JUDGMENT G.B. Singh, J.- This writ petition is directed against the judgment dated 29-10-81, allowing the Urban Land Ceiling Appeal No. 45 of 1980 in part and holding that Harnam Singh, respondent no. 2 was holding 2290 sq. metres excess vacant land. 2. The land in respect of which the writ has been preferred is situated in town Meerut which falls under category 'C' of Schedule I of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) where the ceiling limit of the vacant land is 1500 sq. metres. The land in dispute belonged to Harnam Singh, respondent no. 2 and it is comprised in plots no. 253, 254, 255, 257, 258 and 264 in Nagla Batu Yadgarpur. There was a Kachha house of Harnam Singh over the land measuring 450 sq. yards of plot no. 253 and that-ched house belonging to him in plot no. 257 over a piece of land measuring 250 sq. yards and the remaining land measuring 10,875.56 sq. metres was lying vacant. Harnam Singh, respondent no. 2 submitted statement under Section 6 (1) of the Act before the competent authority and after necessary investigation and survey a draft statement under Section 8 (3) or the Act was served on him. The respondent No. 2 filed objection before the competent authority against that draft statement. The competent authority after considering the facts served final statement under Section 9 of the Act and declared vide his order dated 6-6-78, an area of 9375.56 sq. metres out of 10875.56 sq. metres land as excess vacant land after excluding 1500 sq. metres vacant land and the aforesaid land covered by the two house, for the respondent no. 2. An appeal was preferred by the respondent no. 2 against that judgment of the competent authority contending that the land belonging to him could not be declared excess vacant land and the learned District Judge allowed the appeal in part and held that Harnam Singh, respondent no. 2 was holding 2290 sq. metres only as vacant land in excess of ceiling limit observing that the constructions were not permissible over the land 7085.56 sq. metres and as such that land is liable to be excluded by virtue of Section 2 (q) (i) of the Act. Against this decision the present writ petition has been filed by the state of U.P. and the competent authority. 3. metres and as such that land is liable to be excluded by virtue of Section 2 (q) (i) of the Act. Against this decision the present writ petition has been filed by the state of U.P. and the competent authority. 3. The only point pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the learned District Judge committed an error in excluding 7085.56 sq. metres land under Section 2 (q) (i) of the Act and there was no justification for interference with the finding of the learned competent authority holding that 9375.56 sq. metres excess vacant land. In support of this argument he placed reliance upon the State of U.P. and others v. L.J. Johnson and others, AIR 1983 SC 1303 and Pran Nath Duggal v. State of U.P. and others, 1984 ALJ 1180. In my opinion the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners has much force. Section 2 (q) (i) of the Act reads as follows :- "Vacant land means land, not being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture, in an urban agglomeration, but does not include- (i) land on which construction of a building is not permissible under the building regulations in force in the area in which such land is situated." Section 2 (q) defines vacant land. Sub-clause (i) and other two sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) of Section 2 (q) specify the categories of the land which are not included in the vacant land. The plain meaning of sub-clause (i) appears to be if in an area, there are building regulations in force and those building regulations prohibit construction of a building on a piece of land, then such a land is not included in vacant land. In the present case there is nothing on record showing that the building regulation, in force, in the area prohibit construction of building over the land in question. It can never be the meaning of this sub-clause that a definite percentage of all the vacant lands is to be excluded for the purposes of ceiling limit on the ground that on this percentage constructions cannot be made according to building regulations. It seems that sub-clause (i) contemplates that land where the building regulations totally prohibit the building activity by any one. Thus it covers only that land which is to be maintained as open space like green park, play ground etc. It seems that sub-clause (i) contemplates that land where the building regulations totally prohibit the building activity by any one. Thus it covers only that land which is to be maintained as open space like green park, play ground etc. and not the building sites. The building regulations prohibit constructions over building sites according to certain percentage for beneficial enjoyment of the buildings and this sub-clause does not apply to that percentage land. Thus the learned District Judge committed an error in holding that a definite percentage of the entire vacant land of the respondent no. 2 was liable to be excluded under sub-clause (i) clause (q) of Section 2. 