filed under Section 8 of the Act to the Advisory Board and to consider that representation on the other are two distinct obligation independent of each other. In view of Section 10, the representation of a detenu filed within this stipulated period has to be placed before the Advisory Board within that period and it is not dependent on the decision of the appropriate authority of that representation. ( 20 ) HOWEVER, since we have already held the continued detention of the petitioner illegal, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The respondents are directed not to keep the petitioner under detention in pursuance of the order dated 20-9-1984 passed under Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act by the District Magistrate, Aligarh. It is, however, made clear that the petitioners detention if otherwise required under some other authority of law, the order passed by us today shall not entitled him to be physically released.