Judgment :- 1. Both the appeals arise out of one and the same judgment in O.S. No. 34 of 1974. The said suit was filed in forma pauperis to set aside the sales dated 25-5-1955, 15-9-1968, 15-12-1970 and 22-1-1972 and in the year 1956, executed by the first defendant and as a consequence thereof, to pass a decree directing division of B Schedule properties and item 1 of C Schedule properties into 12 equal shares and for allotment of two such shares to the plaintiffs and for directing division of items 2 to 4 of C Schedule into six shares and for allotment of two such shares to the plaintiffs and for division of D Schedule property and fo r allotment of 40 cents to the plaintiffs and to make suitable provisions for maintenance for the mother of the plaintiffs till her life time and for the maintenance and the marriage of their sisters with a charge over the one third share belonging to the first defendant (the father) comprised in B to D Schedule properties. The case of the plaintiffs is shortly as follows:— 2. The plaintiffs are the sons of the first defendant. Their family was and is a respectable one in Valipalayam village Suburb in Tirupur town. By a partition deed dated 11-7-1952 the first defendant and his brother along with his first cousin and others partitioned their properties. The first defendant and his brother got for their joint share an extent of 3.37 acres of garden land. That forms the B Schedule. The lands were ancestral joint family lands. They were fetching an annual income of Rs. 1,000. Besides the said properties, the first defendant and his brother were also entitled to half shares in Survey No. 391 of Veerapandi village measuring 6.69 acres and an extent of 11.96 acres in Survey Nos. 390, 392 and 382/2 of Veerapandi Village. They form the C Schedule. The annual income will be Rs. 200 from item 1 of C Schedule while items 2 to 4 would fetch an annual income of Rs. 2,000. This was the position prior to 1965, After 1965, the income has increased since the value increased many times consequent to the advent of Parambikulam Canal Project. The first defendant has been borrowing indiscriminately without caring to look after the family. He was married about 20 years prior to the suit. 2,000. This was the position prior to 1965, After 1965, the income has increased since the value increased many times consequent to the advent of Parambikulam Canal Project. The first defendant has been borrowing indiscriminately without caring to look after the family. He was married about 20 years prior to the suit. For two years after the marriage, he was leading a proper life. Thereafter, he got addicted to excessive drinking very often losing his senses. He was a member of the Minerva Club, Tiruppur. He used to indulge in gambling and he had illicit intimacy with one Rajammal. As a result of these bad habits, he used to spend lavishly. Occasionally he visited the house. About six or seven years, the second plaintiff was born and subsequently, a daughter was born about 10 years ago. All the debts borrowed by the first defendant were not for necessities at all. Thereafter, to discharge the debts, he executed two sale deeds dated 25-5-1955 for Rs. 5,000 and dated 15-9-1958 for Rs. 2,400. These sales were not supported by any legal necessity. The debts were borrowed for immoral or illegal purposes. In item 1 of C Schedule, the first defendant is entitled to 1/4 share. He sold his share to the third defendant by two sale deeds, one on 25-4-1968 of 1.5 acres and another on 22-1-1972 of 15 cents for considerations of Rs. 3,000 and Rs. 400 respectively. Items 2 to 4 of C Schedule consist of 11.96 acres of fertile lands. The first defendants half share in items 2 to 4 has been sold for an alleged consideration of Rs. 17,000 to the fourth defendant on 15-12-1970. At that time the properties were worth much more. The consideration was very low and inadequate and there was no legal necessity to sell. Therefore, all the sales are liable to be set aside. Hence the suit. 3. The first defendant remained ex parte. The second defendant in his written statement dated 19-6-1974 would contend that the lands are dry lands and they are dependent upon rains. The annual income might be only about Rs. 1,000. Because the first defendant had a large family and he had to keep up the respectability, he had sold the properties only for purpose of maintenance of the family and therefore, the sales are not liable to be impeached. The annual income might be only about Rs. 1,000. Because the first defendant had a large family and he had to keep up the respectability, he had sold the properties only for purpose of maintenance of the family and therefore, the sales are not liable to be impeached. That apart, the second defendant had invested considerable sum to improve the same and constructed a building investing a lakh of rupees. The litigation is a speculative one. In the same way, each of the defendants filed a written statement supporting the alienation in his favour. 