JUDGMENT S.K. Dhaon, J. 1. This writ petition, at the instance of tenant, is directed against the order dated 22nd September, 1983, passed by the Vth Additional District Judge, Jhansi, 'exercising powers as an Appellate Authority u/s 22 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Appellate Authority has maintained the order of the Prescribed Authority purported to have been passed in proceedings u/s 21(1)(a) of the Act. 2. This is not disputed that the property, which is the subject matter of the present writ petition, was purchased by Smt. Tulsa Bai, the landlady, on 15th July, 1980, and an application u/s 21(1)(a) was made by her on 23rd September, 1982. It is alleged that on 27th September, lv82, a compromise was arrived at between the Petitioner and the landlady in which it was stipulated that the Petitioner would vacate the accommodation in dispute within a period of one month. On 27th September, 1982, itself the Prescribed Authority, passed an order directing the eviction of the Petitioner on the basis of the said compromise. The Petitioner challenged the legality of the said order before the Appellate Authority and as already stated he failed to get any relief from that forum. 3. The first proviso to Section 21 lays down that where the building was in the occupation of the tenant since before its purchase by the landlord, on such purchase being made after the commencement of this Act, no application shall be entertained on the grounds, mentioned in Clause (a), unless a period of three years has elapsed since the date of such purchase, and the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before such application, and such notice may be given even before the expiration of the period of three years. It is obvious that the order dated 27th September, 1982, was passed by the Prescribed Authority well within a period of three years. A perusal of the application of the landlady u/s 21(1)(a) discloses that in it not a whisper was made that she had given any notice whatsoever to the Petitioner in terms of the provisions of the proviso. That apart, the language employed by the Legislature in the proviso is clear and explicit. A perusal of the application of the landlady u/s 21(1)(a) discloses that in it not a whisper was made that she had given any notice whatsoever to the Petitioner in terms of the provisions of the proviso. That apart, the language employed by the Legislature in the proviso is clear and explicit. In it there is a clear mandate that no application u/s 21(1)(a) shall be entertained unless a period of three years has elapsed since the date of the purchase. It is not necessary for the purposes of this case to enter into the controversy as to what meaning should be ascribed to the phrase "entertain". In view of the decisions given by this Court it is amply clear that, at any rate, no decision accepting an application u/s 21(1)(a) should be given by the Prescribed Authority before the expiry of a period of three years from the date of purchase. In any event, the order passed by the Prescribed Authority on 27th September, 1982, was without jurisdiction. 4. Learned Counsel for the contesting Respondent has urged that the defect of jurisdiction stood cured as the appeal preferred by the Petitioner was decided on 22nd September, 1983, that is, after a period of three years from 15th July, 1980. In my opinion, this submission is not sound. The order of the Prescribed Authority dated 27th September, 1982, suffered from an inherent lack of jurisdiction. It was void ab initio on that date. No life could be infused into that order by an order of affordance passed by the Appellate Authority on 22nd September, 1983. The order directing the eviction of the Petitioner from the accommodation in dispute on the basis of the application made by the landlady u/s 21(1)(a) continued to remain void and that is the position even today. 5. Having gone through the application u/s 21(1)(a) made by the landlady I find that in it of is averred that her need is genuine and greater than that of the Petitioner. There is no averment as regards the hardship to be suffered by either of the two parties. 5. Having gone through the application u/s 21(1)(a) made by the landlady I find that in it of is averred that her need is genuine and greater than that of the Petitioner. There is no averment as regards the hardship to be suffered by either of the two parties. The Appellate Authority has taken the view that the admission made by the Petitioner that the application of the landlady should be accepted in law tantamount to the fulfillment of the requirements of the provisions as contained in Section 21(1)(a) and therefore, the Prescribed Authority had passed the order in accordance with that Section . 6. Having considered the matter carefully, I am unable to subscribe to this view. Neither the contents of the application made by the landlady disclose that she will suffer greater hardship than the Petitioner if the order of eviction is not passed, nor do, in their orders, either the Prescribed Authority or the Appellate Authority record any finding that the landlady will suffer greater hardship than the Petitioner in the event an order of eviction is not passed. The net result is that an important ingredient of Section 21(1)(a) remains unsatisfied. 7. This petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 27th September, 1982 passed by the Prescribed Authority is quashed. The order dated 22.09.83, passed by the Appellate Authority is also quashed. The Prescribed Authority may, if the landlady so desires proceed with the hearing of the application made by her on 15th July, 1982 afresh and in disregard of the compromise arrived at between the parties. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.