JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav, J. - The present petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the order passed by the consolidation authorities in the proceedings u/s 9A(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (for short the Act). The plots in dispute were Nos. 2291, 2294/3 and 2294/4, etc. plot No. 2291 was recorded as bhumidhari of Petitioners Nos. 2 to 4, and plot Nos. 2294/3 and 2294/4 were recorded as bhumidhari of the Petitioners in the basic year records. It appears from the pedigree that Respondents No. 4 to 7 were the sons of Bhagwandin, who was the son of Binda whereas Mahabir, Petitioner No. 1 is the great-grand son of Binda. 2. An objection u/s 9A(2) of the Act was filed by Respondent No. 4 claiming that he has obtained a lease dated 24th September, 1954 from Gaon Sabha, in respect of plots in dispute, hence his name may be entered as Sirdar and the entries in the name of the Petitioners may be expunged. 3. The Petitioners contested the case alleging that earlier a suit u/s 49/59 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 was filed in respect of the plots in dispute by Kedar and Jokhai, descendants of Bhagwan against Bhagwaadin father of Respondents 4 to 7, and others for declaration and partition. In that suit the then Zamindar was a party, the suit was partly decreed by the trial court in respect of onlv one plot, but the appeal was filed before the Commissioner and in the appeal a compromise dated 12th February, 1958 was arrived at between the parties including Bhagwandin, father of Respondents No. 4 to 7 and others including the present Petitioners (A copy of the compromise has been filed as Annexure 1' to this petition). On the basis of this compromise the appeal was decided by the Additional Commissioner and all the parties were given share and a final decree was directed to be prepared, which was opposed by Respondent No. 4 by filing an objection but that was dismissed hence compromise decree would operate as res-iudicata or an estoppel against Respondents 4 to 7, and as lease was executed Firing pendency of earlier suit between parties hence doctrine of lis-pendens would apply and lease was illegal and void. The State was not a necessary party in a suit for partition. 4. The State was not a necessary party in a suit for partition. 4. The Consolidation Officer by the order dated 1st December, 1972 partly decided the case against the Petitioners and partly against Respondent No. 4. Both parties preferred appeals which were dismissed by the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation dated 22nd February, 1973. The Petitioners and Doodhnath preferred revisions which also met the same fate by the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 14th May, 1973. Against these orders the present petition has been filed. 5. Sri C.P. Srivastava, appearing for Respondents No. 4 to 7 has raised a preliminary objection that the petition is belated and the explanation given in paragraphs 24 to 37 of the petition are unsatisfactory, hence may be dismissed as belated. In paras 24 to 27 of the petition, the delay has been explained. In short the cause for delay was as the Petitioners (three out of them being ladies) were having implicit faith in pairokar Ram Lakhan and on his suggestion engaged one Sri Laljee Tripathi Advocate but the Petitioners were deceived and writ petition was not filed in time. I think this was all on account of illiteracy prevalent in 'Country side and the ignorance about the proceedings in a court of law. As courts in respect of pardanashin ladies, take a liberal view, I think similar benefits must be given to the persons who are illiterate and ignorant about proceedings in a court of law. Taking this liberal view, in the ends of justice, I am condoning the same. Delay was also caused in filing counter-affidavit which was filed today, but as delay in petition has been condoned by taking liberal view, I am condoning delay in filing counter affidavit as well. 6. Shri Haider Husain appearing for the Petitioners, as regards merits of the petition, urged that the father of Respondent No. 4 Bhagwandin was a party to the compromise decree dated 12th February, 1958 entered in appeal before the Additional Commissioner in the suit, in respect of plots in dispute, u/s 49/59 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 and that compromise became final. Neither any suit for cancellation of the said compromise was filed nor any appeal was preferred, hence Respondents No. 4 to 7 were bound by the compromise and that would operate as res-judicata and in any case, as an estoppel. Neither any suit for cancellation of the said compromise was filed nor any appeal was preferred, hence Respondents No. 4 to 7 were bound by the compromise and that would operate as res-judicata and in any case, as an estoppel. Further during pendency of suit u/s 49/59 U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, the lease deed by Respondent No. 4 was obtained hence doctrine of lis pendens would apply after compromise on 12th February, 1958, the lease deed dated 24th September, 1954 became ineffective. 