4. On these pleadings, the following issues and additional issues were framed for trial: “(1) Whether the sale deed dated 6-10-1956 is binding on the plaintiffs and whether it is valid? (2) Whether the plaintiffs was benefited out of the sale dated 6-10-1956? (3) Whether the sales in favour of the 3rd defendant dated 25-4-1968 is true and binding on the plaintiffis? (4) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? (5) Whether the sales in favour of 3rd defendant dated 25-4-1968 and 22-1-1972 are true valid and binding on the plaintiffs (amended on 24-1-1978)? (6) Whether the mother of the plaintiff is entitled to any maintenance? (7) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? (8) To what relief? Addl. Issue framed on 13-10-1976:— (9) To what relief is the eighth defendant entitled to? Addl. issue framed on 27-10-1976:— (10) Whether the 3rd defendant entitled to any equity? Addl. issues framed on 24-1-1978:— (11) Whether the purchaser of D Schedule property are necessary parties to this suit? (12) Whether the 2nd plaintiff cannot claim any share in D Schedule property? (13) Whether the sale deed dated 9-10-1956, is valid and binding on the plaintiff? (14) Whether the 1st defendant was leading an immoral and extravagant life and whether the alienations are affected by it? Addl. Issue framed on 28-6-1978:— (15) Whether the sale deed Exhibit A1 dated 25-5-1955 and Exhibit B2 dated 15-9-1958 and Exhibit A4 dated 15-12-1970 are true, valid and binding on the plaintiffs?” 5. On issue No. 14, the learned Subordinate Judge on trial came to the conclusion that the allegations of immoral and extravagant life cannot be accepted. Consequently, he rejected the case of the plaintiffs stating that there was no proof that the consideration for those sales were spent for the alleged illegal or immoral purposes. On issue No. 14, the learned Subordinate Judge on trial came to the conclusion that the allegations of immoral and extravagant life cannot be accepted. Consequently, he rejected the case of the plaintiffs stating that there was no proof that the consideration for those sales were spent for the alleged illegal or immoral purposes. On issue No. 15, it was held that the sales under Exs. A1 and B2 are true, valid and binding on the plaintiffs while Ex. A4 sale is not true, valid or binding on the plaintiffs. On issue No. 3 he held that the sales under Exs. B11 and A3 are true and supported by consideration. Issue No. 13, was called superfluous. Issue Nos. 1, 2, 11 and 12 were answered holding that Ex.A5 is true, valid and binding. Issue No. 6 was answered against the plaintiffs. While issue No. 7 was answered in favour of the plaintiffs, issue No. 5 was answered in the affirmative. Issue No. 4 was answered against the defendants. On issue No. 9 concerning C-Schedule, it was held that the eighth defendant is entitled to 1/4 share in item 1 and a half share in items 2 to 4 and to that extent the eighth defendant is entitled to division of her share. On issue No. 10 it was held that since the third defendants sale is upheld, the question of equities does not arise. On issue No. 8 it was eoncluded that as far as Ex. B16 is concerned it was hit by lis-pendens and Exs. B13 and B14 though found to be genuine sales supported by consideration, they had to fail as the sale to the fourth defendant could not be upheld for the reasons already stated. In the result, a decree was passed declaring that the sales under Exs. A4, B13, B14 and B16 are not valid and binding on the plaintiffs shares. A preliminary decree was passed for partition in respect of C-Schedule item 1 excluding Exs. B11 and A3 properties into 12 equal shares and allotment of two such shares to the plaintiffs and three such shares to the eighth defendant and divide items 2 to 4 in C Schedule into six equal shares and for allotment of two such shares to the plaintiffs and three such shares to the eighth defendant. In other respects, the suit was dismissed. In other respects, the suit was dismissed. Since the suit was originally filed in forma pauperis, it was directed that the court-fee due on the plaint to the Government shall be paid by the plaintiffs. It is against this judgment and decree that A.S. No. 267 of 1979 has been preferred by the fifth and the eleventh defendants while A.S. No. 1058 of 1979 has been preferred by the plaintiffs in so far as their case has not been accepted in regard to certain allegations. 6. The learned Advocate-General argues, appearing for the appellants in A.S. No. 267 of 1979, as follows:— The basis of the suit by the respondent-plaintiffs was on the allegation of immorality and illegality, in that the debts belong to the category of Avyavaharika . Once the court below disbelieved that case, it follows that Ex.A4 had to be upheld. 7. Here is a case where the original alienor, the first defendant, remained ex parte. The fourth defendant, the alienor of these appellants under Exs. B13, B14 and B16 also remained absent. Therefore, the recitals made in Ex. A4 should be considered to be prima facie evidence. 8. If those recitals are looked into, they would show that there was in existence a prior debt. Merely because the parties have not been examined, it does not mean that those recitals cannot be given credence to. In support of this submission, reliance is placed on S.V. Gopalakrishnan v. Venugopal 1 , wherein it has been held that debts which are recited in a registered and old document should be accepted as prima facie proof. 9. P.W.1 has signed as an attestor of Ex. B13. Therefore, consequent to the attestation, it must be held that it will be binding upon him. The effect of the attestation is that there will be a complete estoppel as to the validity of the sale deed. In view of this, it is argued that the court below was wrong in holding that these sales were not valid. 