JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav, J. - The present petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the orders dated 15.05.1974 and dated 21.03.1975 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Varanasi u/s 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (for short the Act). 2. The facts are few and simple. Over Khata No. 473 in the basic year the Petitioner and Lagan, father of Respondent No. 4 Sheonath were recorded as sirdars. The Petitioner filed an objection u/s 9A(2) of the Act claiming sole sirdari rights as the plots were acquired by her husband alone and the entry in the name of Lagan was incorrect and the same may be exmpunged. On the other hand, it was alleged by Respondent No. 4, that Lagan was the sole-tenant and after the death of Ramdeo, husband of Smt. Sukali, the Petitioner, she remarried and lost her rights. In any case he claimed to be entitled to 2/3rd share as Deena died after the death of Ramdeo and his l/3rd share came to Lagan, the father of Respondent No. 4, and hence he became entitled to 2/3rd share whereas the Petitioner in the alternative was entitled to l/3rd share only. 3. The Consolidation Officer held the Petitioner to be entitled to 1/2 share and Respondent No. 4 would be entitled to the remaining 1/2 share. Both the parties preferred appeals which were dismissed. Thereafter both the parties preferred revisions. The Petitioner's revision (Revision No. 1941: Smt. Sukali v. Sheonath) was decided ex-parte inasmuch as the Petitioner's counsel prayed that on account of unavoidable difficulties he was unable to argue the case on the date fixed, hence another date may be fixed but that application was rejected and thereafter the revision was decided ex-parte and was dismissed by order dated 15.05.1974. The Petitioner preferred restoration application which was taken for hearing alongwith Revision No. 2735 (Sheonath v. Smt. Sukali). The Petitioner's restoration application was also dismissed holding that no sufficient ground was made out to restore the revision. Whereas the revision of Respondent No. 4 was decided on merits and allowed on 21-3-1975 and it was held that the Petitioner was entitled to l/3rd share and Respondent No. 4 was entitled to 2/3 rd share. 4. The Petitioner's restoration application was also dismissed holding that no sufficient ground was made out to restore the revision. Whereas the revision of Respondent No. 4 was decided on merits and allowed on 21-3-1975 and it was held that the Petitioner was entitled to l/3rd share and Respondent No. 4 was entitled to 2/3 rd share. 4. It has been urged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the application moved by the counsel for the Petitioner before the Deputy Director of Consolidation for adjournment was dismissed, but no reasons were assigned as to why the Petitioner's counsel could not be accommodated for some other date. Nothing was said that on some previous date also the Petitioner or her counsel adopted some delaying tactics. Hence in all probabilities the application moved by the Petitioner's counsel must have been allowed. 5. The learned Counsel for Respondent No. 4, on the other hand, urged that it was discretionary matter to allow the adjournment application or not and once that application was rejected the Petitioner should have appeared in person or could have engaged some other person to get the revision argued but she did not do so, hence the applications for adjournment as well as for restoration were correctly dismissed and the revision of Respondent No. 4 has correctly been disposed of on merits and he has been correctly given 2/3rd share which was based on the appraisal of evidence on record of the case and that no ground for interference Under Article 226 of the Constitution was made out. 6. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties I am of opinion that the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner appears to be well founded. In fact the Deputy Director of Consolidation was final court of fact while exercising revisional powers u/s 48 of the Act. The Legislature was wise-enough to enact Section 48 of the Act in such a way that the hearing of the parties was made a condition precedent before passing a final order in revision. The relevant mandatory clause in Section 48 of the Act is that the revision can be disposed of only "after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard". Hence it was mandatory that the Petitioner should have been allowed an opportunity of being heard. The relevant mandatory clause in Section 48 of the Act is that the revision can be disposed of only "after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard". Hence it was mandatory that the Petitioner should have been allowed an opportunity of being heard. In the instant case even though the adjournment application moved by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner before the Deputy Director of Consolidation was rejected, an opportunity of hearing must have been given to the Petitioner either to appear in person or to engage some other counsel or to grant adjournment to some future date, but that was not done. In the way the revision of the Petitioner was decided ex-parte and as the Petitioner's restoration application has been disposed of by order dated 21.03.75 it appears that the Deputy Director of Consolidation was in great haste in deciding the revision on merits. It does not appear from both the orders that the Petitioner was afforded any opportunity of being heard. Further more the Petitioner was a lady and her husband has died, there was no body to help her. Her rights should not have been affected or curtailed without affording her an opportunity of being heard. 7. Apart from the mandatory provisions of Section 48 of the Act pointed out earlier the basic principle of justice contained in the Latin Maxim "audi alteram partam ", which obviously means that hear the other side as well, was not followed. in the present case without hearing the Petitioner or her counsel the order in revision could not have been passed against her. The facts as emerged from the discussions made in both the orders of the Deputy Director of Consolidation evidence that the Petitioner was not afforded any opportunity of being heard. As without hearing the petitioner her revision was dismissed and both the revisions were in respect of the same khata, it was accordingly obligatory on the part of the Deputy Director of Consolidation to have heard the Petitioner's counsel. Even though it may be assumed that in the revision of Respondent No. 4 both the parties' counsel might have been heard, but nevertheless this remained a fact that the Petitioner's revision was dismissed without hearing her counsel and the restoration application was also dismissed. 8. Even though it may be assumed that in the revision of Respondent No. 4 both the parties' counsel might have been heard, but nevertheless this remained a fact that the Petitioner's revision was dismissed without hearing her counsel and the restoration application was also dismissed. 8. In Nirankar Nath Wahi v. Fifth Additional District Judge, Moradabad 1984 AWC 659 in somewhat similar circumstances where a prayer for adjournment of case was made on account of indisposition of the senior counsel for the Appellant, and that was allowed on May 20, 1983, and only three days' time was allowed to make alternative arrangement and on the next date no adjournment was allowed and judgment was delivered, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held (in para 10, page 662) as follows: This short adjournment for three days was granted by order dated May 20, 1983. But on May 23, 1983 the learned Judge refused to grant further time to the Appellant who had not been able to make suitable arrangement for engaging a counsel on that date. We are of the opinion that the Appellant has been denied the reasonable opportunity of hearing, and that the grievances made by the Appellant, as regards the procedure adopted by the learned judge on this score is not unfounded. This is one of the two reasons which has impelled us to set aside the order passed by the learned Additional District Judge and to remand the matter for a fresh decision in accordance with law after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to the parties. 9. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken in the case of Nirankar Nath Wahi (Supra). In view of the facts stated above it is abundantly clear that the Petitioner was not afforded sufficient opportunity of hearing by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation cannot be sustained. 10. In the result, the petition succeeds and is hereby allowed with costs and the orders dated 21.03.1975 and 15.05.1974 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation are quashed. The Deputy Director of Consolidation is directed to restore both the revisions to their original numbers and to dispose them according to law and in the light of the observations made above.