7. Sri C.P. Srivastava, on behalf of the Respondents 4 to 7 urged that the compromise was not legal inasmuch as State of U.P. was not made party but only Gaon Sabha was made party after the enforcement of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act before the Additional Commissioner during pendency of appeal, the interest of the State was not protected and such compromise could not be held to be binding on the parties. Respondent No. 4 Jai Karan was claiming rights independently and did not derive his title from his father Bhagwandin. He has obtained the lease deed dated 24th September, 1954 from Gaon Sabha in respect of the land in dispute and on that basis he claimed to be recorded a Sirdar, hence he v. as not bound by the compromise decree and the same could not be held to be operative as res-judicata or as an estoppel, nor the doctrine of Lis pendens was applicable. 8. The first point which requires consideration is as to whether the compromise decree dated 12th February, 1958 entered into between the Petitioners and Bhagwandin, father of Respondents No. 4 to 7 in the suit u/s 49/59 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 would be binding on the parties or not? The Petitioners were parties to the suit even though at that time the suit was filed by Jokhai and Kedar, who were of the same pedigree and were grandsons of Bhagwan. Further Bhagwandin, father of Respondents No. 4 to 7 was also a party. The suit was partly decreed only in respect of plot No. 2296 and was dismissed in respect of the remaining plots. The appeal was filed by Bhagwandin, father of Respondents No. 4 to 7. The Gaon Sabha concerned was made a party and the Petitioners were also parties. The suit was partly decreed only in respect of plot No. 2296 and was dismissed in respect of the remaining plots. The appeal was filed by Bhagwandin, father of Respondents No. 4 to 7. The Gaon Sabha concerned was made a party and the Petitioners were also parties. The compromise was arrived at between the parties on 12th February, 1958 and on the same day the Additional Commissioner decided the appeal in terms of the compromise. It appears that all the parties have put their signatures or thumb impressions. Gaon Sabha did not raise any objection, even though it was made a party. Against this compromise a final decree was also prepared and against the final decree, Respondent No. 4 Jai Karan raised an objection that it need not be given effect to in the revenue appears, but ultimately his objection was over-ruled and his revision before the Additional Commissioner was recommended to the Board of Revenue for being rejected. Ultimately his objection and the revision were dismissed by the Board of Revenue. Against that compromise no suit for cancellation of the compromise decree was filed by Respondent No. 4 within a period of three years as provided by Article 91 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Now it is too late in the day to challenge the compromise on behalf of Respondent No. 4 particularly when the father of Respondent No. 4 was a party to the suit u/s 49/59 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. Bhagwandin, the father of Respondents No. 4 to 7 did not challenge the compromise. The compromise was accepted by the Petitioners to be correct and their names were also entered in the revenue papers. The final decree was also prepared and parties were given specific share. In those proceedings for preparation of final decree the Respondent No. 4 has filed objection but that was dismissed and the same order was maintained till the Board of Revenue. I am of the view that the Respondents 4 to 7 were bound by the compromise decree. 9. The next point is whether the compromise would operate as res-judicata or an estoppel. I am of the view that the Respondents 4 to 7 were bound by the compromise decree. 9. The next point is whether the compromise would operate as res-judicata or an estoppel. Section 11 of the CPC enacts the doctrine of res judicata which means the rule of conclusiveness of judgments in earlier suit as to the points decided so as to be effective and binding in every subsequent suit between the parties. In English Law it is called estoppel by judgment. It is also called estoppel by record. The rule of estoppel has been enacted u/s 115 of the Indian Evidence Act. Where a party is not allowed to say that a certain state of facts is untrue, whether in reality it is true or not, it is called estoppel. In other words it is a disability whereby a party is precluded from alleging or proving in legal proceedings that a fact is really otherwise than it has been made to appear by the person who made it. It really means the controversy between the parties being finally decided after contest. Earlier in S. N. Bhanja v. State of Orissa, 1956 SC 346 the Supreme Court has held that a judgment by consent or default is as effective an estoppel between the parties as judgment of court in a contested case. 10. But in Pulavarthi Venkata Subba Rao and Others Vs. Valluri Jagannadha Rao and Others, AIR 1967 SC 591 the Supreme Court held that the decree passed on compromise was not a decision by court on merits hence a compromise decree cannot operate as resjudicata rather such decree would create an estoppel by conduct. It is thus clear that the compromise decree would operate as an estoppel by conduct and not as a resjudicata. It was binding on Respondents 4 to 7. (See also Sunderabai Deshpande and Another Vs. Devaji Shankar Deshpande, AIR 1954 SC 82 . 