10. Mr. V. Krishnan, learned counsel for the respondents, states in opposition to these arguments, first and foremost that Ex. B16 sale was after the suit. This is a case in which there is not even a minimum enquiry by the alienee. Ex. A4 recites the various debts and directs the vendor to discharge the debts. 10. Mr. V. Krishnan, learned counsel for the respondents, states in opposition to these arguments, first and foremost that Ex. B16 sale was after the suit. This is a case in which there is not even a minimum enquiry by the alienee. Ex. A4 recites the various debts and directs the vendor to discharge the debts. In support of such discharge not one promissory note is filed. Besides, no collusion is pleaded between the first and the fourth defendants. It is not correct to rely on S.V. Gopalakrishnan v. Venugopal 1. That case is clearly distinguishable in view of the fact that it is not an old document nor for the discharge of an antecedent debt. The document in this case is a very recent one. 11. As to when an attestation will be binding has been laid down in Ethirajammal v. G. Lakshmi Devi 2. Only when there is a conscious act of abandonment, such an attestation will be binding, not otherwise. Therefore, the failure to examine either the 1st defendant or the fourth defendant clearly goes to prove that these debts were neither antecedent in point of time nor could they be called valid or binding debts. From this point of view, no case has been made out for interference with the bindings of the court below. 12. As regards A.S. 1058 of 1979 which has been preferred by the plaintiffs, the attack is on the following sales. Ex. A1 dated 25-5-1955 for Rs. 5,000 was a sale in favour of the second defendant. The property which formed the subject matter of the sale comprised of an extent of 3 acres 17 cents. Ex. B2 is yet another sale deed dated 15-9-1958 for a sum of Rs. 2,400 in favour of the same second defendant where the subject matter comprised of only 20 cents. Therefore, it is argued that in Ex B2, there is not even a recital about the necessity of the sale. Having regard to the disparity in the sale considerations between Exs. A1 and B2, it is clear that the sale has been done indiscriminately. As regards Ex. A1, neither Muthuswami is examined nor again the promissory note in favour of Muthuswami is produced. Therefore, these sales are liable to be set aside. 13. The next sale that is impeached is Ex. B11dated 25-4-1968 for a sum of Rs. A1 and B2, it is clear that the sale has been done indiscriminately. As regards Ex. A1, neither Muthuswami is examined nor again the promissory note in favour of Muthuswami is produced. Therefore, these sales are liable to be set aside. 13. The next sale that is impeached is Ex. B11dated 25-4-1968 for a sum of Rs. 3,000 in favour of the third defendant. Another sale is Ex. B12 dated 22-1-1972 for a sum of Rs. 4,000 in favour of the third defendant. It comprises of 75 cents. Concerning these two, the attack of the learned counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs is, as regards Ex. B11, there is absolutely no recital in the sale deed as to the purpose of alienation. The same is the position as regards Ex. B12 as well. It question posed in all these cases is whether a prudent father would have alienated this item. It was this test which was propounded in Prasad v. V. Govindaswami Mudaliar 1, in paragraph 63 of the judgment. If, therefore, the act on the part of the father has not been prudent, notwithstanding the fact that the case is that he was leading an immoral and illegal life and he was incurring debts which are tainted with such immorality and illegality, yet the plaintiffs would be entitled to succeed. 14. Mr. S. Gopalaratnam, learned counsel who supports the alienations under Exs.A1 and B2 in favour of the second defendant, contends as follows:— On 11-7-1952, under Ex.B1, there was a partition in the family of the defendants. In plain paragraph 3 it is stated that the net annual income will be Rs. 3,000 from B Schedule. It is on this background that the entire case will have to be analysed. Once the case of immorality is disbelieved, there is nothing to hold that there was any lack of bona fides on the part of the first defendant father in alienating this property. It should also be noted that as regards Ex.A1, not only the first defendant but his brother also joined. Therefore, the paternal uncle of the plaintiffs, namely the brother of the first defendant, would not have joined. The learned counsel draws my attention to a passage occuring at page 329 paragraph 244 of Mullas Hindu Law. In support of this submission, reliance is placed on Ramarao v. Venkattasubayya 2, and Sathappan Ambulam v. Vadivelu 3. Therefore, the paternal uncle of the plaintiffs, namely the brother of the first defendant, would not have joined. The learned counsel draws my attention to a passage occuring at page 329 paragraph 244 of Mullas Hindu Law. In support of this submission, reliance is placed on Ramarao v. Venkattasubayya 2, and Sathappan Ambulam v. Vadivelu 3. On the basis of these rulings, it is urged that the recitals in the document, would be quite enough. More so when the first defendant has not been examined. In so far as there is a clear distinction between the sale by a manager of a joint family and the sale by a guardian of a minors property, in the former case in as much as he sells his own share as well, the nature of enquiry must be entirely different. This is being clearly brought out in Sathappan Ambalam v. Vadivelu 3. Therefore, in view of this, Exs. A1 and B2 having been accepted not only by the 1st defendant but also by the 2nd defendant, it would be clear that those alienations will have to be upheld. Drawing my attention to the passage at page 353 paragraph 5 of Mullas Hindu Law, the learned counsel urges that should the court hold that these alienations are not valid, the specific share that has to be allotted to the alienor of this defendant, namely the second defendant, will be as on the date of the alienation and not on the date of reducing the property to possession. That equity might be adjusted during the final decree proceedings. 