Judgment S.S.SANDHAWALIA, J. 1. Whether the benefit of exemption from court-fee Co the financially weaker section of litigants) as a step in the legal aid admissible under Government notification No.S.O.1207 dt. 19th Aug. 1981 can be defeated by clubbing together of the individual incomes of the co-plaintiffs of a suit, is the significant question which has necessitated the reference of these two connected civil revisions to the Division Bench. 2. The facts are not in dispute and may be briefly noticed from SK. Mohammad Osaid and others V/s. Sk. Abdul Wahid and others (C.R.380/83). The three petitioners had preferred a title suit for a decree of possession. seeking the eviction of the defendants and for mesne profits pendente lite and other ancillary reliefs. Therein they filed a petition in the trial court seeking exemption for the payment of court-fee in the suit on the ground that the individual income of each of the co-plaintiffs did not exceed Rs. 4000.00 only and they were, therefore, entitled to the benefit of the exemption under Notification No.S.O.1207 dt. the 19th Aug. 1981. They also filed certificates of their income granted by the Anchal Adhikari, Dhaka, in support of their claim. These certificates indicated that the incomes of petitioners Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were Rs. 2700/-, Rs.2600.00 and Rs. 2500.00 only respectively. This application was, however, rejected by the learned Subordinate Judge (vide order dt. 5th of Feb. 1983) wherein he patently took the view that the incomes of all the three petitioners were to be clubbed together and since the total would come to more than Rs. 4000/-, they would not be entitled to the benefit of exemption. He accordingly directed the petitioners to file the court-fee by the 16th Feb. 1983. 3. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners have come up by way of these civil revisions. They came up originally before my learned Brother. A.K. Sinha, J., sitting singly. Noticing that the point involved was one of great public importance, which needed an authoritative decision, the matter has been referred to the Division Bench. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners forcefully projected his submission that the statutory provisions applicable do not warrant the clubbing of the income of all the co-plaintiffs for the purpose of giving the benefit of exemption from court-fee. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners forcefully projected his submission that the statutory provisions applicable do not warrant the clubbing of the income of all the co-plaintiffs for the purpose of giving the benefit of exemption from court-fee. It was contended that the income of the individual plaintiff alone has to be considered and the mere fact that because of the jointness of the cause of action the suit has been brought together, is irrelevant for the grant or refusal of the benefit to such exemption. 5. Herein the issue has to be inevitably examined against the backdrop of the recent development of social consciousness for providing legal aid to the traditionally weaker as also financially poorer sections of the society in order to ensure that they are not denied access to justice. The larger concept of legal aid has now come to be so well accepted that it would be unnecessary to elaborate the same, For our purpose it would suffice to mention that within this jurisdiction a statutory scheme for providing legal aid was promulgated as Bihar State Legal Aid Scheme. 1981 (hereinafter to be referred to as the "Scheme1. Para 21 Chap. VII of the Scheme in terms provides as follow :- Persons eligible for aid "Legal aid or advice may be given to all persons who are bona fide residents of the State of Bihar and whose total annual income from all sources, whether in cash or in kind or partly in cash and partly in kind, does not exceed rupees 4,000: Provided that the limitations as to annual income shall not apply to persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and landless persons." 6. It would appear that the provision aforesaid and the Scheme were given formal legal shape by the promulgation of the Ordinance in 1982. Later on the same has been given final legislative sanction by the Bihar State Weaker Section Legal Aid Act, 1983 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). It would appear that the provision aforesaid and the Scheme were given formal legal shape by the promulgation of the Ordinance in 1982. Later on the same has been given final legislative sanction by the Bihar State Weaker Section Legal Aid Act, 1983 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). Therein S. 17 which corresponds to the earlier paragraph 21 of the Scheme is enacted in the terms following : Persons eligible for aid : "Legal aid or advice may be given to persons who are bona fide residents of the State of Bihar and whose total annual income from all sources, whether in cash or in kind, does not exceed rupees 5,000/- Provided that the limitation as to annual income shall not apply to infirm persons or persons belonging to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe and landless persons." 