11. The next point is whether the compromise can be held to be illegal simply because the State of U.P. was not made a party after date of vesting to the appeal and compromise. The suit was filed u/s 49/59 of U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. In a suit for division of holding the declaration for right can also be granted It was virtually a suit for division of holding. The suit was filed u/s 49/59 of U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. In a suit for division of holding the declaration for right can also be granted It was virtually a suit for division of holding. After date of vesting the Gaon Sabha was also made a party to the appeal and compromise. To a suit u/s 176 of the UP ZA and LR Act for division of holding Gaon Sabha concerned were a necessary party and not the State of U.P. I am accordingly of the view that as the Gaon Sabha was made a party to the appeal in place of land-holder, that was sufficient. The State of U.P. was not a necessary patty, hence its non-impleadment was not fatal and the compromise cannot be said .to be illegal on that account inasmuch as the Gaon Sabha did not contest the suit nor raised objections to the compromise. 12. The last point is as to the legal effect of lease deed dated 24th September, 19M in favour of Respondent No. 4 by the Gaon Sabha when in fact compromise in the suit under Sections 49/59 of U.P. Tenancy Act was arrived at earlier on 12th February, i958, to which father of Respondents 4 to 7 was a party. As the suit for division of holding and declaration was filed and was pending between the parties in respect of the land in dispute, to that suit Gaon Sabha was also a party. The appeal is the continuation of the suit. The compromise was arrived at on 12th February, 1958 and the Gaon Sabha did not raise any objection. The suit would be deemed to continue till appeal was decided, in such circumstance. 13. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act enacts the principle of the Latin maxim 'Pendentelite Nihil Innoventure', which obviously means that during pendency of the litigation nothing new should be introduced. In other words Section 52 enacts the doctrine of 'Lis Pendens'. But the next question would be as to how long the proceeding of a suit would be deemed to continue. In other words Section 52 enacts the doctrine of 'Lis Pendens'. But the next question would be as to how long the proceeding of a suit would be deemed to continue. The Explanation added to Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act provides that the pendency of a suit or proceeding would be deemed to commence from the date of presentation of the plaint and shall continue until suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order and complete I satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained. In this case compromise was arrived at on 12th February, 1958 and preparation of final decree and the objection of the Respondent No. 4 were decided much thereafter whereas the lease was obtained by him much earlier on 24th September, 1954. It is thus evident that the lease was hit by doctrine of lis pendens, enacted u/s 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. On the basis of such lease the Respondents get neither legal right nor their names can be entered in revenue papers See Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. Vs. His Highness Maharaja Sir Brijnath Singhji Deo of Maihar and Others, AIR 1975 SC 1810 ; Samerjeet v. Deputy Director of Consolidation AIR 1974 All 1982; Ram Das Popal Patil v. Fakire Pandu Patil AIR 1919 Bom 19. 14. The "Transfer" referred to u/s 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, includes the grant of lease, and hence Respondent No. 4, taking lease of Immovable property during pendency of a suit or proceeding relating thereto, would be affected by this rule-See Nisar Husain and Another Vs. Sundar Lal and Others ; Pancham Palodar Vs. Kandhai Palodar and Another . 15. In view of the discussions made hereinbefore the impugned orders are manifestly erroneous and deserve to be quashed by issuing a writ of certiorari. The petition accordingly succeeds and is alloved. The impugned orders dated 14th May, 1973, 22nd February, 1973 and 1st December, 1972 is hereby quashed. The Deputy Director of Consolidation is, however, directed to pass an appropriate order in pursuance of the terms of the compromise dated 12ih February, 1958 so that the same may be given effect to in the revenue papers. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.