15. Mr. Muthukumaraswami, learned counsel appearing for the third defendant, in supporting Exs.B11 and B12, registration copies of which are Exs.A2 and A3, states that D5 is the mother-in-law of the third and the eleventh defendants. D.W.3 is the husband of the third defendant. D.W.4 is the attestator. Both these witnesses, D.Ws.3 and 4 speak to the passing of the consideration under these documents. In so far as the evidence discloses that an enquiry was made by the alienee about the existence of all the debts which have been so informed, that should be held sufficient to prove the bonafides of the alienor. That is all what is required as seen from the passage occuring at page 295 volume I of N.R. Raghavachariars Hindu Law. Therefore, these sales may be upheld. That is all what is required as seen from the passage occuring at page 295 volume I of N.R. Raghavachariars Hindu Law. Therefore, these sales may be upheld. I may say at this stage that no serious argument was advanced as regards Ex. A5, dated 6-101956 for a sum of Rs. 17,000 in favour of the 6th and 7th defendants. 16. In view of the above submissions, two questions arise for my determination as follows: (i) whether the sale deed Ex.A4 can be upheld as valid; and (ii) whether the sales under Exs.A1, B2, B11 and B12 could be held to be valid as found by the court below. 17. It is undoubtedly true that the plaintiffs came forward with specific allegations that the father, the 1st defendant, was leading a wayward life, that he was addicted to drinking, that he was regularly indulging in gambling, that he had illicit intimacy with one Rajammal and that therefore, because of these bad habits, he used to spend lavishly. He never cared for his wife nor children, nor did he ever support them in any way. That case, under issue No. 14, has been disbelieved by the court below. That finding has not been seriously attacked by the learned counsel for the respondents in A.S.267 of 1979 and the appellants in AS. 1058 of 1979, namely the plaintiffs. Therefore, from that it does not follow that the alienations could straightway be upheld as contended by the learned Advocate General. This is a case in which the first defendant, under Ex.A4, dated 15-12-1970, sells G.S. No. 390 of an extent of an 3 acres 30 cents, G.S. No 392,2 acres 82 cents and G.S. No. 383,20 cents together with 1/12 share in the well. The sale was in favour of the fourth defendant. The 4th defendant, in his turn, sells in favour of D5 under two sale deeds Exs.B13 dated 8-6-1971 and B14 dated 22-11-1971. The last of the sales was in favour of the eleventh defendant, under Ex.B16 dated 29-5-1975. The sale was in favour of the fourth defendant. The 4th defendant, in his turn, sells in favour of D5 under two sale deeds Exs.B13 dated 8-6-1971 and B14 dated 22-11-1971. The last of the sales was in favour of the eleventh defendant, under Ex.B16 dated 29-5-1975. The attack as regards the sale deed under Ex.A4 is what is found in paragraph 7 of the plaint, that the debts recited therein are either false or must have been created or incurred to satisfy the personal wishes and habits of the 1st defendant, the family of the plaintiffs was not benefitted to any extent by the said sale and hence the sale deed dt. 15-12-1970 to the 4th defendant also should be cancelled or set aside as against these plaintiffs. One thing that is clear in this case is that neither the 1st defendant nor even the 4th defendant has come to give evidence. It is only in the absence of these witnesses, the alieneeds from the alienee, namely the 5th and the 11th defendants, are obliged to defend their case. Under Ex.A4, consideration is Rs. 17,000. The debts that are recited there are, the promissory note dt. 29-12-1967 for Rs. 5,000 in favour of the vendee which, inclusive of the interest, comes to Rs. 6,000, the promissory note in favour of Visalakshi for Rs. 3,000 executed on 13-9-1968 which inclusive of interest, comes to Rs. 3,600, the promissory note in favour of Palinisami for Rs. 1,500 dt. 23-6-1969, the total inclusive of interest coming to Rs. 1,650 and the promissory note in favour of Thirumalaswami Gounder executed on 17-10-1969 inclusive of interest and deducting the payments already made to be satisfied to the tune of Rs. 1,750. All these debts are to be discharge by the vendee. A sum of Rs. 4,000 was paid in cash already. It is some what strange that not a single promissory note which is said to have been discharged by the vendee has been produced. Nor again the promises under the various promissory notes were examined. It is well settled that the burden is on the alienees to prove consideration of the binding nature. Therefore, as rightly held by the learned Subordinate judge, in the absence of the 4th defendant and the 1st defendant being examined, it is impossible to accept the passing of consideration of Rs. 17,000. It is well settled that the burden is on the alienees to prove