4. In connection with Section 2 (q) (i) the Supreme Court made following observations in A.I.R. 1983 SC 1303 (para 17) :- "Clause (i) gives blanket exemption to any land situated in an urban area where the entire area is covered by land on which it is not permissible to raise a building which will not be deemed to be vacant land within the meaning of Section 2 (q). This is because such land in an urban area cannot be used for building purposes but being vacant falls beyond the purview of the Act." In Pran Nath Duggal v. State of U.P., 1984 ALJ 1189, the following observations made at page 1195 (paragraphs 29, 30 and 31) in connection with the interpretation of Section 2 (q) (i) appear relevant :- "From these observations of the Supreme Court, it is clear that to a case where 500 sq. metres of land is left under Section 2 (q) (i), the owner will not be entitled to get the benefit of Section 2 (q) (i) as conceding to the application of Section 2 (q) (i) would mean double exclusion." 5. From the above it is clear that the contention of the respondent that he was entitled to exclusion of the land, a certain percentage of which is required under the bye-laws to be left open is not correct. From what has been said above by the Supreme Court, it appears to me that the owner will not be entitled to a separate exclusion both under sub-clauses (i) and (ii) because the area under sub-clause (i) will obviously include the land appurtenant which is referred to in sub-clauses (i) and (ii). 6. From what has been said above by the Supreme Court, it appears to me that the owner will not be entitled to a separate exclusion both under sub-clauses (i) and (ii) because the area under sub-clause (i) will obviously include the land appurtenant which is referred to in sub-clauses (i) and (ii). 6. For what I have said above, I find that the learned District Judge committed an error in holding that if a certain percentage of land is required to be left open as construction of a building is not permissible then that area should be excluded from the definition of vacant land as mentioned in Section 2 (q) (i) of the Act. 7. There is no reason to disagree with the above interpretation of sub-clause (i) of clause (q) of Section 2 of the Act. It, therefore, follows that the learned District Judge committed an error while excluding the land measuring 7085.56 sq. metres on the ground that-constructions are not permissible on such an area under the regulations framed under the U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act, 1959, in addition to 1500 sq. metres vacant land already left to the respondent no. 2 by the competent authority. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 argued that there was no Master Plan in force in Meerut town when the statement under Section 6 (i) of the Act was filed and since it came into force during the pendency of the proceedings before the competent authority, the land in question could not be taken in urban agglomeration and as such the land of the respondent no. 2 could not be declared excess vacant land to an extent as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners. I do not find any force in this contention. The reason is that it is undisputed that the Master plan came into force while the proceedings, were going on before the Competent Authority. The observations made in Pran Nath Duggal v. State of U.P. 1984 ALJ 1189, clearly show that the provisions of the Act are applicable to the land in respect of which the Master plan came in force even after the commencement of the proceedings but before being concluded before the Competent Authority. There is no reason to disagree with this view. There is no reason to disagree with this view. It is undisputed that the land in question lies within the area to which the master plan applies and as such it can be called urban land within the meaning of the Act and its provisions are, therefore applicable to it. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent therefore, falls to the ground. 9. From the observations of the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1983 SC 1303 and the facts of the present case it is evident that the petitioners can get 1500 sq. metres only of the vacant land and the same has been excluded by the Competent Authority. There was no justification for the learned District Judge to exclude 7085.56 sq. metres on the basis of building regulations. Thus the finding of the learned Competent Authority declaring the land measuring 9375 sq. metres as excess vacant land was wrongly interfered by the learned District Judge and it must be restored. 10. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed. The order dated 29-10-81 of the learned District Judge is quashed and the land measuring 9375.56 sq. metres is declared excess vacant land as held by the Competent Authority. In the circumstances of the case no order as to costs.