7. It was common ground before us that the notification which calls for construction was issued prior to the Ordinance and the Act. Reference therein to persons eligible for aid has obvious and patent connection with para 21 of (he Scheme. Since the whole controversy turns on the language of the notification, and Para 21 of the Scheme it becomes necessary to notice the same in extenso : "Notification under Court-fees Act the 19th August, 1981 S.O. 1207 - In exercise of the powers conferred by S. 35 of the Court-fees Act, 1870 (VII of 1870) in its application for the State of Bihar, the Governor of Bihar, is pleased to make (he remissions hereinafter set forth namely : (1) To remit the Court-fee, Process Fee and Vakalatnama fee for persons belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Landless Persons and such other persons whose annual income does not exceed Rs.4,000.00 (Rupees four thousand) who are eligible for legal aid in the entire State in accordance with sec. 3 of Bihar Act 20 of 1977, the Court-fees (Bihar Amendment) Act, 1977. By order of the Governor of Bihar, B. K. Singh, Spl. Secy." 8. 3 of Bihar Act 20 of 1977, the Court-fees (Bihar Amendment) Act, 1977. By order of the Governor of Bihar, B. K. Singh, Spl. Secy." 8. In view of the somewhat plain language of the notification and the mosaic of the statutory provisions granting legal aid in which it stands embedded, we had called upon the respondent-State to clarify its stand with regard to the basic issue which falls for adjudication, namely, whether the income of the co-plaintiffs is to be clubbed for the purpose of the exemption of court-fee therein or whether the benefit should accrue to them on the basis of their individual income. Somewhat surprisingly a constricted stance was sought to be taken on behalf of the Stale by its learned counsel to the effect that the income of the co-plaintiffs must be clubbed and not to be considered separately. To buttress this stand Mr. C. K, Sinha learned counsel for the respondent-State attempted to contend that the court-fee being a mailer affecting the revenue of the State, must be construed strictly and in cases of doubt where two constructions are possible: one in favour of the State should be adopted. This submission, apart from being unacceptable, seems to be directly contrary to the binding observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court. This matter seems to have been amply set at rest in the case of Diwan Brothers V/s. Central Bank of India, Bombay, AIR 1976 SC 1503 as p.1508 with the following observations :- "Even apart from these considerations, it is well settled that in case of a fiscal statute the provisions must be strictly interpreted giving every benefit of doubt to the subject and lightening as far as possible the burden of court-fees on the litigant. Thus where an adjudication given by a Tribunal could fall within two provisions of the Court-fees Act, one of which was onerous for the litigant and the other more liberal, the Court would apply that provision which was beneficial to the litigant." 9. Now as a necessary corollary to his main submission Mr. C. K. Sinha, had also contended that wherever exemption from court-fee was granted by the State in its largesse, the same must again be narrowly construed and be titled in favour of the State. Once the binding observations above are noticed, this corollary must also fall along with the main theorem. C. K. Sinha, had also contended that wherever exemption from court-fee was granted by the State in its largesse, the same must again be narrowly construed and be titled in favour of the State. Once the binding observations above are noticed, this corollary must also fall along with the main theorem. This, apart, the submission is also rebutted by direct precedent in the case of Mohanlal Gangully V/s. State of West Bengal, AIR 1978 Cal 12 wherein it has been observed as under :- "Beneficial construction in the present context is sought to be made by putting a curb on the fiscal statute and in favour of exemption. It is an accepted proposition that where an exemption is conferred by a statute by an exemption clause, that clause is to be interpreted liberally and in favour of the assessee but, of course, it must always be without involving any variance to the language used." 10. In fairness to Mr. C. K. Sinha if must also be noticed that he repeatedly harped on his fears that the claim of exemption must be a bona fide one and the provision should not be abused by litigants for the purpose of evading court-fee and depriving the State of its fair revenue. Now it is axiomatic that the factual basis of the claim for exemption must be well established. But herein there is no doubt which is even remotely raised with regard to the income duly certified for each individual co-plaintiffs. The court below was not even remotely sceptical of the individual income of the co-plaintiffs, but having accepted the same has proceeded on the basis of arithmetically adding them up for holding that the income of all the three co-plaintiffs would exceed the sum of Rs. 4000.00 prescribed by law. I may observe that in the revisional jurisdiction it is hardly apt and there appears not the least ground to enter in the thicket of controversy with regard to the factual aspect of the income of each co-plaintiffs as assessed. Equally, I may notice the well known canon of construction that the mere fact that a provision may be capable of abuse is no ground for deviating from its plain language and the basic norms of interpretation therefor. Indeed, as has been often said, there can hardly be a provision which is not capable of misuse in cleverly manipulating hands. Equally, I may notice the well known canon of construction that the mere fact that a provision may be capable of abuse is no ground for deviating from its plain language and the basic norms of interpretation therefor. Indeed, as has been often said, there can hardly be a provision which is not capable of misuse in cleverly manipulating hands. But that is a factor irrelevant to the issue of the construction of a statute. 