consideration of the binding nature. Therefore, as rightly held by the learned Subordinate judge, in the absence of the 4th defendant and the 1st defendant being examined, it is impossible to accept the passing of consideration of Rs. 17,000. This is the reason why the learned Advocate General relies on the ruling of S.V. Gopalakrishnan v. Venugopal 1, wherein the following observations are found: “Before we deal each of the schedules and the facts as found on the record in relation thereto and the manner and the reason for the alienations of such properties by one or the other or both of the first and the 2nd defendants, it is convenient to make certain general observations regarding such subject matters which have been coming and are likely to come often in courts of law. When a minor institutes an action challenging the alienations made by his father or his ancestors on the ground that the deb ts were avyavaharika in nature and that there was no legal necessity which would compel the manager, though he may be a father to sell or alienate otherwise the properties it is for him to establish at least reasonably, that the circumstances and the position of the family were such that no occasion could have arisen for such a borrowing and that there was no necessity, at all, to alienate the properties at any particular or material point of time. The mere ipse dixit of the plaintiff, as soon as he becomes a major basing his information on hear say and gathering some witnesses who would parrotlike repeat what he wants them to say would not improve the position. Antecedent debt has a special signification. The mere ipse dixit of the plaintiff, as soon as he becomes a major basing his information on hear say and gathering some witnesses who would parrotlike repeat what he wants them to say would not improve the position. Antecedent debt has a special signification. If the debts are incurred for paying off debts already in existence, then it will be normally understood as an occasion in which an antecedent debt is being discharged, It is therefore, essential that in such connections wherein alienations are made so as to pay off antecedent debts in the sense of debts which are recited in a registered and old document as existing debts of the family, the minor should be in a position to bring home to the court that there was no occasion or there could have been no occasion for the father-manager or any other manager of the joint family to involve himself in such entrepreneurship. For this purpose, he must be in a position to prove that would be the income from the joint family properties and after meeting the generality of expenses connected with the family, they could have been available surplus the existence of which cannot prompt a respectable person to borrow unnecessarily or to mortgage unnecessarily the family properties so as to ultimately burden them. The Supreme Court has laid down in uncanny terms that proof of such available surplus or a reasonable inference or acceptable material that there is a possibility of such available surplus, should be established so as to compel courts of law to set aside an ancient or an old alienation on the ground that the recitals in the document which created such alienations have to be ignored lightly and contemporaneously brushed aside as not binding on the challenging minor coparceners. Further in cases like this, it would be a practical impossibility or the alienee who is brought to the threshold of the court on the facts adverted by the minor challenging coparcener to prove that the consideration which passed under one or other alienations made by the father-manager or the manager was rightfully or properly ut ilised by their vendors. It would be unreasonable to expect such meticulous proof of appropriation and treatment of such consideration nearly 15 or 20 years after the date of such alienation.” 18. This case is easily distinguishable, because, as righlty contended by Mr. It would be unreasonable to expect such meticulous proof of appropriation and treatment of such consideration nearly 15 or 20 years after the date of such alienation.” 18. This case is easily distinguishable, because, as righlty contended by Mr. V. Krishnan, learned counsel for the respondents, this is not an ancient document. It was executed only in the year 1970 while the OP itself came to be filed in 1973. Therefore, stronger proof would be required. In the absence of any collusion being pleaded between D1 and D4 it follows that unless they are examined to prove the passing of the consideration, the plea that they are supported by a legal necessity cannot be accepted. Neither S.V. Gopalakrishnan v. Venugopal 1, is a case which related to Avyavaharika debt and it does not help, in any way, to advance the case of the appellants. 19. It is somewhat surprising that Ex. B16 sale has been made after the suit. That prima facie establishes how indiscriminate the father has been in selling these properties. 