Harish Chandra Jindal v. Nagar Palika Executive officer
1985-12-06
H.N.SETH, J.N.DUBEY
body1985
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT H.N. Setb, A.C.J. 1. Aggrieved by an order dated 20.5.1976 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Agra Division Agra rejecting their application u/s 164(2) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, for review of the appellate order passed by him on 5th of August, 1975 the two Petitioners Harish Chandra Jindal and Harish Chandra and Sons have approached this Court for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. The controversy in this petition relates to the determination of annual value of house Nos. 6/1A to H (1) and (2) situate on Subhash Road, Aligarh. 3. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to the petition are that Municipal Board Aligarh issued notices to the two Petitioners and two others in the year 1972 informing them that the annual value of the respective portions in aforementioned house owned by them was to be enhanced to Rs. 3600/- and Rs. 4800/- respectively. The two Petitioners filed objections before the Board objecting to the enhancement of the annual value of various portions as proposed by the Municipal Board. However, the Assessing Authority vide its order dated 29.9.1972 treated the entire premises as one unit and determined is annual value as Rs. 18,540/- which was equal to total of the annual value of all the four portions as had been proposed by the Board earlier. In substance, the Assessing Authority accepted that the enhanced annual value of each of the portions proposed by it was correct and that the annual value of the entire premises had to be determined as one unit. This, as we understand, had the effect of increasing the rate at which the house tax was to be calculated in respect of the said building. Aggrieved, the two Petitioners and one Niranjan Lal went up in appeal before the Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra. Whereas the appeal filed by the Petitioners was numbered as 62 of 1974-75, that filed by Nirajan Lal was numbered as 46 of 1974-75. The Additional Commissioner, by his order dated 5th of August, 1975 allowed the appeal in part. So far as Petitioner No. 1 was concerned he directed that the annual value of the portion of the premises claimed by him had to be determined separately as Rs. 3600/-. He also granted some relief to Niranjan Lal but did not grant any relief to Petitioner No. 2.
So far as Petitioner No. 1 was concerned he directed that the annual value of the portion of the premises claimed by him had to be determined separately as Rs. 3600/-. He also granted some relief to Niranjan Lal but did not grant any relief to Petitioner No. 2. Petitioners then made an application u/s 164(2) praying that the appellate order dated 5.8.1975 be reviewed. The Additional Commissioner rejected the said application by his order dated 20.5.1976 without going into the merit of the submissions sought to be made by the Petitioners in support of their prayer for review of the appellate order, on following two grounds: that an application for review can be made only on discovery of fresh material and new ground ; A perusal of the order under appeal shows that the only ground pressed in the appeal was whether or not the annual value of different portions of the premises in question had to be determined separately and that no other point was urged by the Petitioner. Even if some additional points were urged and not noticed in the appellate order, it will be deemed that those points had been decided against the Petitioners. Section 164(2) of the U.P. Municipalities Act runs thus: (2) The order of the appellate authority confirming, setting aside or modifying an order in respect of valuation or assessment or liability to assessment or taxation shall be final; provided that it shall be lawful for the appellate authority, upon application made within three months from the date of its original order or on its own motion, to review an order passed by it in appeal by a further order ; provided further that no order shall be reviewed by the appellate authority on its own motion beyond three months from its date. 4. This section confers a power on the appellate authority to review, the appellate order passed by it if it so considers it proper either on an application moved by an aggrieved party or on its own motion. The section does not lay down the limitation for and the condition after complying which the said plover is to be exercised. The section does not entitle any person to claim review of an appellate order as of right.
The section does not lay down the limitation for and the condition after complying which the said plover is to be exercised. The section does not entitle any person to claim review of an appellate order as of right. The object underlying conferment of power on the appellate authority to review its order obviously is to enable such authority to prevent injustice to any party. Accordingly, before claiming review the party will have to make out a case that the interest of justice requires reconsideration of the appellate order and thereafter its substitution by a fresh order. It may be that in the context of doing justice, the authority may refuse to exercise its discretion to review its appellate order on the ground that the point sought to be made out was, during the course of hearing by it, given up or not pressed by the party, but then it does not mean that the appellate authority, while considering the request for review of its order, can in no circumstance take into consideration, points which had not been pressed or urged before it in the first instance. In our opinion if adequate explanation for not pressing those points at the first instance is forthcoming, it will be open to the appellate authority to, while considering the question whether or not to review its order, take into consideration those points as well. It will depend upon the facts of each case whether or not the appellate authority should entertain an application for review of its earlier order on grounds which were initially not pressed before it. Likewise, if the interest of justice so requires the appellate authority may also permit the Appellant to reagitate a question which had been pressed before it on the earlier occasion but on which the decision went against the concerned party, irrespective of whether such reconsideration is sought on the basis of existing material or on the basis of some materials discovered subsequently. This being the ambit and scope of the power of review conferred by Section 164(2) the appellate authority had to, in the instant case, apply its mind to the submissions sought to be raised by the Petitioner in his review application and to reconsider whether or not it would on the basis of those submissions, be in the interest of justice to reconsider its earlier appellate judgment.
The appellate authority is, in this regard not strictly bound by the conditions for exercising the power of review contained in Order 47 Code of Civil Procedure. It cannot reject an application for revive without applying its mind to the points sought to be raised merely for the reason that the request was not based on discovery of new and fresh materials or that the particular submissions sought to be made by the applicant had been earlier considered and rejected, or deemed to have been rejected. 5. In the instant case the case of the Petitioner in the review application filed by him was that certain points had been, during the hearing of the appeal, urged on his behalf but the Commissioner did not notice the same in its order. While dealing with the submissions the Additional Commissioner observed that even if such points had been urged, they should, in view of the fact that they have not been noticed in the order, be deemed to have been rejected. He did not find that as a matter of fact no point other than those noticed by him in the appellate order was pressed by the Petitioner at the hearing of the appeal. If, in fact certain points had been urged and not noticed in the appellate order, the Additional Commissioner was duty bound to consider as to whether or not those points had any substance and whether those points were such which, in the interest of justice, required further consideration. In case he finds that in the interest of justice such points require consideration, he would, in our opinion, not be justified in refusing to entertain the review application merely for the reason that such points are deemed to have been repelled. 6. In the result, we are of opinion, that the reasons given by the Additional Commissioner for not entertaining the review application presented by the Petitioner are erroneous and cannot be sustained. The petition, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 20.5.1976 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) is set aside. The Additional Commissioner is directed to reconsider Petitioners' review application in the light of the observations made by us above and in accordance with law. Inasmuch as the review application was filed in the year 1975 the Additional Commissioner may now dispose of the review application as expeditiously as possible.
The Additional Commissioner is directed to reconsider Petitioners' review application in the light of the observations made by us above and in accordance with law. Inasmuch as the review application was filed in the year 1975 the Additional Commissioner may now dispose of the review application as expeditiously as possible. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.