11. With the aforesaid background one may now proceed to analyse para 21 of the Scheme, along with the notification issued thereunder to effectuate the said purpose. It is plain that the benefit sought to be given herein is to four distinct classes; (i) Members of Scheduled Castes, (ii) Members of Scheduled Tribes, (iii) Landless persons and (iv) Persons whose total income from all sources does not exceed Rs. 4000/-. From the proviso to para 21 it is plain that as regards the first three classes the income qualification is irrelevant; that is to say that even though a specific person belongs to Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes or landless persons is having an income above Rs. 4000.00 per annum, he is nevertheless entitled to the benefit of exemption. This is apparently on the ground of the traditional backwardness of these castes and classes. The somewhat modernistic concept of affording similar benefit to the financially weaker persons who live below the poverty line is effected by the newly added class IV with the income qualification of Rs. 4000/-. The plain object of the framers herein is that the person belonging to this class of financially weaker section, irrespective of caste or religion should have an identical benefit of legal aid and consequent exemption from the payment of court-fee for the basic right of access to justice. Once a person comes within the said ambit there seems to be no reason to deny him the benefit because of the fortuitous circumstance that he may have a joint cause of action with other co-plaintiffs with the consequential result that the total of the income of all of them may swell above Rs. 4000/-. Once a person comes within the said ambit there seems to be no reason to deny him the benefit because of the fortuitous circumstance that he may have a joint cause of action with other co-plaintiffs with the consequential result that the total of the income of all of them may swell above Rs. 4000/-. It had to be conceded before us that because of the proviso to paragraph 21 even though a hundred persons belonging to the Scheduled Caste or the Scheduled Tribe or the class of landless persons were to join together as co-plaintiffs, they would not be denied the benefit of the exemption irrespective of the total income of all of the co-plaintiffs. No rationale could be pointed out which, on the other hand, would justify that in the identical situation such a denial should take place with regard to the IVth class of economically weaker persons having an income of less than Rs. 4000.00 merely because they happen to be co-plaintiffs. 12. The issue deserves examination from another angle as well. It is plain that if one of the co-plaintiffs was to bring the suit individually and his income is below the prescribed limit, he would be obviously entitled to the benefit of exemption. The end result would be that if all the three co-plaintiffs herein were to bring their respective suits separately, each would be within the qualification for exemption. It is well known that the law wishes to frown on multiplicity of proceedings and, in terms provides for, and permits, joinder of causes of action. There seems no reason that for merely bringing a joint suit on a joint cause of action within the spirit of the rule of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings, the co-plaintiffs should be penalised and denied the right to claim exemption from court-fee liberally extended to them by a beneficent piece of legislation to advance the directive principles of providing legal aid to the citizens. 13. Lastly, reference to the preamble of the Act is also not less instructive. 13. Lastly, reference to the preamble of the Act is also not less instructive. This is in the following term :- "An Act to execute directive principles of the Constitution of India, to extend free legal aid to the weaker section of society and to save them from being deprived of the opportunity of getting justice owing to their economical, social and other inequalities." It is plain from the above that the whole object is to advance the avowed purpose of providing legal aid to the weaker section of the society with specific reference to the economic inequalities, apart from the ethnic and social ones. Therefore the provisions of the notification along with paragraph 21 of the Scheme (which again closely corresponds to S.17 of the Act) must be read in a manner which advances the larger purpose and does not frustrate the same. It would be evident that if a somewhat hypertechnical stand sought to be taken on behalf of the State were to be accepted then the very purpose of the liberal grant of legal aid and exemption of court-fee to the economically weaker section of the litigant would be defeated by the mere accident of such person having a joint cause of action and his suing jointly. In consequence, it is well settled that such an interpretation is not to be easily acceded to. 14 To conclude the answer to the question posed at the outset is rendered in the negative and it is held that the individual income of the co-plaintiffs cannot be clubbed together to deny them the benefit of exemption of court fee under the relevant statutory provisions for the grant of legal aid. 15. Now applying the above, it is plain that the court below did not remotely doubt the certificates of income granted by the Anchal Adhikari with regard to the individual income of the petitioners. It merely added up the income of the three co-plaintiffs to hold that the same was more than the limit of Rs.4000.00 only. This it was not entitled to do. The order under revision is, therefore, plainly not sustainable and is hereby set aside and the revision petition No. 380 of 1983 is allowed with costs. 16. For identical reasons, Civil Revision No. 381 of 1983. is allowed, with costs. A.K.SINHA, J. 17 I agree.