20. No doubt, the learned Advocate General says that P.W.1 has signed Ex. B13 as an attestor. But in so far as Ex. B13 does not show the purpose of borrowing excepting to state that for family expenses. I do not think the mere signing of the document as an attestor would, in any, be of any help to the appellants. This is on the assumption that the attestor is P.W.1 while there is a dispute whether N. Mani, S/o. Muthuramalinga gounder. Veerapandi otherwise called Muthuramalinga is the same person as P.W.1. As to when exactly an attestation is binding can be gathered from Ethirajammal v. G. Lakshmi Devi 2. In paragraph 21, the following observations are found:— “Reliance was placed on the attestation of the 1st defendant in Ex.B1, which is a partition deed executed between defendants 2 and 3 on 31st May, 1963. In her evidence she has accepted having attested the document and also having known about the 2nd and third defendants effecting a partition of the suit properties as between themselves. The point to be considered is whether the attestation by the 1st defendant can be taken as an admission of hers that the property belonged only to defendants 2 and 3. The point to be considered is whether the attestation by the 1st defendant can be taken as an admission of hers that the property belonged only to defendants 2 and 3. It is necessary to bear in mind the fact that Ex D1, has been given a go-by by all the parties at the time when they entered into the compromise arrangement as a result of which the plaintiff and the third defendant got one half of the properties divided between them equally If it did not bind the others, it could not be held to be binding on a mere attestor. If really Ex.B1 is to hold the field, then the third defendant would be entitled to one half of the properties and the plaintiff would not have any right in any property. The document itself has not been considered to embody a proper arrangement. Further, there was no issue on the question as to whether her attestation of Ex.B1 could be taken as an admission. Though there are cases which lay down that it is the commonest thing in this country for attestation to be obtained from persons having a possible interest in the property with the object of binding them later on, still in the present case, in the absence of any issue as such on this question, I do not think it possible to accept the respondents submission that the 1st defendant must be taken as bound by her attestation. In fact, if there was such an issue, then there would have been some scope for leading evidence on this point. Though she has declared that she knew that the document was, I do not think that she gave up her right in the property merely by making the attestation in a document. A release or abandonment would have to be a conscious act, and cannot be readily inferred especially in the case of an uneducated lady who had no means of independent advice. Her own latter conduct shows that she did not give up any right by attesting Ex.B1.” The above decision clearly establishes that the abandonment of the right must be a conscious act and therefore, that attestation could not constitute an estoppel in this case. There is yet another factor that Exs. B13 and B14 are sales by D4 in favour of D5. There is yet another factor that Exs. B13 and B14 are sales by D4 in favour of D5. They do not even say that the properties were purchased from the 1st defendant, father of P.W.1 Nachimuthu and at least then P.W.1 got apprised as to the property belonging to their family. For all these reasons, I conclude that the court below was right in setting aside the alienation under Ex. A4 holding that the sale is not valid and binding as far as the plaintiffs share is concerned. 21. I shall now take up question No. (ii). The attack on Exs. A1 and B2 is contained in paragraph 5 of the plaint to the following effect: “The Schedule B properties of A-3. 37 cents was sold by the 1st defendant and his brother to 2nd defendant by two sale deeds dated 25-5-1955 for Rs. 5,000 and dated 15-9-1958 for Rs. 2,400 copies of both sale deeds are filed herewith. In the sale of 25-5-1955, an extent of A-3.17cents and in the sale of 15-9 1958 an extent of A.O.20 cents have been sold. Both properties are in the heart of Tiruppur town and easily fetch Rs. 1,000 (Rupees one thousand only) and more per cent. They have been sold for an i nadequate and low price and without any necessity. The consideration amounts of Rs. 5,000 and Rs. 2,500 have been alleged to have been paid in cash. The so called pronote debt to A. Muthuswami chettiar mentioned in the sale of 25-5-1955 is a false one which never existed. Even if true, the said debt must have been borrowed only for the AVYAVAHARIKA purpose by first defendant and hence not binding on the plaintiffs. Since the sales have been effected on behalf of the minor son or minor sons then in exist ence, it is necessary and just that the two sale deeds may be cancelled or set aside as against the plaintiffs and a partition and separate possession of their 2/6 shares granted to them.” No doubt, here also the case of avyavaharika set up by the plaintiffs has been disbelieved. In Ex. A1, the property that is sold is an extent of 3.17 acres for a sum of Rs. 5,000 in favour of the second defendant. In Ex. B2 which comes to be just after three years on 15-9-1958, a sum of Rs. In Ex. A1, the property that is sold is an extent of 3.17 acres for a sum of Rs. 5,000 in favour of the second defendant. In Ex. B2 which comes to be just after three years on 15-9-1958, a sum of Rs. 2,400 is paid for an extent of 20 cents. The purchaser here also is the second defendant. Why there is such a huge disparity has not been explained excepting the alinee stating merely because it was contiguous to his lands he gave a fancy price. This apart, in Ex. A1, neither Muthusami is examined nor again a promissory note in favour of Muthusami is produced. The evidence of D.W.1 in this regard is as follows:—“No doubt, I purchased Ex. B2 property by paying a greater value to the lands covered by Ex. B2. Exs. A1 and B2 properties are dry lands. There will not be a proper income and the income will be only Rs. 100. per annum. As regards enquiries about the existence of debts, all that he states is that he came to know from Nachimuthu gounder that there were debts payable by the first defendant. In cross examination, he candidly admits that he does not know the debts due to chettiar. All that be knew was that it was due under a promissory note. He does not remember the name of the chettiar. He further admits that he had discharged the loan in favour of that chettiar mentioned in Ex. A1. This clearly shows that there is not even a minimum enquiry which is required on the part of the vendee. It is no doubt true that the vendee need not trace the sale consideration as to how it was expanded. But in this case, there is absolutely nothing to show that even a minimum enquiry was made by the vendee. The court below states in paragraph 27 of the judgment, dealing with these sale deeds. “It may be that Ex. A1 price if compared to Ex. B2 price was low. But he have to take into consideration what was the will prevailing rate in 1955 in that locality and what was the condition in which the 1st defendants family was at that time as to whether they had enough surplus, so that he had to need to sell the property at that price of Rs. 5,000.” With regard to Ex. But he have to take into consideration what was the will prevailing rate in 1955 in that locality and what was the condition in which the 1st defendants family was at that time as to whether they had enough surplus, so that he had to need to sell the property at that price of Rs. 5,000.” With regard to Ex. B2 sale it is held by the learned Subordinate Judge in paragraph 31 of his judgment, “But it is worth while to note that it is the admission of the plaintiffs in the plaint that till 1965 the entire family income of B Schedule properties could have been only Rs. 3,200. If that is so, after the sale under Ex. A1 that portion of the income which Ex. A1 property was yielding was not there. Therefore the necessity to raise funds for meeting the family expenses or the agricultural expenses or to meet the debts With regard to agricultural expenses would have continued even in 1958. Even in 1958 it has not been shown that the income from the property had increased and that there was no need for his family to borrow money or sell lands to make both the ends meet or to meet the agricultural expenses”. I am afraid this finding cannot be supported at all because it was not the case of anybody. The learned Subordinate Judge seems to have thought out a case in favour of the alienee. Once it is found that deft the itself was in existence has not been validly proved and that not even Muthuswami che ttiar is examined, worse still the promissory note in favour of Muthuswami chettiar has not been produced in this case, in this connection, 1 should not fail to state that in Ex. B2 there is not even a recital about the necessity for sale. In that, the recital matters much. Even that formal recital being absent, it is impossible to hold that this alienation is valid. 22. Turning to Exs. B11 and B12, here the properties are sold in favour of the third defendant. In neither of these sale deeds there is any recital as to the necessity for selling these properties. In that, the recital matters much. Even that formal recital being absent, it is impossible to hold that this alienation is valid. 22. Turning to Exs. B11 and B12, here the properties are sold in favour of the third defendant. In neither of these sale deeds there is any recital as to the necessity for selling these properties. The learned Subordinate Judge states as follows in paragraph 40 of his judgment: “It is no doubt true that Ex B11 does not recite any existence of debt or that the sale was for the discharge of antecedent debts or for family necessity. It is also spoken to by D.W 3 that the 1st defendant utilised the consideration under Exs. B11 and A3 for the family expenses and for bringing up his children. He also says that he made enquiries at the time of Exs.B11 and A3 whether this Nachimuthu gounder had necessity to alienate the property and that he learnt that the family was suffering from want of funds and so his wife purchased. This bonafide enquiry can be upheld because P.W.1 has spoken to the fact that his family all along is suffering from want of funds. It is admitted by P.W.1 at page 13 that at the time of Ex.B11 his family was suffering from want of funds. So far Exs.B11 and A3 are concerned it must be held that the alienation is supported by bonafide enquiries as to the existence of the necessity and the probability of the same”. Here again, it is impossible to support the reasoning of the learned judge because a debt must not only be antecedent in fact but also antecedent in time. The existence of such a debt has not been proved in this case at all. As regards the enquiry stated to have been made by the vendee, he candidly admits in cross-examination that he does not know to whom all the vendor owed and what were the debts out-standing. All that he states is that the vendor said there were a few sundry debts. That, in my considered view, cannot be held to be bona fide enquirey. Therefore, the learned Subordinate Judge has erred on this aspect seriously. Rightly, the learned counsel for the appellants in this case, namely the plaintiffs, presses into service Prasad v. V. Govindaswamy Mudaliar 1. That, in my considered view, cannot be held to be bona fide enquirey. Therefore, the learned Subordinate Judge has erred on this aspect seriously. Rightly, the learned counsel for the appellants in this case, namely the plaintiffs, presses into service Prasad v. V. Govindaswamy Mudaliar 1. At paragraph 63 of the judgment therein the following observations are found; “There is, however, another condition which must be satisfied before the son could be held liable, i.e., that the father or the manager acted like the prudent man and did not sacrifice the property for an inadequate consideration,” In Dudhnath v. Sat Narain Ram 1, a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court observed (at p. 318). “In order to uphold an alienation of a joint Hindu family property by the father or the manager it is not only necessary to prove that there was legal necessity but also that the father or the manager acted like a prudent man and did not sacrifice the property for an inadequate consideration. A Hindu father or a manager of a joint Hindu family in expected to act prudently, However great the necessity may be, if the joint family property is sacrificed for an inadequate consideration it would be highly imprudent transaction and it would be a case where, though for necessity, the father or the guardian has not acted for the benefit of the estate or the members of the joint Hindu family. The father or the manager is not the sole owner of the property. In fact until the partition takes place even his share does not stand demarcated. The ownership vests in all the coparceners taken together as a unit, the father and the manager, therefore, only represent the co-parceners. Consequently the co-parceners stand bound by the act of the father or the manager of the family only to the extent the act is prudent or for the benefit of the co-parceners or the estate.” “In the instant case on the finding arrived at that the consideration for the sale deed Ex.B5 was thoroughly indequate the sale cannot be upheld.” Tested in the light of this, I find here is a case wherein repeated alienations are made. I think the first defendant acted like a prudent man. By these alienations he did not sacrifice the interests of the other co-parceners for an inadequate consideration. That evidence is totally lacking in this case. I think the first defendant acted like a prudent man. By these alienations he did not sacrifice the interests of the other co-parceners for an inadequate consideration. That evidence is totally lacking in this case. I may, in this connection, mention, under Ex. B11 the endorsement of payment of Rs. 3.000 before the Sub Registrar is found but not the Rs. 400 mentioned under Ex. B12. I think neither Rama Rao v. Venkata Subbayya 2, nor Sathappan Ambalam v. Vadivelu 3, could advance the case of the respondents alienees because I have categorically found that the legal necessity has not been proved. The appellants have not made bona fide enquiry against the existence of the debts. There has not been a formal recital in the various sale deeds as to the purpose of alienation. 23. In N.R. Raghavachariars Hindu Law, Volume I, paragraph 295, it is stated as follows: “The burden of proof is always on the alienee, and in order that a debt or an alienation of joint family property by the manager may be upheld as against the other members of the family, the alienee has got to prove either that a necessity existed for the loan or alienation or that he enquired into the necessity for the transaction and that he satisfied himself as well as he could that the manager was acting in the particular instance for the benefit or necessity of the estate. And for this the representations made by the borrower or the alienor are evidence which can be used to corroborate the recitals in the deed.” It requires to be noted, I have already referred to the testimony of D.W.3 who is not really the alienee but his wife is the alienee under Ex.B11 where even he had admitted that he did not make enquiry as to the existence of the debts as to whom all Nachimuthu owed. Therefore, this passage is of no help to the third defendant alienee. In view of this, differing from the trial court, I have to set aside these alienations as well. Of course, in so far as no serious argument was addressed en Ex.A5, I leave that as it is. Therefore, this passage is of no help to the third defendant alienee. In view of this, differing from the trial court, I have to set aside these alienations as well. Of course, in so far as no serious argument was addressed en Ex.A5, I leave that as it is. The result of it will be that the declaration grated by the court below in favour of the plaintiffs will mean that the alienations under Exs.A1, B2, B11 and B12 must be held to be not binding as far as the plaintiffs shares are concerned. As to how their rights will have to be worked out, it is necessary to refer to Mullas Hindu Law, Fifteenth Edition. At page 353, in paragraph 5 it is stated thus: “The share to which an alienee is entitled on partition is the share which the aliener was entitled at the date of alienation, and not at the date when the alienee seeks to reduce his interest into possession.” In the light of this, the equities, if any, shall be worked out in favour of the alienees during the final decree proceedings. 24. In the result, A.S. No. 267 of 1979 will stand dismissed with costs while A.S. 1058/79 will stand allowed with costs.